Category: History
Bill Gates reviews Acemoglu and Robinson
He doesn’t like the book so much. Here is his bottom line:
This points to the most obvious theory about growth, which is that it is strongly correlated with embracing capitalistic economics—independent of the political system. When a country focuses on getting infrastructure built and education improved, and it uses market pricing to determine how resources should be allocated, then it moves towards growth. This test has a lot more clarity than the one proposed by the authors, and seems to me fits the facts of what has happened over time far better.
He also objects to the critique of foreign and, and the review closes with this:
As an endnote, I should mention that the book refers to me in a positive light, comparing how I made money to how Carlos Slim made his fortune in Mexico. Although I appreciate the nice thoughts, I think the book is quite unfair to Slim. Almost certainly, the competition laws in Mexico need strengthening, but I am sure that Mexico is much better off with Slim’s contribution in running businesses well than it would be without him.
The pointer is from Jeffrey Sachs.
The more things change…
Malthus argued that redemption of the public debt wold be unwise given England’s economic circumstances, which were characterized by an excess of capital relative to aggregate demand and, consequently, a low rate of profit.
That is from Nancy Churchman, her full piece is here. Referring to the early 19th century, she also writes:
There was broad agreement that the debt had reached a dangerously high level and that action of some sort should be taken to address it.
There is good ‘ol Lord Lauderdale, circa 1803:
He constantly links the welfare of the country with the continuance of a high rate of yield to holders of the public debt.
(Source here, jstor) How about J.B. Say? From Wikipedia:
Say himself advocated public works to remedy unemployment, and criticized Ricardo for neglecting the possibility of hoarding if there was a lack of investment opportunities.
And turning to Ricardo:
Ricardo’s theory of public loans then was based on an emphasis of the fact that the primary burden to the community was derived from the wasteful nature of public expenditure itself rather than from the methods adopted to finance such expenditure.
I like this one from Ricardo, in favor of tax rather than debt finance, from his Essay on the Funding System:
When the pressure of war is felt at once, without mitigation, we shall be less disposed wantonly to engage in an expensive contest.
Ho hum, ho hum. Go back and read the classics, and hang your heads in despair.
As I’ve mentioned, it sometimes feels like we are living in the early 19th century.
Are we living in the early 19th century?
I frequently make this reference in talks, though I can’t recall having blogged it yet.
Here is one report from the front today:
Corporate earnings have risen at an annualized rate of 20.1 percent since the end of 2008, he said, but disposable income inched ahead by 1.4 percent annually over the same period, after adjusting for inflation.
“There hasn’t been a period in the last 50 years where these trends have been so pronounced,” Mr. Maki said.
If we turn to the industrial revolution, what do we see? Relatively high productivity from “restructuring,” (machinery replacing labor) but relatively low productivity from innovation or total factor productivity. Robert C. Allen, in his “Engels’ pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the British industrial revolution” (pdf, the final version is in Explorations in Economic History, 2009) estimates TFP from the time at about 0.69% a year, hardly a stunning number (the number runs in the 2%-3% range for the 1920s and 1930s) and actually that early number is close to what we are seeing today for TFP.
From 1780 to 1840, output per worker rose 46% and the real wage index rose by only about 12%, noting that none of these numbers are close to exact. (Contra Ricardo, the share going to land is declining steadily and capital is capturing the gains.) The significant real wage gains come after 1840 and — in my view — even more after 1870. After 1830 TFP is growing at the higher rate of about 1% a year, still not impressive by the standards of the early 20th century however.
During the early 19th century, there is much creative ferment, but much less in terms of products which translate into gains in living standards for the average person.
By the way, you also have theorists — Malthus, Lauderdale, Chalmers, Attwood, and others — who thought the main problem was simply lack of aggregate demand, which Malthus called effectual demand. They were absolutely right about part of the picture in the short run but missed most of the larger truths.
Eventually all of the creative ferment of the industrial revolution pays off in a big “whoosh,” but it takes many decades, depending on where you draw the starting line of course. A look at the early 19th century is sobering, or should be, for anyone doing fiscal budgeting today. But it is also optimistic in terms of the larger picture facing humanity over the longer run.
Kimchee wars
The popularity of kimch’i in Japan greatly stimulated the South kimch’i processing industry. Ironically, it was Japanese attempts to capitalize on manufacturing kimch’i that inflamed Korean claims to its ‘ownership’. This dispute, commonly known as the ‘Kimch’i‘ War…began in 1996 when Japan proposed designating kimuchi (the Japanese pronunciation of kimch’i) an official Atlantic Olympic food. By then Japanese-Korean trade relations were already under stress due to the fact that Japan had already been involved in exporting the Japanese instant version of kimch’i, which lacked the distinctive flavor from the fermentation process. In response, South Korea filed a case with the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), pat of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, arguing that there was a need to establish an international kimch’i standard.
