Category: Current Affairs
The robustness of coal?
Coal consumption in 2030 is now estimated 6% higher than only a year ago. That may sound small, but it amounts to adding the equivalent of the consumption of Japan, the world’s fourth-largest coal burner. By 2030, the IEA now believes coal consumption will remain higher than it was back in 2010…
One notable statistic: Two-thirds of the total increase in energy demand in 2023 was met by fossil fuels, according to the IEA.
Here is more from Javier Blas at Bloomberg. Via Nicanor.
New report on nuclear risk
Phil Tetlock is part of the study, from the Forecasting Research Institute. Obviously this is very importnt. From Tetlock’s email to me:
“In brief, this study is the largest systematic survey of subject matter experts on the risk posed by nuclear weapons. Through a combination of expert interviews and surveys, 110 domain experts and 41 experienced forecasters predicted the likelihood of nuclear conflict, explained the mechanisms underlying their predictions, and forecasted the impact of specific tractable policies on the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe.
Key findings include:
- We asked experts about the probability of a nuclear catastrophe (defined as an event where nuclear weapons cause the death of at least 10 million people) by 2045, the centenary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Experts assigned a median 4.5% probability of a nuclear catastrophe by 2045, while experienced forecasters put the probability at 1%.
a. Respondents thought that a nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO/USA was the adversarial domain most likely to be the cause of a nuclear catastrophe of this scale, however risk was dispersed relatively evenly among the other adversarial domains we asked about: China/USA, North Korea/South Korea, India/Pakistan, and Israel/Iran.
- We asked participants about their beliefs on the likely effectiveness of several policy options aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. Two policies emerged as clear favorites for most participants: a crisis communications network and nuclear-armed states implementing failsafe reviews. The median expert thought that a crisis communications network would reduce the risk of a nuclear catastrophe by 25%, and failsafe reviews would reduce it by 20%.”
You will find the report here.
AfD vs. Bauhaus
By their aesthetics shall ye know them:
It shaped modern industrial design and continues to inspire architects and product designers the world over, but to some on Germany’s far right, Bauhaus is nothing to celebrate.
As the East German city of Dessau prepares to celebrate next year’s centenary of the famed design school’s move there, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has urged local legislators not to glorify Bauhaus’ cosmopolitan style ethos, saying it negated regional traditions.
The AfD’s proposal, debated and roundly rejected by the state parliament of Saxony-Anhalt earlier this week, sparked a predictable outcry: Bauhaus was part of the interwar flourishing of German avant-garde culture that was stamped out by the Nazis when they came to power in 1933.
There are many losers, so it is a debatable question today which political movement has the best aesthetics…
Principles of Economics Textbooks and the Market for Ice Cream
Rey Hernández-Julián and Frank Limehouse writing in the Journal of Economics Teaching write that very few principles of economics textbooks deal with modern information and digital tech industries:
The main takeaways of our review are highlighted by two stand-alone textboxes found in Mankiw’s (2023) textbook. This textbook has been regarded as one of the most dominant players in the principles of economics textbook market for over 20 years. In the introductory chapter of the 10th Edition (2023), “Ten Principles of Economics” there is a stand-alone textbox with the Netflix logo with the following caption: “Many movie streaming services set the marginal cost of a movie equal to zero”. However, there is no further explanation of this statement in the chapter and no presentation of the concept of zero marginal cost pricing in the remainder of the entire textbook. In Chapter 2 (“Thinking Like an Economist”), there is an In the News article from the New York Times, “Why Tech Companies Hire Economists”, but very little coverage in the text on how to apply microeconomic concepts to the tech industry. These two discussions of the tech industry in Mankiw’s text exemplify many of our findings from other texts….updated examples from the modern economy seem to be afterthoughts and detached from the central discussion of the text.
…There are some notable exceptions. The most significant coverage of these questions is in Chapter 16 of Cowen and Tabarrok’s Modern Principles of Microeconomics, 5th edition (2021). In this chapter, the authors discuss platform service providers, such as Facebook, Amazon, Google, Visa, and Uber, and the role they play in competing “for the market,” instead of “in the market.” They also discuss why the prevailing product is not necessarily the best one, how music is a network good, and why these platform services may give away goods for ‘free’.
I would also point out that our example of a constant-cost industry (flat long-run supply curve) is domain name registration! As we write in Modern Principles:
Now consider what happens when the demand for domain names increases. In 2005, there were more than 60 million domain names. Just one year later, as the Internet exploded in popularity, there were more than 100 million domain names. If the demand for oil nearly doubled, the price of oil would rise dramatically, but despite nearly doubling in size, the price of registering a domain name did not increase…the expansion of old firms and the entry of new firms quickly pushed the price back down to average cost.
