Results for “concentration” 203 found
Hazlett on T-Mobile/Sprint
Tom Hazlett whose op-ed on the T-Mobile Sprint merger I quoted earlier writes me:
A few thoughts on your robust MR debate: (1) Were we to observe the counterfactual over the post-merger period we would have additional evidence – no disagreement. But the counterfactuals are themselves controversial to construct, and antitrust analyses typically make just the “before/after” prediction referenced. As the case against the merger (brought by several states, but rejected by a federal court) put it: “The proposed transaction would eliminate Sprint as a competitor… This increased market concentration will result in diminished competition, higher prices, and reduced quality and innovation.”
(2) There is powerful supporting evidence about merger effects apart from the retail price data. If real, quality-adjusted rates were anticipated to drop at even a faster clip (without a merger), reversing a pre-merger pro-consumer trend, then the post-merger performance in stock prices would have benefited the three incumbents in the market. Instead, two of the three firms have seen large abnormal declines in share values.
(3) The “cozy triopoly” theory is itself upended by both the firm stock price performances and the pattern of capital investments. The “Demsetz Critique” of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm showed that a positive concentration-profits correlation does not imply monopolistic behavior if the proximate cause of the excess profits is efficiency. Here, T-Mobile’s network improvements appear to be caused by its merger-based spectrum acquisitions, and these upgrades linked to its subscriber growth and capital gains. The non-merging mobile rivals have suffered highly negative returns, likely in significant part from intensified competitive challenges that forced them to make large investments in response. In 2021, Verizon and AT&T combined to pay over $75 billion for spectrum rights in an FCC auction, easily the most ever paid by two (or any number of) license bidders. Cartel formation predictably reduces rivalry; evidence of firms aggressively increasing capex to better compete for market share runs counter to the expectation.
(4) Industry analysts – who provide third-party evaluations often given great weight by antitrust authorities – support these interpretations. In Dec. 2022, e.g., sector expert Craig Moffett (MoffettNathanson) wrote: “We expect T-Mobile to continue, and indeed accelerate, their market share gains versus AT&T and Verizon, as T-Mobile’s 5G network superiority becomes increasingly evident and increasingly relevant as 5G handsets become ubiquitous. The combination of a single telecom operator having both the industry’s best network and its lowest prices is unprecedented… “
(5) A 750-word oped is not the ultimate format for such evidence. My Working Paper with Robert Crandall (formerly of Brookings, now with the Technology Policy Institute) supplies a more complete analysis – comments again welcome.
*The New Deal’s War on the Bill of Rights*
That is the new book by David Beito, and the subtitle is The Untold Story of FDR’s Concentration Camps, Censorship, and Mass Surveillance. Here is the closing passage:
If Roosevelt’s civil-liberties reputation meant anything to mainstream Americans at the end of the 1950s, it was not for witch hunts against gays in the navy, mass surveillance of private telegrams, crackdowns on free speech, inquisitorial investigations, sedition prosecutions, or the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps. Far more central in the memories of most was his authorship of the four freedoms and the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the appointment of Black and Douglas to the Supreme Court. But that was not the whole truth, or even the beginning of the whole truth.
There you go. I don’t think these facts are much contested, though the accompanying mood affiliation hasn’t changed very much.
The Piketty-Saez-Zucman response to Auten and Splinter
A number of you have asked me what I think of their response. The first thing I noticed is that Auten and Splinter make several major criticisms of PSZ, and yet PSZ respond to only one of them. On the others they are mysteriously silent.
The second thing I noticed is that PSZ have been trying to deploy the slur of “inequality deniers” against Auten and Splinter. I take that as a bad epistemic sign.
I was in the midst of writing a longer post, but then I received the following from Splinter, and I cannot come close to his efforts or authority:
Here is a short response to yesterday’s comments by Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (PSZ) on Auten and Splinter (forthcoming in JPE). These are variations on prior comments that Jerry and I addressed in 2019 and 2020.