That is from Cuisine, Colonialism and Cold War: Food in Twentieth Century Korea, by Katarzyna J. Cwiertka. This is an excellent book on Korean-Japanese relations, the early history of Korean industrialization, and the rise of industrial food, as well as the evolution of Korean food in recent times, all rolled into a scant 237 pp. A good author can do wonders…
Napoleon Chagnon and his *Noble Savages*
I started reading Napoleon Chagnon’s Noble Savages: My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes — the Yanomamo and the Anthropologists. The first fifty pages are excellent fun and well-constructed, though I cannot speak to the details of his claims about the frequency of conflict or the motivation of conflict by sexual competition for women. At some point, however, I realized I don’t want to read an entire book on either tribe, at least not at this moment. I am not suggesting that the book gets worse, but my interest did ebb.
I do not have a view about the controversies surrounding Chagnon, and ultimately that is what should decide the merits of this work. Here is Dreger’s systematic defense of Chagnon. Here is a survey of the Chagnon disputes. I wonder if he has ended up with less credibility from having the first name “Napoleon”?
Our obsession with growth rates, by Scott Winship
Many MR readers have asked for commentary on this very interesting piece by Scott Winship. Scott makes a number of points but here is one in particular:
As nations become wealthier, it is harder for them to sustain high rates of growth. That doesn’t mean that the United States is in decline, or even stagnating. When a nation is as rich as ours, it can realize larger absolute gains than it did in the past and larger gains than other nations even if it has lower growth rates. That’s because a growth rate of, say, 2.5 percent represents a larger increase in absolute wealth the richer an economy becomes. In 1900, a 2.5 percent increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita would have translated into about $150 in today’s dollars for every man, woman, and child in the United States. In 2010, it would have been roughly $1,200, reflecting the fact that in the aggregate, we are about eight times wealthier than we were 110 years ago.3 By focusing too much on growth rates and too little on absolute increases in wealth, we have failed to appreciate the magnitude of economic gains in recent decades.
A few remarks in response:
1. First, this is not so far from my own view, for instance Scott cites me as writing: “Life is better and we have more stuff, but the pace of change has slowed down compared to what people saw two or three generations ago.”
2. I still think this — to the extent it is true — is tragic. Just imagine the future potential loss that would result from the disappearance of compound growth. People one hundred years out would be much worse off, relative to exponential growth, and their ability to fix the environment or elevate poor countries to wealth, also will be much lower. In essence economics would be surrendering the gain it won from the victory over Malthus. “Hey, Reverend, you were right, growth will be only an arithmetical progression, not geometric as we had thought from 18?? through to 19??. But you were wrong about one other thing: the populations of many of the best countries in the world are shrinking!” I find that response horrible and depressing, not heartening.
3. Many features of our budgeting, especially from the public sector, rely on exponential rates of economic growth. For better or worse, we are not about to back our way out of those. We also may need exponential growth to pay off the growing power of special interest groups.
4. Most importantly, I think high rates of economic growth will resume, at some (unknown) date in the future. Note that in a very broad data sample, stretching across centuries, rates of growth for the technological leaders are on average rising, as shown by Paul Romer. It was a big deal in the 17th century when England started to manage an average of about one percent growth a year, but today we would call that a kind of stagnation. The Great Stagnation is a temporary slowdown in growth, not the permanent end of new ideas.
Markets in everything (Reborn)
We live in a diverse world:
Reborn culture started around 1990, with people stripping the paint and hair off store-bought vinyl dolls and painstakingly reworking them to be more lifelike. Now some people use kits with doll parts that when assembled are weighted to feel like a real infant when held.
After discovering this movement, Ms. Martinez bought her own doll for research and started exploring the burgeoning subculture, attending conventions, photographing baby-beauty contests, baby showers, owners and artisans.
“In general, most of the women are Anglo, conservative, Christian and right-to-lifers,” Ms. Martinez said. “All of the things that I’m not.”
When Ms. Martinez travels, she will sometimes bring one of her own five reborn dolls to photograph people’s reactions. She prefers to carry them in open bags because she feels uneasy putting them into closed containers, and her suitcases are always searched by airport security if a doll shows up in a scan. This leads to unusual encounters — like when other people in line get upset thinking that a real baby is about to be harmed by X-rays as they pass through security.
