Category: Education

Rejection Therapy

Jason Comely writes to me:

Rejection Therapy is a real life game with one rule: to be rejected by someone every single day, for 30 days consecutive. There are even suggestion cards available for "rejection attempts" (although they are not essential to the game).

I designed the game for myself about a year ago because I wasn't getting out of my comfort zone anymore. I was afraid of rejection. Rejection Therapy was a way I "incentivized" getting out of my comfort zone, and being rejected became a desired end result.

Are you comforted to learn that?:

Rejection then must be the sister of death.

And yet…you are not supposed to reject others.  Every blogger should ponder the implications of Rejection Therapy.

On which issues will we become less moral?

Ross Douthat considers the hoary question of which current practices we will someday condemn, linking also to Appiah, who raised it, and Will Wilkinson.  Prisons, factory farming, immigration barriers, and abortion are among the nominations.  I would suggest an alternate query, namely which practices currently considered to be outrageous will make a moral comeback in the court of public opinion.  Torture and loss of privacy — in some of its forms at least — already seem to be on the rise, at least in terms of their acceptability in the United States.

What kind of moral status will "probabilistically causing natural disasters" have in the future?  What status does it have now? 

With rising health care costs and tight budgets in many countries, can we not expect euthanasia to rise in moral popularity?  Will the principles for cutting off care force us to transparently embrace some ugly moral principle, or will the ugliness be our lack of transparency and arbitrariness on these matters?

Preemptive warfare feels unpopular, because Iraq and Afghanistan have gone poorly, and because there have no more major successful terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.  I predict the idea will make a comeback.  Robot and drone warfare may become even more commonplace, as will targeting at a distance and selective cyberwarfare.  Those practices don't have to be wrong, but they could lead us to be morally cavalier about fighting a destructive war, even more than we are today.  By the way, the French seem pretty happy about the recent U.S. intensification of drone warfare in Pakistan, which is directed at stopping an planned attack in Europe.  

Tolerance of gay individuals and alternative lifestyles is at a historic high.  I would not endorse a crude "regression toward the mean" hypothesis, but we should at least try it on for size.  That tolerance is as likely to fall back as to progress.

Won't targeted genetic tests make abortion more popular and less sanctioned?  Rural India is already full of ultrasound clinics.  Won't the possibility of discrimination on the basis of genes (not many will refuse to do it, or make use of the information, if only implicitly) make discrimination more acceptable altogether?

On the bright side, totalitarianism and mass murder of one's civilian population have been out of style since the Nazis, the Soviets, and Mao.  In that sense we still can expect the future to be morally superior to the past.  But those gains were achieved some time ago.  If we capitalize them, and take them for granted, at the other margins I am not convinced that we are going to see lots of moral improvement over the next fifty to one hundred years.

Department of Unintended Consequences

Here's Stanley Fish:

Commentators who explain smugly that O’Donnell’s position on masturbation (that it is a selfish, solitary act) is contradicted by her Ayn Rand-like attack on collectivism, or who wax self-righteous about Paladino’s comparing Sheldon Silver to Hitler and promising to wield a baseball bat in Albany, or who laugh at Sharron Angle for being in favor of Scientology (she denies it) and against fluoridation and the Department of Education, are doing these candidates a huge favor. They are saying, in effect, these people are stupid, they’re jokes; and the implication (sometimes explicitly stated) is that anyone who takes them the least bit seriously doesn’t get the joke and is stupid, too.

Sometimes I think of the political blogosphere as a huge commons.  An individual blogger can gain in readership or influence by attacking or ridiculing some enemy, but at the cost of making that enemy stronger in the world as a whole.

I also believe that every time the words "stimulus" or "fiscal policy" are blogged it helps the electoral prospects of the Republican Party, no matter what the content of the blog post.

No Religion, Know Religion

From a recent Pew Survey on U.S. Religious Knowledge, atheists and agnostics know more about religion than most religionists.  Atheists and agnostics score particularly well on knowing something about world religions but also do better than most on Christianity.  The effect remains even after controlling for education.

Take a short version of the quiz here. Graphic from the NYTimes.

Addendum: The Atlantic has a good run down on commentary. I was especially amused by religion scholar Stephen Prothero's line "those who think religion is a con know more about it than those who think it is God's gift to humanity."

28religion-articleInline

Opinion warning signs

Robin Hanson makes a list of "Signs that your opinions function more to signal loyalty and ability than to estimate truth:"

  1. You find it hard to be enthusiastic for something until you know that others oppose it.
  2. You have little interest in getting clear on what exactly is the position being argued.
  3. Realizing that a topic is important and neglected doesn’t make you much interested.
  4. You have little interest in digging to bigger topics behind commonly argued topics.
  5. You are less interested in a topic when you don’t foresee being able to talk about it.
  6. You are uncomfortable taking a position near the middle of the opinion distribution.
  7. You are uncomfortable taking a position of high uncertainty about who is right.
  8. You care far more about current nearby events than similar distant or past/future events.
  9. You find it easy to conclude that those who disagree with you are insincere or stupid.
  10. You are reluctant to change your publicly stated positions in response to new info.
  11. You are reluctant to agree a rival’s claim, even if you had no prior opinion on the topic.
  12. More?

