Luis Garicano career advice
Take the messy job:
The other option is to go for a messy job, where the output is the product of many different tasks, many of which affect each other.
The head of engineering at a manufacturing plant I know well must decide who to hire, which machines to buy, how to lay them down in the plant, negotiate with the workers and the higher ups the solutions proposed, and mobilise the resources to implement them. That task is extraordinarily hard to automate. Artificial intelligence commoditizes codified knowledge: textbooks, proofs, syntax. But it does not interface in a meaningful way with local knowledge, where a much larger share of the value of messy jobs is created. Even if artificial intelligence excelled at most of the single tasks that make up her job, it could not walk the factory floor to cajole a manager to redesign a production process.
A management consultant whose job consists entirely of producing slide decks is exposed. A consultant who spends half of her time reading the room, building client relationships, and navigating organizational politics has a bundle AI cannot replicate.
Here is the full letter.
Direct and Indirect Effects of Vaccines: Evidence from COVID-19
Sorry people, but the verdict on this one continues to come in:
We estimate direct and indirect vaccine effectiveness and assess how far the infection-reducing externality extends from the vaccinated, a key input to policy decisions. Our empirical strategy uses nearly universal microdata from a single state and relies on the six-month delay between 12- and 11-year-old COVID vaccine eligibility. Vaccination reduces cases by 80 percent, the direct effect. This protection spills over to close contacts, producing a household-level indirect effect about three-fourths as large as the direct effect. However, indirect effects do not extend to schoolmates. Our results highlight vaccine reach as important to consider when designing policy for infectious disease.
That is from American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, by Seth Freedman, Daniel W. Sacks, Kosali Simon, and Coady Wing. So many different methods and papers are pointing in the same direction…
What should I ask Henry Oliver?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. We will focus on our mutual readings of Shakespearer’s Measure for Measure, with Henry taking the lead. But I also will ask him about the value of literature, Jane Austen, Adam Smith, Bleak House, his book on late bloomers, and more.
Here is Henry’s (free) Substack. Here is Henry on Twitter.
So what should I ask him?
Friday assorted links
*Pluribus*
The show is very good, noting that very few television series satisfy me. It is conceptual, philosophical, and multi-sided. Episode two I thought was one of the best TV episodes I have seen. So many of you should try it, noting that at first Episode one feels excessive, implausible, and “too fruity.”
AEA: Honoring Milton Friedman
Looks like a good AEA session on Sunday in Philly:
“Honoring Milton Friedman on his 50th Anniversary of Winning the Nobel Prize”
Mark Skousen: “My Friendly Fights with Milton Friedman”
Jeremy Siegel: “Milton Friedman’s contributions to financial markets and the influence of money on the business cycle.”
James K. Galbraith: “Milton Friedman’s Critique of Keynesian Economics and Fiscal Policy: A Response”
Michael Bordo: “The Future of Monetarism After Friedman: What Works, What Doesn’t.”
Judy Shelton: “Milton Friedman and Robert Mundell: Who Won the Nobel Money Duel?”
To be held Sunday Jan. 4, 8-10 am ET at the Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Grand Ballroom Salon B.
Economic inequality does not equate to poor well-being or mental health
A meta-analysis of 168 studies covering more than 11 million people found no reliable link between economic inequality and well-being or mental health. In other words, living in a place that has large gaps between the rich and poor does not affect these outcomes, with implications for policy.
Here is the Nature link, this claim has been bad science all along.
One bad trend from 2025, diminution of the dollar’s safe haven status
It used to be that if you were worried about the future, you would move into dollars as the safe haven—in finance terms a countercyclical asset, which stays resilient when higher-risk assets fall. But if the United States’ own government and policies are unpredictable, and its economy is volatile, you will look for some other hedges instead. Chaos in the U.S., and particularly in the White House, is pushing investors to find alternatives to the dollar.
And so investment funds have been pouring into the precious metals, boosting their prices. While the current high price of silver reflects many factors, some of them technical and quite specific, the shift in risk attitudes has become pronounced over the last year.
The bottom line is that America is less of a safe haven than it used to be. When President Donald Trump announced his heavy tariff plan on “Liberation Day,” the dollar fell. That’s contrary to ordinary economic theory, which suggests that as Americans send fewer dollars abroad to buy imported goods, the dollar should rise. Traders, though, started to view the United States itself as a source of risk. It felt as if the right thing to do was to run away from the dollar. As a result, the dollar is down nearly 10 percent this year.
Here is more from me at The Free Press.
Thursday assorted links
1. How a research trip to Antarctica deals with time zones (NYT).
3. What kind of books did people buy in 2025? (NYT)
4. Notes on Taiwan.
6. What Shruti has been reading, including about India but not only.
7. On the compute theory of everything.
Dan Wang 2025 letter
Self-recommending, here is the link, here is one excerpt:
People like to make fun of San Francisco for not drinking; well, that works pretty well for me. I enjoy board games and appreciate that it’s easier to find other players. I like SF house parties, where people take off their shoes at the entrance and enter a space in which speech can be heard over music, which feels so much more civilized than descending into a loud bar in New York. It’s easy to fall into a nerdy conversation almost immediately with someone young and earnest. The Bay Area has converged on Asian-American modes of socializing (though it lacks the emphasis on food). I find it charming that a San Francisco home that is poorly furnished and strewn with pizza boxes could be owned by a billionaire who can’t get around to setting up a bed for his mattress.
