Results for “interest rates risk fed” 68 found
Robert B. Wilson, Nobel Laureate
Here is his home page. He has been at Stanford Business School since 1964, and born in Geneva, Nebraska. Here is his personal website. Here is his Wikipedia page. He has a doctorate in business administration from Harvard, but actually no economics Ph.D. (bravo!) Here is the Nobel designation.
Most of all Wilson is an economic theorist, doing much of his most influential work in or around the 1980s. He is a little hard to google (no, he did not work with Philip Glass), but here are his best-cited papers. To be clear, he won mainly for his work in auction theory and practice, covered by Alex here. But here is some information about the rest of his highly illustrious career.
He and David Kreps wrote a very famous paper about deterrence. Basically an incumbent wishes to develop a reputation for being tough with potential entrants, so as to keep them out of the market. This was one of the most influential papers of the 1980s, and it also helped to revive some of the potential intellectual case for antitrust activism. Here is Wilson’s survey article on strategic approaches to entry deterrence.
Wilson has a famous paper with Kreps, Milgrom, and Roberts. They show how a multi-period prisoner’s dilemma might sustain cooperating rather than “Finking” if there is asymmetric information about types and behavior. This paper increased estimates of the stability of tit-for-tat strategies, if only because with uncertainty you might end up in a highly rewarding loop of ongoing cooperation. This combination of authors is referred to as the “Gang of Four,” given their common interests at the time and some common ties to Stanford.
His 1982 piece with David Kreps on “sequential equilibria” was oh so influential on game theory, here is the abstract:
We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten’s perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players’ strategies be sequentially rational: Every decision must be part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the game. This entails specification of players’ beliefs concerning how the game has evolved for each information set, including information sets off the equilibrium path. The properties of sequential equilibria are developed; in particular, we study the topological structure of the set of sequential equilibria. The connections with Selten’s trembling-hand perfect equilibria are given.
Here is a more readable exposition of the idea. This was part of a major effort to figure out how people actually would play in games, and which kinds of solution concepts economists should put into their models. I don’t think the matter ever was settled, and arguably it has been superseded by behavioral and computational and evolutionary approaches, but Wilson was part of the peak period of applying pure theory to this problem and this might have been the most important theory piece in that whole tradition.
From Wikipedia:
Wilson’s paper “The Theory of the Syndicates,”JSTOR 1909607 which was published in Econometrica in 1968 influenced a whole generation of students from economics, finance, and accounting. The paper poses a fundamental question: Under what conditions does the expected utility representation describe the behavior of a group of individuals who choose lotteries and share risk in a Pareto-optimal way?
Link here, this was a contribution to social choice theory and fed into Oliver Hart’s later work on when shareholder unanimity for a corporation would hold. It also connects to the later Milgrom work, some of it with Wilson, on when people will agree about the value of assets.
Here is Wilson’s book on non-linear pricing: “What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing.” Yes, he is a business school guy. Here is his survey article on electric power pricing, a whole separate direction of his research.
Here is his 1989 law review article about Pennzoil vs. Texaco, with Robert H. Mnookin.
Wilson also did a piece with Gul and Sonnenschein, laying out the different implications of various game-theoretic conjectures for the Coase conjecture, namely the claim that a durable goods monopolist will end up having to sell at competitive prices, due to the patience of consumers and their unwillingness to buy at higher prices.
Wilson was the dissertation advisor of Alvin E. Roth, Nobel Laureate, and here the two interview each other, recommended. Excerpt:
Wilson: As an MBA student in 1960, I wrote a class report on how to bid in an auction that got a failing grade because it was not “managerial.”
And here is an Alvin Roth blog post on the prize and the intellectual lineage.
The bottom line? If you are a theorist, Stockholm is telling you to build up some practical applications — at the very least pull something out of your closet and sell it on eBay! A lot of people thought Roberts and maybe Kreps would be in on this Prize, but they are not. The selections themselves are clearly deserving and have been “in play” for many years in the Nobel discussions. But again, we see the committee drawing clear and distinct lines.
Let’s see what they do next year!
Are central banks manipulating asset prices?
That case still needs to be made, here is Cullen Roche:
1) Are Central Banks “pushing money” on people?
The whole premise of the first paragraph is that Central Banks have implemented QE and forced money onto people which has resulted in a lot of asset chasing.¹ I’ve never understood this mentality to be honest. When the Fed engages in QE they expand their balance sheet and buy a bond from the private sector. In a low inflation environment bonds become increasingly similar to cash so these sellers of bonds are selling one cash-like instrument for another. As a result, the private sector ends up holding more low interest bearing cash-like instruments and the Fed holds higher interest bearing cash-like instruments. So the whole basis of this theory is that if someone who was already holding a risk averse asset then sells that risk averse asset for something very similar then they will suddenly become less risk averse and run out and drive up stocks? That doesn’t even make sense. If I have a moderate risk tolerance and hold a portfolio of 50% bonds and 50% stocks and I want to sell my bonds because I read a scary article about how bonds are super risky because interest rates are going to rise (more on this later) then I will swap out some part of my 50% bonds for cash or something else that’s relatively low risk (to maintain my moderate risk profile). I don’t swap out my whole bond position for a stock position or a role of the dice at the roulette wheel.