I would add: You feel uncomfortable taking a position which raises the status of the people you usually disagree with.

From my paper on for-profit education

Up through the 1980s, the Philippines offered a relatively level playing field for non-profit and for-profit institutions of higher education.  What was the result?:

Unlike Filipino non-profits, the for-profits typically did not have entrance examinations, and accepted any student who has completed a secondary education and can pay the relevant fees (Zwaenepoel 1975, pp.163-4).  From a survey of Manila institutions, the for-profit institutions had an average student to fulltime faculty ratio of 27:1, whereas the non-profit religious institutions had an average ratio of 19:1 (Miao 1971, pp.71-2). For-profit institutions tend to invest in classrooms to accommodate large enrollments, rather than investing in library facilities, book holdings, or laboratory facilities. Furthermore, Filipino for-profit institutions tend to limit their class offerings to low-cost, labor-intensive classes, such as teacher education and commerce (Zwaenepoel 1975, pp.322, 342, 348, 587).  As of 1970, nonsectarian institutions (typically for-profits) spent four percent of their total budget on sites, equipment, and facilities, whereas sectarian institutions (typically non-profits) spent a much higher 12.41 percent (Isidro and Ramos 1973, p.157).  As of 1971, for-profits held an average of 2.58 books per student, whereas non-profits held an average of 8.9 books per student (Zwaenepoel 1975, pp.347-8).

Filipino for-profits also produce a different kind of education. Students from for-profit institutions tend to take standardized vocational exams in much greater number, although they pass them at a lower rate.  These facts reflect both the vocational emphasis of for-profits as well as the lower academic reputation of their students.  Based on a sample of institutions from the Manila area (from 1963 and 1968), students from nonprofit religious institutions pass these standardized tests at an average rate of 38 percent, whereas students from for-profit institutions pass the same tests at a lower rate of 18 percent.  For-profits, however, produce a much greater number of students taking the tests, and therefore pass a much greater number of students through the tests.  Students at for-profits are approximately ten times more likely to take the tests.  Adjusting for the lower pass rate from for-profits, the for-profits are putting about five times the number of students through the tests as the non-profits, even though for-profits educated no more than three-fifths of all Filipino students at the time (Miao 1971, p. 207).

This is broadly similar to the patterns we see in the United States.  You might conclude that the for-profit status is more useful when an external test takes care of the signaling, and that a non-profit status is required when no test certifies quality.  But why exactly should that be the case?  Is the non-profit institution, by being so jealous of reputation, perks, and donations itself, a better producer of signals?  If signaling yields so much private value, why can't a private for-profit make a sufficiently strong commitment to a credible signal?

My paper has been published in this book.

What is the signaling value of finishing high school?

According to a new paper from Paco Martorell and Damon Clark, not so much:

Although economists acknowledge that various indicators of educational attainment (e.g., highest grade completed, credentials earned) might serve as signals of a worker’s productivity, the practical importance of education-based signaling is not clear. In this paper we estimate the signaling value of a high school diploma, the most commonly held credential in the U.S. To do so, we compare the earnings of workers that barely passed and barely failed high school exit exams, standardized tests that, in some states, students must pass to earn a high school diploma. Since these groups should, on average, look the same to firms (the only difference being that “barely passers” have a diploma while “barely failers” do not), this earnings comparison should identify the signaling value of the diploma. Using linked administrative data on earnings and education from two states that use high school exit exams (Florida and Texas), we estimate that a diploma has little effect on earnings. For both states, we can reject that individuals with a diploma earn eight percent more than otherwise-identical individuals without one; combining the state-specific estimates, we can reject signaling values larger than five or six percent. While these confidence intervals include economically important signaling values, they exclude both the raw earnings difference between workers with and without a diploma and the regression-adjusted estimates reported in the previous literature.

The full paper you will find here.  This to me looks like a fairly clean test.  I still think signaling matters a great deal, but that is distinct from thinking that a high school diploma is the relevant form of such signaling.

