Emergent Ventures winners, 51st cohort

Joseph Schmid, Princeton philosophy, and co-authors. To write up new and better arguments for the existence of god.

Monica Lewis, Sydney, Australia, center-right podcast.

Ashwin Somu, 17, Ontario, payments systems.

Sam Kahn, Kyrgyzstan, digital publication, Republic of Letters.

Nelson Jing, Seattle, decentralized AI systems.

Anubhav Nigam, Cornell, underwater charging stations.

Jordan McGillis, San Diego, the economics and politics of Alaska.

Juan Navarette, Madrid, Cervantes and liberalism.

Jeff Stine, Chicago, matching scientists and donors.

Syrine Ben Driss, San Francisco/Tunisia, biology start-up for AI-powered bio.

Shakti Mb, NYC, how people use AI boyfriends and girlfriends.

Sonia Litwin, London, robotics and emotions.

Alby Churven, 14, Sydney, Clovr, an AI tool.

Mikhail Khotyakov and Igor Kogan, Munich, Aimathic, personal math tutoring.

Archaeology cohort, sponsored by Yonatan Ben Shimon.

Bryce Hoenigman,  Chicago, archaeology, linguistics, and AI.

Benjamin Arbuckle, Chapel Hill, archaeology and ancient DNA.

Duke Summer Institute on the History of Economics

The Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University will be hosting another Summer Institute on the History of Economics from June 2-11, 2026. The program is designed for students in graduate programs in economics, though students in graduate school in other fields as well as recently minted PhDs will also be considered.

Students will be competitively selected and successful applicants will receive free housing, access to readings, and stipends for travel and food. The deadline for applying is March 9.

We are very excited about this year’s program, which will focus on giving participants the tools to set up and teach their own undergraduate course in the history of economic thought. There will also be sessions devoted to showing how concepts and ideas from the history of economics might be introduced into other classes. The sessions will be run by Duke faculty members Jason Brent, Bruce Caldwell, Kevin Hoover, and Steve Medema. More information on the Summer Institute is available at our website, https://hope.econ.duke.edu/2026-summer-institute

What should I ask Julia Ioffe?

Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her.  She has a new and very good book out, namely Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia.  I will focus on that topic, but she has done much else as well.  From Wikipedia:

…a Russian-born American journalist. Her articles have appeared in The Washington PostThe New York TimesThe New YorkerForeign PolicyForbesBloomberg BusinessweekThe New RepublicPolitico, and The Atlantic. Ioffe has appeared on television programs on MSNBCCBSPBS, and other news channels as a Russia expert. She is the Washington correspondent for the website Puck.

And here is Julia on Twitter.  So what should I ask her?

Seb Krier

I think this is spot on. The most useful work in the coming years will be about leveraging AI to help improve and reform liberal democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers, free speech, coordination, and constitutional safeguards.

One heuristic I have for AI is: if somone can instantiate their preference or desire really easily, if principal agent problems are materially reduced, if you can no longer rely on inefficiency or bloat as indirect hedge – then the ‘rules of the game’ matter more than ever.

These are all very difficult questions with or without AI. And I’m concerned with two things in particular: first, the easy appeal of anti-elite populism – people who just think ‘well let’s have vetocracy everywhere, let’s leverage the emotions of the masses for short term gain’.

And second, the appeal of scheme-y behaviour – instrumental convergence for political operators. This is harder to pin down, but basically a variant of “I want goal X, so anything that gets me closer to this goal is good” – what leads to all sorts of bad policy and unsavoury alliances.

And instead of trying to 4D chess it or try to recreate politics from first principles, I think technologists should actively enage with experts in all sorts of discplines: constitutional scholars, public choice economists, game theorists etc. Converesely, many of these experts should engage with technologists more instead of coping with obsolete op-eds about how AI is fake or something.

Lastly, improved AI capabilities means you can now use these systems for more things than you could have before. I couldn’t write software a year ago and now I can create a viable app in a day. This dynamic will continue, and will reward people who are agentic and creative.

Are you a local councillor? Well now you have 1000 agents at your disposal – what can you now that that was otherwise unthinkable? Are you someone who lives in their district? Now you have even better tools to hold them to account. Are you an academic? Great, now consider how the many bylaws, rules, structures, institutions, incentives are messing up incentives and progress, what should be improved, and how to get streamlined coordination rather than automated obstruction.

Here is the link.  Here is the related Dean Ball tweet.

Thursday assorted links

1. The advance of machine learning in economics.

2. Anthropic strategy?

3. The Christian speed painter (NYT).

4. The wisdom of Adam Ozimek.  He is also a Clarence White fan.

5. Thiel on trends.

6. New constitution for Claude.  And Simon Willison on Catholicism.

7. Greenland fact of the day: “Nuuk, Greenland (pop. 19.6k) has 16 buses in its transit system and has higher ridership than Wichita, Kansas’s bus system (pop. 472k).”