In short, it’s called Modern Principles for a reason! Tyler and I are committed to keeping up with the times and not just adding the occasional box and resting on our laurels.
See Hernández-Julián and Limehouse for some further examples of how to introduce modern industries into principles of economics.
Does it matter who Satoshi was?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
It also matters if Satoshi was a single person or a small team. If a single person, that might mean future innovations are more likely than generally thought: If Satoshi is a lone individual, then maybe there there are more unknown geniuses out there. On the other hand, the Satoshi-as-a-team theory would mean that secrets are easier to keep than people think. If that’s the case, then maybe conspiracy theories are more true than most of us would care to admit.
According to many speculations, Satoshi came out of a movement obsessed with e-cash and e-gold mechanisms, dating to the 1980s. People from those movements who have been identified as potential Satoshi candidates include Nick Szabo, Hal Finney, Wei Dai, David Chaum and Douglas Jackson, among others. At the time, those movements were considered failures because their products did not prove sustainable. The lesson here would be that movements do not truly and permanently fail. It is worth experimenting in unusual directions because something useful might come out of those efforts.
If Peter Todd is Satoshi, then it’s appropriate to upgrade any estimates of the ability of very young people to get things done. Todd would have been working on Bitcoin and the associated white paper as a student in his early 20s. At the same time, if the more mainstream Adam Back is involved, then maybe the takeaway is that rebellious young people should seek out older mentors on matters of process and marketing.
I believe that in less than two years we will know who Satoshi is.
Musk on Sharks
A great little video on over-regulation.
Saudi construction project of the day
Saudi Arabia is preparing to begin construction work on its next giga-project: a cube-shaped skyscraper big enough to fit 20 Empire State Buildings.
The Mukaab will be 400-meters on each side when construction is finished, which would make it the largest built structure in the world. The building will be the centerpiece of New Murabba, a community the country hopes will be a new destination within the capital city of Riyadh.
“It’s masquerading as a building today but it’s so much more,” Michael Dyke, chief executive officer of New Murabba, said in an interview. “Ultimately, a capital city the size of Riyadh deserves to have a global, central icon as other capital cities do.”
Here is more from Zainab Fattah at Bloomberg. Here are various images based on artist renderings. Here is further information.
Saudi claim of the day
The Neom giga-project in Saudi Arabia is currently using one fifth of all the steel produced in the world, an official said on Monday.
The futuristic city will be the world’s largest customer for construction materials for several decades, said Manar Al Moneef, Neom’s chief investment officer.
She told the Global Logistics Forum in the King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh that the $500 billion project would be one of the world’s leading drivers of the global logistics sector in coming years.
“Neom is going to be the largest customer over the next decade. If you look at our demand in logistics it’s 5 percent of the global logistics market,” she told the forum, in rare public comments.
Here is the full story, via Mike Doherty.
Noah Smith on the vibe shift
My values haven’t become more conservative — my desire for a more economically egalitarian and socially tolerant society has not diminished an iota. You won’t see me bellowing “I didn’t leave my party, my party left ME!!” and storming over to the GOP in a huff. But I have to say that I now doubt the practical effectiveness of some of the policies I embraced in previous years. Others still seem like good ideas, but I’ve been dismayed at their botched implementation where they were tried. And many progressive ideas simply don’t seem like they’ll be able to win majority political support in the near future. It’s looking more and more likely that America is headed for a more conservative decade.
I’m not the only person to have noticed the shift. Dave Weigel recently wrote a post detailing all the ways that Kamala Harris’ campaign is to the right of Biden’s 2020 run, both in terms of tone and rhetoric and in terms of actual policy. Harris and other Dems have touted their tough stances on the border, abandoned big new spending programs, stopped talking about a public option for health insurance, trumpeted their support for Israel, embraced oil drilling, and gone tough on crime. Harris’ policy agenda includes plenty of pro-business and deregulatory ideas. She even brags about owning a gun and being willing to shoot intruders.
Here is the full post. And this, from later on, past the gate:
The sheer range of issues where progressivism seems adrift and directionless leaves me pensive and morose. I believe in the power of wonky technocrats to implement incremental policy tweaks to accelerate the energy transition, fix the immigration system, and make police more effective and less violent. But what’s left to fight for? Other than defending America against the depredations of Trump and the right, what big political goal can mobilize the masses to get out there and vote for left-of-center politicians?