Anyhow, the evidence doesn’t even mesh with this. Global Central Banks have been implementing QE for 10 years now. The average annual return of the Vanguard Total World Index is 8.9% per year over that period. That is 0.02% higher than the average 35 year return. So, if investors are acting crazy today then they’ve been crazy for 35 years. Which might be true. It’s probably true. I actually think investors are usually kind of crazy. But they’re not any crazier today than they were 35 years ago.
Sensible throughout.
The Nanny Tax and the Miracle of Government Loaves
Before it descends into utter madness, Leslie Forde’s Slate article on Nanny pay opens with a good story:
“I’m sorry … but I can’t,” she told me over the phone. My heart sank. I was confident she’d take the job. Quickly, I went into negotiation mode, “But wait, can we talk about the pay? Do you need more to … ” She said no before I could finish. “I just can’t take a job (that pays) over the table. It’ll mess up my housing. I won’t be able to stay in my apartment. I’m sorry. I’ve already taken another job.” I ended the call. …my entire career was at risk because I couldn’t find a nanny—at least, one willing to be paid legally.
It’s estimated that less than 10 percent of 2 million domestic workers and the families who employ them pay employment taxes.
From that opening I was expecting the author to explain that nannies aren’t willing to work on the books because at the bottom of the income scale income is taxed twice–first by Federal and State direct taxes and second indirectly because higher income causes workers to lose benefits. As a result of this double taxation, in some states it’s possible for poor workers to face effective marginal tax rates above 100 percent. If you had to pay to work, would you work?
High marginal taxes rates on the poor are a problem. We ought to be able to agree on that, even if we disagree on proposals to address the problem such as a universal basic income or a negative income tax. But in Forde’s magical world, up is down and down is up and the problem is that taxes on the poor are too low. But not to worry because this presents a hidden opportunity!
There is, however, a hidden opportunity to provide help to our caregivers and the families who employ them. Right now, these under-the-table arrangements are creating a “tax gap”—billions of dollars in additional funding that would be available to support caregivers, if the majority of families and their caregivers paid into the system.
Did you get that? If nannies were taxed the government would have more money to provide nannies with benefits. Wait, it gets worse. According to Forde, we can make both families and nannies better off by giving them back the money the government takes and still have money left over!
The estimated “gap” from the lost tax revenue is a combination of the federal and state employment taxes typically paid by employees (Social Security, Medicare, and income taxes) and employers (in addition to Social Security and Medicare, they must pay federal and state unemployment taxes.) Imagine if just a portion of this revenue were used to reimburse families for more of their child care expenses and to provide caregivers access to better benefits than they get currently with their under-the-table jobs. (italics added, AT)
Indeed, wouldn’t it be nice to live in a world of pure imagination? One without tradeoffs. Where we could rely on the miracle of government loaves to solve all problems?
How tight is monetary policy now?, and some remarks on ngdp and market monetarism
I say “not that tight,” while leaving room open for the possibility that it should be looser.
What metrics might we look at? Federal funds futures no longer expect imminent further rate hikes from the Fed. Expected rates of price inflation have been very close to two percent. No matter what you think about the structural component of labor supply, cyclical unemployment has recovered a great deal over the last few years. And that is through the period of “taper talk” of almost two years ago. Consumer spending is doing OK, not spectacular but not cut off at the knees. And while in very recent times price expectations are headed downwards away from two percent, this seems to stem from negative real shocks, to which the Fed has responded passively (perhaps unwisely). That’s different than the Fed tightening. There was a quarter point rate hike from December, which is a small tightening for sure, but I don’t see much more than that.
So in sum, those data do not suggest severe monetary tightness, though again I am open to the argument that monetary policy should be looser.
By the way, I agree with Scott Sumner that we should not equate low interest rates with loose money. Tight and loose money are multi-dimensional, cluster concepts, especially post-2008, and require reference to a variety of variables. And if you are wondering, from this list of Lars Christensen monetary policy indicators I accept only #2, at least in a 2016 global setting where other real economies are volatile.
Given that I don’t see monetary policy as so tight right now, I suggested that if we have a recession it was likely to be a risk premium recession. The big uptick in gold prices is consistent with this view, though hardly proof of it.
So what is the context here? I am worried that if the United States has a recession this year (still unlikely, in my view, but maybe 20%?), that recession will be blamed on “tight money.”
To get more specific yet, I am very much a fan of the ngdp rule approach to monetary policy, but I am uncomfortable with one strand in market monetarist thought. I worry when low ngdp growth is blamed for low growth rates of real gdp.
Ngdp is an accounting summation, so I still want to know the real cause of the slower growth in real gdp. Let’s unpack at the most basic level whether the active cause was Fed tightening on the nominal side, or instead a negative real shock, followed perhaps by excess Fed passivity. That is one reason why I think of it as information-destroying to cite ngdp as a cause of developments in rgdp.
More fundamentally, if a central bank is doing anything close to price inflation targeting, mentioning low ngdp and low real gdp growth rates is simply citing the same fact twice, or almost so, rather than explaining one variable with the other. Angus once called the ngdp invocation a tautology; I’m not sure that is the right terminology, but still I wish to look for independent, non-ngdp measures of monetary policy when deciding how to allocate the blame for a recession, to real or nominal factors.
