Category: Economics
The slide toward growing protectionism?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one part of the argument:
Start with the distinction between trade in goods and trade in services. When a US manufacturer sells tractors overseas, that’s goods. When a US software firm creates an AI medical diagnostic tool and sells access via the internet to foreigners, that’s services.
It is much easier to keep trade “free” for the first category than for the second. The tractor crosses a border at a specific place and time. It may face additional regulation once inside the foreign country, but the transaction is relatively clean.
An online medical service, by contrast, could “cross the border” — that is, be used by someone outside the US — hundreds or thousands of times per day. It may also face licensing requirements, foreign liability law, extensive testing and, if the country has multiple jurisdictions, layers of regulation. In the European Union, the website itself would be subject to extensive regulation through laws regarding data, privacy and AI. Even within the EU, a supposed free-trade area, there are restrictions on trade in legal, medical and notary services, to name a few examples.
The wisdom or foolishness of these regulations is not the point. They exist, and most are not going away anytime soon. In fact, they will become only more important as the provision of services expands as a share of the global economy.
In the US, much of this growth occurs in education, health care and, especially, technology. Nvidia, for instance, depending on fluctuations in share prices that day, is often worth more than the entire German and Italian stock markets combined. Efforts to “harmonize” (i.e., increase) corporate taxation thus are more harmful to US interests than would have been the case a decade ago.
Any world trading order that broadly stays put is thus weighted against the exporting interests of the US. That is essential background for understanding the debate over trade prompted by President Donald Trump’s various proposals.
Recommended.
Milei Implements Peer Approval for Food
Reason: In a sweeping move to overhaul Argentina’s food trade policies, Javier Milei’s administration officially deregulated food imports and exports on Monday. The reform, outlined in Decree 35/2025, seeks to boost foreign trade, cut bureaucratic red tape, and lower consumer prices.
Federico Sturzenegger, head of the Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation, explained in a post on X that the measure “seeks cheaper food for Argentines and more Argentine food for the world.”
Under the new policy, food products and packaging certified by countries with “high sanitary surveillance” can now enter Argentina without any additional registration or approval processes. These items will be automatically recognized under the Argentine Food Code, cutting down on administrative delays and costs for importers.
The legislation identifies countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Israel, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union, as having similar or higher sanitary standards than Argentina.
As Sturzenegger explains in his post, this measure “eliminates requirements to register and authorize: samples, products, establishments, warehouses, utensils, and containers (32 pages of paperwork).”
An excellent “peer approval” policy and one that I have long supported when it comes to the FDA and drug approvals. In fact, since 2010 the US FDA has begun to recognize other countries as having comparable food safety systems. To date, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have been recognized with a Systems Recognition partnership.
Systems Recognition (SR) is a partnership between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and a foreign regulatory counterpart, in which the agencies have concluded that they operate comparable regulatory programs that yield similar food safety outcomes.
Argentina’s policy is unilateral and assumes equivalence if a country uses recognized standards (e.g., Codex Alimentarius) or has high sanitary vigilance while the FDA’s SR policy is bilateral and involves more regulatory harmonization and investigation. I prefer the Argentinian approach. Nevertheless, both programs have the goals of simplifying trade, avoiding duplicate inspections, and helping to prioritize scarce inspection resources.
I encourage the FDA to build on SR for food and extend it to drugs. This could be done in a minor and major way, both of which would useful. The minor reform would be peer approval for already-approved US drugs. In this way, importation could ease drug shortages. The FDA has done this in the past on an ad-hoc basis but it should be made permanent. The second, more major reform, would to extend peer-approval to any drug or device approved by a stringent authority.
*Abundance*, by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson
The NIH’s own research indicates that Pioneer Award recipients seem to produce influential, highly cited research. But despite efforts to help younger scientists, the share of basic NIH funding going to scientists under thirty-five continues to decline. In the 2004 fiscal year, the High-Risk, High-Reward Research program allocated about $200 million to scientists, a moderate decline since 2019. The amount was an almost negligible fraction — less than half of 1 percent — of the NIH’s annual budget for that year.
Self-recommending, you can pre-order here.
Democracy, Capitalism and Monarchy (Yarvin)
The Yarvin interview in the NYTimes magazine illustrates the change in vibes, but frankly, I was bored. It’s amusing when Yarvin tweaks liberals by pointing out that FDR was an authoritarian, but Liberal Fascism did it better.
More generally, much of Yarvin’s thinking is superficial. He thinks, for example, that capitalism works because firms are monarchies.
