Category: Uncategorized
Tuesday assorted links
Monday assorted links
1. Where do the great American comedians hail from?
2. General thoughts on biosafety.
3. “Violet Hensley Dies at 109; Ozarks Fiddler Made Opry Debut at 99” (NYT). She also handcrafted 73 fiddles, appeared on The Beverly Hillbillies, and considered bluegrass too modern for her. She had nine children as well.
4. Which campaiging politicians are using AI the most, and other issues?
6. Tommy John, RIP (NYT).
7. China is hoping to influence the AIs through data supply (NYT).
What should I ask Roman Mars?
Yes I will be doing a Conversation with him. Most of all he is obsessed with design, here is Wikipedia:
Roman Mars is an American radio producer. He is the host and producer of 99% Invisible, a KALW radio show and podcast, and a founder of the podcast collective Radiotopia, which he describes as efforts “to broaden the radio landscape [and] make shows that aren’t bound by conventions” of public radio in the United States. In 2020, he co-authored the New York Times best seller The 99% Invisible City with Kurt Kohlstedt…Mars, with Elizabeth Joh, also hosts the podcast What Roman Mars Can Learn About Con Law.
His TED talk on city flags is a good introduction to his thought.
So what should I ask him?
What I’ve been reading
1. Gerald Martin, Mario Vargas Llosa: A Life. A good book if you wish to read about his strange sex life, starting early in his years. But if you are more interested in the history of ideas, Peruvian politics, or the development of the Latin American novel it is far less compelling. So for me a disappointment.
2. Sean Mathews, The New Byzantines: The Rise of Greece and Return of the Near East. A consistently interesting look at Greece, the Ottoman roots in the area, the radical changes brought by the early 20th century, and Greece’s relations with Israel, among other topics. The book has the virtue of “trying to explain how things actually are,” sadly not the case for all works.
3. Simon Morrison, The Love & Wars of Lina Prokofiev. More suspense and interest for me than any biography of Prokofiev I have read. I had not known that she grew up in Brooklyn. I am happy to recommend Morrison’s books more generally.
4. Emily Wilson, Crossing the Wine-Dark Sea: Journeys through Ancient Literature. Wilson has become a controversial figure for a variety of not-so-merited reasons, but the simpler truth is this. She is a superior intellectual presence and mind, so you should be reading what she writes, no matter what your stances. My two favorite essays in this volume were the one on Logue’s War Music, and the closing piece on translations of The Odyssey.
5. Munir Hachemi, The Mulai. A somewhat loopy but intriguing science fiction story, broadly in the direction of Ursula LeGuin. I am not sure what to think, but definitely will keep on reading.
Things you cannot buy in America?
3. Exterior roller shutters (Rollladen)
In much of Europe, homes feature heavy shutters integrated into the exterior of the window, enabling total blackout and better insulation. Sleeping in true, complete darkness—not “blackout curtain” darkness, but can’t-see-your-hand darkness—is an experience most Americans will never have. These shutters are nearly impossible to get in the USA because these shutters are built directly into the home during its construction. They are fundamentally incompatible with standard American wood-frame, siding, and drywall construction, meaning there is no domestic supply chain to support them, even if you built a house to fit them.
From Daniel Frank, here is the full piece, noting I am not convinced you cannot get a “grass roof,” among other items mentioned. In any case an interesting list, file under “possibly thwarted markets in everything.” Via Anecdotal.
Sunday assorted links
Adolfo Bioy Casares delay
My Amazon shipment is postponed from this fall until April 11, 2028 (!).
Will it ever come?
Of course this is the fantastic, and long, Bioy Cesares book Borges, his memoir of their friendship.
How can the reoptimization both be so distant and so exact in timing?
Saturday assorted links
1. Speculative Chinese claims about Alzheimer’s.
2. Very interesting Anthropic piece on why multi-agentic systems seem to show more herd behavior and collusion than human systems. And a comment from Rune Kvist.