For further context, I was disquieted by some recent Lars Christensen posts on monetary policy and the American economy. I read him as “revving up” to blame a possible recession on tight U.S. monetary policy. I don’t think he provides much evidence that money is tight enough to cause a recession, other than citing the deterioration of some real variables.
I would encourage market monetarists to define — now — how tight or loose monetary policy really is. Then stick with that assessment, based on whatever variables you consulted.
A year from now, I won’t count it if you say a) “well, ngdp growth is down, money was tight, therefore real gdp growth rates fell. Tight money must have been the problem because low rates of ngdp growth are tight money.”
I would count it if you say something like b): “the dollar shock [or some other factor] was worse than the Fed had thought. That started to push us into recession. The Fed should have loosened, but they didn’t, and so the slide into recession continued, when the Fed could have moderated it somewhat by pursuing an ngdp target.” (By the way, read Gavyn Davies on the strong dollar issue. Alternatively, here is a Marcus Nunes take which I think is citing ngdp in exactly the way I am worried about.)
I also would count it if you said “I see the Fed tightening a lot right now, a recession is likely coming,” although I might dispute your evidence for that tightening.
Here is a recent Scott Sumner post, mostly about me. It’s basically taking the other side of what I have been arguing, and I would suggest simply disaggregating the ngdp terminology into a more causal language of nominal and real shocks. Surely there are other independent, ex ante signs for judging the tightness of monetary policy, rather than waiting for ngdp figures to come in, which again is citing a transform of the real gdp growth rate as a way of explaining real gdp.
I find these issues come up many, many times in market monetarist writings. I think they have basically the right policy prescription, and could provide the world with billions or maybe even trillions of dollars of value, if only policymakers would listen. But I also think they are foisting a language of causality on the business cycle problem which the rest of economic discourse does not easily absorb, and which smushes together real and nominal shocks into a lower-information accounting variable, namely ngdp, and then elevating that variable into a not entirely deserved causal role. We ought to talk in terms of ex ante, independent measures of monetary policy looseness, not ex post measures which closely resemble indirect transforms of real gdp itself.
That, in a nutshell is why, although I usually agree with the market monetarists on policy, and their desire to lower the status of “hard money” doctrine within liberalism, and while I have long applauded and supported their efforts, I don’t call myself a market monetarist per se.
Addendum: Nick Rowe comments. And Marcus Nunes comments.
What is the anti-austerity recommendation for Brazil?
At 70% of GDP, public debt is worryingly large for a middle-income country and rising fast. Because of high interest rates, the cost of servicing it is a crushing 7% of GDP. The Central Bank cannot easily use monetary policy to fight inflation, currently 10.5%, as higher rates risk destabilising the public finances even more by adding to the interest bill. Brazil therefore has little choice but to raise taxes and cut spending.
Too often, at the popular level, there is a confusion between “austerity is bad” and “the consequences of running out of money are bad.”
Sophisticated analysts of fiscal policy do not make this mistake.
By the way, here is a long study of how Brazilian fiscal policy has been excessively pro-cyclical (pdf).
And how is Brazilian output doing you may wonder?:
By the end of 2016 Brazil’s economy may be 8% smaller than it was in the first quarter of 2014, when it last saw growth; GDP per person could be down by a fifth since its peak in 2010, which is not as bad as the situation in Greece, but not far off. Two ratings agencies have demoted Brazilian debt to junk status. Joaquim Levy, who was appointed as finance minister last January with a mandate to cut the deficit, quit in December. Any country where it is hard to tell the difference between the inflation rate—which has edged into double digits—and the president’s approval rating—currently 12%, having dipped into single figures—has serious problems.
Don’t forget this:
Since the constitution’s enactment, federal outlays have nearly doubled to 18% of GDP; total public spending is over 40%. Some 90% of the federal budget is ring-fenced either by the constitution or by legislation. Constitutionally protected pensions alone now swallow 11.6% of GDP, a higher proportion than in Japan, whose citizens are a great deal older. By 2014 the government was running a primary deficit (ie, before interest payments) of 32.5 billion reais ($13.9 billion) (see chart).
Brazilian commodity prices have fallen 41% since their 2011 peak, so I say Ed Prescott has earned his Nobel Prize right there.
The first underlying article/op-Ed also is from The Economist. Without intending any slight to their other recent issues, the January 2-8 issue is one of their best in a long time. I am very pleased to have bought it in advance at the airport rather than waiting to get to my copy back at home.
Does the Obamacare mandate actually make people better off?
Here is my latest NYT Upshot column, on the topic of the Affordable Care Act. Here is what is to me the key excerpt:
But there is another way of looking at it, one used in traditional economics, which focuses on how much people are willing to pay as an indication of their real preferences. Using this measure, if everyone covered by the insurance mandate were to buy health insurance as the law dictated, more than half of them would be worse off.
This may seem startling. But in an economic study, researchers measured such preferences by looking at data known as market demand curves. Practically speaking, these demand curves implied that individuals would rather take some risk with their health — and spend their money on other things — partly because they knew that even without insurance they still would receive some health care. These were the findings of a provocative National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, “The Price of Responsibility: The Impact of Health Reform on Non-Poor Uninsureds” by Mark Pauly, Adam Leive, and Scott Harrington; the authors are at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
One implication is that the preferences of many people subject to the insurance mandate are likely to become more negative in the months ahead. For those without subsidies, federal officials estimate, the cost of insurance policies is likely to increase by an average of another 7.5 percent; even more in states like Oklahoma and Mississippi. The individuals who are likely losers from the mandate have incomes 250 percent or more above the federal poverty level ($11,770 for a single person, more for larger families), the paper said. They are by no means the poorest Americans, but many of them are not wealthy, either. So the Affordable Care Act may not be as egalitarian as it might look initially, once we take this perspective into account.