Yes. I think that having an effective government and an efficient government is better for people’s lives. When I ask people to answer that question, I ask them to look around the room and point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy, because these things that we call companies are actually little monarchies. You’re looking around, and you see, for example, a laptop, and that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy.
There are many errors here. First, Apple is one firm among countless others most of which do not produce hugely successful products. The big question is not how Apple produces but how Apple is produced. Firms operate as planned entities but they are embedded in and constrained by a broader sea of market competition. It’s the competitive environment that drives innovation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.
Second, Mises was closer to the truth when he wrote in Planned Chaos that it’s the consumers not the producers who are monarchs:
In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality. It determines directly the prices of consumer goods and indirectly the prices of all producer goods, viz., labor and material factors of production. It determines the emergence of profits and losses and the formation of the rate of interest. It determines every individual’s income…The market adjusts the efforts of all those engaged in supplying the needs of the consumers to the wishes of those for whom they produce, the consumers. It subjects production to consumption.
Capitalist firms are disciplined by the necessity of persuading consumers to purchase their products and by competition. Successful firms must continuously meet our desires and needs to survive. When Apple fails to do so, it will face the same fate as countless firms before it—obsolescence and failure.
Markets do hold lessons about governance, but Yarvin draws the wrong conclusions. Democracy, not monarchy, is the political system most analogous to capitalism. As Mises observed, “The market is a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote.” The analogy works both ways: voting in a democracy mirrors spending in a market. Both systems empower individuals—consumers or voters—to shape outcomes, whether by determining market success or selecting leaders.
Democracy and capitalism are both examples of open-access orders, systems characterized by dispersed power, low barriers to entry, and transparent, universally applicable rules. Such features foster adaptability, accountability, and broad participation—qualities essential to both economic and political success.
The West does face a modest “crisis” of democracy, but the root of this crisis lies in expecting democracy to do too much. We have collectivized decisions which are best left in the hands of individuals and markets but democracy is not a good way of making collective decisions.
Democracy is best understood as a constraint on government power, akin to a Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Democracy’s virtue is in providing a mechanism to remove bad rulers without resorting to bloodshed and its primary value lies in preventing catastrophic outcomes like mass famines and democide—a significant and undeniable merit. Autocracies and monarchies perform much less well on the big issues and, contrary to what many people think, autocracies do not grow faster, win more wars, or perform better on any meaningful comparison that has been investigated.
It is also essential to recognize that “democracy” encompasses a wide range of structures—parliamentary, presidential, constitutional, and more—and there is plenty of room for improved choice within the broader category. We can improve our democracy.
The real lesson from markets is not to create monarchs but to design systems that create choice and competition and allow citizens to remove leaders when they fail.
Hat tip for discussion: Connor.
The 1920s immigration restrictions
The 1920s immigration restrictions in the US did not affect manufacturing wages.
The US immigration restrictions of the 1920s lowered the occupational standings of whites and incumbent immigrants.
US counties with more immigrants excluded by the quotas of the 1920s saw increased in-migration.
During the Great Black Migration of the US, black southerners moved to northern counties, filling roles left by excluded immigrants.
During the Great Black Migration, blacks who migrated to counties with more excluded immigrants experienced greater economic gains.
That is from a new piece by Bin Xie in the Journal of Comparative Economics. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Keep an Eye on Crypto Regulation
Crypto regulation is likely to change very rapidly. I expect that SAB 121 will be overturned, perhaps even today. Overturning SAB 121 wouldn’t even be controversial because, as I wrote earlier, Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate both voted to overturn SAB 121 which was saved only by Biden’s veto.
Essentially, SAB 121 made it prohibitive for banks to offer custody services for crypto because that service would then impact all kinds of risk and asset regulations on the bank. Aside from singling out crypto, the SEC is not a regulator of banks so this seemed like a regulatory overreach.
I also hope that the tax rules on staking are simplified. Staking rewards paid in tokens should not be taxed until sold. Just as apples aren’t taxed when they grow on the tree but only when sold.
