Ads as cues
Why do we see both advertising and powerful consumer habits for well-known and intrinsically similar brands? We offer an explanation based on the idea that, as in Bordalo et al. (2020), a consumer is more likely to demand a good if she recalls the pleasure it gave her in the past. In turn, the consumer is more likely to recall goods that are consumed more frequently and more similar to cues, subject to interference from other goods. Our model yields context-dependent brand habits where ads work as memory cues. It predicts that ads: i) are more effective for more habitual consumers and ii) exhibit spillovers, within and across products, that are stronger for more habitual consumers and for goods with more similar ads. Using data from NielsenIQ and Nielsen we find support for these predictions in 20 undifferentiated and highly advertised product categories. Memory offers new insights on how advertising affects market competition and consumer welfare.
That is from a new paper by Pedro Bordalo, Giovanni Burro, Nicola Gennaioli, Gad Nacamulli and Andrei Shleifer.
Podcast with Filippo Gaddo
Here is the link, it runs about forty minutes, with links to Spotify and Apple versions as well. Lots of economics and tech talk in this one, UK productivity, the School of Salamanca, and a discussion of GOAT and the history of economic thought as well, more too. Here is a Twitter thread on the chat.
Will there be a Coasean singularity?
By
AI agents—autonomous systems that perceive, reason, and act on behalf of human principals—are poised to transform digital markets by dramatically reducing transaction costs. This chapter evaluates the economic implications of this transition, adopting a consumer-oriented view of agents as market participants that can search, negotiate, and transact directly. From the demand side, agent adoption reflects derived demand: users trade off decision quality against effort reduction, with outcomes mediated by agent capability and task context. On the supply side, firms will design, integrate, and monetize agents, with outcomes hinging on whether agents operate within or across platforms. At the market level, agents create efficiency gains from lower search, communication, and contracting costs, but also introduce frictions such as congestion and price obfuscation. By lowering the costs of preference elicitation, contract enforcement, and identity verification, agents expand the feasible set of market designs but also raise novel regulatory challenges. While the net welfare effects remain an empirical question, the rapid onset of AI-mediated transactions presents a unique opportunity for economic research to inform real-world policy and market design.
I call it “AI for markets in everything.” Here is the paper, and here is a relevant Twitter thread, there is now so much new work for economists to do…
Tuesday assorted links
1. I am pleased to see Emergent Ventures make The Deseret 50 Changing Philanthropy.
2. The true purveyors of AI slop?
3. Peanut allergies have plummeted in children (NYT).
4. Is major reform coming to Opus Dei?
Harvard graduate admissions
The Faculty of Arts and Sciences slashed the number of Ph.D. student admissions slots for the Science division by more than 75 percent and for the Arts & Humanities division by about 60 percent for the next two years.
The scale of reductions in the Social Science division was not immediately clear, though several departments in the division experienced decreases over the coming two years ranging from 50 percent to 70 percent.
The reductions — detailed by five faculty members and in emails obtained by The Crimson — stipulate smaller Ph.D. admissions quotas across dozens of departments. Departments were allowed to choose how they would allocate their limited slots across the next two years.
Here is the full article, via Chris Brunet.
The MR Podcast: Our Favorite Models, Session 2: The Baumol Effect
On The Marginal Revolution Podcast this week we continue discussing some of our favorite models with a whole episode on the Baumol effect (with a sideline into the Linder effect). I say our favorite models, but the Baumol Effect is not one of Tyler’s favorite models! I thought this was a funny section:
TABARROK: When you look at all of these multiple sectors, the repair sector, repairing of clothing, repairing of shoes, repairing of cars, repairing of people, it’s not an accident that these are all the same thing. Healthcare is the repairing of people. Repair services, in general, have gone up because it’s a very labor-intensive area of the economy. It’s all the same thing. That’s why I like the Baumol effect, because it explains a very wide set of phenomena.
COWEN: A lot of things are easier to repair than they used to be, just to be clear. You just buy a new one.
TABARROK: That’s my point. You just buy a new one.
COWEN: It’s so cheap to buy a new one.
TABARROK: Exactly. The new one is manufactured. That’s the whole point, is the new one takes a lot less labor. The repair is much more labor intensive than the actual production of the good. When you actually produce the good, it’s on a factory floor, and you’ve got robots, and they’re all going through da-da-da-da-da-da-da. Repair services, it’s unique.
