Category: Education

David Gordon emails me on the workplace

by  Tyler Cowen in

Tyler,

I enjoyed reading your excellent post on the Crooked Timber workplace coercion piece. Many of their complaints also hold for the university classroom, e.g., limits to free speech, students have no say in what work is required, etc.; and often there are costs to refusing to enroll in classes the student finds onerous, such as failing to obtain the desired degree. But I doubt Bertram and his friends would regard this situation as coercive.

Best wishes,

David

Nor is it always easy to switch schools…

Sentences to ponder

by  Tyler Cowen in

When the head cook of Viet Taste in Falls Church gets an order for a plate of Bun Cha Hanoi, he knows exactly what to do.

He has cooked the pork dish — with vermicelli noodles, greens and pickled vegetables — countless times and knows exactly how much fish sauce and fresh herbs to add.

Outside his kitchen, the customers, most of them Vietnamese, are expecting authentic Vietnamese cuisine. German Sierra, born in Honduras, makes sure they get it.

Here is more, interesting throughout.

Steve Postrel on marginalism and the paradox of higher education

by  Tyler Cowen in

Via Reihan, this is an excellent blog post.  Rather than excerpt, let me reproduce the whole thing:

By now, you may be getting sick of reading articles and blog posts about the crisis in higher education. This post is different. It proposes an explanation of why students have been willing to pay more and more for undergraduate and professional degrees at the same time that these degrees are becoming both less scarce and more dumbed down. And that explanation rests on a simple and plausible economic hypothesis.

First, let me dispose of the idea that “college (and business school) is all about signaling.” The explanation I present allows signaling to represent a major part of the value of higher education, but it says that the historical increase in willingness to pay for education is not caused by an increase in its signaling value. (And the evidence for signaling or screening education premia, as opposed to human capital accumulation, is pretty thin anyway.) I’m certain signaling plays a role in creating value for certain degrees from certain institutions for certain people in certain situations. That it dominates the value proposition for college seems like a stretch.

My hypothesis is that it is precisely the dumbing down of U.S. education over the last decades that explains the increase in willingness to pay for education. The mechanism is diminishing marginal returns to education.

Typical graduate business school education has indeed become less rigorous over time, as has typical college education. But typical high school education has declined in quality just as much. As a result, the human capital difference between a college and high-school graduate has increased, because the first increments of education are more valuable on the job market than the later ones. It used to be that everybody could read and understand something like Orwell’s Animal Farm, but the typical college graduates could also understand Milton or Spencer. Now, nobody grasps Milton but only the college grads can process Animal Farm, and for employers the See Spot Run–>Animal Farm jump is more valuable than the Animal Farm–>Milton jump.

So the value of a college education has increased even as its rigor has declined, because willingness to pay for quality is really willingness to pay for incremental quality. This principle holds true in many markets. For example, a roof with mean time to failure of 5 years is a lot more valuable than one with a MTF of 2 years, but a 25-year MTF isn’t that much better than a 22-year MTF for most owners. A fuel economy increase from 12 to 15 miles per gallon is a bigger deal than an increase from 27 to 30 MPG.

Empirical points in favor of this diminishing marginal returns/reduced overall rigor hypothesis:

1. Rigor appears to be declining over time at all levels of American education.

2. Rate of return evidence classically suggests that the big marginal gains to education come from lower levels of education.

3. The median wages of college graduates have been flat, but the median wages of high-school-only graduates have gone down even more.

4. The MBA market has continued to support higher tuitions and enrollment despite the secular trend in rigor.

5. Employers increasingly favor those with more education even as they complain more about the quality of the graduates they hire.

Additional implications:

1. The incremental human capital gained from attending a (truly) better school rather than a typical school is increasing, since the additional learning is more basic (and hence more valuable) than it used to be.

2. Five and six-year undergraduate-to-masters programs should grow to accommodate those who would benefit from additional human capital.