I should stress that, at this point, I don’t see any realistic alternative to trying to improve ACA. Still, I find it distressing how infrequently this problem is acknowledged or dealt with, probably from a mix of epistemic closure, a “health insurance simply has to make people better off” attitude, and a dose of “let’s not give any ammunition to the enemy.” In fact, I think a lot of Democratic-leaning economists and commentators are doing a real disservice to their own causes on this one.
It’s worth noting that Kentucky, one of the best-functioning ACA state exchanges, just elected a Republican governor who very explicitly pledged to tank the current set-up as much as possible, Medicaid too. I think it’s time to admit this is not just Tea Party activism or Hee Haw political stupidity, rather a large number of the people subject to the mandate simply are not better off as would be judged by their own preferences. And that is not a secondary problem of Obamacare, it is a primary problem.
Interestingly, I found the NYT reader comments on my piece to be fairly supportive, which is not always the case. There’s a good deal of “this happened to me, too,” and not so much raw invective about whatever defects I may have.
I think it is a big mistake to argue Obamacare is on the verge of collapse, or whatever other exaggeration of the day may be at hand. Still, I don’t find the current set-up of the exchanges to be entirely stable, at least not in terms of ongoing popularity, much less consumer sovereignty.
A key question is what happens moving forward. One option, which I had not initially expected, is for the exchanges to narrow and evolve into an expanded version of some of the earlier plans for a segregated high-risk pool. In that case, the argument would morph from “don’t worry, enough people will sign up for the exchanges” into “the welfare effects here are still positive, because fortunately not everyone signs up for the exchanges.” The high risk pool would then at some point require additional subsidies. In the past, I argued that the penalties for not signing up were too low, but under this scenario it may be desirable to lower rather than raise those penalties.
We’ll see. The piece covers other issues as well, do read the whole thing.
Here is Megan on the costs of ACA plans. Here are some interesting calculations from Jed Graham.
I worry about the carry trade
Remember, in a global economy with multiple currencies, or an economy with lots of price variation, the notion of a single “real interest rate” is tricky. The standard Fisherian story implies real interest rate near-neutrality across a wide set of expected monetary policy decisions. Say expected inflation goes up, the nominal interest rate goes up, and the real rate stays constant, except for a small liquidity effect.
But that story will not apply across the board. If, for instance, you live and consume in Jakarta, and you do not hold a PPP theory of the exchange rate, as indeed you should not, well, borrowing in dollars just got more expensive in real terms (with complicated qualifiers depending on forward rates which in reality don’t predict future currency movements so well). Or if the Fed lowers nominal rates, your real borrowing rate goes down, maybe by more or less the same percentage amount as the nominal rate went down for the Americans.
And if those Indonesians are optimistic about the performance of their own currency vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, crikey! — their current real interest rates from dollar borrowing appear to be very low indeed. And if we are considering the individuals who hold disproportionate shares of non-USD currencies, almost by definition they are overly optimistic about the non-USD currencies.
And there are yet further complications which the nice weather today prevents me from outlining (what if those Indonesians are the marginal investors and they push around the market price for the Americans?)
All of which makes the Fed’s job much tougher. Here is the latest from Bloomberg:
Since the 2008 financial crisis, companies across emerging markets have been borrowing dollars and converting them into local currencies as part of a massive carry trade. This practice has helped U.S. dollar shadow banking go global as the effects of near-zero U.S. interest rates seep into all corners of the world economy.
That’s the main finding of a new report released Thursday by the Bank for International Settlements, an institution in Basel, Switzerland, known as the central bank for central banks.
The paper, co-authored by Valentina Bruno, a finance professor at American University, and BIS Economic Adviser and Head of Research Hyun Song Shin, serves as a follow-up to a report released by the bank in January that found firms outside the U.S. have borrowed $9 trillion in U.S. dollars, up from $6 trillion before the global financial crisis.
To be sure, we do not know how harmful these practices might be, or not. Here is FT coverage of the same:
By doing so companies become shadow banks, financial intermediaries moving dollars into local economies. Note, manufacturers do not have to explicitly act like hedge fund managers. Simply depositing funds with a local bank will help it to extend credit to other customers, while buying local commercial paper provides funds to domestic businesses.
The realisation prompts further questions. If it becomes more expensive to borrow in dollars, because say China fears prompt less dollar lending, will the corporate carry trade stop? Will it matter if it does?
I simply wish to reiterate that, no matter how many times commentators cite the low rate of price inflation, there are risks on both sides of the Fed’s forthcoming monetary policy decision.
Here is my much earlier post on monetary policy and the carry trade. Beware the too-rapid acceptance of the strict Fisherian equation! Once again, we do not live in a representative agent world and furthermore the multiplicity of agents speak a variety of languages and use a variety of currencies.