There are also a number of interesting cases working the way through the courts. Lewellen v. Garland seeks to clarify that crypto projects that don’t custody funds are not money transmitters (they can’t be since they never control funds and have no way of knowing the customer information that money transmitters must provide to the government). The case is particularly interesting to me because Lewellen, the plaintiff, is suing to set up a crypto based assurance contract based, in part, on my work (see also here with Cason and Zubrickas):
Pharos fills an important gap in the existing cryptocurrency financial system. Lewellen has seen that there are “public goods” that many people would be happy to contribute to financially, but only if supporters can be assured that the full amount to fund the public good will be raised. In other words, they will contribute if they can be assured that the public good will be deployed. Partial fundraising for these projects would not be acceptable. Examples include building infrastructure such as a bridge or hospital, building a war monument, funding an event like a festival or conference, funding a medical trial or scientific study, filing an advocacy lawsuit, or funding a movie production or other cultural good. Nobody wants to pay for these endeavours without knowing that others will pay enough to complete the project.
To address this dilemma, Pharos would deploy the concept of “assurance contracts.” An assurance contract is a system in which contributors commit money that is released to the planned recipient only if the fundraising goal is met by a certain date. Otherwise the money is returned to the would-be contributors. By promising a refund if the required amount is not raised, assurance contracts encourage more public goods to be funded through voluntary contributions. See Tabarrok, The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts, 96 Pub. Choice 345, 345-48 (1998).
Travis Fisher on electricity privatization (from my email)
I’m a long-time reader and first-time emailer. I just read your blog post from earlier this month about privatizing public services like water and electric utilities.
My colleague Glen Lyons and I are developing a way to introduce more competition into the electricity sector, which some believe to be hopelessly uncompetitive. The idea is to allow new, large electricity customers to form new electricity networks. The change to state statute would officially introduce contestability into many markets, and we think actual rival networks would be built to satisfy new load. They would probably have to be large, electrically, meaning they would likely need to serve multiple large customers (today you can go off-grid, but only to supply yourself).
We aren’t necessarily trying to revolutionize the existing grid or change the way a typical residential customer receives electric service, although there may be beneficial spillover effects for all customers. And the idea is not brand new (I find myself agreeing with many of Wayne Crews’ views from the late 1990s), but the concept’s technological feasibility is at an all-time high, and the flood of new demand from data centers and new manufacturers is creating the right political environment to enact new policies.
Here is my description of the policy: https://www.cato.org/blog/what-would-consumer-regulated-electricity-look
Plus an interview we did recently: https://secondpower.substack.com/p/wacc
Here is the Cato bio of Travis Fisher.
A Galt’s Gulch for Talent
A new paper in the QJE, The Global Race for Talent: Brain Drain, Knowledge Transfer, and Growth, by Marta Prato uses extensive data on inventors and their migration to make the following points.
(i) gross migration is asymmetric, with brain drain (net emigration) from the EU to the United States; (ii) migrants increase their patenting by 33% a year after migration; (iii) migrants continue working with inventors at origin after moving, although less frequently; (iv) migrants’ productivity gains spill over to their collaborators at origin, who increase patenting by 16% a year when a co-inventor emigrates.
Notice that migration doesn’t just relocate talent from the EU to the US; it amplifies talent. Preventing “brain drain” would create short-term gains for the EU but retaining talent at lower productivity would stifle long-term innovation and patenting, ultimately slowing growth for both the EU and the world. In short, even the EU gains from sending talent to the US! The effect would be much larger if we can import high-skill immigrants from countries where their skills are even less productive than in the EU. Ideally, other nations could replicate the US institutions that supercharge productivity, creating global economic gains. For now, however, the US seem to be a unique Galt’s Gulch for talent.
Prato concludes with a practical suggestion:
On the migration policy side, doubling the size of the U.S. H1B visa program increases U.S. and EU growth by 4% in the long run, because it sorts inventors to where they produce more innovations and knowledge spillovers.
Of course, when we expand the H1B program, we should allocate the visas by compensation rather than by lottery. (Jeremy Neufeld runs the numbers). In this way, we would get the most valuable workers. And please don’t tell me that we need a lottery so some poor startup can hire workers. No. Unless you have some compelling argument for why there is a massive externality and why lotteries (lotteries!) are the best way to target that externality we should let price allocate.
Ross Marchand on postal service privatization (from my email)
I really enjoyed your piece on USPS privatization. I recently wrote about the subject too. Even in the absence of privatization, relaxing the mail monopoly and allowing competition would make for better, more reliable mail services. This is true even in countries with a “national champion”-style carrier subject to a universal service obligation.
It appears that, over the long-run, nations such as Germany and the U.K. that relax their monopolies eventually come around to (at least considering) ending their universal service obligations. The advantage of the “end the monopoly first” approach is it allows countries to experiment with greater competition in a less risky and threatening manner than whole immediate privatization.