3. Cross-cultural data on masculinity.
4. The Griers on the performance of Modi relative to synthetic controls.
A Conservative Case for Liberal Immigration
That is the title of my latest Free Press piece, here is one excerpt:
Or look at the AI revolution, another area where America is leading the world and also using its AI models to exert soft power. Dario Amodei of Anthropic has an Italian father, neural-network pioneer Geoffrey Hinton is originally from the U.K., and Elon Musk and Peter Thiel, who helped initially fund and found OpenAI, are from South Africa and Germany, respectively. OpenAI co-founder Wojciech Zaremba is from Poland. Musk and Thiel, of course, have other achievements to their credit as well. A significant portion of the employees at the major labs are Chinese. In one survey of published AI researchers, 38 percent received their undergraduate education in China, and 72 percent of those are working in the U.S.
Recommended, do read the whole thing.
That was then, this is now
I very much like the new Michael Khodarkovsky book The Steppe and its Empires: The Russian Empire & its Eurasian Counterparts. Excerpt:
Russia presented the most remarkable contrast to both Eurasian and Western empires. The oower of Moscovite tsars and Russian emperors seemed to be completely unconstrained by moral or ethical boundaries. Whereas religious authorities in Europe, the Islamic world, and Cjhina kept some distance from the state and had a degree of independence from the rulers, in Russia the Orthodox Church was fully behind the autocratic powers of the tsars. Ivan III was the first to adopt the title samoderzhets (a calque of a title of Byzantine emperors, literally “autocrat” in Greek), which he used in the sense of a “sovereign” ruler. It took another half century before his grandson, Ivan IV, began to use the title to signal his exceptional, universal, and unrestrained power.
And:
To begin with, each Eurasian ruler conceived of himself as the sovereign of a universal, not natinoal, empire. Such a ruler was non plus ultra; confident in his superiority over other religious or political bodies, he was destined to rule the world, if not politically, at least rhetorically, an autocrat whose subjects’ servile condition was a natural state.
Seen through the prism of a universal monarchy, the Eurasian imperial vision blurred the separation between metropolis and periphery, between the peoples within and outside the empire’s boundaries, between servitude and slavery. Whether they were elites or commoners, all were considered to be in personal servitude to an emperor and often referred to by a term interchangeable with slave.
Consequently, Eurasian societies did not develop either the notions or the institutions that could enshrine the idea of freedom…
The concept of universal monarchy allowed for little differentiation between internal and external territories.
Recommended.
Friday assorted links
1. What sort of maths are LLMs good at?
2. “People think the superrich are unhappy,” she said. “They’re not.” (NYT)
3. Trailer for a Celibadache biopic.
4. Good Joshua Saxe post on the need for a better cybersecurity policy.
5. Refine goes to work on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. At some point we will be reexamining everything, good luck people.
6. A semi-consistent EA view that nuclear energy is bad (not my view though).
7. Updated AI and labor market results, and a summary here.
Regulated Markets Are Slow to Handle Change
Gowrisankaran, Langer and Reguant have an excellent paper, Energy Transitions in Regulated Markets (WP), in the latest AER.
The basic idea is that regulation designed to prevent utilities from building useless power plants can induce them to keep obsolete power plants. Some background. We regulated electric utilities under the theory that they were natural monopolies and therefore we would do better by pushing their prices down. What’s a reasonable price? Hard to say, so regulated utilities were allowed to recoup their operating costs plus a fair return on their “rate base”—their capital stock. Makes sense, but once profits depended on the size of the capital stock, utilities had an incentive to build too much—the classic Averch–Johnson effect. Regulators responded with “prudence” requirements and the rule that capital must be “used and useful.” In a stable world, that rule is a check, albeit an imperfect check, on so-called gold-plating.
But now consider what happens in a time of technological change, such as a rapid decrease in the cost of generating electricity with natural gas (driven by fracking and improvements in combined-cycle natural-gas (CCNG) technology). In a free market, large decreases in costs would cause firms to abandon coal and move to natural gas—some would do this to make profits, others to avoid losses. In short, the market forces sunk investments to be abandoned when not profitable.
