Category: Economics

There are nominal rigidities in Indian villages too

Supreet Kaur has a new NBER paper on this:

This paper tests for downward nominal wage rigidity in markets for casual daily agricultural labor in a developing country context. I examine transitory shifts in labor demand, generated by rainfall shocks, in 600 Indian districts from 1956-2009. First, there is asymmetric adjustment: nominal wages rise in response to positive shocks but do not fall during droughts. Second, transitory positive shocks generate ratcheting: after they have dissipated, nominal wages do not adjust back down. Third, inflation moderates these effects, enabling downward real wage adjustments both during droughts and after positive shocks. Fourth, wage distortions generate employment distortions, creating boom and bust cycles: employment is 9% lower in the year after a transitory positive shock than if the positive shock had not occurred. Fifth, consistent with the misallocation of labor across farms, households with small landholdings increase labor supply to their own farms when they are rationed out of the external labor market. The results are not consistent with other transmission mechanisms, such as migration or capital accumulation. These findings indicate the presence of rigidities in a setting with few institutional constraints. Survey evidence suggests that workers and employers believe that nominal wage cuts are unfair and lead to effort reductions.

There are ungated versions here.  I am often puzzled, by the way, that we do not spend much more time studying nominal rigidities, which are the source of rather considerable deadweight losses.   We do not find nominal rigidities everywhere.  Salespeople working on commission often have flexible wages, as do (some) people working in high-trust, high morale organizations.  What exactly accounts for these differences and how much can they be replicated?  What are their psychological costs?  Are there personality types which can deal with nominal flexibility of wages and types who cannot?  How frequent is one type relative to the other?  How do the psychological costs of a wage cut compare to the psychological costs of suffering losses when running your own business?  Questions such as these should be much higher on the list of research priorities.

The progress of Bitcoin

Timothy B. Lee has a good short essay on that question, here is one piece of it:

Between January 2013 and today, the amount of money invested in Bitcoin startups has grown more than 100-fold. Even after 2014’s declines, Bitcoins today are worth 20 times what they were worth at the start of 2013. The number of Bitcoin ATMs has gone from 0 to 342. Yet during the same two-year period, the number of Bitcoin transactions each day has not even doubled.

In short, there’s a lot of excitement among Bitcoin hackers, Bitcoin investors, and other insiders. But normal people are hardly using the network at all.

Recommended throughout, he argues that 2015 will be a make or break year for Bitcoin.

The ruble and the fiscal theory of money

John Cochrane writes:

Facts

1. Oil prices have gone down by half. Russia is a big exporter, and the Russian government gets a lot of revenue from oil exports, 45% by one media account.

2. The Ruble is collapsing.

There is more to the argument than that, but that is not such a bad start.  The problem I have with the fiscal theory of money is that I do not know how to define the fundamental value of money.  It may work analytically to treat money as a “get out of jail card” of a defined value, yet it seems doubtful to me that is the only factor pinning down money’s value.  Multiple equilibria are running around in the background somewhere…we just don’t quite know how and where.

The ever-finer rating and ranking of consumers

I talked about this phenomenon in Average is Over, here are some recent developments:

In two nonfiction books, scheduled to be published in January, technology experts examine similar consumer-ranking techniques already in widespread use. Even before the appearance of these books, a report called “The Scoring of America” by the World Privacy Forum showed how analytics companies now offer categorization services like “churn scores,” which aim to predict which customers are likely to forsake their mobile phone carrier or cable TV provider for another company; “job security scores,” which factor a person’s risk of unemployment into calculations of his or her ability to pay back a loan; “charitable donor scores,” which foundations use to identify the households likeliest to make large donations; and “frailty scores,” which are typically used to predict the risk of medical complications and death in elderly patients who have surgery.

That is from Natasha Singer, interesting throughout.  And I just received a review copy of the relevant Bruce Schneier book Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Capture Your Data and Control Your World.

My thoughts on quadratic voting and politics as education

That is the new paper by Lalley and Weyl.  Here is the abstract:

While the one-person-one-vote rule often leads to the tyranny of the majority, alternatives proposed by economists have been complex and fragile. By contrast, we argue that a simple mechanism, Quadratic Voting (QV), is robustly very efficient. Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a clearinghouse paying the square of the number of votes purchased. If individuals take the chance of a marginal vote being pivotal as given, like a market price, QV is the unique pricing rule that is always efficient. In an independent private values environment, any type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium converges towards this efficient limiting outcome as the population grows large, with inefficiency decaying as 1/N. We use approximate calculations, which match our theorems in this case, to illustrate the robustness of QV, in contrast to existing mechanisms. We discuss applications in both (near-term) commercial and (long-term) social contexts.