First, PSZ say audit data suggest adding underreported income implies little change in top 1% shares. We agree. But their approach increases recent top 1% shares about 1.5 percentage points, with about 50% of underreported business income going to the top 1% by reported income. However, Johns and Slemrod (2012) found only 5% of underreporting went to the top 1% by reported income. This discrepancy is because PSZ allocate underreported income proportional to reported positive income, which ignores that a substantial share of business underreporting (about 40%) goes to individuals with reported negative total income, where misreporting rates are the highest (Table B3 here). The concentration of underreporting at the bottom of the reported distribution causes substantial upward re-ranking when adding underreported income, but that’s mostly ignored in the PSZ approach. The PSZ approach also implies that someone who decreases their underreporting rate by increasing their reported income is allocated more underreporting. That’s backwards.
In contrast, our approach fits prior estimates from audit data, makes use of many years of audit data, and improves upon prior approaches. We find that underreported income slightly lowers top 1% pre-tax income shares and slightly increases after-tax income shares (Figure B6 here), which is consistent with the audit data. For example, 16% of underreporting is in our top 1% ranked by true income, far less than PSZ’s near 50%-allocation and a bit under the 27% in Johns and Slemrod because we improve upon prior approaches that misallocate undetected underreporting (discussion here). Contrary to the assertions and approach of PSZ, our Figure B5 (bottom panel, here) shows that re-ranking between reported and true (reported plus underreported) income matters substantially. PSZ appear confused about the difference between ranking by reported versus true income. Our underreporting allocations (as are theirs) must be based on reported income because that is all one observes with the primary tax data we both use. But, unlike their method, our allocations are done such that we match the re-ranking implied by audit data. Therefore, we match both the distributions by reported and true income after re-ranking (top two panels of Figure B5, here).
Second, income missing from individual tax returns has shifted from the top to outside the top. The shift from the top was from movements out of closely-held C corporations, whose income is missing from individual tax returns, to passthrough businesses, whose income is on individual tax returns. This created growth in the top share of taxed business income. The growth in PSZ’s top share of untaxed business income, however, is due to their skewed allocation of underreported income that re-allocates underreported income to the top of the distribution. Outside the top, the growth of missing income is from increasing tax-exempt employee compensation, especially from health insurance (see Figure B16 here).
Third, PSZ suggest that top wealth and capital income shares should run parallel over the long run. This is a problematic assumption. Economic changes can push down capital income shares relative to wealth shares. For example, interest rates fell dramatically between 1989 and 2019—the federal funds effective rate fell from 9 to 2 percent. This tends to decrease the ratio of interest-income to bond-wealth and therefore falling interest rates likely increased the gap between top income and wealth shares. Also, much of top wealth patterns are driven by passthrough business, but this is fully or two-thirds excluded from PSZ’s definition of “capital” income here. When fully including passthrough business, the Auten–Splinter top 1% non-housing “capital” income share increased by 5 percentage points between 1989 to 2019, about two-thirds the Federal Reserve’s estimated increase in top 1% wealth shares. Therefore, the Auten-Splinter estimates are broadly consistent with increasing top wealth shares.
The Auten–Splinter approach is fundamentally a data-driven approach (Table B2 here). Based on Saez and Zucman’s (2020) suggestions and conversations, our more recent work adds new uses of data to account for high-income non-filers, flexible spending accounts, and depreciation issues from expensing. Where we rely on assumptions, alternative ones suggest top 1% shares change little, see Table 5. Our headline finding of relatively flat long-run top 1% after-tax income shares is robust.
Auten and Splinter had presented versions of those points previously, as they note. Yet PSZ present them as naive fools who somehow forgot to think about these issues at all, and PSZ do not, in their reply, consider these more detailed presentations of the point and defenses of the Auten-Splinter estimates. So I don’t think of the PSZ response as especially strong.
Here are relevant Auten and Splinter points from back in 2020. Phil Magness offers commentary.
Who Runs the AEA?
That is a new JEL publication (gated) by Kevin D. Hoover and Andrej Svorenčík, here is the abstract:
The leadership structure of the American Economic Association is documented using a biographical database covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional affiliations by education and employment. The structure is strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored: that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing concentration are also investigated.
And this:
The current paper is based on an extensive prosopographical database covering the entire leadership of the AEA over the
1950–2019 period, including all Presidents, Presidents-elect, Vice Presidents, ordinary members of the Executive Committee, as well as the losing candidates for all elective offices, and members of the Nominating Committee.
