Results for “corporate tax” 243 found
At what rate should we tax AI workers?
I find this (somewhat) tractable problem one good way to start thinking about alignment issues. Here is one bit from my Bloomberg column:
More to the point, there are now autonomous AI agents, which can in turn create autonomous AI agents of their own. So it won’t be possible to assign all AI income to their human or corporate owners, as in many cases there won’t be any.
And to continue the analysis:
One option is to let AI bots work tax-free, like honeybees do. At first that might make life simple for the IRS, but a problem of tax arbitrage will arise. Tax-free AI labor would have a pronounced competitive advantage over its taxed human counterpart. Furthermore, too many AIs will be released into the commons. Why own an AI and pay taxes when you can program it to do your bidding, renounce ownership, and enjoy its services tax-free? It seems easy enough to disclaim ownership of autonomous bots, especially if they are producing autonomous bots of their own. If nothing else, you could sell them to shell corporations.
The obvious alternative is to tax AI labor. Laboring AIs would have to file tax returns, which they may be capable of doing in the very near future. (Can they claim deductions for their baby AIs? What about their investments?)
Since AIs do not enjoy leisure as humans do, arguably their labor should be taxed at a higher rate than that of humans. Still, AIs shouldn’t be taxed too much. At prohibitively high rates of taxation, AIs will have lower stocks of wealth to invest in improving themselves, which in turn would lower long-run tax revenue from AI labor. Yes, they’re AIs, but incentives still matter.
Some people might fear that super-patient, super-smart AIs will accumulate too much wealth, though either investments or labor, and thereby hold too much social influence. That would create a case for a wealth tax on AIs, in addition to an income tax. But if AIs are such good investors, humans will also want the social benefits that accrue from such wisdom, and that again implies rates of taxation well below the confiscatory level.
And here is one of the deep problems with AI taxation:
The fundamental problem here is that AIs might be very good at providing in-kind services — improving organizational software, responding to emails, and so on. It is already a problem for the tax system when neighbors barter services, but the AIs will take this kind of relationship to a much larger scale.
Forget about hiring AIs, actually: What if you invest in them, tell them to do your bidding, repudiate your ownership, and then let them run much of your business and life? You could write off your investment in the AI as a business expense, and subsequently receive tax-free in-kind services, in what would amount to a de facto act of exchange.
Here is one general issue:
A major topic in AI circles is “alignment,” namely whether humans can count on AI agents to do our bidding, rather than mounting destructive cyberattacks or destroying us. These investments in alignment are necessary and important. But the more successful humans become at alignment, the larger the problem with tax arbitrage.
Not easy!
Corporate campaign spending doesn’t matter much
To what extent is U.S. state tax policy affected by corporate political contributions? The 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling provides an exogenous shock to corporate campaign spending, allowing corporations to spend on elections in 23 states which previously had spending bans. Ten years after the ruling and for a wide range of outcomes, we are not able to identify economically or statistically significant effects of corporate independent expenditures on state tax policy, including tax rates, discretionary tax breaks, and tax revenues.
That is from a new paper by Cailin R. Slattery, Alisa Tazhitdinova, and Sarah Robinson.
The tax provisions of the new climate and taxes bill
I can’t quite bring myself to call it the Inflation Reduction Act. One thing I have learned from experience is how hard it is to judge such bills upfront. For instance, I just learned that the electric vehicle tax credits do not currently apply to any electric vehicle whatsoever, nor will they obviously apply to any electric vehicle to be produced in the near future. Now the United States might take a larger role in battery production, or perhaps the law/regulation will be modified — don’t assume these standards will collapse. Still, the provisions are going to evolve. Or maybe there is a modest chance that provision of the bill simply will never kick in.
I don’t know.
How about the corporate minimum tax provisions? It sounds so simple to address unfairness in this way, and how much opposition will there be to a provision that might cover only 150 or so companies? But a lot of the incentives for new investment will be taken away, including new investment by highly successful companies. (You can get your tax bill down by making new investments, for instance, and that is why Amazon has paid relatively low taxes in many years.) Most of the companies covered are expected to be manufacturing, and didn’t we hear from the Democratic Party (and indeed many others) some while ago that manufacturing jobs possess special economic virtues? Furthermore, some of the tax incentives for green energy investments will be taken away. Has anyone done and published a cost-benefit analysis here? That is a serious question (comments are open!), not a rhetorical one.
