*Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years*

The author is Diarmaid MacCulloch and here is one excerpt:

…it was small wonder that the preoccupations and character of Ethiopian faith developed on very individual (not to say eccentric) lines.  It was the Ethiopians, for instance, who meditated on various Coptic apocryphal accounts of Pontius Pilate and decided that the Roman governor who presided over Christ's crucivixion should become a Confessor of the Church, to be celebrated in their sacred art and given a feast day in June and a star place in the liturgy at Epiphany, the greatest feast of the year, when the priest intoned a phrase from the Psalms which was also an echo of his words: "I will wash my hands in innocence."  The Copts and Ethiopians did not forget Pilate's complicity in the death of Christ, but in retelling his story they made him realize the full extent of his guilt, and they brought a symmetry to his fate by making him die on a cross…

I can't remember the last time I read a book that was so chockful of information and offered such a steady flow of interesting, substantive points.  Virtually every sentence counts and as a result the book is quite slow to read — in the good sense.  The writing flows very well.

It promises you 1016 pp. of text but in "real terms" you are getting much, much more.  If you are only going to read a few books on European or religious history, this probably should be one of them.  It is broadly in the Paul Johnson mode but better researched, more serious, and less subjective, though it is ultimately subjective nonetheless.  Overall I would describe the author as sympathetic to Christianity and he comes from an Anglican background, although I am not sure how "formal" a Christian or Anglican he is, at least not from the vantage point of p.346.

If there's any danger in buying this one, it's that the book is better than you are.

Nonetheless you can purchase it here.  You can find a good review here.

Do women today have more libertarian freedom than in 1880?

Bryan Caplan set off a debate which has spread to many corners of the blogosphere.  I have no interest in recapping and evaluating the whole thing but I'd like to make a simple but neglected point: negative liberty and positive liberty are not separable.

Here is one simple scenario.  Let's say the government tells me I have to buy and place a five-foot ceramic grizzly bear statue on my front lawn.  How bad an act of coercion is that?  If I have an upper-middle class income, it's an inconvenience and an aesthetic blight but no great tragedy.  If I have a Haitian per capita income, it is a very bad act of coercion and it will impinge on my life prospects severely.  I either give up some food or they send me to jail.

In other words, even theories of negative liberty — purely libertarian theories where only negative liberty seems to matter — require standards for degrees of coercion.  Those standards will very often depend on how much wealth the victims of the coercion have and they will depend on a more general concept of positive liberty.  Negative liberty standards can't help but seep into a concern with consequences.

Fast forward to said debate.  When people are poor, apparently small interventions can be quite crushing and quite coercive.  To cite the "smaller" interventions of 1880 doesn't much convince me.  The real impact of the depredations against women was very, very large, even from some "small interventions" (and I don't think they were all small).

(Also, I would not in this case take the *legal* oppressions to be a stand-alone or exogenous variable, separable from more general societal attitudes.  There were various male desires to oppress women, which took a mix of legal and non-legal forms.  Asking how bad the "government-only" restrictions were is an odd division of the problem, since the governmental and non-governmental restrictions were an integrated package which worked together in non-linear fashion.)

Every negative liberty theorist is a positive liberty theorist in disguise and this comes out once they start citing degress of outrage, degrees of harm, degrees of coercion, and the like.

I suppose my views are close to those of Will.  I also largely agree with Dave Schmidtz and Jason Brennan in their symposium at Cato UnBound.

Who are the best economists without a Nobel Prize?

Bob T., a loyal MR reader, asks:

Who are the best economists who did not win the Nobel Prize since its inception until today, e.g., Alchian, Tullock, Tiebout(?), and Barro?

I'll add Albert Hirschman and Anthony Downs to that list.  Who else?  Kevin Murphy is a tremendous economist, qua economist, although he doesn't fit the traditional Nobel mold.

Why do colleges care about extracurricular activities?

Bryan Caplan asks:

Colleges care about applicants' extracurricular activities.  Employers don't.  What's going on?  I'm tempted to just repeat my adage that, "Non-profits are crazy," but even non-profit employers don't seem very concerned about how you spend your spare time. 

Theories?

I'll take the bait.  Colleges want to expand the heterogeneity of the selection criteria so they can pick who they want.  If it's a top college or university, mostly this means limiting the number of Asians and maximizing the number of future donors and by the way those two goals tend to move in tandem.  Other than legacy admissions, I wonder what other features of applications predict future donations?  Might extra-curricular activities be one candidate here?