But there is another possibility under regulation. Tell the regulator that your plants are still viable. Well, telling is cheap talk so you keep burning coal to prove that the plant remains useful. If you can keep your base operating that’s better than abandoning it and to signal how valuable your coal plant still is, it may even be worth while to burn coal when the cost exceeds the price of electricity! The authors have some nice data on exactly this point.
Figure 3 takes a little work to understand, but the pattern is clear. Each point represents a state. In panel A, the vertical axis shows how much less likely a coal plant is to run when the cost of coal exceeds the price of electricity. Obviously, a strongly negative coefficient is the economically sensible response: when burning coal is more expensive than buying electricity, the plant should burn less.
The red points represent restructured states and the green points regulated states. In restructured states coal burning falls when prices fall, just as expected. Coal burning in regulated states responds much less. (I.e., the red points generally lie below the green points.) Indeed, the six states with the largest reductions in coal operation are all restructured states.
One objection to this analysis might be that utilities in general are just slow to respond to prices, so on the horizontal axis the authors plot how well utilities respond to a higher price of gas. Note that these coefficients are all negative and there is no obvious difference between regulated and restructured states. In both types of states, utilities respond well to the price of gas, but only in restructured states do utilities respond strongly to the price of coal. (Why coal and not gas? Because the used-and-useful standard binds on capital whose usefulness is in doubt—which, once gas got cheap, meant coal. In other words, the utilities have to defend coal to the regulators, not gas.)
Panel B on the right shows a slightly different way of presenting the same data. The vertical axis is again how much less likely a coal plant is to run when its cost exceeds the electricity price. The horizontal axis is the fraction of generation owned by electric utilities. Regulated states tend to be vertically integrated, while restructured states opened electricity generation to competition, so utility ownership and regulatory status are closely correlated. Regulated states generally have utility ownership above 60%, while all the restructured states but one are below 30%. The best-fit line slopes upward: in other words, the more generation a state’s utilities own, the less coal dispatch responds to price. A different perspective on the same story.

That is the direct empirical evidence. The authors then construct a more ambitious structural model. In theory, regulation could produce either too much or too little investment in the new technology; their estimates imply too much. Much, too much. Not only do regulated utilities retain too much coal, they also build too much gas capacity. In short, they accumulate both too much old capital and too much new capital. Averch–Johnson on steroids.
The bottom line is that regulation under dynamic conditions is much more difficult than under static conditions. My view is that it may not even be worth the candle.
The Economics of a Shrinking World
From Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick:
As of 2026, humanity is likely below replacement fertility. That has never happened before, not in wars or pandemics. But the real surprise is that the fall has been concentrated in low- and middle-income countries and among poorer and less educated women. We fit a single-factor model to 236 countries since 1950: the common component peaked in 1978, and what drives fertility down today are country-specific trends, 219 of them negative and not one leveling off. None of the commonly cited mechanisms can account for this pattern, so we offer a conjecture: modernity itself, which makes a third child expensive and childlessness cheap. Children come in integers, so it takes very little to move a cohort’s fertility rate from 1.8 to 1.3. And nothing in an economy pushes fertility back to 2.1. We close with the main economic consequences, in particular slow growth.
When I read “The estimated common factor peaks in 1978 and has been declining since.” I do think of birth control, however, albeit with lags. The actual availability of birth control, all economic and social constraints considered, is a lot more fraught and difficult than some of the more superficial accounts might indicate.
Intergenerational mobility of immigrants in 15 destination countries
We estimate intergenerational mobility of children of immigrants in fifteen receiving countries. Children of immigrants have somewhat lower income than children of local-born parents. Around half of this gap can be explained by differences in parental income, with the remainder due to differences in mobility parameters. The daughters of immigrants enjoy higher absolute mobility than daughters of locals in most destinations. Absolute mobility of sons of immigrants is higher outside Europe and lower in Europe compared to sons of locals. Cross-country differences in absolute mobility are not driven by parental country-of-origin, but instead by destination labor markets and immigration policy.
Here is the paper, by Leah Boustan, et.al. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
Thursday assorted links
2. Saloni on the future of medicine. “Every disease is a policy failure.”
3. John List on generalizability, very important. And his comments here.