Category: Economics
The economic contributions of Ben Bernanke
Ben Bernanke is best known for being Fed chairman, but he has a long and distinguished research career of great influence. Here are some of his contributions:
1. In a series of papers, often with Alan Blinder, Bernanke argued that “credit and money” are a better leading indicator than money alone. And more generally he helped us rethink the money-income correlation that was so promoted by Milton Friedman. This work was more correct than not, but since money as a leading indicator has fallen out of favor (partially because of Bernanke’s own later actions!), these contributions are seen as less important than was the case for about fifteen years. See also this piece on the (earlier) import of the federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy. Ben’s body of work on money and credit was what first brought him renown.
2. Bernanke has a famous 1983 paper on how the breakdown of financial intermediation was a key component of the Great Depression. Earlier, Milton Friedman had stressed the import of the contraction of the money supply, but Bernanke’s work led to a much richer picture of how the collapse happened. Savers were cut off from borrowers, due to bank failures, and the economy could not mobilize its capital very effectively. This article also shows the integration between Bernanke’s work and that of Diamond and Dybvig. This piece has held up very well.
3. Bernanke has related work, with Gertler, Gilchrist and others, on how financial problems can worsen a business cycle. This work of course fed into his later decisions as chairman of the Fed. In yet other work, Bernanke showed how economic downturns can lower the value of collateral, thus squeezing the lending process and exacerbating business cycle downturns.
4. Bernanke’s doctoral dissertation was on the concepts of option value and irreversible investment. Modest increases in business uncertainty can cause big drops in investment, due to the desire to wait, exercise “option value,” and sample more information. This work was published in the QJE in 1983. I have long felt Bernanke does not receive enough credit for this particular idea, which later was fleshed out by Pindyck and Rubinfeld.
5. Bernanke wrote plenty of pieces — this one with Mishkin — on inflation targeting as a new means of conducting monetary policy. Those were the days! Much of the OECD lived under this regime for a few decades.
6. Here is Ben with co-authors: “We first document that essentially all the U.S. recessions of the past thirty years have been preceded by both oil price increases and a tightening of monetary policy…” Uh-oh!
7. Here is 2004 Ben on what to do when an economy hits the zero lower bound. Here is Ben on earlier Japanese monetary policy, and what he called their “self-induced paralysis” at the zero bound. He really was in training for the Fed job all those years. Here is Ben on “The Great Moderation.” Here is 1990 Ben on clearing and settlement during the 1987 crash.
8. Ben has made major contributions to our understanding of how the gold standard and international deflationary pressures induced the Great Depression, transmitted it across borders, and made it much worse. This work has held up very well and is now part of the mainstream account. And more here.
9. Bernanke coined the term “global savings glut.”
Here is all the Swedish information on the researchers and their work. I haven’t read these yet, but they are usually very well done. Here is Ben on scholar.google.com.
In sum, Ben is a broad and impressive thinker and researcher. This prize is obviously deserved. In my admittedly unorthodox opinion, his most important work is historical and on the Great Depression.
The Diamond and Dybvig model
The Diamond and Dybvig model was first outlined in a seminal paper from Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig in 1983 in a famous Journal of Political Economy piece, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.” You can think of this model as our most fundamental understanding, in modeled form, of how financial intermediation works. It is a foundation for how economists think about deposit insurance and also the lender of last resort functions of the Fed.
Here is a 2007 exposition of the model by Diamond. You can start with the basic insight that bank assets often are illiquid, yet depositors wish to be liquid. If you are a depositor, and you owned 1/2000 of a loan to the local Chinese restaurant, you could not very readily write a check or make a credit card transaction based upon that loan. The loan would be costly to sell and the bid-ask spread would be high.
Now enter banks. Banks hold and make the loans and bear the risk of fluctuations in those asset values. At the same time, banks issue liquid demand deposits to their customers. The customers have liquidity, and the banks hold the assets. Obviously for this to work, the banks will (on average) earn more on their loans than they are paying out on deposits. Nonetheless the customers prefer this arrangement because they have transferred the risk and liquidity issues to the bank.