3. More-rigorous high schools will attract larger premia (in either tuition, ability to be selective, or, for public schools, their impact on local property values), because at lower overall levels of rigor the increment of human capital is worth more.

Extensions of the logic to signaling considerations:

1. If you accept that the marginal ability and effort necessary to acquire education increases in the level of education (the flip side of the assumption about diminishing marginal payoff), then the signaling value of the typical degree is actually declining. The innate ability difference between the college and high-school-only graduate shrinks as both curricula are made less rigorous.

2. Signaling by the quality of the institution attended and the difficulty of the major subject studied is becoming more important; a very selective (or hard to complete) school or major adds back some of the lost signaling power of the typical degree.

3. We should see college degrees becoming more important in occupations that wouldn’t seem to “require” them under the old model of college, such as service staff in food service and hospitality jobs.

“Scene of the Verge of the Hay-Mead”

by  Tyler Cowen in

That is a chapter from Far From the Madding Crowd, which remains a much underrated Thomas Hardy novel.  This chapter is a masterpiece of behavioral economics, most of all on matters of courtship and romance.  It is difficult to excerpt, because it relies so much on the sequence of events and dialog.  You can read it free here.  There are other sources, including MP3s, here.

Zingales on Education Equity

by  Alex Tabarrok in

Luigi Zingales has a good op-ed on education in today’s NYTimes:

… scholars like me…work in the least competitive and most subsidized industry of all: higher education.

We criticize predatory loans by mortgage brokers, when student loans can be just as abusive. To avoid the next credit bubble and debt crisis, we need to eliminate government subsidies and link tuition financing to the incomes of college graduates…Just as subsidies for homeownership have increased the price of houses, so have education subsidies contributed to the soaring price of college.

…These subsidies also distort the credit market. Since the government guarantees student loans, lenders have no incentive to lend wisely. All the burden of making the right decision falls on the borrowers. Unfortunately, 18-year-olds aren’t particularly good at judging the profitability of an investment…

Last but not least, these subsidized loans keep afloat colleges that do not add much value for their students, preventing people from accumulating useful skills.

Instead of subsidies Zingales, drawing a page from Milton Friedman, proposes income-contingent loans.

Investors could finance students’ education with equity rather than debt. In exchange for their capital, the investors would receive a fraction of a student’s future income — or, even better, a fraction of the increase in her income that derives from college attendance. (This increase can be easily calculated as the difference between the actual income and the average income of high school graduates in the same area.)

As I wrote about earlier, Bill Clinton received a loan like this from Yale’s law school and later created a national program but it didn’t get very far (although Obama wants to expand the program). Australia, however, implemented an income contingent loan program in 1989. Australian students don’t pay anything for university when they attend but once their income reaches a certain threshold they are charged through the income tax system.  Many other countries are experimenting with income contingent loans.

Lumni is a private organization, started by economist Miguel Palacios (here is his book and Cato paper on human capital contracts), that is funding loans like this right now.

One point that Zingales doesn’t examine is adverse selection – an income-contingent loan will appeal most to people who want careers with low-income prospects, say in the non-profit sector. (Redistribution of this type was one of the reasons for the Yale law school program.) Thus, the program works best when incomes differ due to luck. My guess is that the adverse-selection problem can be handled if education venture capitalists are left free to price.

Who will be next to ask for a raise?

by  Tyler Cowen in

Angus reports:

Kudos to Thomas Sargent for landing a two year position at Seoul National University for an estimated $1,250,000 per year.

Economists can pull down 7 figures in total compensation when you figure in consulting and speech-giving on top of the academic salary, but this is the biggest salary+”research funds” number that I’m aware of in economics.

What is the correct Bayesian inference from this British message?

by  Tyler Cowen in

I found a little card in my bathroom, perched above the toilet and near the shower:

This bath has a non slip surface in part.  If you would like a rubber bath mat in addition please contact housekeeping.

