Category: Political Science
“Can America Win the AI War with China?”
A long video chat, with Geoffrey Cain, who is more hawkish than I am. Bari Weiss moderates. One argument I make is that America may prefer if China does well with AI, because the non-status quo effects of AI may disrupt their system more than ours. I also argue that for all the AI rival with China (which to be sure is real), much of the future may consist of status quo powers America and China working together to put down smaller-scale AI troublemakers around the rest of the world. Interesting throughout.
What should I ask Sheilagh Ogilvie?
She is a Canadian economic historian at Oxford, here is from her home page:
I am an economic historian. I explore the lives of ordinary people in the past and try to explain how poor economies get richer and improve human well-being. I’m interested in how social institutions – the formal and informal constraints on economic activity – shaped economic development between the Middle Ages and the present day.
And:
My current research focusses on serfdom, human capital, state capacity, and epidemic disease. Past projects analysed guilds, merchants, communities, the family, gender, consumption, finance, proto-industry, historical demography, childhood, and social capital. I have a particular interest in the economic and social history of Central and Eastern Europe.
Here is her Wikipedia page. Her book on guilds is well known, and her latest is Controlling Contagion: Epidemics and Institutions from the Black Death to Covid. Here are her main research papers.
So what should I ask her?
Trumpian policy as cultural policy
The Trump administration has issued a blizzard of Executive Orders, and set many other potential changes in the works. They might rename Dulles Airport (can you guess to what?). A bill has been introduced to add you-know-who to Mount Rushmore. There is DOGE, and the ongoing attempt to reshape federal employment.
At the same time, many people have been asking me why Trump chose Canada and Mexico to threaten with tariffs — are they not our neighbors, major trading partners, and closest allies?
I have a theory that tries to explain all these and other facts, though many other factors matter too. I think of Trumpian policy, first and foremost, as elevating cultural policy above all else.
Imagine you hold a vision where the (partial) decline of America largely is about culture. After all, we have more people and more natural resources than ever before. Our top achievements remain impressive. But is the overall culture of the people in such great shape? The culture of government and public service? Interest in our religious organizations? The quality of local government in many states? You don’t have to be a diehard Trumper to have some serious reservations on such questions.
We also see countries, such as China, that have screwed-up policies but have grown a lot, in large part because of a pro-business, pro-learning, pro-work culture. Latin America, in contrast, did lots of policy reforms but still is somewhat stagnant.
OK, so how might you fix the culture of America? You want to tell everyone that America comes first. That America should be more masculine and less soft. That we need to build. That we should “own the libs.” I could go on with more examples and details, but this part of it you already get.
So imagine you started a political revolution and asked the simple question “does this policy change reinforce or overturn our basic cultural messages?” Every time the policy or policy debate pushes culture in what you think is the right direction, just do it. Do it in the view that the cultural factors will, over some time horizon, surpass everything else in import.
Simply pass or announce or promise such policies. Do not worry about any other constraints.
You don’t even have to do them!
They don’t even all have to be legal! (Illegal might provoke more discussion.)
They don’t all have to persist!
You create a debate over the issues knowing that, because of polarization, at least one-third of the American public is going to take your side, sometimes much more than that. These are your investments in changing the culture. And do it with as many issues as possible, as quickly as possible (reread Ezra on this). Think of it as akin to the early Jordan Peterson cranking out all those videos. Flood the zone. That is how you have an impact in an internet-intensive, attention-at-a-premium world.
You will not win all of these cultural debates, but you will control the ideological agenda (I hesitate to call it an “intellectual” agenda, but it is). Your opponents will be dispirited and disorganized, and yes that does describe the Democrats today. Then just keep on going. In the long run, you may end up “owning” far more of the culture than you suspected was possible.
Yes policy will be a mess, but as they say “man kann nicht alles haben.” The culture is worth a lot, both for its own sake and as a predictor of the future course of policy.
Now let’s turn to some details.
In the first week, Trump makes a huge point of striking down DEI and affirmative action (in some of its forms) as the very beginnings of his administration. The WSJ described it as the centerpiece of his program. Take origins seriously!
Early on, we also see so many efforts to make statements about the culture wars. Trans issues, for instance trans out of the military. No more “Black History Month” for the Department of Defense. There are more of these than I can keep track of, use Perplexity if you must.
It is no accident that these are priorities. And keep in mind the main point is not to eliminate Black History Month, though I do not doubt that is a favored policy. The main point is to get people talking about how you are eliminating Black History Month. Just as I am covering the topic right now.
