2024 is already an incredible year for cinema
There is:
Poor Things
The Delinquents [Los Delincuentes], from Argentina, tragicomedy.
The Teacher’s Lounge
All of Us Strangers
Anselm 3-D
The Zone of Interest
Of course many of those came out in their respective foreign markets before 2024, but that is not the point. Rather it seems cinema has turned a corner and is vital and original again (though not culturally central?). The best films of 2023 list was very good as well.
The David Network
I am pleased to have spoken at their yearly conference yesterday. If I understand them correctly (here is their web site), it is for elite college students — grad and undergrad — at Harvard, MIT, Stanford and the rest of the Ivies. No other schools. The group is explicitly religious (across religions and denominations) and also right-leaning and explicitly elitist. [Correction: Unlike as previously stated, Robert George of Princeton does not have a leadership role in the group, though he has a speaker role. The Network is run by volunteers.]
Here is the thing — there were about five hundred people at the event. That shocked me. Overall the energy and talent levels in the rooms seemed high.
The group is four years old, and I had never heard of them before, so I am passing this information along. As I’ve said in the past, the most important thinkers of the future will be religious thinkers (and I’m not one of them). Today I am upping my “p” on that prediction.
Addendum: My comments were on higher education, and they were more optimistic than what the other panel members expressed. There is a good chance they will put it on-line.
Will Milei succeed in Argentina?
I give him a 30-40% chance, which is perhaps generous because I am rooting for him. Bryan Caplan, who is more optimistic, offers some analysis and estimates that Milei needs to close a fiscal gap of about five percent of gdp.
I have two major worries. First, if Milei approaches fiscal success, the opposing parties will think long and hard about whether they wish to enable further success. Or will they instead prefer to see the Milei reforms crash and burn for fiscal reasons? I don’t think they know themselves, but the history of politics in Argentina does not give special reason to be super-optimistic here. You don’t have to believe the opposition will deliberately flush their country down the toilet, they just not might be convinced that further fiscal consolidation is needed, even if it is (surely they gotten this wrong a lot in the past).
Second, Argentina has not succeeded in obtaining fiscal stability in the past, not for a long time. I disagree with this passage of Bryan’s:
The monetary and fiscal stabilization is very likely to work. Argentina has faced far worse crises before: The hyperinflations of the 70s to the 90s multiplied prices 100 billion times. That’s like turning a billion dollars into a penny. Yet Argentinians ultimately overcame all these problems and more using the orthodox medicines of monetary restraint and fiscal responsibility. Since even politicians who ideologically opposed these treatments ultimately endured their short-run costs, it is a safe bet that a libertarian economics professor will do the same.
That is a misread of the history. One common tactic, for instance, is to do enough stabilization so that Argentina is “fiscally sound enough” at the peak of a commodity super-cycle. Most recently, that super-cycle has been China buying lots from Argentina (no such positive wave from China will be coming again, not anytime soon at least). When the positive real shocks subside, Argentina goes back into the fiscal hole.
In reality, past reforms never put the country on a sound fiscal footing, even if inflation rates were low for a while.
One scenario for now is that Argentina does enough so that it appears fiscally stable, and the recent discoveries of oil and gas — which will translate into government revenue — kick in to support a temporary status quo. But within ten years the whole thing falls apart again. Even if Milei wants to do more on the fiscal front to get past that point, it is not obvious that either voters or the legislature would support such further moves.
Those are two “pretty likely” scenarios in which Milei fails, and in neither case is it the fault of Milei. As I mentioned above, the chances of success remain below fifty percent.
Boosting fertility by subsidizing child-bearing for *young* women
From Vidya Mahambare:
Several countries have grappled with a longstanding dilemma – how to reverse the trend of falling fertility rates. In 2019, eighty-one countries had fertility rates below the population replacement threshold. The replacement fertility rate, estimated at 2.1 births per woman, represents the level required to sustain a stable population over the long run, assuming mortality and migration remain constant.
Is it now time, at least in some countries, to implement policies targeted at lowering the age at which women have their first child?
Perhaps, yes. Here is why.
While most countries in Europe, Northern America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and China have had low fertility rate for years, India, the most populous country, joined them in 2021. Countries such as Greece, Italy, Japan, and Spain have had very low fertility levels below 1.5 births per woman for decades. South Korea has the lowest fertility rate, with 0.8 births per woman.
Countries have tried several policies to raise the fertility rates, with only sporadic and local success. A commonly adopted measure is maternity leave, paid or unpaid, with job security. Other policies include subsidised childcare, child or family allowances, paid or unpaid paternity leave, flexible or part-time work hours for parents, and tax credits for dependent children.
These measures are appropriate, but miss one point.
The age at which a mother gives birth to her first child can impact her likelihood of having a second child. In several developed countries, the mean age of mothers at the birth of their first child has surpassed or is close to 30 years. Since 2000, many countries have seen the mean age at first birth increase by at least two years. Even in China, reports indicate that the age at which new mothers give birth to their first child now exceeds 30 years in Shanghai.