COWEN: I think you’re not being subjectivist enough in terms of how you define the service. The service for me, if my CD player breaks, is getting a stream of music again. That is much easier now and cheaper than it used to be. If you define the service as the repair, well, okay, you’re ruling out a lot of technological progress. You can think of just diversity of sources of music as a very close substitute for this narrow vision of repair. Again, from the consumer’s point of view, productivity on “repair” has been phenomenal.
TABARROK: That is a consequence of the Baumol effect, not a denial of the Baumol effect. Because of the Baumol effect, repair becomes much more expensive over time, so people look for substitutes. Yes, we have substituted into producing new goods. It works both ways. The new goods are becoming cheaper to manufacture. We are less interested in repair. Repair is becoming more expensive. We’re more interested in the new goods. That’s a consequence of the Baumol effect.
You can’t just say, “Oh, look, we solved the repair problem by throwing things out. Now we don’t have to worry about repairs.” Yes, that’s because repair became so much more expensive. A shift in relative prices caused people to innovate. I’m not saying that innovation doesn’t happen. One of the reasons that innovation happens is because the relative price of repair services is going up.
COWEN: That’s a minor effect. It’s not the case that, oh, I started listening to YouTube because it became too expensive to repair my CD player. It might be a very modest effect. Mostly, there’s technological progress. YouTube, Spotify, and other services come along, Amazon one-day delivery, whatever else. For the thing consumers care about, which is never what Baumol wanted to talk about. He always wanted to fixate on the physical properties of the goods, like the anti-Austrian he was.
It’s just like, oh, there’s been a lot of progress. It takes the form of networks with very complex capital and labor interactions. It’s very hard to even tease out what is truly capital intensive, truly labor intensive. You see this with the AI companies, all very mixed together. That just is another way of looking at why the predictions are so hard. You can only get the prediction simple by focusing very simply on these nonsubjectivist, noneconomic, physical notions of what the good has to be.
TABARROK: I think there’s too much mood affiliation there, Tyler.
COWEN: There’s not enough Kelvin Lancaster in Baumol.
Here’s the episode. Subscribe now to take a small step toward a much better world: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube.
Words of wisdom
Among these changes, the most underrated is not misinformation or kooky conspiracy theories or even populism per se — it’s relentless negativity. One thing that we’ve learned from revealed preferences on the internet is that negativity-inflected stories perform better…
The impact of ultra-negativity is symmetrical in the sense that both sides do it, but it’s asymmetrical in the sense that conservatives outnumber progressives. In practice, oscillating extremism results in a right-wing authoritarian regime, not a left-wing one.
That is from the gated Matt Yglesias. The important thing is to keep a positive, constructive attitude toward what is possible. Content creators who do not do that, no matter what their professed views, are supporting the darker sides of MAGA.
So keep up the good work people!
How the pandemic has changed the world
From Patrick Collison on Twitter:
Maybe a very prosaic observation, but I’ve been reflecting on just how much the pandemic changed the world in ways that are completely unrelated to the pandemic itself. I think I’ve underestimated it ’till now.
In a recent interview, I was struck by the comment that so many of the shops that we associate with the best of France—the poissonneries and the fromageries—closed during the pandemic, to be replaced by take-out pizza shops and the like.
College professors almost uniformly describe big changes in student behavior: lecture attendance and willingness of students to complete reading assignments are both way down.
A UK government official recently told me that British economic statistics have become much less reliable since the pandemic: data on trade, employment, and population is suspect. (The true GDP per capita figures are probably worse than what is indicated by the published data, since the 2021 census is believed to be an undercount.)
In the West, there are far fewer bustling workplaces than there used to be. In recent conversation with a well-traveled friend, he bemoaned how so many cities—places like Madrid, Buenos Aires, and Bali—have lost so much of their erstwhile vibrant nightlife.
Immigration accelerated enormously across many countries, including the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia.
In China, I hear descriptions of how fear, caution, and conservatism have persisted since the COVID lockdowns. (And Western travel to China remains massively depressed.)
Lots of the changes are neutral, or even good. Retail participation in the US stock market almost doubled overnight, say, and has persisted at that elevated rate. Firm creation in the US increased by around 50%, which is probably a very good thing.
