My excellent Conversation with Julia Ioffe
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is from the episode summary:
Julia joined Tyler to discuss why so many of Russia’s great constructivist painters were women, why the tsarist government established women’s medical courses in 1872, changing attitudes towards abortion and birth control in the 20th century, why the Soviet regime turned prudish, how Khrushchev’s plan to “replace the dead” institutionalized single motherhood, Russian superwomen, why Jewish men were a prized commodity amid rampant antisemitism, the cultural significance of flowers, why a few Russian names still dominate, why Russian women think Western feminists have their priorities backwards, how gender attitudes and autocracy feed into each other, three underrated Russian novels, what she wants to write about next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: I’m sure you’ve noticed that quite a few American men will marry Russian or Soviet women, but not so many American women want to marry Russian or Soviet men. It’s a kind of market test, right? Why exactly are the men so bad? Why are they such louts? Maybe that’s a rude way to put it, but surely in one’s mind, one asks that question, right?
IOFFE: It’s a question that a lot of us who were living in Moscow in the late aughts and the teens were asking that all the time. I remember a friend of mine, a male Western TV correspondent, saying, “The women are so gorgeous here, but the men are so ugly and unfashionable.” He had lived all over the place and worked all over the place, and he said, “I’ve never seen such disparity,” and it was true.
The women like me, Western women who were living and working in Moscow at the time, said, “We’ll just wait till we get home.” I think it’s because of what I talked about before, or what you and I talked about before, which is that so many men were killed in the first half of the 20th century, and so few demands were placed on them because they were seen as an endangered species, in general. They were a resource to be fought over and protected.
In 1968, when the West was undergoing a sexual revolution, and women were fighting for more rights, more equality, the Soviets were talking about saving the men, protecting the men, and saying, “We’ve done enough for the women, but our men die young.” That’s after a lifetime of alcohol abuse, smoking, being largely irrelevant in the home, and obviously politically, because it’s a totalitarian system, so let’s work on protecting them.
Soviet men, and then Russian men, became these coddled, spoiled children essentially, where on one hand, so little was asked of them that it’s the bigotry of low expectations. So little was asked of them, and very little was expected of them, and they rose to meet those very low expectations.
On top of that, the idea of what made a man a manly man in Russia is he’s physically strong, but he dies a young death, or he dies an early death. He drinks a lot, he smokes a lot, he’s reckless, he’s careless, and takes a lot of risk, and that usually means an early death. If you have fewer men to begin with, and as a Russian woman, you see them dying early, and you’re fighting over them, what is the impetus for men to take care of themselves, to act better, be better, if there’s always going to be a beautiful, super competent woman to take him if you don’t want him?
COWEN: These points you’re raising, historically, do you feel it’s been quite different for Soviet and Russian Jews or the same?
IOFFE: I think it’s a little bit different. The caveat is, and I hate that I have to say this, Jews are people too, and subject to the same social forces that everybody else is, but culturally, Soviet Jews were more educated as a rule, more urban, and culturally came from a very family-centric tradition. Russian women, actually, for all the intense antisemitism in the Soviet Union, in Russia, Jewish men were actually a prized commodity for Russian women.
COWEN: With ethnic Russian women?
IOFFE: Yes. Ethnic Ukrainian women, you name it, because the cultural stereotype was that Jewish men don’t drink, they don’t hit you, they are family-focused, family-oriented, they’re involved fathers, they bring their money home, they don’t waste it at the bar or on bottles of vodka with their buddies. That’s the kind of man you would want as a husband. Ironically, the same polls that will tell you that Russians would want their daughters to marry a Jew will tell you that they don’t want their president to be a Jew.
One of my favorite episodes of the year, interesting throughout, and I very much enjoyed Julia’s book Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia.
Solve for the (Refine) equilibrium
We’re proud to announce that Refine has signed partnerships with two leading publishers in economics. Both the American Economic Association and the Econometric Society now use Refine’s AI-assisted technical verification as part of their publication processes.