The Ferguson Kleptocracy
In Ferguson and the Modern Debtor’s Prison I wrote:
You don’t get $321 in fines and fees and 3 warrants per household from an about-average crime rate. You get numbers like this from bullshit arrests for jaywalking and constant “low level harassment involving traffic stops, court appearances, high fines, and the threat of jail for failure to pay.”
The DOJ report on the Ferguson Police Department verifies this in stunning detail:
Ferguson has allowed its focus on revenue generation to fundamentally compromise the role of Ferguson’s municipal court. The municipal court does not act as a neutral arbiter of the law or a check on unlawful police conduct.
… Our investigation has found overwhelming evidence of minor municipal code violations resulting in multiple arrests, jail time, and payments that exceed the cost of the original ticket many times over. One woman, discussed above, received two parking tickets for a single violation in 2007 that then totaled $151 plus fees. Over seven years later, she still owed Ferguson $541—after already paying $550 in fines and fees, having multiple arrest warrants issued against her, and being arrested and jailed on several occasions.
Predatory fining was incentivized:
FPD has communicated to officers not only that they must focus on bringing in revenue, but that the department has little concern with how officers do this. FPD’s weak systems of supervision, review, and accountability…have sent a potent message to officers that their violations of law and policy will be tolerated, provided that officers continue to be “productive” in making arrests and writing citations. Where officers fail to meet productivity goals, supervisors have been instructed to alter officer assignments or impose discipline.
Excessive, illegal and sometimes criminal force was used routinely:
This culture within FPD influences officer activities in all areas of policing, beyond just ticketing. Officers expect and demand compliance even when they lack legal authority. They are inclined to interpret the exercise of free-speech rights as unlawful disobedience, innocent movements as physical threats, indications of mental or physical illness as belligerence. Police supervisors and leadership do too little to ensure that officers act in accordance with law and policy, and rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints of officer misconduct. The result is a pattern of stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; infringement on free expression, as well as retaliation for protected expression, in violation of the First Amendment; and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Here is one example:
In January 2013, a patrol sergeant stopped an African-American man after he saw the man talk to an individual in a truck and then walk away. The sergeant detained the man, although he did not articulate any reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. When the man declined to answer questions or submit to a frisk—which the sergeant sought to execute despite articulating no reason to believe the man was armed—the sergeant grabbed the man by the belt, drew his ECW [i.e. taser, AT], and ordered the man to comply. The man crossed his arms and objected that he had not done anything wrong. Video captured by the ECW’s built-in camera shows that the man made no aggressive movement toward the officer. The sergeant fired the ECW, applying a five-second cycle of electricity and causing the man to fall to the ground. The sergeant almost immediately applied the ECW again, which he later justified in his report by claiming that the man tried to stand up. The video makes clear, however, that the man never tried to stand—he only writhed in pain on the ground. The video also shows that the sergeant applied the ECW nearly continuously for 20 seconds, longer than represented in his report. The man was charged with Failure to Comply and Resisting Arrest, but no independent criminal violation.
Here is another, especially interesting, example:
While the record demonstrates a pattern of stops that are improper from the beginning, it also exposes encounters that start as constitutionally defensible but quickly cross the line. For example, in the summer of 2012, an officer detained a 32-year-old African-American man who was sitting in his car cooling off after playing basketball. The officer arguably had grounds to stop and question the man, since his windows appeared more deeply tinted than permitted under Ferguson’s code. Without cause, the officer went on to accuse the man of being a pedophile, prohibit the man from using his cell phone, order the man out of his car for a pat-down despite having no reason to believe he was armed, and ask to search his car. When the man refused, citing his constitutional rights, the officer reportedly pointed a gun at his head, and arrested him. The officer charged the man with eight different counts, including making a false declaration for initially providing the short form of his first name (e.g., “Mike” instead of “Michael”) and an address that, although legitimate, differed from the one on his license. The officer also charged the man both with having an expired operator’s license, and with having no operator’s license in possession. The man told us he lost his job as a contractor with the federal government as a result of the charges.
Although the report says the initial stop was constitutionally defensible, the initial stop was also clearly bullshit. “The officer arguably had grounds to stop and question the man, since his windows appeared more deeply tinted than permitted under Ferguson’s code.” Deep tinting!!!
Missouri, like most states, has a window tint law which essentially requires that tinting not be so dark as to impede the ability of the driver to see out of the car. Ok. But why does Ferguson have a window tint law! What this means is that you can be fined for driving through Ferguson for window tinting which is legal in the rest of Missouri. Absurd. Correction: the code appears to be the same as the state code but passed as a municipal ordinance so fines were collected locally. The purpose of the law was simply to extract more blood:
NYTimes: Last year Ferguson drivers paid $12,400 in fines for driving cars with tinted windows. They paid another $4,905 for loud music coming out of their cars.
The abuse in Ferguson shouldn’t really surprise us–this is how most governments behave most of the time. Democracy constrains what governments do but it’s a thin constraint easily capable of being pierced when stressed.
The worst abuses of government happen when an invading gang conquer people of a different race, religion and culture. What happened in Ferguson was similar only the rulers stayed the same and the population of the ruled changed. In 1990 Ferguson was 74% white and 25% black. Just 20 years later the percentages had nearly inverted, 29% white and 67% black. The population of rulers, however, changed more slowly so white rulers found themselves overlording a population that was foreign to them. As a result, democracy broke down and government as usual, banditry and abuse, broke out.
