Category: Political Science

An Unbalanced Budget Amendment

by  Alex Tabarrok in

The main argument against a balanced budget amendment is that it makes it more difficult to engage in Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The main argument in favor is that without some legal or moral constraint, the ordinary rules of politics will push costs onto unrepresented and unorganized future taxpayers, as Jim Buchanan argued. In order to transcend these arguments I propose an unbalanced budget amendment.

The unbalanced budget amendment is a requirement that in good times the government must run a budget surplus. The virtues of such a rule are that it allows for counter-cylical fiscal policy during a recession. Indeed, it reduces the cost of counter-cyclical fiscal policy because it guarantees a reserve fund for just such emergencies. The unBBA is thus a type of automatic stabilizer of the kind I have argued for before (e.g. here).

A simple version of the unBBA requires surpluses but more generally the rule would be a surplus or a similarly sized reduction from the previous year’s deficit. The size of the required surplus/deficit reduction would be tied to a function of current and recent GDP growth rates.

Notice that while making counter-cyclical fiscal policy easier the unBBA would tend to create budget balance as surpluses in good times were spent in bad times. Thus over a period of time the unBBA has similar results to a BBA. By requiring surpluses (and thus taxes) to be high(er) in good times,however, rather in bad times the unBBA has a lower cost and a better chance of being passed than the BBA.

Overall, an unbalanced budget amendment seems much preferable to a balanced budget amendment.

Econometric papers on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

by  Tyler Cowen in

Ending violent international conflicts requires understanding the causal factors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Israelis and Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence only in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally and implacably violent foe bent on their destruction. Econometric techniques allow us to empirically test the degree to which violence on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side. Prior studies using these methods have argued that Israel reacts strongly to attacks by Palestinians, whereas Palestinian violence is random (i.e., not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). Here we replicate prior findings that Israeli killings of Palestinians increase after Palestinian killings of Israelis, but crucially show further that when nonlethal forms of violence are considered, and when a larger dataset is used, Palestinian violence also reveals a pattern of retaliation: (i) the firing of Palestinian rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and (ii) the probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel. These findings suggest that Israeli military actions against Palestinians lead to escalation rather than incapacitation. Further, they refute the view that Palestinians are uncontingently violent, showing instead that a significant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in response to Israeli behavior. Well-established cognitive biases may lead participants on each side of the conflict to underappreciate the degree to which the other side’s violence is retaliatory, and hence to systematically underestimate their own role in perpetuating the conflict.

That link is here.  One of the researchers, Johannes Haufhofer, has a Ph.d. in economics from the University of Zurich and a Ph.d. in neuroscience from Harvard.  His other papers are here.  Here is one of his recent grants, it looks quite interesting.

For the pointer I thank a loyal MR reader.

“Pick Your Poison: Do Politicians Regulate When They Canʼt Spend?”

by  Tyler Cowen in

From Noel Johnson, Matthew Mitchell, and Steven Yamarik:

We investigate whether laws restricting fiscal policies across U.S. states lead politicians to regulate more instead. We first show that partisan policy outcomes do exist across U.S. states, with Republicans cutting taxes and spending and Democrats raising them. We then demonstrate that these partisan policy outcomes are moderated in states with no-carry restrictions on public deficits. Lastly, we test whether unified Republican or Democratic state governments regulate more when constrained by no-carry restrictions. We find no-carry laws restrict partisan fiscal outcomes but tend to lead to more-partisan regulatory outcomes.

The presentation slides are here.  In my view this is one reason of many why a balanced budget amendment is not a workable path toward fiscal conservatism. 

Is a eurobond a possible solution?

by  Tyler Cowen in

I don’t see how, though I understand the arguments in its favor.  I can imagine a German leader saying to her citizens: “We need to pay this one-time clean-up cost, hold your nose and support it.”  (Actually maybe I can’t imagine that, but that’s another story.)  I cannot imagine such a leader saying “From here on in, we’re in the same boat with them.”  The latter seems to be like too much affiliation for anyone’s comfort, and on the back Greek end the associated long-term fiscal restrictions would rankle to say the least.

Imagine that you had an insolvent relation of uncertain future creditworthiness.  You could either make a one-time transfer of $10,000, to help pay off a debt, or co-sign a mortgage.  Wouldn’t the latter be psychologically harder to do, even if it involved a smaller expected subsidy in real terms?

Are we using tax cuts to make up for declining median household income?

by  Tyler Cowen in

DeptofNumbers reports:

I’ve long wondered what median income would look like after taxes were taken into account and if the structure of Lane’s chart might change given the dynamic nature of tax policy. Bruce Bartlett’s recent post on average tax rates for four-person families pointed out the data I needed to make such a comparison. The Tax Policy Center produces annual average tax rates for four-person families at the median income level. Using their historical data I can back out the growth of after-tax median family income since 1980 (just after GDP per capita and median family income start to diverge) and add that data to the chart that Lane produced.

…The results, though not earth shattering, are interesting. Prior to 2000, both real (i.e. inflation adjusted) median family income and real median family income after taxes grew at about the same rate. Real median family income has actually declined since 2000, but when you look at after-tax dollars received by households it’s been relatively flat. In other words, the median family has been able to avoid a more substantial decline in income by paying somewhat less in taxes. [emphasis added by TC]

There are useful graphs at the link.  This of course is one big reason why raising taxes — or even ceasing to cut them — is an unpopular idea with the American electorate.

Government size and economic growth

by  Tyler Cowen in

I thought the new paper by Andreas Bergh and Magnus Henrekson was both useful and wise:

The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth: (i) that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy, and (ii) that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market-friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by current research.

That is the working paper version, there is a published and gated version in Journal of Economic Surveys.  By the way, here is a new video on economic freedom.