*Doing More With Less*

That's a new book out, edited by Joshua C. Hall, and it is a collection of essays with the subtitle Making Colleges Work Better.  My essay in the volume, co-authored with Sam Papenfuss, is a look at for-profit higher education.  It's not about the recent lending scandals, but rather the general question of why for-profits do quite well in vocational areas and in areas where the student is eventually certified by relatively objective tests.  Non-profits, in contrast, remain dominant in the liberal arts and in areas where quality is harder to measure.  What can we learn from this pattern of market segmentation about a) the true nature of education, and b) trust and agency problems in both non-profits and for-profits?  These cross-sectional questions have received surprisingly little attention and for-profit education in general has not attracted much research scrutiny, relative to its size and rate of growth.  Yet these questions date back to Plato, Socrates, and the Sophists.  Overall I believe that the not-for-profit model for higher education is robust.

Here is an interesting article on the recent growth in elite for-profit schools at the high school level and below.

The value of a liberal arts education

Seth Roberts writes:

…is “liberal education” so hard to defend that no one can coherently defend it?

Bryan Caplan also seems skeptical, although I do not recall if he has tackled liberal arts education per se.

A liberal arts education helps us think with greater subtlety, even if it does not improve our performance on subsequent standardized tests.  I see an impact here even on the lesser students in state universities.  It also helps explain how the U.S. so suddenly leaps from having so-so high schools to outstanding graduate schools; how many other countries emphasize liberal arts education in between?

Liberal arts education forces us to decode systems of symbols.  We learn how complex systems of symbols can be and what is required to decode them and why that can be a pleasurable process.  That skill will come in handy for a large number of future career paths.  It will even help you enjoy TV shows more.

For related reasons, I believe that people who learn a second language as adults are especially good at understanding how other people might see things differently.

I am interested in food (among other topics), not only because of the food itself.  I also view it as an investment in understanding symbolic meaning, cultural codes of excellence, the transmission of ideas, and also how the details of an area fit together to form a coherent whole.  I believe this knowledge makes me smarter and wiser, although I am not sure which mass-produced formal test would pick up any effects.  I view this interest as continuing my liberal arts education, albeit through self-education.  

Up close, I see Yana getting four years of a liberal arts education and I believe that her school is a very good one.  I have not seriously flirted with the idea that she is learning nothing important.  

How should economic instruction change?

I'll transplant the links in from Mark Thoma:

Here's my response, along with responses by Alberto Alesina, Laurence Kotlikoff, Michael Pettis, Gilles Saint-Paul, Paul Seabright, Richard Baldwin, Michael Bordo, Guillermo Calvo, Tyler Cowen, Harold James, David Laibson, and Eswar Prasad [All Responses].

I realized I forgot to talk about the need for more economic history, but that is discussed by several others so at least the point got made.

Serial hyperspecializers, and how they think

The highly-regarded-but-still undervalued Elijah Millgram has a paper on this topic, and he seems to be preparing a book.  Here is one good short bit:

So one reasonable strategy for a hyperspecializer will be to divide its energies between activities that don't share standards and methods of assessment, and let's abbreviate that to the fuzzier, problematic, but more familiar word, "values." It will be a normal side effect of pursuing the parallel hyperspecialization strategy that its values are incommensurable. The hedonic signals that guide reallocation of resources between niches do not require that niche-bound desires or goals or standards be comparable across niches. If you are a serial (and so, often a parallel) hyperspecializer, incommensurability in your values turns out not to be a mark of practical irrationality, or even an obstacle to full practical rationality, but rather, the way your evaluative world will look to you, when you are doing your practical deliberation normally and successfully. Evaluative incommensurability is a threat to the sort of rationality suitable for Piltdown Man. Serial hyperspecializers gravitate towards and come equipped for incommensurability.

Here is a good review of Millgram's latest book, which argues, among other things, that truth is messy in nature.

Adam Phillips serves up a Bob Dylan quotation: "I have always admired people who have left behind them an incomprehensible mess."

Zero price markets in everything, religious search engines

Shea Houdmann runs SeekFind, a Colorado Springs-based Christian search engine that only returns results from websites that are consistent with the Bible. He says SeekFind is designed "to promote what we believe to be biblical truth" and excludes sites that don't meet that standard.

Houdmann says a search on his site would not turn up pornography. If you search “gay marriage,” you would get results that argue against gay marriage. And if you type in “Democratic Party,” your first search result is a site on Marxism.

But SeekFind isn’t the only search engine carving a niche market among religious Internet users. There is also Jewogle for Jews and I'mHalal, a Muslim search engine that started in the Netherlands.

The Muslim site is already getting ten million users (or is that site visits?) a month.  The full story is here and for the pointer I thank Anastasia.

Addendum: I couldn't get the Christian search engine to work at all; the site blames heavy traffic [I tried again; googling my name gets you to Tyler Perry.  If you google "economics", "Islamic economics" pops up before "Christian economics" and "postmodern economics" comes before both].  The Halal site brought up more or less normal results both for my name and for "economics," although page one for the latter had some squirrely (non-Muslim) results, such as Hunter College.  I don't appear in Jewogle at all, but an economics query will bring you to a list of Nobel Laureates.