The results?:
The 14 institutions in the table account for almost more than 80 percent of the positions for the whole 1950–2019 period. Even within this select group, the distribution is highly skewed with Harvard, the top supplying institution over the period accounting for more than a fifth of the total, and the last five universities accounting for around 2 percent each. The top five institutions, Harvard, MIT, Chicago, Columbia, and Stanford, which we designate as the first tier, account for over half (57.1 percent) of the positions over the whole period…
The authors summarize their findings:
The most obvious lessons are, perhaps, hardly surprising: the AEA leadership is overwhelmingly drawn from a small group of elite, private research universities—in the sense that its leaders were educated at these universities and, to a lesser degree, employed by them. What is less well-known is that for much of the past 70 years, the AEA leadership has been drawn predominantly from just three universities—Harvard, MIT, and Chicago.
By the way, institutional concentration has become more pronounced over time, not less. But since about eighty percent of U.S. students go to state schools, most of those large state schools, I guess we can reconfigure all these panels to have eighty percent state school representation, rather than 80 percent elite school representation. Right? Right?
You may or may not like these facts (I for one am willing to admit to more elitism than are many people), for the time being I will say only this: “Do not listen to what they say, watch what they do!”
Political Sentiment and Innovation
Are these the “animal spirits” they like to talk about? And is this also evidence of the growing politicization of the U.S. economy?:
We document political sentiment effects on US inventors. Democratic inventors are more likely to patent (relative to Republicans) after the 2008 election of Obama but less likely after the 2016 election of Trump. These effects are 2-3 times as strong among politically active partisans and are present even within firms over time. Patenting by immigrant inventors (relative to non-immigrants) also falls following Trump’s election. Finally, we show partisan concentration by technology class and firm. This concentration aggregates up to more patenting in Democrat-dominated technologies (e.g., Biotechnology) compared to Republican-dominated technologies (e.g., Weapons) following the 2008 election of Obama.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Joseph Engleberg, Runjing Lu, William Mullins, and Richard R. Townsend.
More on the Merger Guidelines
Jason Furman and Carl Shapiro write about the merger guidelines. On the thrust of the guideline as political rather than summarzing existing law they are very much in agreement with the Hurwicz and Manne piece that I summarized last week.
Merger guidelines aren’t enforceable regulations. They have also never attempted to be a legal brief or offered an interpretation of the case law. Instead they have described widely accepted economic principles that the Justice Department and the FTC use to analyze mergers. As a result, the guidelines have commanded widespread respect and bipartisan support. Amazingly, for at least 25 years, when regulators have challenged mergers in court, the merging firms themselves have accepted the framework articulated in the guidelines.
The new draft guidelines depart sharply from previous iterations by elevating regulators’ interpretation of case law over widely accepted economic principles. The guidelines have long helped courts use economic reasoning to evaluate government challenges to mergers. They shouldn’t become a debatable legal brief or, worse, a political football.
But in addition Furman and Shapiro make specific critiques:
,,,parts of the draft lack an adequate economic foundation. They contain a structural presumption against many vertical mergers unsupported by theory or evidence. The proposed guideline on acquisitions of products or services that rivals may use to compete includes legal wishful thinking about how commitments made by the merging parties are treated, as the recent court rebuke of the FTC’s attempt to block Microsoft’s acquisition of Activision illustrates.
Likewise, a new guideline states that “mergers should not entrench or extend a dominant position,” where a “dominant position” means a market share of at least 30%. As we read this guideline, many nonhorizontal deals that enable the acquiring firm to become more efficient, and thus gain market share or compete more effectively in adjacent markets, would be considered illegal even if they benefit consumers and workers….we are troubled by the draft guidelines’ claim that efficiencies won’t be counted, even if they benefit consumers and workers, for a merger that furthers a trend toward horizontal concentration or vertical integration. Imagine if regulators had applied such a rule to the automobile industry in the 1910s.
SuperFreakonomics on Geoengineering, Revisited
Geoengineering first came to much of the public’s attention in Levitt and Dubner’s 2009 book SuperFreakonomics. Levitt and Dubner were heavily criticized and their chapter on geoengineering was called patent nonsense, dangerous and error-ridden, unforgivably wrong and much more. A decade and a half later, it’s become clear that Levitt and Dubner were foresighted and mostly correct.