How is that war against US AID going? Will it be abolished? Cut off from the Treasury payments system? Simply rolled up into the State Department? Presidential “impoundment” invoked? I do not know. Perhaps nobody knows, not yet. The point however is to delegitimatize what US AID stands for, which the Trumpers perceive as “other countries first” and a certain kind of altruism, and a certain kind of NGO left-leaning mindset and lifestyle.
The core message is simply “we do not consider this legitimate.” Have that be the topic of discussion for months, and do not worry about converting each and every debate into an immediate tangible victory.
What about those ridiculous nominations, starting with RFK, Jr.? As a result of the nomination, people start questioning whether the medical and public health establishments are legitimate after all. And once such a question starts being debated, the answer simply cannot come out fully positive, whatever the details of your worldview may be. People end up in a more negative mental position, and of course then some negative contagion reinforces this further.
JFK and UAP dislcosure? The point is to get people questioning the previous regime, why they kept secrets from us, what really was going on with many other issues, and so on. It will work. The good news, if you can call it that, is that we can expect some of the juicier secrets to be made public.
I think by now you can see how the various attempts to restructure federal employment fit into this picture. And Trump’s “war against universities” has barely begun, but stay tuned. Don’t even get me going on “Gaza real estate,” the very latest.
Finally, let’s return to those tariffs (non-tariffs?) on Canada and Mexico. We already know Trump believes in tariffs, and yes that is a big factor, but why choose those countries in particular? Well, first it is a symbol of strength and Trump’s apparent ability to ignore and contradict mainstream opinion. But also those are two countries most Americans have heard of. If Trump announced high tariffs on say Burundi, most people would have no idea what it means. They would not know how to debate it, and they would not know if America was debasing itself or thumbing its nose at somebody, or whatever.
Canada and Mexico gets the cultural point across. Canada, all the more so, and thus the Canadian tariffs might be harder to truly reverse. At least to many Yankee outsiders, Canada comes across as exactly the kind of “wuss” country we need to distance ourselves from.
To be clear, this hypothesis does not not not require any kind of cohesive elite planning the whole strategy (though there are elites planning significant parts of what Trump is doing). It suffices to have a) conflicting interest groups, b) competition for Trump’s attention, and c) Trump believing cultural issues are super-important, as he seems to. There then results a spontaneous order, in which the visible strategy looks just like someone intended exactly this as a concrete plan.
In a future post I may consider the pluses and minuses of this kind of political/cultural strategy.
US AID bleg
What are the best sources to read on US AID, and its costs and benefits? I am not interested in your anecdotes and adjectives, please offer serious research sources only. Thank you.
Gradual Empowerment?
The subtitle is “Systemic Existential Risks from Incremental AI Development,” and the authors are Jan Kulveit, et.al. Several of you have asked me for comments on this paper. Here is the abstract:
This paper examines the systemic risks posed by incremental advancements in artificial intelligence, developing the concept of `gradual disempowerment’, in contrast to the abrupt takeover scenarios commonly discussed in AI safety. We analyze how even incremental improvements in AI capabilities can undermine human influence over large-scale systems that society depends on, including the economy, culture, and nation-states. As AI increasingly replaces human labor and cognition in these domains, it can weaken both explicit human control mechanisms (like voting and consumer choice) and the implicit alignments with human interests that often arise from societal systems’ reliance on human participation to function. Furthermore, to the extent that these systems incentivise outcomes that do not line up with human preferences, AIs may optimize for those outcomes more aggressively. These effects may be mutually reinforcing across different domains: economic power shapes cultural narratives and political decisions, while cultural shifts alter economic and political behavior. We argue that this dynamic could lead to an effectively irreversible loss of human influence over crucial societal systems, precipitating an existential catastrophe through the permanent disempowerment of humanity. This suggests the need for both technical research and governance approaches that specifically address the risk of incremental erosion of human influence across interconnected societal systems.
This is one of the smarter arguments I have seen, but I am very far from convinced. When were humans ever in control to begin with? (Robin Hanson realized this a few years ago and is still worried about it, as I suppose he should be. There is not exactly a reliable competitive process for cultural evolution — boo hoo!)
Note the argument here is not that a few rich people will own all the AI. Rather, humans seem to lose power altogether. But aren’t people cloning DeepSeek for ridiculously small sums of money? Why won’t our AI future be fairly decentralized, with lots of checks and balances, and plenty of human ownership to boot?