The new Y2K problem?

by  Tyler Cowen in

Felix Salmon writes:

…it’s far from clear that it’s even possible to stop making the 3 million payments that Treasury makes automatically every day. Doing so involves a massive computer-reprogramming effort which I’m sure could not be implemented overnight — and for political reasons nobody is going to get started on such an effort until after all hope is lost for a deal in Congress.

Now that’s what I call government precommitment.  The post is interesting throughout.

Medicare Cost Control?

by  Alex Tabarrok in

Long-time readers will know that I am skeptical of the FDA. Let’s ignore that for the purpose of this post. Now consider the following two quotes.

The FDA recommended unanimously that Avastin no longer be used to treat breast cancer, saying that the risks of the drug far outweighed any benefits.

…”Even though we have anecdotal information, we don’t have evidence that it prolongs survival or improves quality of life,” said Natalie Compagni-Portis, a patient representative and voting member of the FDA panel. In a series of four questions, the six-member panel voted across the board that the clinical trials conducted by Genentech did not provide evidence that Avastin prolonged life for breast cancer patients, nor did it improve their quality of life. The panel also recommended that FDA commissioner Peggy Hamburg should not continue to allow the drug to be used for breast cancer patients.

A strong statement from the FDA. Now compare:

Medicare will continue to cover Avastin for breast cancer treatment even if U.S. Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Peggy Hamburg decides to withdraw Avastin for such use, according to Don McLeod, a spokesman for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid.

“The FDA decision, when it comes, does not affect CMS,” McLeod told Reuters.

How does this make sense? Does CMS have information that runs counter to the FDA’s information? If so, let’s hear it. Or is this just a turf war? What does this say about the prospects for cost control of Medicare?

“It is too soon to tell” — the real story China fact of the day

by  Tyler Cowen in

The impact of the French Revolution? “Too early to say.”

Thus did Zhou Enlai – in responding to questions in the early 1970s about the popular revolt in France almost two centuries earlier – buttress China’s reputation as a far-thinking, patient civilisation.

The former premier’s answer has become a frequently deployed cliché, used as evidence of the sage Chinese ability to think long-term – in contrast to impatient westerners.

The trouble is that Zhou was not referring to the 1789 storming of the Bastille in a discussion with Richard Nixon during the late US president’s pioneering China visit. Zhou’s answer related to events only three years earlier – the 1968 students’ riots in Paris, according to Nixon’s interpreter at the time.

How so?

At a seminar in Washington to mark the publication of Henry Kissinger’s book, On China, Chas Freeman, a retired foreign service officer, sought to correct the long-standing error.

“I distinctly remember the exchange. There was a mis­understanding that was too delicious to invite correction,” said Mr Freeman.

He said Zhou had been confused when asked about the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. “But these were exactly the kinds of terms used by the students to describe what they were up to in 1968 and that is how Zhou understood them.”

But will this revelation diminish the use of this story?  Dare I say it is too soon to tell?  By the way:

The oft-quoted Chinese curse, “May you live in interesting times”, does not exist in China itself, scholars say.

The next Fed nominee

by  Tyler Cowen in

1. Should have spent a lot of time talking to Republicans.

2. When meeting with Ron Paul, the following should come to his mind: “I have great respect for the proponents of hard money and I view them as one reason why America became great again, in the 1980s.  I know you think the minimum wage is worse than we at the Fed do, so please let me bring one argument to your attention.  Unemployment is very high now, perhaps in part because the minimum wage has raised forty percent in the midst of a downturn a few years ago.  But those statists in Congress simply will not vote to lower or abolish the minimum wage, damn them.  We can, however, surreptitiously lower the minimum wage in real terms with a bit of loose monetary policy.  I know you are not with us on this monetary issue, but if you find yourself having to strike a compromise of some kind, at least rest assured that a budge from your side would be liberating millions of lower-income Americans from slavery.  It could get us off the Road to Serfdom.”

The Fed governor doesn’t have to believe that, and may not wish to say exactly that, but a speech of that nature should come rather quickly to his or her mind.  If not, he or she is probably not the right nominee in the first place.  The Fed staff can figure out the rest.

Addendum: Matt Yglesias offers relevant comment.  Alternatively, Felix Salmon may be correct that there is no deal to be made with the Republicans.  In that case, a) Diamond would not have mattered anyway, and b) we still should base the choice upon the scenarios where the choice stands a chance of making a difference.  Furthermore, the Republican reps. do not have the same incentives as the Presidential candidate, so a deal may be possible after all.

When does greater inequality lead to greater redistribution?

by  Tyler Cowen in

Henry Farrell reports:

Noam Lupu and Jonas Pontussen (PDF) have a piece on the relationship between inequality and distribution in the new American Political Science Review. There is a lot of debate about whether the level of economic inequality in society leads to greater or lesser distribution – what Lupu and Pontussen suggest is that the structure of inequality (that is – the more particular relationships between different segments in the income distribution, rather than some summary index) is more important. More particularly they argue that if one tries to hold racial and ethnic cleavages constant, the key factor determining redistribution is the income gap between middle income voters and lower income voters. Where this gap is low, middle class people feel some degree of solidarity with the poor and exhibit what Lupu and Pontussen describe as “parochial altruism.” That is, they are more likely to support income redistribution because they feel that the poor are in some sense, ‘like them.’ When the gap is high, middle class people will have a much weaker sense of solidarity with the poor, and hence be less supportive of redistribution. Lupu and Pontussen suggest that the US is an outlier, with weaker solidarity than the structure of US inequality would suggest. They argue that the explanation for this is straightforward – “it is clearly attributable to the high-concentration of racial-ethnic minorities in the bottom of the income distribution.” More bluntly put – middle class Americans feel less solidarity with the very poor because the very poor are more likely to be black.