Women and wealth
This new NBER working paper has an abstract in which every sentence is interesting:
The extent of and changes in inter-generational mobility of wealth are central to understanding dynamics of wealth inequality but hard to measure. Using estate tax returns data, we observe that the share of women among the very wealthy (top 0.01%) in the United States peaked in the late 1960s, reaching almost 50%. Three decades on, women’s share had declined to one third, a return to pre-war levels. We argue that this pattern mirrors the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth in the economy and thus the gender-composition of the wealthiest may serve as a proxy for inter-generational wealth mobility. This proxy for "dynastic wealth” suggests that wealth mobility in the past century decreased until the 1970s and rose thereafter, a pattern consistent with technological change driving long term trends in income inequality and mobility. Greater wealth mobility in recent decades is also consistent with the simultaneous rise in top income shares and relatively stable wealth concentration.
Do note the wealth mobility discussed toward the end might be occurring only among the relatively rich, as described by Pareto’s "circulation of elites." The pointer is from the "still excellent but why doesn’t he post more?" New Economist blog, which also references related work about the UK.
The researcher is Lena Edlund, here is her home page. Here is her article "Hermaphroditism: What’s Not to Like?" If you are in the popular press and are looking for a fascinating, undercovered economist to profile, try Lena Edlund. Here is her paper on "Sex and the City." Here is her paper on why "love marriage," as opposed to arranged marriage, is good for the economy.
The Economic Naturalist, part II
Why do women’s clothes always button from the left, while men’s clothes always button from the right?
…This is an example in which history really seems to matter. When buttons first appeared in the seventeenth century, they were seen only on garments of the wealthy. At that time it was the custom for men to dress themselves and for women to be dressed by servants. Having women’s shirts button from the left thus made things easier for the mostly right-handed servants who dressed them…
Might there be a continuing rational reason for this difference, namely that the women’s approach looks better (does it?) but is harder, thus scaring off the men? This sounds like a question for Fashion-Incubator.
In any case that excerpt is from Robert Frank’s new The Economic Naturalist. Here is Craig Newmark’s review of the book. Here is Brad DeLong on the book. Here is my previous post on the book.
My secret blog
Soon you will hear more about my secret blog. Here is my previous post on secret blogs.
Sanity about guest workers, from James Surowiecki
Guest workers are also, paradoxically, less likely than illegal immigrants to become permanent residents. The U.S. already has a number of smaller–and less well-designed–temporary-worker programs, and there’s no evidence that workers in those plans routinely overstay their visas. Mexican workers, contrary to popular belief, do not, generally, intend to live their entire lives in the U.S. Instead, as the sociologists Douglas Massey and Jorge Durand concluded after a comprehensive study of immigrant attitudes and behavior, most want to work “for short periods to generate an alternative source of household income . . . or to accumulate savings for a specific purpose,” like buying a house in Mexico. This is harder to do as an illegal immigrant than as a guest worker, both because illegal workers are paid less and because when an illegal goes home he runs the risk of getting caught. One remarkable study found that after border enforcement was stepped up in 1993 the chances of an illegal immigrant returning to Mexico to stay fell by a third.
Here is the full piece. Please leave comments of high quality. Let’s try two new norms for comments. First, don’t say anything stronger against another commenter (or blogger) than "I don’t agree with you John." Second, it is fine if you are commenting on a single thread more than once, but you should be adding new arguments and material, not just debating with another commenter.
Addendum: Megan Non-McArdle makes excellent points about civility.
How Should the FDA Incentivize?
The FDA often wants manufacturers to provide additional studies such as for pediatric uses or for testing of off-label uses of already approved drugs. How should the FDA incentivize these studies? Long-time reader Steve (who has good reason to know and thus shall otherwise remain anonymous) writes:
I was reading an article about pediatric drug testing and the BPCA, and I had an epiphany–the people at the
table don’t have the incentives necessary to solve the problem.…possible solutions to the problem of limited pediatric testing appear to boil down to: 1) Modify the reward (primarily through exclusivity); 2)
Give out grants; and 3) Force studies through a government mandate.
These solutions reflect the interests of the three groups sitting at
the bargaining table, i.e., 1) Big pharma, 2) Academics, and 3)
Bureaucrats. What is totally missing is the idea that incentives can be created on both the risk and reward side of the equation. … For example, if the FDA fast-
tracked NDAs with pediatric data, and guaranteed a decision in 90 days, they could, with minimal cost, cause a major shift in incentives.…Any thoughts on how the situation can be improved?