Here are some other concerns (NYT):
“The evidence from the studies of outcomes around the Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggest that companies responded to such a policy by altering how they report financial accounting income — companies deferred more income into future years,” Michelle Hanlon, an accounting professor at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told the Senate Finance Committee last year. “This behavioral response poses serious risks for financial accounting and the capital markets.”
Other opponents of the new tax have expressed concerns that it would give more control over the U.S. tax base to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, an independent organization that sets accounting rules.
“The potential politicization of the F.A.S.B. will likely lead to lower-quality financial accounting standards and lower-quality financial accounting earnings,” Ms. Hanlon and Jeffrey L. Hoopes, a University of North Carolina professor, wrote in a letter to members of Congress last year that was signed by more than 260 accounting academics.
How bad is that? I do not know. Do you? My intuition is that the book profits concept cannot handle so much stress. By the way, kudos to NYT and Alan Rappeport for doing that piece. It is balanced but does not hold back on the skeptical side.
And here’s one matter I haven’t seen anyone mention: the climate part of the bill, and indeed most of the accompanying science and chips bill, assume in a big way that private sector investment is deficient in solving various social problems and needs some serious subsidy and direction.
Now the direction of that investment is a separate matter, but when it comes to the subsidy do you recall Kenneth Arrow’s classic argument that the private sector does not invest enough in risk-taking? Private investors see their private risk as higher than the actual social risk of the investment. This argument implies subsidies for investments, as much of the rest of the bill and its companion bill provide, not additional taxes on investment. This same kind of argument lies behind Operation Warp Speed, which most people supported, right?
And yet I see everyone presenting the new taxes on investment in an entirely blithe manner, ignoring the fact that the rest of the bill(s) implies private investment needs to be subsidized or at least taxed less.
Overall the ratio of mood affiliation and also politics in this discussion, to actual content, makes me nervous. The bills went through a good deal of uncertainty, and so a significant portion of the intelligentsia has been talking them up. Biden after all needs some victories, right? And at some point the green energy movement needs some major legislative trophies, right? What I’d like to see instead is a more open and frank discussion of the actual analytics.
It is very good when a top economist such as Larry Summers has real policy influence, in this case on Joe Manchin. But part of that equilibrium is that other economists start watching their words, knowing some other Democratic Senator might fall off the bandwagon. There is Sinema, Bernie Sanders has been making noise and complaining, someone else might have tried to extract some additional rents, and so on.
The net result is that you are not getting a very honest and open discussion of what is likely to prove a major piece of legislation.
The new tax on stock buybacks
Democrats opted to seek a new 1 percent tax on corporate stock buybacks, a move that would make up at least some of the revenue that might have lost as a result of the [Sinema-driven] changes.
Here is further detail. Something has to be taxed, and I don’t pretend to have a comprehensive ranking of tax options from best to worst. I can’t tell you where this might rank on the list. I can however tell you these three things:
1. This is flat out a new tax on capital, akin to a tax on dividends.
2. Are you worried about corporations being too big and monopolistic? This makes it harder for them to shrink! Think of it also as a tax on the reallocation of capital to new and growing endeavors.
3. The real reason this is being proposed is because so many Democratic and left-leaning public intellectuals have written “flat out wrong, doesn’t matter what your partisan stance is” pieces on stock buybacks.
And there you go.
Colombia tax facts of the day
According to the OECD, only 5 per cent of Colombians pay income tax. Revenue from personal income tax is worth just 1.2 per cent of gross domestic product compared to an OECD average of 8.1 per cent.
Taxes on businesses, on the other hand, are relatively high. The outgoing rightwing government of Iván Duque initially cut the corporate tax rate from 33 to 31 per cent. But when the coronavirus pandemic hit, followed by prolonged street protests against his rule, he was forced to raise it to 35 per cent, its highest level in 15 years and above the Latin American average.
Here is more from the FT. Note that the president-elect, Petro, actually is planning on cutting taxes on business, though he is proposing a wealth tax on individuals as well.
How do low real interest rates affect optimal tax policy?
Alan Auerbach and William Gale have a new paper on this topic:
Interest rates on government debt have fallen in many countries over the last several decades, with markets indicating that rates may stay low well into the future. It is by now well understood that sustained low interest rates can change the nature of long-run fiscal policy choices. In this paper, we examine a related issue: the implications of sustained low interest rates for the structure of tax policy. We show that low interest rates (a) reduce the differences between consumption and income taxes; (b) make wealth taxes less efficient relative to capital income taxes, at given rates of tax; (c) reduce the value of firm-level investment incentives, and (d) substantially raise the valuation of benefits of carbon abatement policies relative to their costs.