Rather than focusing on “humans in general,” I say look at the marginal individual human being. That individual — forever as far as I can tell — has near-zero bargaining power against a coordinating, cartelized society aligned against him. With or without AI. Yet that hardly ever happens, extreme criminals being one exception. There simply isn’t enough collusion to extract much from the (non-criminal) potentially vulnerable lone individuals.
I do not in this paper see a real argument that a critical mass of the AIs are going to collude against humans. It seems already that “AIs in China” and “AIs in America” are unlikely to collude much with each other. Similarly, “the evil rich people” do not collude with each other all that much either, much less across borders.
I feel if the paper made a serious attempt to model the likelihood of worldwide AI collusion, the results would come out in the opposite direction. So, to my eye, “checks and balances forever” is by far the more likely equilibrium.
Robert Paul Wolff, RIP
He has passed, here is one obituary.
The culture that is German (Roman)
We compare present-day regions that were advanced by Roman culture with those that remained outside of Roman influence. Even when accounting for more recent historical factors, we find that regions developed by Roman civilization show more adaptive personality patterns (Big Five) and better health and psychological well-being today. Results from a spatial regression discontinuity design indicate a significant effect of the Roman border on present-day regional variation in these outcomes. Additional analyses suggest that Roman investments in economic institutions (e.g., trade infrastructure such as Roman roads, markets, and mines) were crucial in creating this long-term effect. Together, these results demonstrate how ancient cultures can imprint a macro-psychological legacy that contributes to present-day regional inequalities.
That is from a recent paper by Obschonka, et.al., via Alexander Le Roy. Also on the German front:
The German parliament will debate on Thursday, January 30th whether to ban the opposition right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party.
A group of lawmakers, 113 MPs, have called for parliament to discuss a motion which would invite the constitutional court to decide whether the party is unconstitutional.The motion is supported by MPs from the centre-right CDU/CSU alliance, the far-left Die Linke, as well as the two governing parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.
The signatories claim that the AfD “opposes central basic principles of the free democratic basic order,” questions human dignity, and strives for the “ethno-nationalist strengthening” of the German identity.
Of course the strongest support for AfD is not to be found in Trier. I would not myself support AfD, for both policy and cultural reasons. But I find it strange that Europeans so often see the United States as the locale where democracy is in danger. Right now AfD polls as the second most popular party in Germany — beat them at the ballot box!
*Abundance*, by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson
The NIH’s own research indicates that Pioneer Award recipients seem to produce influential, highly cited research. But despite efforts to help younger scientists, the share of basic NIH funding going to scientists under thirty-five continues to decline. In the 2004 fiscal year, the High-Risk, High-Reward Research program allocated about $200 million to scientists, a moderate decline since 2019. The amount was an almost negligible fraction — less than half of 1 percent — of the NIH’s annual budget for that year.
Self-recommending, you can pre-order here.
Democracy, Capitalism and Monarchy (Yarvin)
The Yarvin interview in the NYTimes magazine illustrates the change in vibes, but frankly, I was bored. It’s amusing when Yarvin tweaks liberals by pointing out that FDR was an authoritarian, but Liberal Fascism did it better.
More generally, much of Yarvin’s thinking is superficial. He thinks, for example, that capitalism works because firms are monarchies.
Yes. I think that having an effective government and an efficient government is better for people’s lives. When I ask people to answer that question, I ask them to look around the room and point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy, because these things that we call companies are actually little monarchies. You’re looking around, and you see, for example, a laptop, and that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy.
There are many errors here. First, Apple is one firm among countless others most of which do not produce hugely successful products. The big question is not how Apple produces but how Apple is produced. Firms operate as planned entities but they are embedded in and constrained by a broader sea of market competition. It’s the competitive environment that drives innovation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.
Second, Mises was closer to the truth when he wrote in Planned Chaos that it’s the consumers not the producers who are monarchs:
In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality. It determines directly the prices of consumer goods and indirectly the prices of all producer goods, viz., labor and material factors of production. It determines the emergence of profits and losses and the formation of the rate of interest. It determines every individual’s income…The market adjusts the efforts of all those engaged in supplying the needs of the consumers to the wishes of those for whom they produce, the consumers. It subjects production to consumption.
Capitalist firms are disciplined by the necessity of persuading consumers to purchase their products and by competition. Successful firms must continuously meet our desires and needs to survive. When Apple fails to do so, it will face the same fate as countless firms before it—obsolescence and failure.