The AEA is making social media recommendations
Timur Kuran is right, they have no business doing this. Furthermore the quality of the work is not befitting an AEA journal. Demonstrated preference is not stressed, for instance that even survey respondents are about 10x more likely to be reading Twitter than BlueSky. Maybe it is all a network effect and they would prefer the other network if it were much larger, but maybe not. Talk is cheap, especially when the AEA is surveying you. Or maybe it is a network effect, but the dominant network cannot be broken and we should just work to improve it rather than defecting. Or maybe it is better to have economists on the platform where so much of the AI news is coming? Maybe not, but is this trade-off (a key economic idea) even considered? And did they perform his survey before the (quite significant) improvements in the X algorithm?
Think like an economist, people! Or should the JEL instead create a new research classification for “mood affiliation”? Kevin Bryan adds comment.
Here is your periodic reminder that the AEA elects a president through a process that allows only one person to run for the office.
Gordon Tullock was right
Do minimum wage changes affect workplace health and safety? Using the universe of workers’ compensation claims in California over 2000-2019, we estimate whether minimum wage shocks affect the rate of workplace injuries. Our identification exploits both geographic variation in state-and city-level minimum wages and local occupation-level variation in exposure to minimum wage changes. We find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage increases the injury rate by 11% in an occupation-metro area labor market which is fully exposed to the minimum wage increase. Our results imply an elasticity of the workplace injury rate to minimum-wage-induced wage changes of 1.4. We find particularly large effects on injuries relating to cumulative physical strain, suggesting that employers respond to minimum wage increases by intensifying the pace of work, which in turn increases injury risk.
That is from a new working paper by Michael Davies, R. Jisung Park, and Anna Stansbury, MIT and U. Penn, by the way. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Net neutrality, we hardly knew ye
That is the topic of a recent Bloomberg column. Here is the opening bit:
One of the longest, most technical and, as it turns out, most inconsequential public-policy debates of the 21st century was about net neutrality. Now that a federal appeals court has effectively ended the debate by striking down the FCC’s net neutrality rules, it’s worth asking what we’ve learned.
If you have forgotten the sequence of events, here’s a quick recap: In 2015, during President Barack Obama’s presidency and after years of debate, the Federal Communications Commission issued something called the Open Internet Order, guaranteeing net neutrality, which is broadly defined as the principle that internet service providers treat all communications equally, offering both users and content providers consistent service and pricing. Two years later, under President Donald Trump, the FCC rescinded the net neutrality requirement. It was then reinstated under President Joe Biden in 2024, until being struck down earlier this month.
Hardly anyone cares or even notices, and the rest of the column explains why. Here is one part of that argument:
The actual reality has been somewhat different. Bandwidth has expanded, and Netflix transmissions do not interfere with Facebook, or vice versa. There is plenty of access to go around. That has been the case during periods with net neutrality and without.
So one lesson of the net neutrality debate comes from economics: Supply is elastic, at least when regulation allows it to be.
Internet experts Tim Wu, Cory Doctorow, Farhad Manjoo and many others were just plain, flat out wrong about this, mostly due to their anti-capitalist mentality.
Tax incidence theory and congestion tolls
One More Hospitality Restaurants
The New York company will refund $9 to diners driving into the city for meals at four of its Greenwich Village restaurants. That includes Italian restaurant Osteria 57, Italian seafood restaurant Alice, Italian cafe Travelers Poets & Friends, and also-Italian seafood restaurant Alaluna. Osteria: 57 West 10th Street near Sixth Avenue; Alice: 126 West 13th Street between Sixth and Seventh avenues; Travelers: 457 Sixth Avenue at West 11th Street; Alaluna: 453 Sixth Avenue near West 11th Street
Here is a link to other examples. Here is a related NYT piece. I am not suggesting that will be the typical equilibrium, as it should demand on elasticities of demand and supply, and also the time horizon over which you consider adjustment. But do note that if you are a NIMBY vs. YIMBY type, you ought to conclude that a lot of the congestion tax will fall on landlords, ultimately, and not drivers.
Via Steve Rossi.
Anonymous Attention and Abuse
There is a new paper by Florian Ederer, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Kyle Jensen. It concerns what happens on EJMR, and abusive rhetoric in on line economic discourse. I have not yet read it, but very likely it is of interest. Here is the direct paper link.
Some game theory of Greenland
It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory. Along some dimensions that is likely. But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.
I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty. The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same. In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.
One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.” Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.
Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate. If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider. A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent. Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.
So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive. And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table. For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”
It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.