8. Different ways of thinking about American TFR.

9. On the manosphere.

What Davos (and Mark Carney) get wrong

That is the topic of my latest Free Press column, here is one excerpt:

Though Donald Trump seems to be calling off his latest trade war, the United States has indeed retreated from free trade with a new era of tariffs. It’s a development I rue. But Canada just opened its market to Chinese cars. So Trump did in fact find the recipe to nudge an oft-protectionist Canada toward freer trade, though it is the opposite of what he might have been wishing for. Soon, Canada will have access to better and cheaper electric cars than what we can get in the United States. And even if you think that spyware could make those cars a security risk in Washington, D.C., due to spying possibilities, I am less worried about their proliferation in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Keep them out of Ottawa if need be.

The European Union just worked out a free trade agreement, pending final approval, with Mercosur, a trade bloc encompassing hundreds of millions of people in South America, a region that is likely to be more economically important in the future. The EU also announced it is likely to strike a free trade agreement with India, the most populous nation in the world and one of its fastest-growing economies. However imperfect these agreements may turn out to be, has there been any recent short period with so much progress in free trade?

And this on Mark Carney:

Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s speech on Tuesday garnered a lot of attention, but I think for the wrong reasons. He proclaimed the ability of “middle powers”—that is, Europe and countries like his own—to stand their ground against America and China, but he mentioned AI only in passing. He had no solution to an immediately pending world where Canada is quite dependent on advanced AI systems from American companies (often, incidentally, developed by Canadian researchers in the U.S.). That is likely to be the next major development in this North American relationship, and it will not increase the relative autonomy of Canada or of any other middle powers.

Carney has garnered praise for staking out such bold ground and standing up to Trump. The deeper reality is that Carney can “talk back” in the North American partnership because he knows America will defend Canada, including against Russia, no matter what. Most European countries cannot relax in the same manner, and thus they are often more deferential. What the reactions from Carney and the Europeans show is not any kind of growing independence for the middle powers, but rather a reality where you are either quite tethered to a major power—as Canada is to America—or you live in fear of being abandoned, which is the current status of much of Europe.

Recommended.

How Restrictive is U.S. Trade Policy?

This short note computes Trade Restrictiveness Index measures for current U.S. trade policy. Building on the ideas of Anderson and Neary (1996, 2005), the Trade Restrictiveness Index is the uniform tariff that leaves the U.S. consumer as well off as under actual policy. As of October 2025, U.S. trade policy is twice as restrictive as headline tariff numbers suggest. The Trade Restrictiveness Index is 23 percent, which stands in contrast to the 11 percent average tariff rate. Trade policy towards Canada and Mexico is two to three times more restrictive than average tariff rates suggest. Sectoral analysis shows that the restrictiveness is concentrated in vehicles, machinery, and electrical equipment.

That is from Michael E. Waugh.

My Conversation with Diarmaid MacCulloch

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler and Diarmaid explore whether monotheism correlates with monogamy, Christianity’s early instinct towards egalitarianism, what the Eucharistic revolution reveals about the cathedral building boom, the role of Mary in Christianity and Islam, where Michel Foucault went wrong on sexuality, the significance of the clerical family replacing the celibate monk, why Elizabeth I—not Henry VIII—mattered most for the English Reformation, why English Renaissance music began so brilliantly but then needed to start importing Germans, whether Christianity needs hell to survive, what MacCulloch plans to do next, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: There’s a recent rise of interest in theories that attribute the rise of the West to the church banning cousin marriage, that this broke down clan structures. What’s your view of that hypothesis?

MACCULLOCH: It’s, as usual with such hypotheses, far too simple. I don’t see that so at all. Cousin marriages went on being a feature of Christianity, particularly if you’ve got a pope to dispense such marriages in the West. What could one say about such a theory? Clans, families were not broken up by Christianity. By far, the reverse. Those structures did not change very significantly. No, I don’t think that really works at all.

COWEN: Why does Islam so emphasize the sexual desires of women relative to Christianity?

MACCULLOCH: A good question. Because the Quran allows that to happen? The Quran has been interpreted by men when very often what it’s talking about is just people, so that may be one explanation. Islam did remain very much a militarized culture to start with, so it’s almost by definition run by men. There within it, is a powerful set of images for women in the Quran itself. On top of the Quran, there is so much added, and it’s usually added by male societies. So yes and no, really.

There is a constant strain of things one can say about the position of women in Christianity. Women are constantly carving out parts of Christian faith for themselves, against the fact that men are increasingly running the church. That’s a fact of life. Think of the mystics of the medieval West and the way in which so many of them are females. To be a mystic, you don’t need the male language of Latin, the language of the professions, the language of the clergy.