Markets do hold lessons about governance, but Yarvin draws the wrong conclusions. Democracy, not monarchy, is the political system most analogous to capitalism. As Mises observed, “The market is a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote.” The analogy works both ways: voting in a democracy mirrors spending in a market. Both systems empower individuals—consumers or voters—to shape outcomes, whether by determining market success or selecting leaders.
Democracy and capitalism are both examples of open-access orders, systems characterized by dispersed power, low barriers to entry, and transparent, universally applicable rules. Such features foster adaptability, accountability, and broad participation—qualities essential to both economic and political success.
The West does face a modest “crisis” of democracy, but the root of this crisis lies in expecting democracy to do too much. We have collectivized decisions which are best left in the hands of individuals and markets but democracy is not a good way of making collective decisions.
Democracy is best understood as a constraint on government power, akin to a Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Democracy’s virtue is in providing a mechanism to remove bad rulers without resorting to bloodshed and its primary value lies in preventing catastrophic outcomes like mass famines and democide—a significant and undeniable merit. Autocracies and monarchies perform much less well on the big issues and, contrary to what many people think, autocracies do not grow faster, win more wars, or perform better on any meaningful comparison that has been investigated.
It is also essential to recognize that “democracy” encompasses a wide range of structures—parliamentary, presidential, constitutional, and more—and there is plenty of room for improved choice within the broader category. We can improve our democracy.
The real lesson from markets is not to create monarchs but to design systems that create choice and competition and allow citizens to remove leaders when they fail.
Hat tip for discussion: Connor.
The case for democracy (from the comments)
“Be careful what you wish for, you might get it!”
I said that to Ezra Klein about the current rightward vibes shift. What are some of the scenarios I had in mind?:
1. If the Republicans regulate social media companies to discriminate less against “the Right,” those regulations may someday be used against them.
2. Personal presidential issuance of crypto assets is not always (ever?) a good thing or lead to the right incentives. In the meantime, it might serve as a daily referendum on how much of a lame duck presidency we are having, a mixed blessing.
3. The conspiracy theorizing promoted by Trump and various minions could someday come back to bite them, or to sink Vance, or…I guess we will see. Don’t think you can keep this genie in the bottle, or use it only for preferred ends.
4. DOGE successes might centralize power in the executive branch in a manner that the Republicans later regret. That centralization can be more easily be used to expand government regulatory power than to contract it.
5. If there is a pandemic under Trump’s term, the cultivated anti-vaccine sentiment could make it much worse.
6. Rhetoric on taxes and central bank independence could (further) raise real interest rates, damaging the economy and also Republican electoral prospects.
7. The dwindling of various “safeguards” on rhetoric, as the Woke are dismantled, could end up harming later Republican or right-leaning targets of harmful rhetoric, including from other right-wingers. Some of you may feel this is absurd, but just wait.
8. I don’t think we really know what it would mean (will mean?) to put feminization seriously in reverse. I would note I see myself as a significant beneficiary of our more feminized society. I am pleased if more women decide to become “trad wives,” but it is not the circle I will hang around in either. This one really needs much further thought from its advocates, it is not enough to be fed up with the recent excesses. A lot of the people who claim to want more “trad wives” actually want more super talented women who can do that and be very successful in a career at the same time. I am all for that, but I also recognize when I am asking for a free lunch of sorts. I am not sure how elastic the supply is there. Nor am I sure how much such a change might boost birth rates — Iran anybody?
9. To the extent Trump succeeds, American politics will become all the more personality-driven. I see that as a mixed blessing, most likely more negative than positive in the longer run.
10. If Trump does something good for a foreign country you like or favor, he may ask for his pound of flesh in return.
Those are only a few options, the list is really pretty long. I am not panicked about the status quo, but I see it as fraught and unstable. And we haven’t even touched upon AGI advances.
More generally, I would stress that even the most optimistic person should not relinquish his or her sense of the tragic. A lot of Democrats were pretty ecstatic when Obama won a second term, but how happy are they now? Is that just them, or could it be you too?
I’ll say it again — be careful what you wish for, you might get it. The celebratory perspective can be important for getting things done, or for maintaining ideological coherence, but accuracy matters too, and the more accurate perspective should take all this into account.