Overall, the number of time series (either literal or figurative) that jumped discontinuously during COVID and then didn’t return to baseline is just very striking.
Which are the best historical analogs? Are there any apart from major wars?
I want to read this book!
Monday assorted links
1. Why is Argentina not a great nation?
2. The evolution of the Singapore health care system.
3. Vanderbilt in West Palm Beach? (NYT)
4. Forethought is looking to hire on AI safety.
5. What if we ranked colleges on the basis of whether or not they help you become more wise? And a separate file with rankings.
The median voter model, or the Becker pressure group model?
Or perhaps a game-theoretic model between the President and the Supreme Court? From the WSJ:
President Trump in recent weeks has exempted dozens of products from his so-called reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more goods from farm products to airplane parts when countries strike trade deals with the U.S.
The offer to exempt more products from tariffs reflects a growing sentiment among administration officials that the U.S. should lower levies on goods that it doesn’t domestically produce, say people familiar with administration planning. That notion “has been emerging over time” within the administration, said Everett Eissenstat, deputy director of the National Economic Council in Trump’s first term. “There is definitely that recognition.”
The move comes ahead of a Supreme Court hearing in early November on the reciprocal tariffs—a case that could force the administration to pay back many of the levies if it loses in court. The White House, Commerce Department and U.S. Trade Representative’s office didn’t respond to requests for comment.
I suppose that is good news, but of course it can introduce more cross-product and cross-nation distortions as well.
Creative Destruction in a Nutshell
A good figure from the Nobel Prize Foundation’s Scientific Background to the Mokyr, Aghion and Howitt Nobel. The figure shows that firm exit rates and job destruction rates are positively correlated with growth in labor productivity; creative destruction in a nutshell.

What should I ask Diarmaid MacCulloch
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. He has a recent book out on the history of sexuality and Christianity, but of course is renowned for a much longer series of books and writings on Christianity, the Reformation, and Tudor British history, just for a start.
Here is his Wikipedia page. So what should I ask him?
*Surviving Rome: The Economic Lives of the Ninety Percent*
By Kim Bowes, this is an excellent book, the best I know of on ordinary economic life in the Roman empire. It also shows a very good understanding of economics, unlike some forays by archeologists. Here is one excerpt:
On the income side, we’ve seen that unskilled wages, which were very low indeed, were also a very bad proxy for income. Wages were usually part of a portfolio of income, a portfolio that all family members contributed to, but one still centered on own production — either farming or textile/artisanal work. Unskilled wages supplemented own-production; they mostly weren’t equivalent to it. Roman wagges, unlike modern wages, can’t be used as a proxy for income.
Gross income from own-production, particularly farming, appears to have been much higher than previously supposed. Rotation strategies practiced by Italian and Egyptian farmers meant that per-hectare outputs were many times greater than alternate fallow models predicted, since outputs included not only wheat but also significant quantities of fodder and animals. In the northwest provinces, where rotation was less common, outputs per hectare were lower but still included some hay and larger animal herds. And every, high settlement densities and shrinking amounts of land would have urged farmers to achieve higher yields — in some places three or more times greater than previously supposed. We can’t be sure they managed this, only that low yields would have been mostly unteanble and that farmers had the tools — rotation, manuring, weeding — to achieve higher ones.
Most working class Romans, by the way, bought their clothing rather than having to make it themselves.
Recommended, you can pre-order it here.
Sunday assorted links
1. Cass Sunstein names some GOATs.
4. A theory: “Everyone under 30 is prematurely old (worried about savings, career, FIRE). Everyone over 50 is desperately young (Burning Man, psychedelics). My theory: Information abundance aged the young by showing them all future problems all at once. Information abundance also made the old young by showing them all missed experiences all at once. So now Gen Z talks like retirement planners and boomers act like teenagers. It’s so over.”
5. Further cuts at the Department of Education.
6. Spanish town bans black cat adoptions during Halloween.
7. Topkapi is a good movie. And John Woo’s Once a Thief remains underrated.
*The Loneliness of Sonia and Sunny*, by Kiran Desai
I read all the glowing reviews, and concluded it was the kind of book I probably would regard as overrated and to me dull. Then I started reading it, as indeed I will experiment and sample such things. The reviews are in fact warranted, and this is a fictional masterpiece. It is also further evidence for our current literary golden age.
You can order it here.