One core intuition here is that as the safe return goes to zero, capital taxes are not especially burdensome compared to consumption taxes. Of course “the safe return” may not be entirely well-defined within a corporate context, and capital taxes often hit returns to risk as well, so this is a bit more complicated than the abstract alone would indicate.
The authors also offer this intuition, which I do not quite follow:
In simplified environments, a wealth tax can be written as an equivalent tax on capital income. As the rate of return falls, the equivalent income tax rate of any given wealth tax rises. That is, a given wealth tax rate becomes more distortionary relative to a given capital income tax as the rate of return falls.
One of my biggest worries about a wealth tax is that it takes resources away from people who at the margin seem to be good at generating extra-normal returns. That comparative advantage might be more important as the safe rate goes to zero. So I am fine with the conclusion of the authors, but not sure if their intuition is equivalent to mine (I suspect it is not).
This one is clearer to me:
A major focus of potential tax reform has been the treatment of capital gains, given their tax-favored status, their high concentration among the very wealthy, and the distortions that the current method of taxation causes. A key element of the current system of capital gains taxation
is the lock-in effect, which discourages the realization of gains to take advantage of deferral of taxation. With very low interest rates, the deferral advantage loses much of its relevance, and this can make relatively simple reforms (such as taxing capital gains at death) achieve results very similar to more complicated schemes (such as taxing capital gains on accrual, even when not realized).
Overall this paper is very interesting and thought-provoking. Nonetheless, until we understand better why the safe rate of return has diverged so radically from “typical” (but still risky) corporate rates of return, I am not sure what implications we can draw from the model.
Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms
That is a paper by Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde, from a few years ago:
We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms’ profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.
This may all turn out to matter more if the new multinational corporate tax regime comes into existence. Of course you can vary the assumptions further yet, and get additional and differing results, but please keep in mind: the tax you impose is not the incidence you get.
Summers on the Wealth Tax
Larry Summers is my favorite liberal economist because even while maintaining his liberal values he never stops thinking like an economist. That makes him suspect among the left but it means that he is always worth listening to. The video below with Saez, Summers and Mankiw (with Rampell moderating) is excellent throughout. I cribbed a number of points from Summers:
“I have studied last week’s twitter war very carefully and I have to say that I am 98.5% convinced by the critics that the Zucman-Saez data are substantially inaccurate and misleading.”
The arguments around political power are not persuasive. Most of what is wrong with politics is because that is what the people want (I’m filling in a bit here from comments throughout). A wealth tax does nothing about corporate lobbying and would increase the incentive to give to political organizations. If you cut wealth at the top by 30% that wouldn’t change relative political power in the slightest.
Wealth is up in large part because interest rates are down which means that permanent income hasn’t increased.
Forced savings programs like social security and unemployment insurance mean that people at the bottom need to save less and thus their wealth falls even as their welfare increases.
A wealth tax increases the incentive to consume instead of save and invest.
On employee stock ownership plans: “When you put workers in control of firms and you give them substantial control–see Israeli kibbutz’s, see Yugoslav cooperatives, see universities where faculties have a powerful voice–the one thing you do not get is expansion. You get more for the people who are already there. That does not seem to be an attractive position for progressives.”
In the Q&A Summers just goes to town on Saez when Saez claims 90% tax rates are a great American invention. “The people who were around in the Kennedy administration who were at least as progressive as you are were united in the belief that 90% tax rates were a bad idea….The number of people who paid those 90% tax rates was trivial and it wasn’t because there weren’t a lot of rich people.” Greg Mankiw, who gives a nice parable in his remarks, has to stifle a laugh as Summers lets rip.
The body language in the Q&A is very interesting.
The three percent digital tax
France among other nations has been calling for a three percent digital tax, for instance as might apply to Facebook revenue connected to France but booked say to Ireland, which has a lower corporate tax rate. (The exact meaning of “connected to France” is indeed murky here, if you are wondering, but proponents might have in mind a simple France-to-France transaction, such as selling an ad to a French buyer for a French product; there are more complicated grey areas.)
As is so often the case, the debate is focusing on how little tax some of the major tech companies pay directly to the French treasury, rather than on tax incidence. In reality, the major tech companies may already be bearing a quite significant tax burden.
Let’s say you believe that Facebook has significant market power over the advertising market in France. That is not exactly my view, but let’s run with it — a competitiveness assumption will hardly boost the case for taxing Facebook.