This arrangement works out because (usually) not all the customers wish to withdraw their money from the bank at the same time. Of course we call that a bank run.
If a bank run occurs, the bank can reimburse the customers only by selling off a significant percentage of the loans, perhaps all of them. But we’ve already noted those loans are illiquid and they cannot be readily sold off at a good price, especially if the banks is trying to sell them all at the same time.
Note that in this model there are multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the customers expect that the other customers have faith in the bank and there is no massive run to withdraw all the deposits. In another equilibrium, everyone expects a bank run and that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. After all, if you know the bank will have trouble meeting its commitments, you will try to get your money out sooner rather than later.
In the simplest form of this model, the bank is a mutual, owned by the customers. So there is not an independent shareholder decision to put up capital to limit the chance of the bad outcome. Some economists have seen the Diamond-Dybvig model as limited for this reason, but over time the model has been enriched with a wider variety of assumptions, including by Diamond himself (with Rajan). It has given rise to a whole literature on the microeconomics of financial intermediation, spawning thousands of pieces in a similar theoretical vein.
The model also embodies what is known as a “sequential service constraint.” That is, the initial bank is constrained to follow a “first come, first serve’ approach to serving customers. If we relax the sequential service constraint, it is possible to stop the bank runs by a richer set of contracts. For instance, the bank might reserve the right to limit or suspend or delay convertibility, possibly with a bonus then sent to customers for waiting. Those incentives, or other contracts along similar lines, might be able to stop the bank run.
In this model the bank run does not happen because the bank is insolvent. Rather the bank run happens because of “sunspots” — a run occurs because a run is expected. If the bank is insolvent, simply postponing convertibility will not solve the basic problem.
It is easy enough to see how either deposit insurance or a Fed lender of last resort can improve on the basic outcome. If customers start an incipient run on the bank, the FDIC or Fed simply guarantees the deposits. There is then no reason for the run to continue, and the economy continues to move along in the Pareto-superior manner. Of course either deposit insurance or the Fed can create moral hazard problems for banks — they might take too many risks given these guarantees — and those problems have been studied further in the subsequent literature.
Along related (but quite different!) lines, Diamond (solo) has a 1984 Review of Economic Studies piece “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” This piece models the benefits of financial intermediation in a quite different manner. It is necessary to monitor the quality of loans, and banks have a comparative advantage in doing this, relative to depositors. Furthermore, the bank can monitor loan quality in a diversified fashion, since it holds many loans in its portfolio. Bank monitoring involves lower risk than depositor monitoring, in addition to being lower cost. This piece also has been a major influence on the subsequent literature.
Here is Diamond on google.scholar.com — you can see he is a very focused economist. Here is Dybvig on scholar.google.com, most of his other articles in the area of finance more narrowly, but he won the prize for this work on banking and intermediation. His piece on asset pricing and the term structure of interest rates is well known.
Here is all the Swedish information on the researchers and their work. I haven’t read these yet, but they are usually very well done.
Overall these prize picks were not at all surprising and they have been expected for quite a few years.
The Invisible Hand Increases Trust, Cooperation, and Universal Moral Action
Montesquieu famously noted that
Commerce is a cure for the most destructive prejudices; for it is almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and that wherever there is commerce, there we meet with agreeable manners.
and Voltaire said of the London Stock Exchange:
Go into the London Stock Exchange – a more respectable place than many a court – and you will see representatives from all nations gathered together for the utility of men. Here Jew, Mohammedan and Christian deal with each other as though they were all of the same faith, and only apply the word infidel to people who go bankrupt. Here the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts a promise from the Quaker. On leaving these peaceful and free assemblies some go to the Synagogue and others for a drink, this one goes to be baptized in a great bath in the name of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that one has his son’s foreskin cut and has some Hebrew words he doesn’t understand mumbled over the child, others go to heir church and await the inspiration of God with their hats on, and everybody is happy.