And so what does that mean?  Here are some options:

1. The part without the non slip surface is really, really slippery.  Watch out!

2. We are boasting about having a non slip surface “in part,” yet without appearing to be boasting too explicitly.

3. We are not sure which is your best course of action (there is human heterogeneity), but we want to get you thinking about the non slip surface and also the slip surface.  We are sure you will put the information to good use and also we are showing our respect for your decision-making and autonomy.

4. We have attempted to word this message as emotionally neutrally as possible.  We are therefore signaling that we are a quality hotel, without intending to offer any particular advice about the non slip surface or for that matter the slip surface.  We also did not fall into the trap of hyphenating “non slip” (though we did elsewhere in the bathroom hyphenate “co-operation”), nor did we place a comma after “addition” as you barbarians might have done.

I am not intelligent enough to discern which of these might be true.

Should B. emigrate from England?

by  Tyler Cowen in

A request from a loyal blog reader. I attended a talk in Oxford by Martin Wolf from the FT a few months ago, in which he gave a very pessimistic assessment of prospects for the British and European economies. A member of the audience asked what his advice for a young graduate entering the job market would be, and his response was ’emigrate’.

So two requests, really:

(1) Do you agree?
(2) If so, where should I go?

To put things in context, I am a 21-year-old male, a final year student at Oxford University reading for a BA in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics (concentrating on the latter two subjects). I have work experience in the financial sector, moderate language ability (high school level French and German, but a fast learner), and I am willing to consider a wide range of locations. I am an EU citizen, so obviously have freedom of movement within the EU. I am open to staying somewhere for a relatively long period, but at the moment I am more inclined to think of it as a below-ten-year stay. Assume, perhaps, the prospect of permanent residence is not excluded. Feel free to edit the request as appropriate for the blog.

I say:

1. The key data point is the polarization of labor market returns, including in the United Kingdom and much of Western Europe.  Given that your background and reading habits signal smarts and hard work, you probably will do fine staying at home.

2. Switching languages will set you back by years, even if you are a quick study.  Stick to the Anglo world, or to an English-speaking job at least.

3. It is not already obvious to B. that he should move to the United States.  That’s fine, so perhaps he quite likes England already and indeed who wouldn’t?  That lack of obsession with America also means he does not have a diehard commitment to maximizing pecuniary returns and that is yet further evidence he should stay in England.

4. If you want to travel and live abroad, try to start with an English multinational and then signal a willingness to move far afield.  Or consider the foreign service.  Or work for a year or two and then do a Jodi Ettenberg for as long as you can.  All of those options sound better to me than moving to Stuttgart and trying to master the intricacies of “dass ich nicht habe lachen mussen,” (or is it “dass ich habe nicht lachen mussen”?, or do they mean different things?) while petitioning the Knigge Society for a knowledge of manners.

5. “A man who is tired of London is tired of life.”

Why were we obsessed with flying cars?

by  Tyler Cowen in

David Graeber has a fascinating albeit uneven essay about our changing visions of the future, here is one excerpt:

Why, these analysts wonder, did both the United States and the Soviet Union become so obsessed with the idea of manned space travel? It was never an efficient way to engage in scientific research. And it encouraged unrealistic ideas of what the human future would be like.

Could the answer be that both the United States and the Soviet Union had been, in the century before, societies of pioneers, one expanding across the Western frontier, the other across Siberia? Didn’t they share a commitment to the myth of a limitless, expansive future, of human colonization of vast empty spaces, that helped convince the leaders of both superpowers they had entered into a “space age” in which they were battling over control of the future itself? All sorts of myths were at play here, no doubt, but that proves nothing about the feasibility of the project.

And this bit:

The growth of administrative work [in universities] has directly resulted from introducing corporate management techniques. Invariably, these are justified as ways of increasing efficiency and introducing competition at every level. What they end up meaning in practice is that everyone winds up spending most of their time trying to sell things: grant proposals; book proposals; assessments of students’ jobs and grant applications; assessments of our colleagues; prospectuses for new interdisciplinary majors; institutes; conference workshops; universities themselves (which have now become brands to be marketed to prospective students or contributors); and so on.