And:
One of the things I like about the finance industry is that it might be better at encouraging diverse opinions. Portfolio managers want to be right on average, but everyone is wrong three times a day before breakfast. So they relentlessly seek new information sources; consensus is rare, since there are always contrarians betting against the rest of the market. Tech cares less for dissent. Its movements are more herdlike, in which companies and startups chase one big technology at a time. Startups don’t need dissent; they want workers who can grind until the network effects kick in. VCs don’t like dissent, showing again and again that many have thin skins. That contributes to a culture I think of as Silicon Valley’s soft Leninism. When political winds shift, most people fall in line, most prominently this year as many tech voices embraced the right.
Interesting throughout, plus Dan writes about the most memorable books he read in 2025.
Autism Hasn’t Increased
Autism diagnoses have increased but only because of progressively weaker standards for what counts as autism.
The autistic community is a large, growing, and heterogeneous population, and there is a need for improved methods to describe their diverse needs. Measures of adaptive functioning collected through public health surveillance may provide valuable information on functioning and support needs at a population level. We aimed to use adaptive behavior and cognitive scores abstracted from health and educational records to describe trends over time in the population prevalence of autism by adaptive level and co-occurrence of intellectual disability (ID). Using data from the Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network, years 2000 to 2016, we estimated the prevalence of autism per 1000 8-year-old children by four levels of adaptive challenges (moderate to profound, mild, borderline, or none) and by co-occurrence of ID. The prevalence of autism with mild, borderline, or no significant adaptive challenges increased between 2000 and 2016, from 5.1 per 1000 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 4.6–5.5) to 17.6 (95% CI: 17.1–18.1) while the prevalence of autism with moderate to profound challenges decreased slightly, from 1.5 (95% CI: 1.2–1.7) to 1.2 (95% CI: 1.1–1.4). The prevalence increase was greater for autism without co-occurring ID than for autism with co-occurring ID. The increase in autism prevalence between 2000 and 2016 was confined to autism with milder phenotypes. This trend could indicate improved identification of milder forms of autism over time. It is possible that increased access to therapies that improve intellectual and adaptive functioning of children diagnosed with autism also contributed to the trends.
The data is from the US CDC.
Hat tip: Yglesias who draws the correct conclusion:
Study confirms that neither Tylenol nor vaccines is responsible for the rise in autism BECAUSE THERE IS NO RISE IN AUTISM TO EXPLAIN just a change in diagnostic standards.
Earlier Cremieux showed exactly the same thing based on data from Sweden and earlier CDC data.
Happy New Year. This is indeed good news, although oddly it will make some people angry.
My podcast with Neil Joseph
Rrecommended, and we talk about India a good deal. Here is a transcript.
Taxation in a strong AI world
Here is Dwarkesh’s tweet, based on his recent paper with Trammell, raising the issue of whether wealth taxes will become desirable in the future. A few points:
1. I think quality homes in good locations will be extremely valuable. Those could be taxed more. You could call that a wealth tax, but arguably it is closer to a “housing services tax.”
2. You could put higher consumption taxes on items the wealthy purchase to a disproportionate degree. Paintings and yachts, and so on. Tom Holden argues: “In a world in which capital is essentially the only input to production, taxing capital reduces the growth rate of the economy. Whereas at present capital taxes have only level effects. So if anything, capital taxes will become less desirable as the labour share falls.”
3. I think the amount of money spent on health care will go up a lot. And people will live much longer, which will further boost the amount spent on health care. Taxing health care more is the natural way to address fiscal problems. Some people will fly abroad for their knee surgeries, but for a long time most health care will be consumed nearby, even in a strong AI world. If the way we keep the budget sane is to have people die at 95 instead of 97, there may be some positive social externalities from the shorter life spans. We also could use some of that money for birth subsidies.
4. As a more general point, capital will not be a perfect substitute for labor, or anything close to that, anytime soon.
5. Final incidence of the AI revolution is not just about the degree of substability of capital for labor. It is also about supply and demand elasticities in goods and services markets. For instance, to the extent AI makes various services much cheaper, real wages are rising not falling. That may or may not be the dominant effect, but do not assume too quickly that wages simply fall.
5b. It is not an equilibrium for capital to simply “have all the goodies.” Let’s say that Simon Legree, using advanced AI, can produce all the world’s output using a single watt of energy. And no one else with an AI company can produce anything to compete with that (this already sounds implausible, right?). If Simon simply hoards all that output, he has no profit, though I guess he can cure his own case of the common cold. The prices for that output have to fall so it can be purchased by someone else. The nature of the final equilibrium here is unclear, but again do not assume all or even most of the returns will stay with capital. That is almost certainly not the case.
Addendum: Here is some follow-up from Dwarkesh. I think he is talking about a world very different from our own, as there is talk of ownership of galaxies. That said, many other people wish to implement his ideas sooner than that.
Building more will boost labor’s share
This paper argues that the decline in the labor share is not driven by the overall quantity of capital, but by its changing composition. Constructing annual macro data for 16 advanced countries over two centuries, we show that, since 1980, the relative decline in buildings capital and the associated increase in real prices of buildings have reduced the labor share because buildings and labor are complements. The decline in the labor share has been reinforced by the increase in machinery capital and the associated decline of real prices of machinery capital because machinery capital and labor are substitutes. Together, these shifts in capital composition account for a substantial portion of the observed decline in the labor share of income.
Here is the full article by Jacob Kerspien, Jakob Madsen, and Holger Strulik, via tekl.
Wednesday assorted links
1. New data on the economics of LLMs: “Fifth, we estimate preliminary short-run price elasticities just above one, suggesting limited scope for Jevons-Paradox effects.”
2. How much is Germany still using fax machines?
3. Top ten pieces from Works in Progress.
4. MIE claims about Slovenia. Cheap talk, or can this be true?
6. Top economics papers from 2025?
7. The best “best movies of the year” set of lists I have seen.
8. The basics on Sudan. And more ongoing trouble in the Gulf and in East Africa. I hope this is not the big story of the year to come, but fear it may be.