Commerce makes people traders and by and large traders must be benevolent, agreeable and willing to bargain and compromise with people of different sects, religions and beliefs. Contrary to what one naively might expect, people with more exposure to markets behave more cooperatively and in less nakedly self-interested ways. Similarly, in a letter-return experiment in Italy, Baldassarri finds that market integration increases pro-social behavior towards in and outgroups:
In areas where market exchange is dominant, letter-return rates are high. Moreover, prosocial behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members moves hand in hand, thus suggesting that norms of solidarity extend beyond group boundaries.
Also, contrary to what you may have read about the mythical Wall Street game versus Community game, priming people in the lab with phrases evocative of markets and trade, increases trust.
In a new paper, Gustav Agneman and Esther Chevrot-Bianco test the idea that markets generate more universal behavior. They run their tests in villages in Greenland where some people buy and sell in markets for their primary living while others in the same village still rely for a substantial part of their subsistence on hunting, fishing and personal exchange. They use a dice game in which players report the number of a roll with higher numbers being better for the player. Only the player knows their true roll and there is no way to detect cheaters on an individual basis. In some variants, other people (in-group or out-group) benefit when players report lower numbers. The upshot is that people exposed to market institutions are honest while traditional people cheat. Cheating is only ameliorated in the traditional group when cheating comes at the expense of an in-group (fellow-villager) but not when it comes at the expense of an out-grou member. More generally the authors summarize:
…We conduct rule-breaking experiments in 13 villages across Greenland (N=543), where stark contrasts in market participation within villages allow us to examine the relationship between market participation and moral decision-making holding village-level factors constant. First, we document a robust positive association between market participation and moral behaviour towards anonymous others. Second, market-integrated participants display universalism in moral decision-making, whereas non-market participants make more moral decisions towards co-villagers. A battery of robustness tests confirms that the behavioural differences between market and non-market participants are not driven by socioeconomic variables, childhood background, cultural identities, kinship structure, global connectedness, and exposure to religious and political institutions.
Markets and trade increase trust, cooperation and universal moral action–it is hard to think of a more important finding for the world today.
Hat tip: The still excellent Kevin Lewis.
Inflation and attention
One of the dangers of high inflation is that it can cause firms and households to pay close attention to it. This internalization of inflation can lead to an accelerationist regime, making inflation harder to control. We empirically assess the relationship between attention and the level of inflation for 37 countries. Our measures of attention are constructed either from internet search behavior or the popularity of inflation mentions on Twitter. We find evidence that attention thresholds do exist for the majority of countries in our sample. We also find interesting variability across countries.
Here is the full paper, by Oleg Korenok, David Munro, and Jiayi Chen, via John Chilton.
Will Europe choose an energy crisis or a fiscal crisis?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
Estimates of the size of the energy price shock vary, but one plausible assessment runs in the range of 6% to 8% of GDP for Europe. One response to this shock would be to let energy prices rise and allow the private sector to adjust. This would mean higher costs for manufacturing, higher home heating bills, and lower disposable income to spend on other goods and services. In broad terms, it would be like the energy price shock of 1979 and the following recession…
That sounds grim, but it is important to realize that there is a different yet equally grim path: Governments could take this energy price shock and turn it into a fiscal shock instead…
If a government picked up the entire extra energy cost, it would cost something in the range of 6% to 8% of GDP — and that cost would need to be incurred every year that energy prices stayed high. That would require more government borrowing, higher taxes, more money printing, or some mix of those options.
The good news is that turning an energy crisis into a fiscal crisis doesn’t spread high energy costs through the entire economy. The bad news is twofold: First, keeping energy prices low does nothing to encourage conservation. Second, and more important, a fiscal crisis is still a crisis. Even if a government eschews extra borrowing, how much room is there to raise taxes, given economic and political constraints?
Recommended, and with a nod to Arnold Kling.
India: The Revolution in Private Schooling
A whopping 50%+ of secondary school students in India are educated in private schools. Do private schools increase human capital or merely skim the best students? My paper, Private Education in India: A Novel Test of Cream Skimming made a simple but telling point:
…As the private share of school enrollment increases simple cream skimming becomes less plausible as the explanation for a higher rate of achievement in private schools. If the private schools cream skim when they are at 10% of public school enrollment how much cream can be left in the public school pool when the private schools account for 60% of total enrollment? Thus, if this simple form of cream skimming is the explanation for the higher achievement rate in private schools, we would expect the “private effect,” the difference between private and public scores, to be smaller in regions with a high
share of private schooling.