The FDA significantly raises the costs of creating new drugs – there are some benefits in better safety and efficacy but I think the current system results in too much drug lag and drug loss. I would cut back on FDA regulation considerably but I am not against more government-financed studies of safety and efficacy. Once a drug is on the market and especially when it is off-patent, knowledge about the drug is a public good and thus often underprovided. I would thus reduce the FDA’s control over drug choice but increase the budget for drug information e.g. through NIH financed studies like the Women’s Health Initiative which shockingly showed that then widely used homorone replacement therapy increased not decreased coronary disease.
Readers?
Why so much youth entrepreneurship in the U.S.?
Here is my latest column, featuring wunderkind Ben Casnocha; it has been titled "The Loose Reins on U.S. Teenagers Can Produce Trouble or Entrepreneurs." Here is an excerpt:
The longstanding criticism of the American school system is that even
in the better schools, too many students just “get by” rather than
engage in a rigorous curriculum. This academic leniency is bad for many
average or subpar students, but it also allows some students to
flourish. Relatively loose family structures have similar effects;
American children are especially likely to be working on their own
projects, rather than being directed by parents and elders.
American philanthropy is also a significant and unheralded factor behind American youth entrepreneurship; many young entrepreneurs used elders as mentors or asked them for financial assistance. Furthermore "selling to the young" is much derided by critics such as Juliet Schor or Benjamin Barber, but it has its benefits. Sometimes advertising inspires the young to start marketing themselves, as did Ben Casnocha.
You can read more about Ben, who started his successful company at age 14 (he is now 19), in the article. Here is Ben’s blog. Here is the web site for Ben’s new book. Ben will soon be attending Claremont McKenna college, I am curious to see whether or not it drives him crazy.
My review of Taleb’s *The Black Swan*
The book is very stimulating, here is one excerpt from my review on Slate.com:
Another human failing stems from the nature of happiness. In the short run, people’s happiness is often shaped more by how many "positive events" occur in their day than by the arrival of one important piece of good news. Winning $100,000 in the lottery feels almost as good as winning $1 million. We therefore look, consciously or not, for small but repeated successes when we should be shooting for "one large win." It’s easy to see why: Big payoffs come only rarely, and perhaps late in life; in the meantime, who wants to keep on feeling like a loser?
Here is another bit:
Oddly, Taleb’s argument is weakest in the area he knows best, namely finance. Only on Wall Street do people seem to give proper credence–not too much, not too little–to very unlikely events. It is easy enough to use hindsight to identify the black swans Wall Street has missed, such as stock-price crashes. But it is harder to argue that the market undervalues surprise more generally. Stock and bond markets offer simple ways to bet on black swans. In financial terminology, you can purchase an option that is "deeply out of the money"; for instance, you can bet that Google shares will rise or fall in value an enormous amount over the next three months. These investments pay off precisely when the rest of the market does not anticipate the scope for surprise. Yet "long-shot" strategies are well-studied, and they do not yield extra profit. In other words, organized securities markets track rare and unpredictable events as well as the current state of knowledge will allow. If you don’t believe me, it is easy enough to bet on the Los Angeles Clippers to win the 2008 NBA title, or to bet on the longest odds at the racetrack. Such actions are hardly the path to either happiness or riches.
Here is my previous post on the book. Here is Taleb’s podcast on EconTalk. If you’ve read the book, do tell us what you thought of it…
Prospect magazine has a new blog
1. So far it is very interesting.
2. And the very very smart Jason Furman is guest-blogging over at Free Exchange.
3. And Brad DeLong directs us to the invaluable Lingua Franca archives.
Steve Levitt at the World Series of Poker
Here is one account, here is Levitt’s account of another round. In the latest he did very well indeed. Out of 900 or so contestants, I am hearing reports that he finished about #25, some sources are saying as high as #10. The pointer is from Scott Cunningham, tell us more if you know more.
So how many dimensions does intelligence have? Some top chess players, such as Etienne Bacrot, are switching into poker for the higher pay, though I suspect Levitt’s move is temporary rather than permanent.
Addendum: Here is Levitt’s account.
The best “comments are closed” fragment I read today
Mr. Lago is the mayor of this scenic Swedish town of 60,000 people [Sodertalje], which last year took in twice as many Iraqi refugees as the entire United States…
Here is the full story.
The best business blogs
This list is from The (UK) Times. They pick an atypical quotation from MR, but I suppose it will make happy a few aggrieved yet comment-ready readers…
We thank David for the pointer.
Why did the Soviet Union fall?
In a simplified way, the story of the collapse of the Soviet Union could be told as a story about grain and oil.