Here is the thread. And more comments here.
Thursday assorted links
2. New publication on AI and institutions. Good people involved.
4. What kind of machine can a book make?
5. Longevity firms push for medical deregulation in Montana (WSJ).
6. OpenAI Economic Research Exchange.
7. Victor Niederhoffer obituary. Do not forget Victor also was a world class checkers player, art collector, and a very good jazz bassist as well (yes I have heard him play) in addition to his other achievements.
Will U.S. cities face a knock-on fiscal crisis from the feds?
Federal money flows to cities in three flavors: direct transfers, indirect transfers, and what we call fiscal dark matter. Direct transfers are exactly what they sound like — money sent directly from the federal government to various localities. These include funds disbursed through programs like the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which supports things like public infrastructure and neighborhood services.3 In 2022, direct transfers like the CDBG totaled $146.3 billion.4 That’s significant, but actually the smallest of the three categories.
Less visible are the indirect transfers. These monies are initially awarded to state governments, which then allocate funds to municipal-level programs and services in accordance with state prerogatives. The cleanest example is probably K-12 education, which receives federal Title I dollars to pay for teachers and programs, but federal highway dollars work essentially the same way. All told, in 2022, the federal government handed down $1.1 trillion to state governments. That amounted to 36% of overall state revenue for that year and, depending on the individual state, ranged from roughly 22% to 50% of state revenue. How much of that ultimately flowed down to cities is hard to say, which is itself a problem: it’s difficult to even establish how exposed local governments are to a pullback in federal support of state budgets.
The third category – our fiscal dark matter – is all the federal money spent into local communities that never shows up in a local budget. This includes housing subsidies like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and Section 8. It also includes food support programs like SNAP and even some direct funding for local food banks.
Rightfully or not, when the flow of federal money in this category starts to dry up, the resulting problems will fall squarely on the mayor’s desk. After all, the median voter is never going to see increasing numbers of homeless encampments and think to blame the head of HUD.
Here is the full piece by Jeff Fong.
Who Pays for Unions?
If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less-attached “outsider” workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses–and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.
That is forthcoming in the QJE by Samuel Dodini, Anna Stansbury, and Alexander Willén.
Wednesday assorted links
1. A catalog of past AI predictions.
2. Jasmine Sun on why people do not want data centers. And Jasmine Sun on Ezra Klein, on data centers (NYT).
3. A bot running an SF retail boutique? (NYT)
5. On the NYC grocery store plan.
6. New credit card gives you tokens instead of miles.
7. Does AI mean the end of math heroes? Some other heroes too?
Is this why China finds it so hard to inflate producer prices?
This paper investigates why China’s recurrent credit expansions have coincided with persistently weak inflation. We argue that this pattern reflects the country’s production-oriented monetary regime. At the aggregate level, faster monetary-financial expansion temporarily raises PPI inflation but depresses it over longer horizons. At the sectoral level, liability growth among listed industrial firms is followed by weaker producer prices, lower profitability, higher leverage, rising inventories, and reduced capacity utilization. We also find asymmetric supply-chain transmission: downstream liability growth raises upstream PPI inflation, while upstream liability growth does not generate a corresponding downstream price response. These findings indicate that credit expansion in China tends to sustain production and balance sheets rather than stimulate final demand. As a result, monetary policy operates less as a conventional tool for demand management and durable reflation, and more as a mechanism for preserving production capacity and supporting growth.
That is from a new paper by . I have to say I understand the result but not exactly the mechanism. I am reminded of Milton Friedman’s dictum not to focus too much on the first-order effects of an increase in money supply.
Victor Niederhoffer, RIP
In addition to his well-known public roles, he worked very hard to help and befriend me when I was younger. Here are the Google searches for Victor. Less well known about Victor is that he had one of the world’s best collections of private letters. He also once gave me a very nice small painting by Jack Savitzky, for which I remain grateful.