In fact, what I find is the private advantage, although larger in districts with smaller shares of private schooling (suggesting some skimming), stabilizes and doesn’t disappear even as the share of private schooling heads towards 100%. I also show that mean scores across all students, public and private, increase with the share of private schooling which is inconsistent with cream skimming (which predicts a constant mean). At right a picture showing that private scores continue to outpace public scores even in districts where private schools educate a majority or larger share of students.
In a new paper, Bagde, Epple and Taylor study 4 million students in thousands of villages in India during 2004-2014. In the early years of the study, none of the villages have private schools but entry starts to occur in 2007-2009 and the authors look at who switches to private schools. They find significant selection from higher income, higher caste, higher ability, and males towards private schools but no evidence that public school students are harmed.
The authors give a nod to the possibility that stratification could generate problems down the line if it increases inequality but they don’t mention the key point that, as with arguments for cream skimming, stratification concerns diminish the more students are in private schools and disappear altogether if 100% of students are in private schools.
More generally, India is pioneering private education on a grand scale and the entire world should pay attention to these innovations.
Addendum: See also my previous post on a key paper by Muralidharan and Sundararaman, Private Schooling In India: Results from a Randomized Trial.
“But are you long volatility?”
As many of you know, when I confront mega-pessimists I like to ask them “But are you short the market?” Not once in my life have I heard a satisfactory rejoinder to this query. (The last answer I heard was “I will be!”.)
I now have a new question for those who see a reasonably high likelihood of AGI. Of course AGI could wreck the world, make the world a whole lot better, or simply overturn multiple sectors of the economy, in both good and bad ways. If you believe in AGI, typically you believe it will matter a lot, though there is considerable disagreement on the cost-benefit ratio.
So basically you should go long volatility, both of the aggregate market and sector-by-sector.
Can I call them AGIers? (“Aggies” is already taken.) AGIers ought to be long volatility.
Are they? I have started asking this question, and I plan to continue the practice.
The market for property insurance vs. climate change
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one bit:
One of the classic rejoinders to worries about climate change is the claim that people can move out of highly vulnerable areas into safer areas. Maybe the world will not be willing to accept hundreds of millions of climate-change refugees, but within the US, perhaps people can move from storm-prone Florida to the northern Midwest, or to wherever might prove appropriate, including safer parts of Florida. The US, after all, has a longstanding tradition of individual mobility. And many parts of the country have the space and infrastructure for additional residents.
For such migration to have any effect on the costs of climate change, however, price signals have to be active and relatively undistorted. That is, some set of market prices has to be giving people impetus to leave one place for another. And policymakers have not been letting insurance markets perform their proper work in this regard.
And on the details:
Currently the market for Florida property insurance is in a pretty bad way. This year six relevant insurance companies went insolvent, and for Florida underwriting losses have run more than $1 billion for each of the last two years. Not surprisingly, insurers have been cutting back their coverage in the state or leaving altogether. The end result is that homeowners are finding it much harder to get coverage and finding it much more expensive when they do. None of this should come as a surprise, given the immense damage wrought by Hurricane Ian and previous storms.
Yet politics is stifling market adjustments. Florida has a state-run insurer of last resort, called Citizens Property Insurance Corp. Not surprisingly, that insurer has financial problems of its own, and in May Governor Ron DeSantis oversaw an additional $2 billion in reinsurance support for the company’s efforts. In other words, the state government is stifling the market signals that might induce some of the state’s homeowners to leave for drier pastures.
But don’t put your hopes in the Florida gubernatorial election. DeSantis’s Democratic rival, Charlie Crist, has criticized the governor for not doing more on the property insurance front and has proposed 90-day emergency insurance coverage for residents. That would stifle market incentives all the more.
I should note that water subsidies for the Southwest are another example of the same general phenomenon.