The good news is that climate change is a solved problem. Solar, wind, nuclear and various synthetic fuels can sustain civilization and put us on a long-term neutral footing. Per capita CO2 emissions are far down in developed countries and total emissions are leveling for the world. The bad news is that 200 years of putting carbon into the atmosphere still puts us on a warming trend for a long time. To deal with the immediate problem there is probably only one realistic and cost-effective solution: geoengineering. Geoengineering remains “fiendishly simple” and “startlingly cheap” and it will almost certainly be necessary. On this score, the world is catching up to Levitt and Dubner.
Fred Pearce: Once seen as spooky sci-fi, geoengineering to halt runaway climate change is now being looked at with growing urgency. A spate of dire scientific warnings that the world community can no longer delay major cuts in carbon emissions, coupled with a recent surge in atmospheric concentrations of CO2, has left a growing number of scientists saying that it’s time to give the controversial technologies a serious look.
“Time is no longer on our side,” one geoengineering advocate, former British government chief scientist David King, told a conference last fall. “What we do over the next 10 years will determine the future of humanity for the next 10,000 years.”
King helped secure the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015, but he no longer believes cutting planet-warming emissions is enough to stave off disaster. He is in the process of establishing a Center for Climate Repair at Cambridge University. It would be the world’s first major research center dedicated to a task that, he says, “is going to be necessary.”
Similarly, here is climate scientist David Keith in the NYTimes:
The energy infrastructure that powers our civilization must be rebuilt, replacing fossil fuels with carbon-free sources such as solar or nuclear. But even then, zeroing out emissions will not cool the planet. This is a direct consequence of the single most important fact about climate change: Warming is proportional to the cumulative emissions over the industrial era.
Eliminating emissions by about 2050 is a difficult but achievable goal. Suppose it is met. Average temperatures will stop increasing when emissions stop, but cooling will take thousands of years as greenhouse gases slowly dissipate from the atmosphere. Because the world will be a lot hotter by the time emissions reach zero, heat waves and storms will be worse than they are today. And while the heat will stop getting worse, sea level will continue to rise for centuries as polar ice melts in a warmer world. This July was the hottest month ever recorded, but it is likely to be one of the coolest Julys for centuries after emissions reach zero.
Stopping emissions stops making the climate worse. But repairing the damage, insofar as repair is possible, will require more than emissions cuts.
…Geoengineering could also work. The physical scale of intervention is — in some respects — small. Less than two million tons of sulfur per year injected into the stratosphere from a fleet of about a hundred high-flying aircraft would reflect away sunlight and cool the planet by a degree. The sulfur falls out of the stratosphere in about two years, so cooling is inherently short term and could be adjusted based on political decisions about risk and benefit.
Adding two million tons of sulfur to the atmosphere sounds reckless, yet this is only about one-twentieth of the annual sulfur pollution from today’s fossil fuels.
Even the Biden White House has signaled that geoengineering is on the table.
Geoengineering remains absurdly cheap, Casey Handmer calculates:
Indeed, if we want to offset the heat of 1 teraton of CO2, we need to launch 1 million tonnes of SO2 per year, costing just $350m/year. This is about 5% of the US’ annual production of sulfur. This costs less than 0.1% on an annual basis of the 40 year program to sequester a trillion tonnes of CO2.
…Stepping beyond the scolds, the gatekeepers, the fatalists and the “nyet” men, we’re going to have to do something like this if we don’t want to ruin the prospects of humanity for 100 generations, so now is the time to think about it.
Detractors claim that geoengineering is playing god, fraught with risk and uncertainty. But these arguments are riddled with omission-commission bias. Carbon emissions are, in essence, a form of inadvertent geoengineering. Solar radiation engineering, by comparison, seems far less perilous. Moreover, we are already doing solar radiation engineering just in reverse: International regulations which required shippers to reduce the sulphur content of marine fuels have likely increased global warming! (See also this useful thread.) . Thus, we’re all geoengineers, consciously or not. The only question is whether we are geoengineering to reduce or to increase global warming.
The rise of niche consumption
Over the last 15 years, individual households have concentrated their spending on a few preferred products. However, this is not driven by “superstar” products capturing larger market shares. Instead, households increasingly purchase different products from each other. As a result, aggregate spending concentration has decreased. We develop a model of heterogeneous household demand and use it to conclude that increasing product variety drives these divergent trends. When more products are available, households select products better matched to their tastes. This delivers welfare gains from selection equal to about half a percent per year in the categories covered by our data.