You can explore mysticism without the new invention of men in the 12th century — theology, which is something associated with, first, the cathedral schools and then the universities, both of which are male institutions. But mysticism, no. You can just get on with it. It involves many of the same themes in every religion that turns to mysticism, themes like fire and water, air. The vocabulary of the mystic really is quite universal. It is not restricted to Christianity or Islam or anything. It’s the way that one aspect of humanity works out when it tries to meet the divine.

COWEN: Why is Islam sometimes, at least at the intellectual level, so obsessed with Mary? You can debate whether she was a saint or a prophet. In a way, the role in Christianity is much more circumscribed.

And:

COWEN: Why are there still a fair number of English Catholics, but so few in the Nordic countries?

MACCULLOCH: Now, an interesting question. Lutheranism became much more universal in the Nordic countries. Catholicism did not survive there. The monarchies of these countries were, I think, much more thorough-going in suppressing it. I think the nobility also decided to go over to the Reformation fairly uniformly in Sweden, Norway, Denmark. Of course, it does matter when the nobility make decisions.

In England, they were divided. Quite a lot of the nobility and gentry did stick with the old faith, maybe because they admired many of the bishops of the old church. I did a little work of research on this in my younger days, in which you could see that those gentry who stayed Catholic after the Reformation were often those who had personal ties to the great bishops of the pre-Reformation church.

Yes, the picture is very different in England to that in Scandinavia. Also, remember that extraordinary counter case, the case of Ireland, where the government became Protestant as it did in England, but the great bulk of the population did not go with it. The story of Ireland is a story of the rejection of the religion of the upper classes right through to the present day, when they’ve now rejected so much of Catholicism too. Fascinating different stories next to each other there.

Recommended.

Sectoral shifts in supply, wartime agriculture edition

It is all the more remarkable, then, that within six years Britain’s agricultural output had transformed, more profoundly and at a faster pace than any time since the start of the Industrial Revolution.  The most urgent need was to provide a substitute for all that previously imported foreign wheat.  In 1939, Britain only had 11.8 million acres of suitable land under the plough, compared to 17.3 million acres of grass and pastureland.  Four years later those figures had been almost exactly reversed — to 17.3 million and 11.4 million acres respectively.  The amount of tillage soil devoted to wheat had doubled.  Just over 4.2 million harvested tons of wheat, barley and oats had become 7.6 million tons.  By 1943 the potato crop was almost twice as big as it had been in 1939.  Less pastureland meant fewer animals, and so a veritable massacre on pork and poultry farms ensued.  By 1943 there were almost 30 million fewer British chickens and 2.2 million fewer pigs than pre-war numbers.  Cows were spared — but strictly for milk production, not beef.

That is from the new and excellent book by Alan Allport, Advance Britannia: The Epic Story of the Second World War, 1942-1945.

Measuring Efficiency and Equity Framing in Economics Research

Using LLMs:

We measure how frontier research frames what is normatively at stake along the efficiency and equity dimension. We develop and validate an LLM-based measurement pipeline and apply it to 27,464 full-text journal articles from 1950 to 2021. Efficiency focused framing rises through the late 1980s, then declines as equity related framing expands after 1990, especially in applied work and policy evaluations. By 2021, papers with an equity component are about as common as papers framed purely around efficiency. President transmittal letters in the Economic Report of the President show a similar post 1990 shift toward equity, providing an external benchmark.

Here is the new NBER working paper by Sebastian Galiani, Ramiro H. Gálvez, Franco Mettola La Giglia & Raul A. Sosa.  I take this to be a sign of radical decline in the quality of our profession.  I am all for welfare economics considering values other than efficiency.  How about liberty, opportunity, and merit?  Actual people, especially Americans, care about those too.  The longstanding focus on equity as the relevant alternative to efficiency is one of the most blatant politicizations of economic research you will find.  Most people doing it are not even aware of that, they simply take for granted that is the relevant trade-off.

Indicate precisely what you mean to say…

The book I was reading is titled Encounters and Reflections: Conversations with Seth Benardete, here is one excerpt:

Michael: What was [Allan] Bloom like when you first met him?

Seth: He was supersensitive to people’s defects. He had antennae out, he knew exactly…

Robert: People’s weak spots?

Seth: Oh yes, it was extraordinary.

Ronna:  You continued talking to Bloom often over the years, didn’t you?

Seth: Pretty often. But he was often was distracted. He got impatient if you could not say what you wanted to say in more than half a sentence.

Robert: The pressure of the sound bite.

Seth: I remember the last time he came. He was about to write the book and he asked me what I thought the Phaedrus was about.  I summed it up in a sentence, and it didn’t make any impressions.

Ronna: Do you remember what the sentence was?

Seth: Something about the second speech turning into the third speech, and how this was connected to the double character of the human being.  I managed to get it into one sentence, but it wasn’t something he wanted to hear.

A fun book.  For all the criticisms you hear of Straussians, the few I have known I find are quite willing to speak their actual views and state of mind very clearly and directly.