Until 2010, the largest number of new births in developed countries occurred among mothers aged 25 to 29. Presently, the highest number of first-time mothers falls within the 30-34 age group. Women can and do have successful deliveries in their late thirties and early forties. For many, it is a deliberate decision to start a family late.
The point however, is this – even if a woman desires to reconsider her choice of having a single child, there is less time and inclination to reverse the course if the first childbirth occurs after the mother reaches the age of 30.
Studies often report decreased happiness and life satisfaction during the early stages of parenthood, and younger parents may be unhappier. This is not the same as saying children don’t make parents happy. Parenthood by itself can have a substantial positive effect on life satisfaction but time and monetary cost offsets it. That is why the negative association between fertility and happiness is weaker in countries with higher public support for families.
As parents gain experience and adjust to the demands of parenthood, they may become more adept at managing stress and finding joy in parenthood. They may begin to recognise that loosening the intensive parenting norm relieves stress and raises happiness. Also, recently a study shows that the reported results about the trade-off between happiness and children require strong assumptions about how individuals report happiness and their beliefs about its distribution in society.
Rising female education and employment, women’s delayed entry into the labour market, high monetary and time cost of raising kids, and rising real estate prices have all played a role in declining fertility. In societies where marriage is culturally deemed essential for starting a family, the rising age at marriage and a declining marriage rate also contribute to a postponement in having the first child. For example, In South Korea, a country where only 2% of childbirth is outside marriage, the marriage rate has slid to a record low.
Countries need to contemplate whether they should promote more women having their first child in their twenties. Historically, several countries have had official policies to raise women’s age at marriage and the age at their first child. Is it time to shift gears?
Should countries that aim to boost fertility consider offering increased financial incentives or tax concessions for specific age brackets? Is it time for countries, including Canada and the United States of America, which currently have below-replacement level fertility and lack official policies to influence fertility levels, to initiate strategies aimed at reducing the average age of women with their first child?
Further, several countries facing fertility crises continue to subsidise family planning services directly through public programs or indirectly through non-governmental organisations. Indeed, the option for family planning should be accessible to all adults, but is there a necessity to offer public support for it in countries facing below-replacement-level fertility rates?
A word of caution. The above suggestions do not apply to all countries with fertility rates below the replacement level. An example is India, where the mother’s mean age at first birth is still less than 22 years, with the median age at first marriage less than 20 years in 2019-21 for women in 25-29 age cohort.
What may go wrong with a policy that aims to lower women’s age at first child? Could it be that women would still prefer to have only one child but at a younger age? Yes, that is possible, but that’s no different from today and, hence, not a worse outcome. Would women end up compromising their education and employment? Not really, if we are targeting the whole age group of twenties. Can couples afford to have children 2-3 years earlier than now? That’s tough to answer, but it may be feasible with childcare subsidies and workplace support.
To be clear, child support should be available for women of all ages. Exploring increased incremental support tailored to specific age groups might be worthwhile in a race to raise fertility rates.
Settembrini and the continuing relevance of classical liberalism
Adrian Wooldridge has an excellent Bloomberg column on this topic, promoting the relevance of Thomas Mann, and here is one excerpt:
In the book [Magic Mountain], Castorp falls in with two intellectuals who live in the village of Davos below his sanitorium: an Italian humanist called Lodovico Settembrini and a Jewish-born cosmopolitan called Leo Naphta who is drawn to the Communist revolution and traditional Catholicism. The two men carry on a bitter argument about the relative merits of liberalism and illiberalism that touches on every question that mattered in prewar Europe: nationalism, individualism, fairness, tradition, war, peace, terrorism and so on.
Settembrini mechanically repeats the central tenets of liberalism but doesn’t seem to realize that the world is a very different place from what it was in 1850…Settembrini is like the bulk of today’s liberals — well-meaning but incapable of recognizing that the world of their youth has changed beyond recognition.
My reading of the world, however, is slightly different. I think the Settembrini example, from 1924, shows classical liberalism is still relevant. In 1924, classical liberalism seemed out of touch because the rest of the world was too fascistic, too communist, and too negative, among other problems. Yet at the time the classical liberals were essentially correct, even though Settembrini sounds out of touch.
Because classical liberals continued to carry the torch, we later had another highly successful classical liberal period, something like 1980-2000, though of course you can argue the exact dates.
Perhaps the underlying model is this: classical liberals often seem out of touch, because the world is too negative to respond to their concerns. Most of the time classical liberals are shouting into the well, so to speak. But they need to keep at it. Every now and then a window for liberal change opens, and then the classical liberals have to be ready, which in turn entails many years in the intellectual and ideological wilderness.
When the chaos surrounds, the liberals are no less relevant. The Settembrini character, from 1924, illustrates exactly that. Because he did eventually have his day, though many years later.
Saturday assorted links
1. Did proxenia grants help ancient Greece grow?
2. Bob Lawson tribute to Jim Gwartney.
3. Puffin walking on the cliff in Iceland, other good photos too.
4. “Alphafold found thousands of possible psychedelics.”
5. Daniel Gross on AGI trades?
6. Girardian Papuans, circa 1963 (short video).
7. Nabeel on how to use Twitter. And on Substack.
Miss Information
Miss America, Miss United States and Miss USA are three different people.