The US has Relatively Low Rates of Hiring Discrimination
There have now been lots of resume-audit studies in which identical resumes but for the “minority-distinct” name are sent out to employers and callback rates are measured. A meta-study of 97 field experiments (N = 200,000 job applicants) in 9 countries in Europe and North America finds there is some discrimination in every county but, if anything, the USA has one of the lower rates of discrimination while France and perhaps also Sweden have very high levels. These result’s aren’t that surprising to those who travel but they run counter to the narrative that the US is uniquely or especially discriminatory because of its history of slavery and capitalism. Capitalism, in fact, is likely to predict less discrimination. A picture summarizes. The US is here defined as 1 and these are relative levels after controlling for some basic differences across studies:
The authors make a number of interesting points:
…national histories of slavery and colonialism are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a country to have relatively high levels of labor market discrimination. Some countries with colonial pasts demonstrate high rates of hiring discrimination, but several countries without extensive colonial pasts (outside Europe), such as Sweden, demonstrate similar levels. Likewise, the lower rates of discrimination against minorities in the United States than we find for many European countries seem contrary to expectations that emphasize the primacy of connection to slavery in shaping the contemporary level of national discrimination. These results do not suggest that slavery and colonialism do not matter for levels of discrimination, rather they indicate that they matter in more complex ways than suggested by theories that posit simple, direct influences of the past on current discrimination.
And:
High discrimination in the French labor market seems inconsistent with claims made by some scholars that discourse or measurement of race and ethnicity itself will tend to produce more discrimination by promoting “groupism” and group stereotypes (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The efforts in France not to measure or formally discuss race or ethnicity do not seem to have led to less discrimination.
And, reminisicent of Agan and Starr’s work on ban the box policies:
…the cross-national differences we find should not be read as primarily reflecting national levels of prejudice or as indicators of national levels of racism. Our discrimination measures are specific to hiring, and some evidence suggests national levels in discrimination in other outcomes may be different. For instance,we find low hiring discrimination in Germany,15 but Germany has not been found to be low on housing discrimination (Auspurg, Schneck, and Hinz 2018), suggesting weak antiminority prejudice may not account for this result. More likely, low discrimination in Germany could be a result of distinctive hiring practices in Germany: Employees typically submit far more extensive background information at initial application than in most other countries—including, for instance, high school transcripts and reports from apprenticeships (Weichselbaumer 2016). This may reduce the tendency of employers to assume lower skills and qualifications among nonwhite applicants, which is one potential source of discrimination. If so, this suggests the importance of high levels of individual information about applicants as a method to mitigate discrimination (c.f., Wozniac 2015; Auspurg et al. 2018).
It’s notable that these studies have mostly been done in Western capitalist democracies. I would bet that discrimination rates would be much higher in Japan, China and Korea not to mention Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria or the Congo. Understanding why discrimination is lower in Western capitalist democracies would reorient the literature in a very useful way.
Hat tip: Jay Van Bavel.
New issue of Econ Journal Watch
Hemma bäst—or, English versus native language: Illustrating with Sweden and economics, Eva Forslund and Magnus Henrekson question the English-language pull where English is not the native language. Commentary essays are provided by Lars Engwall and by Alberto Mingardi.
What are your most underappreciated works? Responding to an open invitation, 18 scholars with 4k+ Google Scholar cites point to a decade-or-more old paper with cite count below his or her h-index. The contributors are Doug Allen, Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov, Peter Boettke, Nick Bostrom, Bryan Caplan, Joshua Gans, Terri Griffith, Zoe Hilton, Dan Klein, Douglas Noonan, Michael Ostrovsky, Sam Peltzman, Eric Rasmusen, Paul Rubin, Steve Sheffrin, Stefan Voigt, and Richard Wagner.
Cooked: Higher temperatures decrease the rate of economic growth in the United States, according to Riccardo Colacito, Bridget Hoffmann, and Toan Phan. David Barker criticizes their JMCB article on two counts, makes the improvements, dissolves the results, and uses alternate data yielding a sign reversal though also not statistically significant.