Eric Posner has a good summary.  I would put it this way.  Simple vote trading won’t work, because buying a single vote is too cheap and thus a liquid buyer could accumulate too much political power.  No single vote seller internalizes the threshold effect which arises when a vote buyer approaches the purchase of an operative majority.  Paying the square of the number of votes purchased internalizes this externality by an externally imposed pricing rule, as is demonstrated by the authors.  This is a new idea, which is rare in economic theory, so it should be saluted as such, especially since it is accompanied by outstanding execution.

The authors give gay marriage as an example where a minority group with more intense preferences — to allow it — could buy up the votes to make it happen, paying quadratic prices along the way.

My reservation about this and other voting schemes (such as demand revelation mechanisms) is that our notions of formal efficiency are too narrow to make good judgments about political processes through social choice theory.  The actual goal is not to take current preferences and translate them into the the right outcomes in some Coasean or Arrovian sense.  Rather the goal is to encourage better and more reasonable preferences and also to shape a durable consensus for future belief in the polity.

(It is interesting to read the authors’ criticisms of Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanisms on p.30, which are real but I do not think represent the most significant problems of those mechanisms, namely that they perform poorly on generating enough social consensus for broadly democratic outcomes to proceed and to become accepted by most citizens.  One neat but also repugnant feature of democratic elections is how they can serve as forums for deciding, through the readily grasped medium of one vs. another personae, which social values will be elevated and which lowered.  “Who won?” and “why did he win?” have to be fairly simple for this to be accomplished.)

I would gladly have gay marriage legal throughout the United States.  But overall, like David Hume, I am more fearful of the intense preferences of minorities than not.  I do not wish to encourage such preferences, all things considered.  If minority groups know they have the possibility of buying up votes as a path to power, paying the quadratic price along the way, we are sending intense preference groups a message that they have a new way forward.  In the longer run I fear that will fray democracy by strengthening the hand of such groups, and boosting their recruiting and fundraising.  Was there any chance the authors would use the anti-abortion movement as their opening example?

If we look at the highly successful democracies of the Nordic countries, I see subtle social mechanisms which discourage extremism and encourage conformity.  The United States has more extremism, and more intense minority preferences, and arguably that makes us more innovative more generally and may even make us more innovative politically in a good way.  (Consider say environmentalism or the earlier and more correct versions of supply-side economics, both innovations with small starts.)  But extremism makes us more innovative in bad ways too, and I would not wish to inject more American nutty extremism into Nordic politics.  Perhaps the resulting innovativeness is worthwhile only in a small number of fairly large countries which can introduce new ideas using increasing returns to scale?

By elevating persuasion over trading in politics (at some margins, at least), we encourage centrist and majoritarian groups.  We encourage groups which think they can persuade others to accept their points of view.  This may not work well in every society but it does seem to work well in many.  It may require some sense of persuadibility, rather than all voting being based on ethnic politics, as it would have been in say a democratic Singapore in the early years of that country.

In any case the relevant question is what kinds of preference formation, and which kinds of groups, we should allow voting mechanisms to encourage.  Think of it as “politics as education.”  When it comes to that question, I don’t yet know if quadratic voting is a good idea, but I don’t see any particular reason why it should be.

Addendum: On Twitter Glenn Weyl cites this paper, with Posner, which discusses some of these issues more.

Bangladesh fact of the day

Among the top ten largest malls in the world are two, perhaps surprisingly, in Iran, while even Bangladesh with a GDP per capita of $1,851 boasts a new mall far bigger than Pennsylvania’s “King of Prussia” (the same figure for the US is $51,749 according to the World Bank).

There is more here, mostly about the decline of the shopping mall in the United States.  Here is Wikipedia on the Bangladesh mall.  Here are photos.

How to ensure non-negative nominal interest on your cash

John Cochrane writes:

So, quiz question for your economic classes: Suppose we have substantially negative interest rates — -5% or -10%, say, and lasting a while. But there is no currency. How else can you ensure yourself a zero riskless nominal return?

Here are the ones I can think of:

  • Prepay taxes. The IRS allows you to pay as much as you want now, against future taxes.
  • Gift cards. At a negative 10% rate, I can invest in about $10,000 of Peets’ coffee cards alone. There is now apparently a hot secondary market in gift cards, so large values and resale could take off.
  • Likewise, stored value cards, subway cards, stamps. Subway cards are anonymous so you could resell them.
  • Prepay bills. Send $10,000 to the gas company, electric company, phone company.
  • Prepay rent or mortgage payments.
  • Businesses: prepay suppliers and leases. Prepay wages, or at least pre-fund benefits that workers must stay employed to earn.

Comments section: how many more can you think of?

His conclusion:

The zero bound is not just cash.

More generally, he is discussing work by Kenneth Rogoff.

Thomas Piketty refuses France’s highest honor

France’s influential economist Thomas Piketty, author of “Capital in the 21st Century”, on Thursday refused to accept the country’s highest award, the Legion d’honneur, to criticise the Socialist government in power.