What I’ve been reading
1. Hannah Ritchie, Not the End of the World: How We Can be the First Generation to Build a Sustainable Planet. An excellent book with sound conclusions, think of it as moderate Julian Simon-like optimism on environmental issues, but with left-coded rhetoric.
2. Colin Elliott, Pox Romana: The Plague that Shook the Roman World. Think of this as a sequel to Kyle Harper’s tract on Roman plagues and their political import, this look at the Antonine plague and its impact has both good history and good economics. It is also highly readable.
3. Carrie Sheffield, Motorhome Prophecies: A Journey of Healing and Forgiveness. A highly effective and harrowing tale of a lifetime journey from abuse to Christianity: “Carrie attended 17 public schools and homeschool, all while performing classical music on the streets and passing out fire-and-insurance religious pamphlets — at times while child custody workers loomed.” The author is well known in finance, ex-LDS circles, public policy, and right-leaning media, and she has a Master’s from Harvard. This story isn’t over.
4. Charles Freeman,
5. Erin Accampo Hern, Explaining Successes in Africa: Things Don’t Always Fall Apart. I found this book highly readable and instructive, but I find it more convincing if you reverse the central conclusion. There is too much talk of the Seychelles and Mauritius, and is Gabon the big success story on the Continent? Population is 2.3 million, the country ranks 112th in the Human Development Index, and almost half the government budget is oil revenue. Still, this book “tells you how things actually are,” and that is more important than any objections one might lodge.
Recent and noteworthy is Peter Jackson, From Genghis Khan to Tamerlane: The Reawakening of Mongol Asia. You may recall that the Mongol empire at its peak was much larger than the Roman empire at its peak, but how many young men think about it every day?
Then there is Jian Chen’s Zhou Enlai: A Life, which seems like a major achievement. I’ve only had time to read small amounts of it…is it “too soon to tell”? I say no!
Who feels the pinch of status competition?
Here is one interesting hypothesis:
Despite the persistence of anti-Black racism, White Americans report feeling worse off than Black Americans. We suggest that some White Americans may report low well-being despite high group-level status because of perceptions that they are falling behind their in-group. Using census-based quota sampling, we measured status comparisons and health among Black (N = 452, Wave 1) and White (N = 439, Wave 1) American adults over a period of 6 to 7 weeks. We found that Black and White Americans tended to make status comparisons within their own racial groups and that most Black participants felt better off than their racial group, whereas most White participants felt worse off than their racial group. Moreover, we found that White Americans’ perceptions of falling behind “most White people” predicted fewer positive emotions at a subsequent time, which predicted worse sleep quality and depressive symptoms in the future. Subjective within-group status did not have the same consequences among Black participants.
That is from a new paper by Nava Calouri, Erin Cooley, Lauren E. Philbrook. Via excellence.
Friday assorted links
1. Are some Latin American countries “quiet quitting” the war on drugs?
3. Some much-needed perspective on the “Chinese brain killer virus.”
4. Detroit Beer Exchange closes, erstwhile floating price markets in everything.
5. On Solano and cars, noting that I don’t find the car outcomes so bad myself.
6. How good is the three-minute intelligence test?
8. BAP on populism and libertarianism.
There is now an Andrew Gelman newsletter.
David Brooks on bureaucracy
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology now has almost eight times as many nonfaculty employees as faculty employees. In the University of California system, the number of managers and senior professionals swelled by 60 percent between 2004 and 2014. The number of tenure-track faculty members grew by just 8 percent.
The column (NYT) is on the mark throughout, and it goes beyond higher education.
Brazil fact of the day
Brazil’s productivity — the output per hour worked, crucial to raising a nation’s prosperity — grew by just 0.5 per cent annually in the four decades to 2022, according to the Getúlio Vargas Institute.
Here is more from Michael Pooler and Bryan Harris at the FT.
Open AI will partner with Arizona State University
- OpenAI on Thursday announced its first partnership with a higher education institution.
- Starting in February, Arizona State University will have full access to ChatGPT Enterprise and plans to use it for coursework, tutoring, research and more.
- The partnership has been in the works for at least six months.
- ASU plans to build a personalized AI tutor for students, allow students to create AI avatars for study help and broaden the university’s prompt engineering course.
Here is the full story. After a very brief lull, AI progress is heating up once again…
Meta, the forward march of progress
Just in case you don't want to click over to the other sites, Big Zuck update
– Open sourcing will continue
– Currently training LLama 3
– AI + Metaverse
– Will have 350,000 H100s and ~600 H100 equivalents of compute 🤯
-Ideal AI formfactor is 🕶️ pic.twitter.com/xJSi7yVzXe— Alex Volkov (Thursd/AI) (@altryne) January 18, 2024
According to one estimate, that is about $20 billion spent on GPUs. Which I guess is a lot.
Thursday assorted links
1. Why doesn’t the Davos set sound more intelligent? (Only a partial diagnosis)
2. New and lucrative scholarships at University of Austin.
3. “What would an empirical revolution in safety research consist of?” Many would do well to heed this piece.
5. Cayalá, Guatemala (NYT).