Interview with John Cochrane
There are many interesting bits from the interview, sometimes polemic bits too, here is one excerpt:
EF: What do you think are the biggest barriers to our own economic recovery?
Cochrane: I think we’ve left the point that we can blame generic “demand” deficiencies, after all these years of stagnation. The idea that everything is fundamentally fine with the U.S. economy, except that negative 2 percent real interest rates on short-term Treasuries are choking the supply of credit, seems pretty farfetched to me. This is starting to look like “supply”: a permanent reduction in output and, more troubling, in our long-run growth rate.
This part reminds me of some ideas in my own Risk and Business Cycles:
There is a good macroeconomic story. In a business cycle peak, when your job and business are doing well, you’re willing to take on more risk. You know the returns aren’t going to be great, but where else are you going to invest? And in the bottom of a recession, people recognize that it’s a great buying opportunity, but they can’t afford to take risk.
Another view is that time-varying risk premiums come instead from frictions in the financial system. Many assets are held indirectly. You might like your pension fund to buy more stocks, but they’re worried about their own internal things, or leverage, so they don’t invest more.
A third story is the behavioral idea that people misperceive risk and become over- and under-optimistic. So those are the broad range of stories used to explain the huge time-varying risk premium, but they’re not worked out as solid and well-tested theories yet.
The implications are big. For macroeconomics, the fact of time-varying risk premiums has to change how we think about the fundamental nature of recessions. Time-varying risk premiums say business cycles are about changes in people’s ability and willingness to bear risk. Yet all of macroeconomics still talks about the level of interest rates, not credit spreads, and about the willingness to substitute consumption over time as opposed to the willingness to bear risk. I don’t mean to criticize macro models. Time-varying risk premiums are just technically hard to model. People didn’t really see the need until the financial crisis slapped them in the face.
I’ve long believed the risk premium is the underexplored variable in macroeconomics and finally this is being rectified.
The new “carry trade”?
Loosely regulated non-bank lenders have emerged as among the biggest beneficiaries of the Federal Reserve’s ultra-low interest rates with three specialist categories increasing their assets by almost 60 per cent since the height of the financial crisis.
Such lenders, widely considered part of the “shadow banking” system, have expanded rapidly on the back of investors who are clamouring for the higher returns on offer from financing riskier types of lending.
From the FT, there is more here.
For how long can the carry trade go on?
Here is a rather scary article by @exantefactor, consider it speculative and please use with care, nonetheless I thought it was worth a ponder. Here is one bit:
This QE carry trade nightmare became reality last week, and the Eurodollar pit was ground zero. As carry trade asset prices come under pressure due to rising US real interest rates, investors are forced to sell Eurodollars to hedge higher financing costs and negative gamma exposure. The magnitude of the selling implies that there is a lot of money exposed, but it’s not clear what still needs to unwind.
Last week, there were rumors of bond dealers who were both liquidating MBS inventory and ceasing to bid on these securities until quarter end. There were also accounts of liquidity drying up in the Treasury market. When dealers cease to bid on the assets that collateralize the loans for carry trades, the system is frozen. This is serious.
If you believe the accounts in the media, you would think the Fed believes the move in the front end of the yield curve, including the Eurodollar strip, is a misinterpretation of Fed tightening. The Eurodollar market not only has an interest rate component but also a credit component, and one interpretation of the blow out in the strip is a spike in banking system credit risk.
…Make no mistake about it: Bernanke is blowing up the QE trade he engineered. The question for markets at this juncture is not what assets are exposed to this trade but rather how much capital is exposed and who will take the other side of the unwind. The move in the most liquid part of the rates curve suggests that the position is very deep; the reluctance of dealers to bid on financing collateral suggests the bid is very shallow. Finding a level where that bid/ask comes together is likely to be a very disruptive process, and if history is any guide, the “collateral” damage will be felt around the world.
The full article is here, hat tip goes to Izabella Kaminska. Is “we haven’t been understanding the carry trade” the key to unpacking some otherwise puzzling recent asset price movements?
Are we living in a time of asset bubbles?
Here is one typical complaint about bubbles, from Jesse Eisinger, excerpt:
We are four years into the One Percent’s recovery. Now, we are in Round 3 of quantitative easing, the formal term for the Fed injecting hundreds of billions of dollars into the economy by purchasing longer-term assets like Treasury bonds and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paper. What’s that giving us? Overvalued stocks. Private equity firms racing to buy up Arizona real estate. Junk bond yields at record lows. Ratings shopping on structured financial products.
These are dangerous signs of prebubble activity.
Here is a Krugman rebuttal. I will offer a few points on a series of debates which in general I have stayed away from.
1. I don’t find most predictive discussions of bubbles interesting, while admitting that such claims often will prove in a manner correct ex post. “OK, the price fell, but was it a bubble? I mean was there froth, like on your Frappucino?” Or to quote Eisinger, it might also have been “dangerous signs of prebubble activity” (what happens between the “prebubble” and the “bubble”? The “nascent bubble”? The “midbubble”? The “midnonbubble”?)
2. Good news and improving conditions may well bring more bubbles or greater likelihood of bubbles, but that is hardly reason to dislike good news and improving conditions.