Real theories of the financial crisis

I don't agree with the emphasis on energy bottlenecks (although in the author's defense read this new paper), but there is much of interest in this rumination:

I was working backwards above but the whole crisis makes perfect sense if you start with lack of high ROE investment opportunities in the world as a whole, with local markets struggling to incorporate this information appropriately. To institutional investors, ranging from pension funds to insurance companies, fixed income investments appear disproportionately attractive in this environment, driving long-term interest rates low. Consequently, mortgage rates drop, making equity investment in housing attractive for homeowners. Even in the absence of a well-functional mortgage market (common in other countries that also had a significant housing boom) equity investment in housing appears to have the characteristics of a fixed-income investment, which again appears attractive in the absence of high ROE investments elsewhere. All of this boosts housing prices significantly above cost, which creates apparent arbitrage opportunities for the homebuilding industry and related industries (mortgage, finance, materials, machinery, etc). This temporarily cushions the blow to the economy of not having high ROE investment opportunities, by becoming the high ROE investment opportunity itself. But since the demand for housing is driven by miscalculation to start with (lower long-term interest rates driven by lower expected economic growth should not lead to an increase in real estate prices, except to the extent that the underlying real estate itself represents a bottleneck to growth), those high ROE investment opportunities turn out to have been illusory and cause significant losses for whoever in the supply chain is stuck with the excess inventory. The growth in supply of housing uncovers the illusion and the resulting price volatility causes a credit crisis and a severe economic downturn, as the economy faces both the temporary shock of price volatility and the long term shock of lack of high ROE investment opportunities.

And what explains the lack of high ROE investment opportunities in the first place? There are many places to look, but the biggest is the supply bottleneck in energy. While the growth in information technology has been impressive, as is the consequent potential for increase in productivity, none of this can increase return on capital against the backdrop of energy supply bottleneck. This is hard to explain, though my posts in the following thread effectively discuss the logic behind why energy scarcity will lead to low long term interest rates and low growth, not high energy prices:

http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/11…regime-397397/

I don't know who wrote that, but I thank a loyal MR reader for pointing it out to me.  Here is related data on MPK.

Sperm and egg donors

Via Eric Barker, we learn this:

Donor recruitment at the egg agencies and sperm banks appeared to reinforce these stereotypes, Almeling found. Egg agency advertisements tend to appeal to women’s altruism, while men are informed of a job opportunity. The application process for donors also favors what Almeling called “gendered stereotypes of selfless motherhood and distant fatherhood.” Although egg donors stood to be handsomely compensated, women who indicated there was a financial motive behind their participation were routinely rejected in favor of applicants who expressed more altruistic motives, such as the desire to “help” infertile couples. Sperm banks, meanwhile, were much less explicit about the need to appear altruistic.

The entire post is interesting.

The economics of fashion

One of my two talks today is on this topic.

Obviously fashion is a signal and maybe it is also a relatively efficient signal.  To the extent signals are wasteful (debatable of course, given sorting considerations), you want a signal which does not have much free entry —  to limit rent-seeking costs – and a signal whose price is greater than marginal cost, to limit total costs of production.  High couture satisfies these requirements to some degree.

Here is a short essay on the economics of fashion.  Here is McClure, Coelho, and others on the economics of fashion.

Kevin Drum’s ten reasons to be pessimistic about the economy

I'm just glad he didn't decide to list twenty:

  1. This is a balance sheet recession, not a Fed-induced recession. Paul Volcker caused the 1981 recession by jacking up interest rates and he ended it by lowering them. That's not going to happen this time.
  2. In fact, there won't be any further stimulus from lower interest rates. They're already at zero, and Ben Bernanke has made it clear that he doesn't plan to effectively lower them further by setting a higher inflation target.
  3. Consumer debt is still way too high. There's more deleveraging on the horizon, and that's going to make consumer-led growth difficult.
  4. The financial sector remains fragile and there could still be another serious shock somewhere in the world.
  5. There are strong political pressures to reduce the budget deficit. That makes further fiscal stimulus unlikely.
  6. Housing prices are still too high. They're bound to fall further, especially given rising interest rates combined with the end of government support programs.
  7. Our current account balance remains pretty far out of whack. Fixing this in the short term will hinder growth, while leaving it to the long term just kicks the can down the road.
  8. The Fed still has to unwind its balance sheet. That has the potential to stall growth.
  9. Oil prices are rising. This not only causes problems of its own, but also makes #7 worse.
  10. Unemployment and long-term unemployment continue to look terrible. Yes, these are lagging indicators, but still.

*Stumbling on Wins*

The subtitle is Two Economists Expose the Pitfalls on the Road to Victory in Professional Sports and the authors are David Berri and Martin Schmidt.  I liked this bit (p.21) about the factors which do not explain free agents' salaries in the NBA:

Free Throw Shooting Efficiency

Steals

Turnovers

Size of Market Where Player Signs

Playing the Center, Power Forward, or Point Guard position

Race of Player

Here is previous coverage on their earlier book, The Wages of Wins.