At this point your mind already may be thinking that the monopolist in the supply chain will bear some significant portion of a tax, just as land bears tax burdens in a Georgian land monopolist model.
Let’s now say that France boosts its VAT — how will that impact Facebook? Well, the short-run effect is that directly taxed good and services will tend to cost more. That in turn will create pressures for them to advertise less, because their potential market size and potential profits are smaller. If they advertise less, they are spending less money on Facebook ads. Facebook profits go down (remember, Facebook is selling those ads above marginal cost), and thus Facebook bears some of the burden of the tax.
Do the same analysis in terms of levels rather than changes, and you will see that Facebook bears some of the burden of the current French VAT.
So the French VAT brings money into the French treasury, and some of that money comes from Facebook in an indirect form, in addition to whatever direct tax liabilities Facebook may bear under the current French VAT structure. Furthermore, the net tax burden on Facebook is higher, the more monopolistic is Facebook in the ad market.
I should note that there are other ways you can play around with the assumptions.
A good rule of thumb is that you should place less weight on tax discussions that do not focus obsessively on tax incidence.
Amazon and taxes: a simple primer
The main reason Amazon as a corporate entity does not pay much in taxes is because the company so vigorously reinvests its profit. The resulting expensing provisions lower their tax liabilities, in some cases down to zero or near-zero. That is in fact the kind of incentive our tax system is supposed to create, and does so only imperfectly, noting that many economists have suggested moving to full expensing.
(NB: You can’t hate both share buybacks and profit reinvestment!)
Amazon pays plenty in terms of payroll taxes and also state and local taxes. Nor should you forget the taxes paid by Amazon’s employees on their wages. Not only is that direct revenue to various levels of government, but the incidence of those taxes falls somewhat on Amazon, which now must pay higher wages to offset the tax burden faced by their employees. Not everyone wants to live in NYC or Queens! (Do you agree with Paul Krugman’s charge that the Trump tax cuts are mainly a giveaway to capital? If so, you probably also should believe that the wage taxes paid by Amazon employees fall largely on capital.)
There is no $3 billion that NYC gets to keep if Amazon does not show up. That “money” was a pledged reduction in Amazon’s future tax burden at the state and local level.
When it comes to the discussion surrounding Amazon and taxes, I can only sigh…
Taxes and innovation: shout it from the rooftops
We find that taxes matter for innovation: higher personal and corporate income taxes negatively affect the quantity, quality, and location of inventive activity at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, cross-state spillovers or business-stealing from one state to another are important, but do not account for all of the effect. Agglomeration effects from local innovation clusters tend to weaken responsiveness to taxation. Corporate inventors respond more strongly to taxes than their non-corporate counterparts.
That is from a new NBER paper by Ufuk Akcigit, John Grigsby, Tom Nicholas, and Stefanie Stantcheva, via Adam Ozimek.
The hidden taxes that challenge women
That is the new and excellent Sendhil Mullainathan NYT column, here is one excerpt from many good points:
Corporate success has similar consequences: Women who become chief executives divorce at higher rates than others.
Another study found that the same is true in Hollywood: Winning the best actress Oscar portends a divorce, while winning the best actor award does not.
Of course, the divorce itself may be a preferred outcome, one that is better than enduring a poisonous relationship. Even then, I’d argue that the tax was exacted in the emotional toll and the time lost in a failed marriage.
Men react particularly negatively to their spouses’ relative success. Marianne Bertrand and Emir Kamenica, economists at the University of Chicago, and Jessica Pan, an economist at the National University of Singapore, examined the wages of spouses. Because women generally earn less in the work force, they generally earn less than their husbands, too.
What is more surprising in the data is that it is far more common for the husband to earn just a tiny bit more than the wife than the other way around. The fact that women on average earn less does not account for such a sharp asymmetry.
The piece is interesting throughout.
This seems whacky, yet I cannot refute it (from the comments), tax incidence department
Here is an unrelated topic, but part of the general topic of tax incidence. Do federal employees pay income tax on their wages? I know they do nominally, but that tax goes back to their employer, the federal government. So, doesn’t that mean that, while their actual salary may be lower than their official nominal salary, they actually don’t pay any tax? (NB: this is quite different from a private sector employee whose after-tax salary is less than the pre-tax salary. In that case, the difference between the two does *not* go to the employer, creating a gap between what the employer pays and what the employee receives.)