Ezra Klein on the vibe shift
In July of 2024, Tyler Cowen, the economist and cultural commentator, wrote a blog post that proved to be among the election’s most prescient. It was titled “The change in vibes — why did they happen?” Cowen’s argument was that mass culture was moving in a Trumpian direction. Among the tributaries flowing into the general shift: the Trumpist right’s deeper embrace of social media, the backlash to the “feminization” of society, exhaustion with the politics of wokeness, an era of negativity that Trump captured but Democrats resisted, a pervasive sense of disorder at the border and abroad and the breakup between Democrats and “Big Tech.”
I was skeptical of Cowen’s post when I first read it, as it described a shift much larger than anything I saw reflected in the polls. I may have been right about the polls. But Cowen was right about the culture.
And the end bit:
Cowen may have correctly called the shift in vibes, but he isn’t particularly comfortable with it. If 2024 was partly a backlash to the Democratic Party and culture of the last four years, what might a backlash to this more culturally confident and overwhelming form of Trumpism look like?
“I’ve taken to insisting to my friends on the right: ‘Be careful what you wish for,’ ” Cowen told me. “You might get it.”
Here is the full NYT column.
An Economic Approach to Homer’s Odyssey: Part I
I wrote this paper several years ago when preparing for my CWT with Emily Wilson. It is now being published by Liberty Fund, in parts. Here is part I. Here is an excerpt from the introduction:
In this series, I will use an economic approach to better understand the implicit politics and economics in The Odyssey. As a “naïve” reader with no training in ancient history, I find the comparative treatment of political regimes as one of the most striking features of the narrative, namely that Odysseus visits a considerable number of distinct polities, and experiences each in a different way. How does each regime operate, and how does it differ from the other regimes presented in the book? Economics forces us to boil down those descriptions and comparisons to a relatively small number of variables. Trying to model the polities in Homer’s Odyssey forces us to decide which are their essential, as opposed to accidental features, and what they might have in common, or which are the most important points of contrast.
And this:
In the world(s) of Homer’s Odyssey, in contrast [to standard economics], the assumptions about human behavior are different. In general terms I think of the core assumptions as looking more like the following:
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- 1. Humans pursue quests rather than consumption as traditionally defined.
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- 2. Humans are continually deceiving others and indeed often themselves. Gains from economic trade are scant, but the risk of death or imprisonment is high.
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- 3. Humans seek out states of intoxication.
Under the economic approach I am proposing, you can think of Homer’s Odyssey as what happens when you inject assumptions along the above lines (with some qualifiers) into a variety of settings.
The piece has numerous points of interest, and I will be covering later installments as they appear.
Thinking about Greenland critically (from the comments)
Well one thing that comes up is the Diego Garcia problem. It appears that Downing Street opted to relinquish sovereignty of an isolated territory remote from major population centers for reasons of domestic politics and perhaps international popularity.
As long as we might (continue to) see a major gulf between American and European norms regarding “international law” and politics, American policy makers can rest far more assured that their strategic interests in say Thule are not going to be sold out for concerns in Copenhagen.
And then, of course, there is the bidding war problem. Currently Greenland is run by a PM who formally wants independence. If Greenland votes that through (and they have been voting for more distance from Copenhagen by supermajority), US bases in Greenland are now subject to bidding on the open market. After all, a lot of US bases have had to be abandoned with changes in leadership and we are already seeing China dumping lots of cash to buy influence.
Best outcome, from a US perspective, is Trump waives around money, Greenland votes to accept, and everyone goes home with resolution of the fact that Greenland is likely more salient to US defense interests than Danish defense interests. A more likely scenario is that Greenland accelerates its independence, particularly if Trump can get together a package of mining setups, the US signs some bilateral treaties and perhaps leases directly with the folks who have the ultimate votes, and Denmark maintains some sort of affiliated roll.
But moral posturing over sovereignty and territory is costly. And from a hard nosed American perspective, the assurances that Greenland will not end up embroiled in some moral posturing like Diego Garcia are simply stronger with American or Independent Greenland than with Danish sovereignty.
That is from Sure. From yesterday’s WSJ:
The Danish government in recent days has privately sent a message to Donald Trump’s team that Copenhagen is happy to negotiate military and economic deals related to Greenland, but it wants the conversations to take place behind closed doors.
And from the WaPo:
But might Greenland be for rent? Or amenable to a Compact of Free Association? Just as the United States has in the Pacific with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau?
The odds are still against any deal, but this is not impossible either.
Should the U.S. recognize Somaliland?
I do not myself have a position on this issue, but I found this analysis by Ken Opalo interesting:
The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.
To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.
The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).
There is much more at the link.
That is from Hadur.