I do see two big bright spots here. The first is industrial policy, which promises not just to restore American manufacturing, but to revitalize whole areas of the country. The second is the abundance agenda and YIMBYism, which promises to provide cheap housing, energy, and transportation for all.
Recommended.
My Conversation with Musa al-Gharbi
I am a big fan of Musa’s work, most of all his new book We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite. As for the podcast, here is the video, audio, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Tyler and Musa explore the rise and fall of the “Great Awokening” and more, including how elite overproduction fuels social movements, why wokeness tends to fizzle out, whether future waves of wokeness will ratchet up in intensity, why neuroticism seems to be higher on the political Left, how a great awokening would manifest in a Muslim society, Black Muslims and the Nation of Islam, why Musa left Catholicism, who the greatest sociologist of Islam is, Muslim immigration and assimilation in Europe, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Let me give you an alternate theory of the Great Awokening, and tell me what’s wrong with it. It’s not really my view, but I hear it a lot.
So on the Left, there’s some long-term investment in teaching in America’s top universities. You produce a lot of troops who could become journalists, and they’re mostly left-leaning. Then 2011, 2012 — there’s something about the interaction of social media and, say, The New York Times and other major outlets, where all of a sudden they have a much bigger incentive to have a lot of articles about race, gender, Black Lives Matter, whatever. When those two things come together, wokeness takes off based on a background in Christianity and growing feminization of society.
By the time you get to something like 2021, enough of mainstream media has broken down that it’s simply social media out there going crazy. That just gives us a lot of diversity of bizarre views rather than just sheer wokeness — and besides, Elon is owning Twitter, so wokeness ends.
What’s wrong with that account?
AL-GHARBI: For one, I do think that some of the factors that you identified are important for contextualizing the current moment. For instance, a lot of the symbolic professions, like law and consulting, academia, journalism — they are being feminized. I do talk a bit in the book about how this matters for understanding the dynamics in a lot of these institutions. Not just over the last 10 years, but over the last several decades, in part because women and men tend to engage in very different forms of status-seeking and competition and things like that. So that does matter.
Things like social media obviously do change the way interactions play out. But you can see, actually, that things like social media or changes in the media landscape after 2010 — one limitation for using those kinds of explanations to explain the current moment is that it becomes hard, then, to understand how or why it was the case that . . .
There were three previous episodes like this, one in the 1920s through the early ’30s, one in the mid-1960s to the late ’70s, and then one in the late ’80s through early ’90s. In all cases where we didn’t have social media, where the structure of media enterprises was importantly different than it is today, and before you had Gen Z “kids these days” with their idiosyncratic attitudes, or before a lot of these professions were as feminized as they were today.
I think all of those factors you said actually do matter, and they matter in the sense — because each of these episodes, there’s so much in common, an insane amount. When you read the book and I walk through some of these — I think a lot of readers will be troubled, maybe, by how similar these episodes are. But they’re also importantly different. They don’t play out identically. They are importantly different: The role that symbolic capitalists occupy in society changed immensely over the last century. The constitution of these fields has changed immensely. There are a lot more women; there are a lot more nonwhite people in these professions than there were in the past, and so on and so forth.
All of those factors you described: I think they actually do matter, especially for understanding the ways in which this period of awokening might differ from previous episodes, but I don’t think they explain why awokenings happen at all.
COWEN: If “woke” recurs, do you think there’s a ratchet effect where it comes back bigger and stronger each time, a bit like the destructiveness of war? Or is it more of a random walk? Like, the next wave of woke in 37 years might be half as strong as the one we just had. What’s your model?
AL-GHARBI: I think it’s random; that depends a little bit on . . .
What I argue in the book is that the — for instance, when we look at the last period of awokening in the late ’80s and early ’90s, it was much less — that was the last time we had these struggles over what they call political correctness, or the PC culture, which we call wokeness today. As I argue in the book, it didn’t last as long, that awokening. It was shorter than most of the others, actually. Shorter than the one in the ’60s, shorter than the one after 2010. It was a little shorter, and it also wasn’t quite as dramatic.
I think there are these kind of contextual factors that significantly inform how severe it is or how long it lasts, how long it’s able to sustain itself or how long it is until the frustrated elites get — enough of them get satisfied that they disengage. My guess is that it’s more of a random walk, but I’m open to persuasion.
Definitely interesting.