3. Relative to measured real interest rates, stocks look cheap right now. That doesn’t mean they are, but reread #1.
4. No one understands the term structure of interest rates, no matter what they tell you. Reread #1.
5. I don’t see why anything particular about the current state of affairs, at least in the United States, needs to be “unwound.” I sometimes draw a distinction between those of us who have been thinking about interest on reserves since S. Tsiang, Fischer Black, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and those of us who have not.
6. One coherent definition of bubble is that of a hot potato, traded in a world of heterogeneous expectations, but which must ultimately pop, because eventually the price of that asset will consume all of gdp, a bit like those old Tokyo parking spots. Fair enough, but I don’t see that in many asset markets today if any (Bitcoin for a while?).
7. Another coherent definition of a bubble has less to do with a dynamic price path and ongoing resale for gain, but rather there may be a (temporary) segmentation across classes of asset market buyers. The obvious candidate here is that many people and institutions have been frightened into Treasuries and away from almost everything else. That could mean we have a real interest rate bubble, but it also could mean that lots of other assets are undervalued, at least if the liquidity effect defeats the higher real interest rate effect of moving out of Treasuries. (It would be odd to think that a shift of funds out of Treasuries and into stocks would cause stock prices to fall, but perhaps some people fear this.)
I don’t agree with this view, but I do feel I understand it. The most likely “bubble” is then in real interest rates, due to a (temporary?) skewing of the risk premium. That all said, I do not think this should be called a bubble. Changes in the risk premium and “bubbles” have traditionally been considered alternative explanations for asset prices. Reread #1, and reread #4 while you’re at it.
8. Ruchir Sharma made some interesting points yesterday:
Far from fighting off a deluge of foreign capital, leaders from India to South Africa are struggling to attract a greater share of global capital flows in order to fund widening current account deficits. Over the past decade, the foreign exchange reserves of the developing world grew at an average annual rate of 25 per cent, swelling from $570bn in 2000 to $7tn in 2011. But over the past year, the average rate slowed to a crawl of barely 5 per cent.
The idea that money is still flooding emerging markets misses the big picture, which is that global cross-border capital flows are down 60 per cent from their 2008 peak. The largest shares of cross-border capital flows are in bank loans, trade and foreign direct investment, which are slowing worldwide.
9. I expect the real economy over the next twenty years to be more volatile than it was say in the 1990s. In that sense, many current asset market prices may be revised and quite dramatically. Still, I don’t find the bubble category to be so useful in this regard. We really don’t know what is going to happen and that is why the current prices are wrong, not because of a “bubble.”
10. I am probably done blogging about bubbles for a while. Satisfying you was not the goal of this post, but that is in the nature of the subject area, not out of any desire for spite.
Thoughts on how to avoid another Great Depression
This is another excellent Martin Wolf column, read the whole thing. Here is one excerpt:
Before now, I had never really understood how the 1930s could happen. Now I do. All one needs are fragile economies, a rigid monetary regime, intense debate over what must be done, widespread belief that suffering is good, myopic politicians, an inability to co-operate and failure to stay ahead of events. Perhaps the panic will vanish. But investors who are buying bonds at current rates are indicating a deep aversion to the downside risks. Policy makers must eliminate this panic, not stoke it.
I believe people should take more seriously the notion that the ECB will remain hopeless, and that the crisis can only be addressed by some kind of joint US-German-UK-toss-in-the-other-sound-countries radical multilateral move. Which is not to say I am predicting that. But at least in principle, those three countries can get something done and they also have stronger common interests than those across the eurozone, sorry to say.
Just to make the comparison biting, what if we postponed the costly benefits part of ACA for a year (it may be struck down anyway) and send $200 billion directly to Spain and its banks? Is more money needed? Use this as an excuse to get rid of farm subsidies and cut defense spending. Surely the Germans would then chip in too, and perhaps even the Chinese, if we made the donors club sound exclusive and toney enough. Drop hints about various silly islands (not Taiwan).
Have the new QEwhatever driven by purchases of Spanish mortgages. If they keep the money abroad, we lose only the cost of the paper or the electronic bookkeeping entries. If they buy American goods and services with it, consider it QEwhatever as applied to American exports rather than mortgage paper. No liquidity trap there, and the Fed doesn’t itself have to choose which exports to buy. Combine with the Fed’s FX swap facility in some kind of nefarious way, and we can invent four or five new acronyms. And so on. We would still have a long, grinding worldwide recession but perhaps much less of an AD collapse with it.
I understand that Obama may not be the binding constraint here, but is he even thinking about pulling this off? Is he sitting around wishing for it? Is anyone talking to him about these options?
Excess Reserves and Intraday Credit
In my 2008 post, Interpreting the Monetary Base Under the New Monetary Regime, I argued that the massive increase in bank reserves was neither a necessary harbinger of inflation (as people on the right feared) nor a sure sign of a liquidity trap (as people on the left claimed) but rather represented, at least in part, a sensible aspect of the new regime of paying interest on reserves. I wrote:
When no interest was paid on reserves banks tried to hold as few as possible. But during the day the banks needed reserves – of which there were only $40 billion or so – to fund trillions of dollars worth of intraday payments. As a result, there was typically a daily shortage of reserves which the Fed made up for by extending hundreds of billions of dollars worth of daylight credit. Thus, in essence, the banks used to inhale credit during the day – puffing up like a bullfrog – only to exhale at night. (But note that our stats on the monetary base only measured the bullfrog at night.)