For example, suppose a private firm and the federal government both value a worker’s output at $100k/yr and the tax rate is 20%. The private firm offers the worker $100k and the worker receives $80k after paying taxes. The federal government, however, can offer the worker $125k in nominal salary, *knowing that it will receive $25k back in income tax*. The net result is that the federal government pays $100k and the worker receives $100k after taxes, i.e., the worker earns $100k tax free, $20k more than he or she would earn at the private firm. Another way of seeing this is to note that taxes paid by employees are economically equivalent to taxes paid by employers. So, if employers received rebates for income taxes paid by employees, then the net income tax would be zero. Well, the federal government *does* receive a rebate for all income taxes paid by employees!
Doesn’t this mean that taxes are doubly distortive? Not only do they discourage employment by creating a gap between what (private) employers pay and what workers receive — the usual cited distortion — they also distort the *composition* of the workforce by allowing the federal government to crowd out other employers.
That is from BC.
Could the Republican tax plan lead to bipartisan results?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one bit:
If the bill succeeds in limiting these deductions, a logic is set in motion for future tax reforms. Let’s say the Republicans eliminate tax deductions for new mortgages above $500,000. That would become a sign that the homeowner and real-estate lobbies are not as strong as we might have thought. The next time tax reform comes around, legislators will consider lowering the value of the deduction further yet. After all, the anti-deduction forces won before and, in the new battle, those who expect to have future mortgages above $500,000 don’t have a stake anymore.
In other words, any squeezed deduction will remain a vulnerable target for more squeezing, or even elimination, over successive reforms.
And then:
The exact treatment in the House plan seems to be in flux, but the top rates from President Barack Obama’s tax reform are likely to stick in some manner. There even seems to be a rateof 45.6 percent on some earners, in the range of $1.2 million to $1.6 million a year. That is a far cry from Jeb Bush’s call in the Republican presidential primaries for a 28 percent top marginal rate, in the tradition of President Ronald Reagan. Some well-off Californians could possibly face a total marginal rate, all taxes considered, of over 62 percent.
You will recall that the Republican Party had in the past pressed strongly for reductions in the capital-gains rates, but that isn’t on the agenda now. Take that as a sign that Obama’s boost to those rates will stick.
If you solve for the equilibrium over time, maybe maybe you will get:
If we look at the Republican plan as a whole, it appears to be a recipe for a future tax code with many fewer deductions, lower corporate rates, higher income tax rates for the wealthy and a continuing inheritance tax. I’m not saying that the exact mix will or should make everyone perfectly happy, but is this not what a bipartisan tax reform compromise might look like?
My fear, of course, is that those deductions will not survive the next stage of the process. Stay tuned…
Should we tax the endowments of wealthy universities?
This NYT story has some background detail:
The House Republican tax plan released on Thursday includes a 1.4 percent tax on the investment income of private colleges and universities with at least 500 students and assets of $100,000 or more per full-time student. It would not apply to public colleges.
The endowments are currently untaxed, as they are considered part of the nonprofit mission of the colleges. The new tax, if it passed, would bring in an estimated $3 billion from 2018 to 2027, one of many new revenue sources Congress is considering to pay for broad tax cuts.
Note that this would apply to about 140 schools, and also that private foundations already pay tax on their investment income. Greg Mankiw writes:
If my rough calculations are correct, the tax would cost schools like Harvard between $1,000 and $2,000 per student every year.
I am opposed to this change, mostly because I don’t like to see the government deciding to go after a new source of wealth for its tax base. The focal point of non-interference ceases to be focal, and excesses and politicization too often follow. Slippery slope!
But if you are otherwise not so keen on this Brennan-Buchanan argument, what exactly are the grounds for opposing this? It taxes the relatively wealthy, and it taxes income from wealth. It taxes finance. I haven’t heard anyone oppose the tax on the investment income of private foundations, other than diehard anti-tax types. That tax has hardly vanquished the private foundation form. On top of all that, university endowments seem to have long time horizons, and to play the g > r game pretty well. As early as 1958, Paul Samuelson taught us we can transfer resources out of g > r games at no real cost.
So, you’ll hear a lot of caterwauling on this one, but the only good arguments against it are the libertarian ones. Broadening the base isn’t always good. Don’t be suckered by the “give up education for tax cuts for millionaires” non-rigorous rhetoric you will hear. With or without those tax cuts, you still have to ask yourself whether this tax hike is a sensible way of paying off our huge and growing debt.
I wonder if there are people who think a corporate income tax falls mainly on capital, but that this levy would fall mainly on students. Actually…I don’t wonder.