Erroneous Erratum: Previously, Stephen Walker criticized an article in Journal of Accounting Research (here and here). Now the authors, Yang Bao, Bin Ke, Bin Li, Y. Julia Yu, and Jie Zhang, have issued an Erratum in JAR, citing Walker’s critiques. Walker takes a hard look and calls on JAR to do an investigation into research misconduct.
Justice to Hutt: Phil Magness and Art Carden appreciate W. H. Hutt, in rebutting William Darity, M’Balou Camara, and Nancy MacLean.
Film incentive programs revisited: Picking up on an earlier exchange (Bradbury’s critique, O’Brien and Lane’s reply), Bruce Bird, Hilde Patron, and William Smith bring scrutiny to the reply, new data to bear, and renewed doubts about the original paper, which was published in Regional Studies.
Not being tread upon: Ryan Murphy rejoins to Jan Ott on the understanding of freedom in the Fraser economic freedom index, and Ott supplies a second reply.
Classical liberalism in Finland, 1900–2022: Previously, Jens Grandell told of liberalism in Finland to about 1900. Now Grandell completes the story. The essays contribute to the Classical Liberalism in Econ, by Country series.
Adam Smith’s View of Man: “Smith would not have thought it sensible to treat man as a rational utility-maximiser.” The University of Chicago professor Ronald Coase’s Journal of Law and Economics essay from 1976, republished here by permission, focuses especially on Smith’s Moral Sentiments.
Scattered Hints Concerning Philosophy and Learning: In this little-known essay from the 1750s, Edmund Burke warns against “confined” learning: “The End of learning is not knowledge but virtue; as the End of all speculation should be practice of one sort or another.”
EJW Audio:
Eva Forslund and Magnus Henrekson on English vs. the Native Language
The labor market mismatch model
This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of skill mismatch and quantifies its impact on labor productivity. We build a tractable directed search model, in which workers differ in skills along multiple dimensions and sort into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements. Skill mismatch arises because of information frictions and is prolonged by search frictions. Estimated to the United States, the model replicates salient business cycle properties of mismatch. Job transitions in and out of bottom job rungs, combined with career mobility, are key to account for the empirical fit. The model provides a novel narrative for the scarring effect of unemployment.
That is from the new JPE, by Isaac Baley, Ana Figueiredo, and Robert Ulbricht. Follow the science! Don’t let only the Keynesians tell you what is and is not an accepted macroeconomic theory.
Why energy price policy is hard
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column. The core problem is that if you let prices go up “too much” (i.e., to where they ought to be), many people will stop paying their bills. We don’t in fact have the political economy in place to enforce the wealth transfer to the public utility:
You might think, as I do, that utilities should take a relatively tough stance on delinquents. Still, the realities of politics can intervene. By one estimate, Truss’s plan would lead to average energy bills of £2,500, compared to £3,548 with no plan.
That is quite a difference, and many people might have trouble paying the higher amount. They might be able to pay more, but at what cost? Fewer pub visits? No satellite TV? Would people in fact choose such austerity? Customers know that if enough of them do not pay their bills, it would be very difficult to cut off service to such a large part of the electorate, especially with winter approaching.
By way of comparison, consider the current water crisis in Jackson, Mississippi. The town’s water utility is undercapitalized, and almost one-third of customers are behind on their bills . About one-sixth of customers are not even receiving bills. Yet it would be politically unfeasible for Jackson’s elected officials to cut off all those users, regardless of whether it would ultimately be more humane.
The fact is, it’s not always possible to increase prices. Especially if you are unable to collect any payment at all from many customers.
The problem is worse yet. Once customers are in the habit of not paying their utility bills, it gets harder to collect payment, even if future prices are much lower. Customers might expect the no-payment-necessary regime to continue, and to organize with that goal in mind. This is a common problem in lesser developed nations.
I do not favor the extensive UK energy subsidies, which unduly distort relative price signals, but they have to be understood in this context. Their net cost, relative to the alternatives actually on the table, is not nearly as large as it looks.
Open the Skies!