The full story, interesting throughout, is here.
Facts about Britain and France and Belgium
Britain’s Royal Air Force now has just a quarter of the number of combat aircraft it had in the 1970s. The Royal Navy has 19 destroyers and frigates, compared with 69 in 1977. The British army is scheduled to shrink to 82,000 soldiers, its smallest size since the Napoleonic wars. In 1990 Britain had 27 submarines (excluding those that carry ballistic missiles) and France had 17. The two countries now have seven and six respectively.
And yet Britain and France are commonly regarded as the only two European countries that still take defence seriously.
That is from Gideon Rachmann. Here is one possibly rude remark:
The Belgians distinguished themselves in the Libyan campaign of 2011. But about 75 per cent of Belgian military spending now goes on personnel – causing one critic to call the Belgian military “an unusually well-armed pension fund”.
Armen Alchian
Armen Alchian has died. Alchian was both clever and wise, an unusual combination. His 1950 paper Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory applied basic insights from evolutionary theory to suggest new approaches to economic ideas. Alchian, particularly with Demsetz, began the analysis of property rights not only what property rights do but how they evolve with changing circumstances (the link goes to Alchian’s entry on this topic in the CEE). Alchian’s textbook with Allen, University Economics which became Exchange and Production, is a classic; never a bestseller among students but avidly read by masters. The Alchian-Allen theorem, sometimes called the third law of demand, continues to bedevil theorists despite its simplicity. I am a fan of his paper Costs and Outputs which generalized some ideas about production and time and inspired Fisher Black. I never met Alchian but have always profited from reading his papers and I was truly grateful and also thrilled when he blurbed my book Entrepreneurial Economics. Fred McChesney has a good appreciation including Alchian’s pioneering event study which was suppressed for national security reasons; Bob Higgs remembers Alchian’s legendary class at UCLA and here is Larry White interviewing William Allen about A Life Among the Econ his memoir of UCLA economics during its glory years.
You can find all of these works and more in Alchian’s Collected Works.
*The Battle of Bretton Woods*
This is an excellent book. The author is Benn Steil and the subtitle is John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order.
If you enjoyed Liaquat Ahamed’s Lords of Finance, and his take on the 1920’s, and you are looking for something comparable on postwar economic reconstruction, this is the place to go.
The book also contains some explosive revelations about White’s work as a Soviet spy, very well documented I might add.
Arrived in my pile
Coolidge, by Amity Shlaes, and
Thomas O. McGarity, Freedom to Harm: The Lasting Legacy of the Laissez Faire Revival.
Perhaps these two authors have some disagreements with each other…
John Darwin’s *Unfinished Empire*
The subtitle is The Global Expansion of Britain. The book received strong reviews in the UK and these are justified. Here is the bottom line: I started it Wednesday, have read parts of it every day, and I am still reading it. There is interesting and fresh material on almost every page. Think of it as a selective history of the building of the British empire.
So far it is my favorite non-fiction book of 2013. Here is one good WSJ review.
Bruce Caldwell emails me
The Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University will be hosting another Summer Institute on the History of Economics this summer, June 2-21. The three week program is sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and is designed primarily for faculty members in economics, other social sciences, and the humanities, though three of the twenty-five slots are reserved for graduate students. Participants will be competitively selected and successful applicants will receive a $2700 stipend for attending, out of which they will pay for their own room and board. Our line-up of discussion leaders is pretty impressive, and includes scholars from economics, political science, and history. The deadline for applying is March 4. More information on the Summer Institute is available at our website, http://hope.econ.duke.edu
This is a superb program and I recommend it heartily.
*Sharing the Prize*
That is the new and much awaited book by Gavin Wright, with the subtitle The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South. Here is one small bit, reflecting some of the book’s main themes:
By the 1930s, labor markets in the South had come to display a distinct “racial wage gap,” supported by systems of vertical workplace segregation. Not only were job categories classified by race, but black wage rates typically peaked about where white pay grades began. These structures persisted through World War II and the 1950s, showing few signs of softening even in the presence of rapid urbanization and industrial employment growth.
Here are some related powerpoints by Wright (pdf). Here is the book’s home page.
*Engineers of Victory*
The author is Paul Kennedy and the subtitle is The Problem Solvers who Turned the Tide in the Second World War. This is an excellent look at the managerial and logistics side of the war. My main regret — not really a criticism — is that the central role of economists was not given more attention. Haven’t you wondered how it was possible that say the American role in the War was started and finished in less than five years’ time? These days it can take that long to design, approve, and build a freeway interchange.
Here is a good review of the book. Here is a useful NYT review.