By Brent Neiman and Joseph Vavra, that is from a new issue of American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Some of you may recall a related discussion of “matching” in The Complacent Class.
Agglomeration externalities from restaurants
We estimate agglomeration externalities in Milan’s restaurant sector using the abolition of a unique regulation that restricted where restaurants could locate. In 2005, Milan abolished a minimum distance requirement that had kept the number of establishments artificially constant across neighborhoods. We find that after 2005, the geographical concentration of restaurants increased sharply and at an accelerating rate. Consistent with the existence of strong and self-sustaining agglomeration externalities, restaurants agglomerated in some neighborhoods and deserted others, leading to a growing divergence in local amenities across neighborhoods. Restaurants located in neighborhoods that experienced large increases in agglomeration reacted by increasing product differentiation.
That is from a new AER Insights piece by Marco Leonardi and Enrico Moretti. Here are some ungated copies. I am myself repeatedly surprised how much the mere location of a restaurant can predict its quality.
The Poop Detective
Wastewater surveillance is one of the few tools that we can use to prepare for a pandemic and I am pleased that it is expanding rapidly in the US and around the world. Every major sewage plant in the world should be doing wasterwater surveillance and presenting the results to the world on a dashboard.
I was surprised to learn that wastewater surveillance is now so good it can potentially lock-on to viral RNA from a single infected individual. An individual with an infection from a common SARS-COV-2 lineage like omicron won’t jump out of the data but there are rare, “cryptic lineages” which may be unique to a single individual.
Marc Johnson, a virologist at the University of Missouri and one of the authors of a recent paper on cryptic lineages in wastewater, believes he has evidence for a single infected individual who likely lives in Columbus, Ohio but works in the nearby town, Washington Court House. In other words, they poop mostly at home but sometimes at work.
Twitter: First, the signal is almost always present in the Columbus Southerly sewershed, but not always at Washington Court House. I assume this means the person lives in Columbus and travels to WCH, presumably for work. Second, the signal is increasing with time. Washington Court House had its highest SARS-CoV-2 wastewater levels ever in May, and the most recent sequencing indicates that this is entirely the cryptic lineage.
Moreover the person is likely quite sick:
Third, I’ve tried to calculate how much viral material this person is shedding. (Multiply the cryptic concentration by the total volume). I’ve done this several times and gotten pretty consistent results. They are shedding a few trillion (10^12) genomes/day. What does this tell us? How much tissue is infected? It’s impossible to know for sure. Chronically infected cells probably don’t release much, but acutely infected cells produce a lot more. I gather a typical output in the lab is around 1,000 virus per infected cell. If we assume we are getting 1,000 viral particles per infected cell, that would mean there are at least a billion infected cells. The density of monolayer epithelial cells is around 300k cells/sq cm. A billion cells would represent around 3.5 square feet of epithelial tissue! Don’t get me wrong. The intestines have a huge surface are and 3 square feet is a tiny fraction of the total. But it’s still a massive infection, no matter how you slice it….My point is that this patient is not well, even if they don’t know it, but they could probably be helped if they were identified.
…If you are the individual, let me know. There is a lab in the US that can do ‘official’ tests for COVID in stool, and there are doctors that I can put you in contact with that would like to try to help you.
So if you poop in Columbus Ohio and occasionally in Washington Court House and have been having some GI issues contact Marc!
Hat tip to Marc for using the twitter handle @SolidEvidence.
Private ownership sentences to ponder
Anyone keen to understand how should look at Brookfield Renewable Partners’ recent investment of up to $2 billion in Scout Clean Energy and Standard Solar. B.R.P. is a vehicle of Brookfield Asset Management, a leading global asset management firm, with around $800 billion of assets under management, and it purchased two American developers and owner-operators of wind and solar power-generating facilities. This took place six weeks after President Biden signed the I.R.A. into law.
The I.R.A. will help accelerate the growing private ownership of U.S. infrastructure and, in particular, its concentration among a handful of global asset managers like Brookfield. This is taking the United States into risky territory. The consequences for the public at large, whose well-being depends on the quality and cost of a host of infrastructure-based services, from energy to transportation, are unlikely to be positive.