Google signs contract for small modular nuclear reactors
Since pioneering the first corporate purchase agreements for renewable electricity over a decade ago, Google has played a pivotal role in accelerating clean energy solutions, including the next generation of advanced clean technologies. Today, we’re building on these efforts by signing the world’s first corporate agreement to purchase nuclear energy from multiple small modular reactors (SMRs) to be developed by Kairos Power. The initial phase of work is intended to bring Kairos Power’s first SMR online quickly and safely by 2030, followed by additional reactor deployments through 2035. Overall, this deal will enable up to 500 MW of new 24/7 carbon-free power to U.S. electricity grids and help more communities benefit from clean and affordable nuclear power.
Here is more from Google.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson Win Nobel Prize for Institutions and Prosperity
The Nobel prize goes to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson for their work on institutions, prosperity, and economic growth. Here is a key piece summarizing their work: Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two “quasi-natural experiments” in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power…Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders.
See this great MRU video on Institutions for a quick overview! Here from an interview with Acemoglu, is a slightly more pointed perspective. Politics keeps people poor:
Why is it that certain different types of institutions stick?….it wouldn’t make sense, in terms of economic growth, to have a set of institutions that ban private property or create private property that is highly insecure, where I can encroach on your rights. But politically, it might make a lot of sense.
If I have the political power, and I’m afraid of you becoming rich and challenging me politically, then it makes a lot of sense for me to create a set of institutions that don’t give you secure property rights. If I’m afraid of you starting new businesses and attracting my workers away from me, it makes a lot of sense for me to regulate you in such a way that it totally kills your ability to grow or undertake innovations.
So, if I am really afraid of losing political power to you, that really brings me to the politics of institutions, where the logic is not so much the economic consequences, but the political consequences. This means that, say, when considering some reform, what most politicians and powerful elites in society really care about is not whether this reform will make the population at large better off, but whether it will make it easier or harder for them to cling to power.
Those are the sort of issues that become first-order if you want to understand how these things work.
One interesting aspect of this year’s Nobel is that almost all of AJRs Nobel work is accessible to the public because it has come primarily through popular books rather than papers. The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Why Nations Fail, and the The Narrow Corridor all by Acemoglu and Robinson and Power and Progress by Acemoglu and Johnson are all very readable books aimed squarely at the general public. The books are in many ways deeper and more subtle than the academic work which might have triggered the broader ideas (such as the famous Settler Mortality paper). Many of the key papers such as Reversal of Fortune are also very readable.
This is not to say that the authors have not also made many technical contributions to economics, most especially Acemoglu. I think of Daron Acemoglu (GS) as the Wilt Chamberlin of economics, an absolute monster of productivity who racks up the papers and the citations at nearly unprecedented rates. According to Google Scholar he has 247,440 citations and an H-index of 175, which means 175 papers each with more than 175 citations. Pause on that for a moment. Daron got his PhD in 1992 so that’s over 5 papers per year which would be tremendous by itself–but we are talking 5 path-breaking, highly-cited papers per year plus many others! (Of course, most written with excellent co-authors). In addition, he’s the author of a massive textbook on economic growth. More than any other economist Daron has pushed the cutting-edge of technical economics and has also written books of deep scholarship still accessible to the public. In his overview of Daron’s work for the John Bates Clark medal Robert Shimer wrote “he can write faster than I can digest his research.” I believe that is true for the profession as a whole. We are all catching-up to Daron Acemoglu.
Indeed, in reading a book like Why Nations Fail and papers like The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations (one of my favorite Acemoglu papers) and The Uniqueness of Solutions for Nonlinear and Mixed Complementarity Problems it’s difficult to believe they are co-authored by the same person. Acemoglu is as comfortable talking history, politics, and political economy as he is talking about the economics of recessions and abstruse mathematics.
Here are Previous MR posts on Daron Acemoglu including this post on democracy where I find the effect of democracy on growth to be ho-hum. Here is Maxwell Tabarrok on Acemoglu on AI. Here is Conversations with Tyler with Acemoglu and a separate conversation with Simon Johnson.
As noted, one of my favorite Acemoglu papers (with Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi) is The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Conventional economics models the aggregate economy as if it were a single large firm. In fact, the economy is a network. An auto plants needs steel and oil to operate so fluctuations in the steel and oil industry will influence production in the auto industry. For a long time, the network nature of production has been ignored. In part because there are some situations in which a network can be modeled as if it were a single firm and in part because it’s just much easier to do the math that way. Acemoglu et al. show that aggregate fluctuations can be generated by sector fluctuations and that organization of the network cannot be ignored. This is a modern approach to real business cycles. See also my post on Gabaix and granular fluctuations).