The Value of Behavioral Policies
Behavioral interventions have become central to modern public policy, but their empirical promise remains contested because estimated treatment effects often appear small. We argue that a policy response is economically meaningful only relative to the response generated by alternative policies. We assemble more than 1,200 estimates from over 600 studies comparing “nudges” and traditional price interventions in the markets for cigarettes, alcohol, influenza vaccination, electricity, and residential water. Translating nudge effects into equivalent price changes, we find that behavioral interventions often correspond to enormous fiscal interventions, from an 11% tax on electricity to a 100% subsidy on influenza vaccinations. Nudges are also more cost-effective than price instruments in all markets, but cost-effectiveness does not predict the welfare ranking of policies. Using a behavioral extension of the Marginal Value of Public Funds, we show that nudges have high welfare returns at the margin, while price instruments often generate larger total surplus at scale.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Estimating the Economic Value of Zoning Reform
We estimate the economic value of zoning reform in São Paulo, which altered maximum permitted construction along transportation corridors. Developers increased filings for multifamily construction in blocks affected by the reform, leading to more housing supply and lower housing prices in neighborhoods that allow more densification. Our equilibrium model of housing markets estimates an aggregate 1.6 percent increase in housing stock and a 0.4 percent reduction in prices, resulting in large housing wealth transfers from current to future homeowners. The reform produced welfare gains of 0.65 percent of city GDP, mostly due to developer profits and consumer gains from the newly built environment.
That is from the AEA policy journal, by Santosh Anagol, Fernando Ferreira, and Jonah Rexer.
Tuesday assorted links
The economics of H-1B immigration
We study the effects of H-1B immigration on U.S. industries that employ H-1B workers and their trading partners. Using a novel cross-industry design and the 1999–2003 expansion of the H-1B visa cap for identification, we find that H-1B exposure raised incomes for natives and pre-existing immigrants, with gains concentrated in non-STEM occupations. Income gains propagate forward through supply chains to downstream industries but not backward to upstream industries, consistent with a productivity shock rather than a labor supply shock. We find no direct effect on patenting, suggesting that productivity gains arise from better task execution rather than patentable invention.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Emergent Ventures winners, 57th cohort
Oisin O’Gorman, 15, Dublin, misinformation and fakes.
Karsen Lee Wahal, Stanford, is AI killing the web?, and measuring media slant.
Davy Deng, with Claire Wang (previous winner), whole brain emulation, MIT.
Enerj Grmek, 16, Ljubljana, privacy.
Vladimir Shmelev, Ukraine, Ukrainian children for relief trips to Montenegro.
Nik Verma, Chicago, a legal framework for AI agents.
Emirhan Demir and Çınar Yıldırım, Istanbul area, 19, protection against AI agents.
Midhat Doruk, 14, Ankara, longevity, biology, and skin cosmetics.
Burak Yilmaz, 17, Diyarbarkir, Turkey, browser-native authentication.
Lloyd Strickland, London, to publish the remaining Leibniz papers, including on computation.
Abdul Quyum, 15, Perth, organizing information and data.
Catharine Young, podcast on women in science, science communication tranche, Cambridge/DC.
How does the market regard stablecoins?
We study the demand for safety and liquidity in the crypto ecosystem. We do so under a framework in which a representative investor allocates liquidity across stablecoin deposits in lending pools and traditional safe assets (e.g., MMF shares). Our model delivers three main predictions: (i) the stablecoin deposit premium co-moves with the Treasury premium when investors value the safety and liquidity services of stablecoins; (ii) increases in Treasury supply reduce the stablecoin deposit premium; and (iii) drops in the perceived safety and liquidity of stablecoin deposits (e.g., due to de-pegs or hacker attacks) reduce their premium. Using granular data from hundreds of DeFi pools spanning multiple protocols, tokens, and blockchains, we find evidence supporting these predictions. Investors treat stablecoin deposits as money-like instruments that are borderless and permissionless, yet as fragile as other forms of privately produced safe assets.
That is from a new NBER working paper by