As marketing overwhelms university life, it generates documents about fostering imagination and creativity that might just as well have been designed to strangle imagination and creativity in the cradle. No major new works of social theory have emerged in the United States in the last thirty years.

Interesting throughout, as they say.  For pointers I thank Umung Varma and Kevan Huston.

Cheating and Signaling

by  Alex Tabarrok in

The Chronicle of Higher Education has an article on cheating in online courses and some of the high-tech measures being used to detect such cheating:

As the students proceeded, they were told whether each answer was right or wrong.

Mr. Smith figured out that the actual number of possible questions in the test bank was pretty small. If he and his friends got together to take the test jointly, they could paste the questions they saw into the shared Google Doc, along with the right or wrong answers. The schemers would go through the test quickly, one at a time, logging their work as they went. The first student often did poorly, since he had never seen the material before…The next student did significantly better, thanks to the cheat sheet, and subsequent test-takers upped their scores even further. They took turns going first.

…”So the grades are bouncing back and forth, but we’re all guaranteed an A in the end,” Mr. Smith told me. “We’re playing the system, and we’re playing the system pretty well.”

…A method under consideration at MIT would analyze each user’s typing style to help verify identity, Mr. Agarwal told me in a recent interview. Such electronic fingerprinting could be combined with face-recognition software to ensure accuracy, he says. Since most laptops now have Webcams built in, future online students might have to smile for the camera to sign on.

Some colleges already require identity-verification techniques that seem out of a movie. They’re using products such as the Securexam Remote Proctor, which scans fingerprints and captures a 360-degree view around students, and Kryterion’s Webassessor, which lets human proctors watch students remotely on Web cameras and listen to their keystrokes.

The cheater-detector arms-race is interesting but also makes me think about the signaling theory of education. Cheating works best if the signaling model is true. If education were all about increasing productivity and if employers could measure productivity then cheating would be a waste of time. As illustrated by Mr. Smith, however, at least some students care about the A that cheating produces more than the knowledge that learning produces. Mr. Smith must believe either that education (in at least this class) doesn’t increase productivity or that employers don’t learn about productivity. Employers have big incentives to learn about productivity so my bet is on the former.

If students perceive the situation correctly we also have an interesting hypothesis: students should cheat more in those courses that offer the least productivity gains. Studies on cheating find mixed results across major, with some finding that business majors cheat more and others not, but these studies are cross sectional, i.e. across individuals. A better test of the theory that I propose would look at cheating by the same individuals across courses. Absences should also be higher in courses with lower productivity gains.

Public Choice Outreach!

by  Alex Tabarrok in

Students are invited to apply to the Public Choice Outreach Conference. The Conference is an intensive lecture series on public choice and constitutional economics that will be held at George Mason from Friday August 10 to Sunday August 12. Speakers will include Tyler Cowen, Robin Hanson, Peter Boettke, Nobelist Jim Buchanan and many others. It will be a lot of fun!

Graduate students and advanced undergraduates majoring in economics, history, international studies, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, public administration, religious studies, and sociology have attended past conferences. Applicants unfamiliar with Public Choice and students from outside of George Mason University are especially encouraged. A small stipend is available and meals and rooms will be provided by the conference (for non-locals). Space, however, is very limited.

Applications are due June 22. You can find more information here. Contact Lisa Hill-Corley if you have further questions about applications.

I, Robot?

by  Tyler Cowen in

In experiments at six public universities, students assigned randomly to statistics courses that relied heavily on “machine-guided learning” software — with reduced face time with instructors — did just as well, in less time, as their counterparts in traditional, instructor-centric versions of the courses. This largely held true regardless of the race, gender, age, enrollment status and family background of the students.

Here is more.  The report was led by William Bowen, an economist who is famous for, among other things, having described education as subject to an inexorable “cost disease” for lack of labor-saving innovation.