In recent work, Acemoglu and Restrepo have created a new way of modeling production functions which divides work into tasks, some of which are better performed by capital and others by labor. Technological change is not simply about increasing the productivity of labor or capital (modeled in standard economics as making one laborer today worth two of yesterday’s) but about changing which tasks can best be done by capital and which by labor. As a task moves from labor to capital the demand for labor falls but productivity increases which generates demand for other kinds of labor. In addition, as capital replaces labor in some tasks entirely new tasks may be created for which labor has a comparative advantage. A number of interesting points come out of this including the idea that what we have to fear most is not super-robots but mediocre-robots. A super-robot replaces labor but has an immense productivity advantage which generates wealth and demand for labor elsewhere. A mediocre-robot replaces the same labor but doesn’t have a huge productivity advantage. In an empirical breakdown, Acemoglu and Restrepo suggest that what has happened in the 1990s and especially since 2000 is mediocre-robots. As a result, there has been a decline in labor on net. Thus, Acemoglu is more negative than many economists on automation, at least as it has occurred recently. Acemoglu and Restrepo is some of the best recent work going beyond the old tired debates to reformulate how we think of production and to use that reformulation to tie those reformulations to what is actually happening in the economy.
Solow thought of technical change as exogenous which is still the first-pass approach to thinking about technical change. Acemoglu in contrast focuses on price and market size. In particular, the larger the market the greater the incentive to invest in R&D to serve that market (see also my TED talk). Thus, technical change will tend to be cumulative. A sector with a productivity improvement will grow which can make that sector even more remunerative for further technical advances (depending on elasticities). This matters a lot for environmental change because it suggests that a relative small intervention today–including subsidizing research on clean technologies–can have a huge payoff in the future because by directing technical change in the right direction you make it easier to switch later on. (from this interview)
But let’s think of the logic of directed technical change with cumulative research. The less we do on green technology today, the less knowledge is accumulated in the green sector, so the bigger is the gap between fossil-fuel-based technology and energy, and the cleaner energy, so the harder it will be in the future to close that gap. With more proactive, decisive action today, we already start closing the gap, and we’re making it easier to deal with the problem in the future.
Simon Johnson has also written important books on banking and finance including and that was before the big run up in American debt! James Robinson has written widely on African development and colonialism and African development more generally.
Overall, I’d say that this is an award for political science and for popular economics in the very best sense of economics that matters. Go buy their books and read them!
“California officials cite Elon Musk’s politics in rejecting SpaceX launches”
Elon Musk’s tweets about the presidential election and spreading falsehoods about Hurricane Helene are endangering his ability to launch rockets off California’s central coast.
The California Coastal Commission on Thursday rejected the Air Force’s plan to give SpaceX permission to launch up to 50 rockets a year from Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara County.
“Elon Musk is hopping about the country, spewing and tweeting political falsehoods and attacking FEMA while claiming his desire to help the hurricane victims with free Starlink access to the internet,” Commissioner Gretchen Newsom said at the meeting in San Diego.
The agency’s commissioners, appointed by the governor and legislative leaders, voted 6-4 to reject the Air Force’s plan over concerns that all SpaceX launches would be considered military activity, shielding the company from having to acquire its own permits, even if military payloads aren’t being carried.
Here is more from Politico, which is the source of that headline. Wildlife issues are significant as well.
The Missing Dockworkers
One of the most amazing facts to come out of the dockworker strike (now resolved, it seems):
WSJ: Start with the astounding fact that there were 50,000 or so ILA strikers but only 25,000 or so port jobs. That’s right, only about half of the union’s members are obliged to show up to work each day. The rest sit at home collecting “container royalties” negotiated in previous ILA contracts intended to protect against job losses that result from innovation.
Hat tip: Scott Lincicome.
That was then, this is now…
Oil companies are conveying an unlikely message to the GOP and its presidential candidate: Spare President Biden’s signature climate law. At least the parts that benefit the oil industry.
In discussions with former President Trump’s campaign and his allies in Congress, oil giants including Exxon Mobil, Phillips 66, and Occidental Petroleum have extolled the benefits of the Inflation Reduction Act. Many in the fossil-fuel industry opposed the law when it passed in 2022 but have come to love provisions that earmark billions of dollars for low-carbon energy projects they are betting on.
Some executives in the largely pro-Trump oil industry are worried the former president, if re-elected, would side with conservative lawmakers who want to gut the IRA. They fear losing tax credits vital for their investments in renewable fuel, carbon capture and hydrogen, costly technologies requiring U.S. support to survive their early years.
Here is more from the WSJ.