Here’s a list of the world’s top ten airlines:
- Qatar Airways
- Singapore Airlines
- Emirates
- ANA (All Nippon Airways)
- Qantas Airways
- Japan Airlines
- Turkish Airlines
- Air France
- Korean Air
- Swiss International Air Lines
The airlines in this list have at least two things in common: None of world’s best airlines are US owned and none of them are allowed to operate domestically in the United States. The two common elements are related because so-called “cabotage laws” prohibit foreign airlines from serving domestic travelers.
Imagine what international travel would be like if you could only fly on a US owned airline? Ok it’s not that hard to imagine. Restricting international flights to domestic airlines would make international travel much more expensive and more inconvenient. The US State Department rightly lauds the Open Skies Agreements that have brought competition to international flights:
Since 1992 the United States has pursued an “Open Skies” policy designed to eliminate government intervention in airline decision-making about routes, capacity, and pricing in international markets…Open Skies agreements expand cooperative marketing opportunities between airlines, liberalize charter regulations, improve flexibility for airline operations, and commit both governments to high standards of safety and security. They are pro-consumer, pro-competition, and pro-growth, and facilitate countless new cultural links worldwide.
True! But US domestic flights fly on Closed Skies. Europe has opened up competition to all European airlines. Indeed, Europe is also substantially open to US carriers, but the US is closed to foreign carriers for domestic flights. Cabotage laws are, in effect, a Jones Act for the airlines.
In an good review, Scott Lincicome summarizes:
Europe’s deregulatory experiences—and our own—show that nixing cabotage restrictions would not only put additional downward pressure on fares but also likely improve route coverage and maybe even customer service.
The economy that is British
10y breakevens are now *down* from 4.2% last week to 3.8%…?
(And 5y breakeven inflation is down even more from 4.7% to 4% …?) pic.twitter.com/csAyYP8xzI
— Basil Halperin (@BasilHalperin) September 27, 2022
Risk of British default has not gone up. Real interest rates are up.
To be clear, I don’t envy their current macroeconomic situation. But again, the talk of how terrible this is seems much overblown to me.
Now you might be wondering how the five-year break even rates can be so well behaved. Well, here is a dirty little secret: there is much less stimulus in the Truss plan than people are claiming.
I don’t mean to pick on Josh Barro, of whom I am a huge fan, but his pithy summary is so clear it allows me to summarize some of my disagreements on these issues. Here is one excerpt from his Substack:
It’s a huge fiscal stimulus at exactly the wrong time. Truss is proposing over £160 billion of deficit-increasing policies over the next five years. To give you a sense of scale, since the US economy is approximately eight times the size of Britain’s, the equivalent would be if we implemented an additional $1.4 trillion, five-year stimulus package.
I agree this is expenditure, but by no means is all or even most of it “stimulus.” As Josh notes, the energy price subsidies are the biggest part of this announced plan. I am against that policy, but it is trying to absorb a contractionary shock rather than being stimulus per se. The Truss plan is transferring much of that higher energy cost from the private sector to the public sector. The real cost involved is mostly the preexisting problem from the higher cost of energy, which now is on the government’s books to an increasing degree. Many people are speaking of that as “a cost of the Truss plan,” which it is in terms of nominal flows but not nearly as much in real resource terms (I would admit and indeed stress that the plan distorts relative prices, which is a big part of my objection to it).
That is probably one reason why the five-year break-even rates for the UK generally have been falling, not rising.
Then there are the tax cuts for the wealthy. But those too are (mostly) not stimulus. Dare I make a…Barrovian argument? If you cut taxes, hold spending constant, and the tax cut recipients save most of that money, that satisfies the Barrovian neutrality theorem. That also isn’t stimulus. (Obviously government spending isn’t constant, but the main boost in spending, as discussed immediately above, is not itself net stimulus but rather a funny inefficient transfer that still leaves a net contractionary force partly in place, namely higher energy prices.) You might object to the tax cut policy for distributional or other reasons, but you shouldn’t add it to “the stimulus pile.” At least not most of it. Furthermore, you can buy this argument without accepting the (Robert) Barro analysis for more general settings.
Again, people think there is much more “stimulus” in the new plan than there really is.
Ronald W. Jones, RIP
The University of Rochester has reported his passing, via Michael Rizzo. He was one of the very greatest trade economists, here is further information on him.