That is from Yegor Gaidar. In the 1980s it was necessary to import more and more grain, and Saudi Arabia was no longer supporting oil prices. It worked like this:
The timeline of the collapse of the Soviet
Union can be traced to September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh Ahmed
Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of Saudi Arabia, declared that the
monarchy had decided to alter its oil policy radically. The Saudis
stopped protecting oil prices, and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its
share in the world market. During the next six months, oil production
in Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by
approximately the same amount in real terms.As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per
year, money without which the country simply could not survive. The
Soviet leadership was confronted with a difficult decision on how to
adjust. There were three options–or a combination of three
options–available to the Soviet leadership.First, dissolve the Eastern European empire and effectively stop
barter trade in oil and gas with the Socialist bloc countries, and
start charging hard currency for the hydrocarbons. This choice,
however, involved convincing the Soviet leadership in 1985 to negate
completely the results of World War II. In reality, the leader who
proposed this idea at the CPSU Central Committee meeting at that time
risked losing his position as general secretary.Second, drastically reduce Soviet food imports by $20 billion, the
amount the Soviet Union lost when oil prices collapsed. But in
practical terms, this option meant the introduction of food rationing
at rates similar to those used during World War II. The Soviet
leadership understood the consequences: the Soviet system would not
survive for even one month. This idea was never seriously discussed.Third, implement radical cuts in the military-industrial complex.
With this option, however, the Soviet leadership risked serious
conflict with regional and industrial elites, since a large number of
Soviet cities depended solely on the military-industrial complex. This
choice was also never seriously considered.Unable to realize any of the above solutions, the Soviet leadership
decided to adopt a policy of effectively disregarding the problem in
hopes that it would somehow wither away. Instead of implementing actual
reforms, the Soviet Union started to borrow money from abroad while its
international credit rating was still strong. It borrowed heavily from
1985 to 1988, but in 1989 the Soviet economy stalled completely…The money was suddenly gone. The Soviet Union
tried to create a consortium of 300 banks to provide a large loan for
the Soviet Union in 1989, but was informed that only five of them would
participate and, as a result, the loan would be twenty times smaller
than needed. The Soviet Union then received a final warning from the
Deutsche Bank and from its international partners that the funds would
never come from commercial sources. Instead, if the Soviet Union
urgently needed the money, it would have to start negotiations directly
with Western governments about so-called politically motivated credits.In 1985 the idea that the Soviet Union would begin bargaining for
money in exchange for political concessions would have sounded
absolutely preposterous to the Soviet leadership. In 1989 it became a
reality, and Gorbachev understood the need for at least $100 billion
from the West to prop up the oil-dependent Soviet economy.
Here is the full article. The pointer is from VoxBaby. Do you have further thoughts?
Do insiders have an advantage getting tenure?
Yes:
At most universities there are two types of tenured economists – those that came to the school shortly after leaving graduate school (and were later promoted) and experienced economists that were hired with tenure. Conventional wisdom in academic circles suggests that it is easier to get tenure as an insider than it is to attract an offer as an outsider. That is, schools hold potential external senior hires to tougher standards than the requirements for promotion of the school’s junior professors. In this paper, I take a first step towards showing that, at least for academic economists, there is an insider advantage. I analyze the research records of economists with ten years of experience and compare the productivity of those who recently changed employers (suggesting they were hired with tenure) to those that did not (suggesting internal promotion.) I show that the productivity of “outsiders” is higher than the productivity of “insiders” at all but the top 10 economics institutions in the world.
That is from the May 2007 American Economic Review, here is one version of the paper. I have seen much anecdotal evidence in support of these results, though never at my school. I wonder, however, how much of this trend can be justified by efficiency, given that departments engage in some amount of team production. If a department –especially a non-top department — has a true jerk, it really does make everyone else less productive.
Did Norman Finkelstein deserve tenure?
Dan Drezner has an excellent post, with which I largely agree. I haven’t read the guy’s work (I doubt if I would like it), but my smell test suggests the following. Many non-top universities tenure a large group of faculty members, none of whom really deserve it. They are insiders, they have friends in the department, the replacements wouldn’t really be better, and so the tenure sticks. It is quite easy to argue ex post that a "no" vote is warranted in most of these cases. But if Finkelstein hadn’t done controversial work, he in fact would have received tenure along with many other non-deserving candidates. He didn’t, and in that sense I also suspect the process was unfair.
Tabarrok in NYC
I will talking about my book (with Eric Helland) Judge and Jury: Amercian Tort Law on Trial at the Harvard Club in NYC this Thursday (June 14, 07), 12pm-2pm. The event is sponsored by the Manhattan Institute. You can RSVP here.