A common belief about both the I.R.A. and 2021’s Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, President Biden’s other key legislation for infrastructure investment, is that they represent a renewal of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal infrastructure programs of the 1930s. This is wrong. The signature feature of the New Deal was public ownership: Even as private firms carried out many of the tens of thousands of construction projects, almost all of the new infrastructure was funded and owned publicly. These were public works. Public ownership of major infrastructure has been an American mainstay ever since…
So it would be truer to say that in political-economic terms, Mr. Biden, far from assuming Roosevelt’s mantle, has actually been dismantling the Rooseveltian legacy. The upshot will be a wholesale transformation of the national landscape of infrastructure ownership and associated service delivery.
That is from Brett Christophers (NYT), who is disapproving. For an alternative view, see this WSJ Op-Ed by Katherine Boyle and David Ulevitch.
Thursday assorted links
1. How much are people spending on dates.
2. Why not buy an abandoned Japanese house? The price is right (NYT). Soon they may be cheaper than repeated dating.
3. At the local level, employment concentration is falling.
4. “Who is crazier? Me or them?” (Ukraine issues)
5. “We’re Not Going to Die,” Robin Hanson video. And ask the experts: good common sense from Tom Tugendhat, UK security minister, on AI safety. “China, with its vast datasets and fierce determination, is a strong rival.” Keep in mind we need to stay ahead of them for a long while, not just a few years. The fact that the Chinese might heavily regulate their private sector AI tells you nothing about what their government will do, or if anything it tells you they will emphasize developments in the military direction.
Thursday assorted links
1. Open AI lessons for science policy. And Steve Landsburg and GPT-4 are not in synch.
2. “Every single street lamp in New Zealand’s capital city is at risk of plunging without warning on to the footpaths below them.” And can anything stop the feral hog invasion?
3. Survey of Tyler Cowen’s “My Favorite Things.”
4. Brian Potter on how did solar power get cheap.
5. Clearinghouse for LLMs in scientific research workflows.
Regulation Can’t Prevent the Next Financial Crisis
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one piece of it:
For another, an effort to make banks safer can effectively push risk into other sectors of finance. It can move into money market funds, commercial credit lenders, fintech, insurance companies, trade credit, and elsewhere. These institutions are generally less regulated than are banks and don’t have the same kind of direct access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window.
This is no mere hypothetical: In the 2008 crisis there were major problems with both money market funds and insurance companies.
There is a temptation, in light of recent events, to greatly stiffen bank capital requirements — to raise them to, say, 40%. Again, that would make banks safer, but it would not necessarily make the financial system as a whole safer.
And so policymakers allow banks to continue along their potentially precarious path. Whatever their reasons, the fact remains that bank regulations can get only so tough before financial risk starts spreading to other, possibly more dangerous, corners of the system.
And:
During the 2008 financial crisis, for example, there was an excess concentration of derivatives activity in AIG, later necessitating a bailout. Financial derivatives acquired a bad name in many quarters, and government securities were viewed as a safe haven. With Silicon Valley Bank, the problem was the inverse: Its portfolio was insufficiently hedged with derivatives and interest-rate swaps, leaving it vulnerable to major swings in interest rates. It should have used derivatives more.
It is easy enough to say, “We can write regulations so this won’t happen again.” But those regulations won’t prevent new kinds of mistakes from happening.
Do Americans want to ban TikTok?
A Washington Post poll finds that 41 percent of Americans support a federal ban of the popular short-video app, while 25 percent say they oppose it. And 71 percent are concerned that TikTok’s parent company is based in China, including 36 percent who say they are “very concerned.”
Here is the WaPo article. A single poll on this issue is not dispositive, but still it suggests to me that if our politicians force the sale of TikTok to an American company that would not be an electorally unpopular move.
You can see the broader pattern here:
1. Change starts with the states, many of which have been restricting the use of TikTok on government phones. Then the momentum spreads to the federal government.
2. American companies end up heavily favored (yes the competitors gain, as a side issue who will Elizabeth Warren allow to buy TikTok? Certainly not Meta.) Market concentration rises.
3. National security considerations, or ostensible national security considerations, win out.
4. For all the talk of polarization and gridlock, both parties get on board.
5. TikTok is the Girardian sacrifice to the American national vision, which in any case proceeds with rampant surveillance.
6. We then move on to the next thing.
Welcome to American history people!
As you may recall, I do not favor a ban on TikTok, but a forced sale, at the very least, now seems likely.