Today, the banks are no longer in bullfrog mode. The Fed is paying interest on reserves and they are paying at a rate which is high enough so that the banks have plenty of reserves on hand during the day and they keep those reserves at night. Thus, all that has really happened – as far as the monetary base statistic is concerned – is that we have replaced daylight credit with excess reserves held around the clock.
A post today at Liberty Street Economics, the blog of the New York Federal Reserve illustrates and explains how the excess reserves have reduced transaction costs in the payment system and risk to the Federal Reserve.
The last chart shows the level of intraday credit extended by the Federal Reserve to Fedwire participants, measured as the daily maximum amount extended by the Federal Reserve. There has been a dramatic decline in the amount of credit extended since the expansion of reserve balances in October 2008. The reduced level of daylight credit has the benefit of reducing the risk exposure of Federal Reserve Banks, as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) fund. Indeed, the expected losses to that fund would be greater if some of the assets of a failed bank had been pledged to a Federal Reserve Bank to collateralize a daylight overdraft, as the collateral would not be available to pay other creditors of the bank. With a greater amount of reserves in the system, banks largely “prepay” for their liquidity needs by maintaining large reserve balances with which to fund their outgoing payments.
Bubbles and economic potential and potential gdp
Here is a Krugman post on the question, here are earlier posts from Sumner and Yglesias. I will put my remarks under the fold…This topic is easiest to understand if you sub out the United States and sub in Greece. There is no AD boost that can (anytime soon, without a lot of extra growth kicking in), restore Greece to its previous output peak and its previously expected performance-to-come. Circa 2006, Greece was in an unsustainable position, if for no other reason the market didn’t understand the correct risk premium for Greece. Once the correct risk premium is applied, Greek output falls and furthermore numerous (related) bad events kick in and also a whole set of previous plans are shown to be unsustainable (and no this doesn’t have to be an Austrian argument!). The gap between Greece’s current path, and the path previously envisioned for Greece is thus:
a. part AD gap which can be fixed by AD policy
b. part a difference in risk premia, and for Greece the old risk premium, when the country borrowed at very low rates, was wrong and is gone more or less forever. The concomitant financial and fiscal stability is gone too.
c. part a difference in enthusiasm in supply, based on the differences between earlier expectations that “get rich quick” really does apply to Greece, and the current more pessimistic expectation that “get rich quick” is now unlikely, and thus “smaller-scale, scrabble-around projects just to make ends meet” are the order of the day. DeLong gets at some of this here.
Greece does have to rebuild a) — don’t get sucked into aggregate demand denialism! — but it also has to rebuild b) and c) and perhaps other factors too. This follows rather directly from — dare I breathe the words? — the synthetic real business cycle/neo Keynesian models which form the backbone of contemporary macroeconomics and which Krugman apparently still doesn’t wish to recognize. (To various commentators and other bloggers: when I write macro on this blog I usually take knowledge of these models for granted; if you don’t know those models that is fine, call me arcane, but it doesn’t mean I am the one who is wrong.) Krugman runs through a bunch of weak arguments and responses, and counters them well enough, but he doesn’t see or consider the baseline response that would follow from standard contemporary macro, with the possible exception of his brief parenthetical phrase about credit conditions.
Turning for a moment to broader points, the astute reader will note that in this framework the current sluggishness of recovery need not be evidence for Old Keynesianism. An ineffective response to fiscal policy does not per se have to mean we just didn’t do enough fiscal policy. And so on. Maybe yes, maybe no, but all of a sudden there is a lot more room for agnosticism about macroeconomics and more broadly there is more room for epistemic modesty.
Contra Tim Duy, you can hold this mixed view without wanting to see the Fed raise interest rates. Just avoid the AD denialism.
Krugman defines “potential GDP is a measure of how much the economy can produce” but keep in mind that this quite possibly won’t be a unique number. With what risk premium? With what enthusiasm of supply? See my Risk and Business Cycles for an extended discussion and also numerous citations.
It’s also worth noting that while gdp is a useful “we can all agree upon what to measure” kind of concept, its real meaning is conceptually fairly slippery and “potential gdp” is not likely to be better pinned down at its foundations. Let’s not reify that concept above and beyond what it is worth.
In any case, we can be agnostic about the size of the potential gdp gap with regard to the United States today and indeed my original post very carefully used a question mark in its title. But there is no incoherence to assert that part of the apparent gap is due to the real side. The new learning about America is not about the correct risk premium for our debt (not yet at least), but about our financial fragility, how well our politics responds to crises, some worrying long-term trends in the labor market, possible misreadings of the productivity numbers, and a few other real factors. It really is possible that previous investment plans were based on expectations of the real economy that were wrong and unsustainable and now have been (partially?) corrected, with negative growth penalties looking forward.
Stephen Williamson offers very detailed comment, noting also that the recession started well over four years ago, which gives plenty of time for nominal resets, and we’ve seen no downward cascading spiral, so maybe there is a non-AD problem with getting back on track at the preferred rate. He also eschews AD denialism. Today Krugman has a brief note along the lines that the views of his opponents on these questions are “even worse than your first impression” but that is best thought of as a) his occasional churlishness, and that b) his writings on this topic do not, at least not to date, reflect a very thorough knowledge of the relevant literature(s).