“I refuse this nomination because I do not think it is the government’s role to decide who is honourable,” Piketty told AFP.

“They would do better to concentrate on reviving (economic) growth in France and Europe,” added Piketty, who was once close to the Socialist Party but has distanced himself from the policies of President Francois Hollande.

The link is here, via many people in my Twitter feed, including Justin Wolfers and Claudia Sahm.  There is a bit more here.

Why I think Greece will leave the eurozone this year or soon thereafter

Matt Yglesias has a good argument to the contrary:

On its face, the political crisis in Greece seems relatively likely to lead to Greece exiting the Eurozone. And why not? Europe’s leading politicians pretty clearly regret having let Greece in back in 1999 (particularly in off-the-record conversations), and Greek voters are clearly fed up with being told what to do by Brussels and Frankfurt. Journalistically, a “Grexit” is certainly the most interesting outcome, so people talk a lot about it, and at this point there are a lot of plausible theories about how it could go. But I think it’s not going to happen. The forces of the status quo will rally, and another grand coalition will lead Greece through several more dreary years of austerity and slow growth.

Nonetheless I think Germany wants them out.  First, I think Germany regards Greece as a kind of cultural and economic cancer for the eurozone, and they don’t want to enshrine the principle that eighty percent default is OK.  Second, Germany sees a fair amount of eurozone stability right now (NB: I’m not saying stability is always good in every way) and has noticed that the contagion effects from the recent Greek troubles have been small.  This is not a bad time to get them out.  Third, Germany is smart and knows that the real problems are Podemos in Spain and just about everyone in Italy and maybe even a few people (or more) in France.  Now is a good time to send splinter parties a message that they had better not mess around with the Troika, and what could do that better than an economic disaster in a recalcitrant Greece?

So I think Germany will play brinksmanship with Syriza and, when the time comes, simply pull the plug and leave them high and dry.

Addendum: Here are some useful graphs.

Top Ten MR Posts of 2014

Here is my annual rundown of the top MR posts of 2014 as measured by page views, tweets and shares.

1. Ferguson and the Debtor’s Prison–I’d been tracking the issue of predatory fining since my post on debtor’s prisons in 2012 so when the larger background of Ferguson came to light I was able to provide a new take on a timely topic, the blogging sweet spot.

2. Tyler’s post on Tirole’s win of the Nobel prize offered an authoritative overview of Tirole’s work just when people wanted it. Tyler’s summary, “many of his papers show “it’s complicated,” became the consensus.

3. Why I am not Persuaded by Thomas Piketty’s Argument, Tyler’s post which links to his longer review of the most talked about economics book of the year. Other Piketty posts were also highly linked including Tyler’s discussion of Rognlie and Piketty and my two posts, Piketty v. Solow and The Piketty Bubble?. Less linked but one of my personal favorites was Two Surefire Solutions to Inequality.

4. Tesla versus the Rent Seekers–a review of franchise theory applied to the timely issue of regulatory restrictions on Tesla, plus good guys and bad guys!

5. How much have whites benefited from slavery and its legacy–an excellent post from Tyler full of meaty economics and its consequences. Much to think about in this post. Read it (again).

6. Tyler’s post Keynes is slowly losing (winning?) drew attention as did my post The Austerity Flip Flop, Krugman critiques often do.

7. The SAT, Test Prep, Income and Race–some facts about SAT Test Prep that run contrary to conventional wisdom.

8. Average Stock Returns Aren’t Average–“Lady luck is a bitch, she takes from the many and gives to the few. Here is the histogram of payoffs.”

9. Tyler’s picks for Best non fiction books of 2014.

10. A simple rule for making every restaurant meal better. Tyler’s post. Disputed but clearly correct.

Some other 2014 posts worth revisiting; Tyler on Modeling Vladimir PutinWhat should a Bayesian infer from the Antikythera Mechanism?, and network neutrality and me on Inequality and Masters of Money.

Many posts from previous years continue to attract attention including my post from 2012, Firefighters don’t fight fires, which some newspapers covered again this year and Tyler’s 2013 post How and why Bitcoin will plummet in price which certainly hasn’t been falsified!

Who are the most influential economists?

Everyone is up in arms over the list supplied by The Economist.  I won’t go through those debates.  Let me just note that for all the talk of wonk this, data that, and Generalized Method of Moments this that and the other, every now and then the best algorithm is simply Asking Tyler Cowen.  So here are, in no particular order, the most influential economists circa 2014:

1. Thomas Piketty

2. Paul Krugman

3. Joseph Stiglitz

4. Jeffrey Sachs

5. Amartya Sen

Basta.  Of course Yellen and Draghi are extremely influential as central bankers, but in the way Paul Volcker was, so that is a different list, albeit a more important one.

I would add several comments:

a. Piketty does very very well for marginal impact in 2014, but probably would/will do less well over broader time spans, even if you think his work will hold up.

b. Krugman is a clear winner for the United States.

c. Stiglitz, Sachs, and Sen have most of their influence outside of the United States.

d. Larry Summers is influential among economists and the intelligentsia and is one possible choice for number six, with Dani Rodrik as another, or maybe drum up the leading Islamic theorist on sukuk.  But Summers is not so influential with casual observers, which in some ways puts him as the opposite of Stiglitz (in his current incarnation).

e. There is no right-wing or center-right economist on the list.  See the EJW symposium on why there is no Milton Friedman today.  Krugman is probably the most politically conservative figure among the top five.

f. Behavioral economics as a whole is quite influential, but with no single dominant figure of influence.  In actuality Cass Sunstein (not formally an economist) and Richard Thaler might globally be #1 in the behavioral area, followed by Daniel Kahneman.

Barkley Rosser on Russia (from the comments)

Yes, they are clearly going to have a recession, and probably a pretty bad one. But, oil prices may well be near their bottom. Russia has a lot of foreign exchange and little sovereign debt and is running a current account surplus, ironically reinforced by western sanctions. Yes, much of the private sector will face refi problems that could still blow up, and that would be the most likely mechanism for a severe collapse worse that Putin and others are forecasting. But, as of now, Putin’s popularity rating has reached an all time high after his latest press conference, 85% approval. You of all people should understand that he has successfully prepared the Russian people for bad times ahead by convincing them that they are in some replay of The Great Patriotic War and the Cold War combined, phoney baloney as that appears to us outsiders. The chances are in fact pretty good that they will tough it out without a major collapse, and the public will be willing to accept the likely privations that will arise due to the impending stagflation.
His comment also discusses Greece.  Alternately, here is Leonid Bershidsky, arguing that a Putin dictatorship is on the way.

Does the Shake Shack IPO mean you should stop eating there?

A simple theory of IPOs suggests that they arrive when a product or company is experiencing “peak buzz,” or at least when the insiders in the privately held company think they are at or near peak buzz.  This will maximize the expected returns on the IPO when it comes to market.

When it comes to food, peak buzz usually arrives a wee bit after peak quality, given reputational lags.  So if you are seeing peak buzz, it is probably time to bail on the restaurant, at least on a restaurant which is going to be sold.  Bailing on the restaurant may in fact be slightly overdue.

After an IPO, the equity share of the original creators — in this case Danny Meyer — is diluted.  Meyer’s incentive to maintain quality standards and his personal brand name is weakened.  The subsequent public shareholders are more likely to insist on a less risky and more mass market approach, which is not in tune with what you, highly intelligent reader of this blog, are likely to prefer.

In other words, both the signaling and the moral hazard arguments suggest that soon you should stop eating at Shake Shack.  Alternatively, perhaps you should now go lots of times, in quick succession, given that quality will decline even more and you must stock up on your fix as a kind of intertemporal substitution.

All you can eat books vs. all you can eat food

In the book market:

…a new complaint is about Kindle Unlimited, a new Amazon subscription service that offers access to 700,000 books — both self-published and traditionally published — for $9.99 a month.

It may bring in readers, but the writers say they earn less.

Here is some analysis:

“Your rabid romance reader who was buying $100 worth of books a week and funneling $5,200 into Amazon per year is now generating less than $120 a year,” she said. “The revenue is just lost. That doesn’t work well for Amazon or the writers.”

Amazon, though, may be willing to forgo some income in the short term to create a service that draws readers in and encourages them to buy other items. The books, in that sense, are loss leaders, although the writers take the loss, not Amazon.

And when it comes to food?:

New research shows that paying that much for a buffet might actually make the food taste better. Three researchers did an all you can eat (AYCE) buffet field experiment to test whether the cost of an AYCE buffet affected how much diners enjoyed it. They conducted their research at an Italian AYCE buffet in New York, and over the course of two weeks 139 participants were either offered a flier for $8 buffet or a $4 buffet (both had the same food). Those who paid $8 rated the pizza 11 percent tastier than those who paid $4. Moreover, the latter group suffered from greater diminishing returns—each additional slice of pizza tasted worse than that of the $8 group.

“People set their expectation of taste partially based on the price—and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If I didn’t pay much it can’t be that good. Moreover, each slice is worse than the last. People really ended up regretting choosing the buffet when it was cheap,” said David Just, professor at Cornell’s Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, and one of the study’s authors.

In the old days one heard speculation about bundling a great number of newspapers and blogs into a single-price access model, but in retrospect this probably never had much financial potential, for reasons which by now should be clear.  What would an “all-you-can-eat buffet for economists” mean?  And who if anyone would benefit from it?