Category: Political Science
US AID bleg
What are the best sources to read on US AID, and its costs and benefits? I am not interested in your anecdotes and adjectives, please offer serious research sources only. Thank you.
Gradual Empowerment?
The subtitle is “Systemic Existential Risks from Incremental AI Development,” and the authors are Jan Kulveit, et.al. Several of you have asked me for comments on this paper. Here is the abstract:
This paper examines the systemic risks posed by incremental advancements in artificial intelligence, developing the concept of `gradual disempowerment’, in contrast to the abrupt takeover scenarios commonly discussed in AI safety. We analyze how even incremental improvements in AI capabilities can undermine human influence over large-scale systems that society depends on, including the economy, culture, and nation-states. As AI increasingly replaces human labor and cognition in these domains, it can weaken both explicit human control mechanisms (like voting and consumer choice) and the implicit alignments with human interests that often arise from societal systems’ reliance on human participation to function. Furthermore, to the extent that these systems incentivise outcomes that do not line up with human preferences, AIs may optimize for those outcomes more aggressively. These effects may be mutually reinforcing across different domains: economic power shapes cultural narratives and political decisions, while cultural shifts alter economic and political behavior. We argue that this dynamic could lead to an effectively irreversible loss of human influence over crucial societal systems, precipitating an existential catastrophe through the permanent disempowerment of humanity. This suggests the need for both technical research and governance approaches that specifically address the risk of incremental erosion of human influence across interconnected societal systems.
This is one of the smarter arguments I have seen, but I am very far from convinced. When were humans ever in control to begin with? (Robin Hanson realized this a few years ago and is still worried about it, as I suppose he should be. There is not exactly a reliable competitive process for cultural evolution — boo hoo!)
Note the argument here is not that a few rich people will own all the AI. Rather, humans seem to lose power altogether. But aren’t people cloning DeepSeek for ridiculously small sums of money? Why won’t our AI future be fairly decentralized, with lots of checks and balances, and plenty of human ownership to boot?
Rather than focusing on “humans in general,” I say look at the marginal individual human being. That individual — forever as far as I can tell — has near-zero bargaining power against a coordinating, cartelized society aligned against him. With or without AI. Yet that hardly ever happens, extreme criminals being one exception. There simply isn’t enough collusion to extract much from the (non-criminal) potentially vulnerable lone individuals.
I do not in this paper see a real argument that a critical mass of the AIs are going to collude against humans. It seems already that “AIs in China” and “AIs in America” are unlikely to collude much with each other. Similarly, “the evil rich people” do not collude with each other all that much either, much less across borders.
I feel if the paper made a serious attempt to model the likelihood of worldwide AI collusion, the results would come out in the opposite direction. So, to my eye, “checks and balances forever” is by far the more likely equilibrium.
Robert Paul Wolff, RIP
He has passed, here is one obituary.
The culture that is German (Roman)
We compare present-day regions that were advanced by Roman culture with those that remained outside of Roman influence. Even when accounting for more recent historical factors, we find that regions developed by Roman civilization show more adaptive personality patterns (Big Five) and better health and psychological well-being today. Results from a spatial regression discontinuity design indicate a significant effect of the Roman border on present-day regional variation in these outcomes. Additional analyses suggest that Roman investments in economic institutions (e.g., trade infrastructure such as Roman roads, markets, and mines) were crucial in creating this long-term effect. Together, these results demonstrate how ancient cultures can imprint a macro-psychological legacy that contributes to present-day regional inequalities.
That is from a recent paper by Obschonka, et.al., via Alexander Le Roy. Also on the German front:
The German parliament will debate on Thursday, January 30th whether to ban the opposition right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party.
A group of lawmakers, 113 MPs, have called for parliament to discuss a motion which would invite the constitutional court to decide whether the party is unconstitutional.The motion is supported by MPs from the centre-right CDU/CSU alliance, the far-left Die Linke, as well as the two governing parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.
The signatories claim that the AfD “opposes central basic principles of the free democratic basic order,” questions human dignity, and strives for the “ethno-nationalist strengthening” of the German identity.
Of course the strongest support for AfD is not to be found in Trier. I would not myself support AfD, for both policy and cultural reasons. But I find it strange that Europeans so often see the United States as the locale where democracy is in danger. Right now AfD polls as the second most popular party in Germany — beat them at the ballot box!
*Abundance*, by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson
The NIH’s own research indicates that Pioneer Award recipients seem to produce influential, highly cited research. But despite efforts to help younger scientists, the share of basic NIH funding going to scientists under thirty-five continues to decline. In the 2004 fiscal year, the High-Risk, High-Reward Research program allocated about $200 million to scientists, a moderate decline since 2019. The amount was an almost negligible fraction — less than half of 1 percent — of the NIH’s annual budget for that year.
Self-recommending, you can pre-order here.
Democracy, Capitalism and Monarchy (Yarvin)
The Yarvin interview in the NYTimes magazine illustrates the change in vibes, but frankly, I was bored. It’s amusing when Yarvin tweaks liberals by pointing out that FDR was an authoritarian, but Liberal Fascism did it better.
More generally, much of Yarvin’s thinking is superficial. He thinks, for example, that capitalism works because firms are monarchies.
Yes. I think that having an effective government and an efficient government is better for people’s lives. When I ask people to answer that question, I ask them to look around the room and point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy, because these things that we call companies are actually little monarchies. You’re looking around, and you see, for example, a laptop, and that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy.
There are many errors here. First, Apple is one firm among countless others most of which do not produce hugely successful products. The big question is not how Apple produces but how Apple is produced. Firms operate as planned entities but they are embedded in and constrained by a broader sea of market competition. It’s the competitive environment that drives innovation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.
Second, Mises was closer to the truth when he wrote in Planned Chaos that it’s the consumers not the producers who are monarchs:
In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality. It determines directly the prices of consumer goods and indirectly the prices of all producer goods, viz., labor and material factors of production. It determines the emergence of profits and losses and the formation of the rate of interest. It determines every individual’s income…The market adjusts the efforts of all those engaged in supplying the needs of the consumers to the wishes of those for whom they produce, the consumers. It subjects production to consumption.
Capitalist firms are disciplined by the necessity of persuading consumers to purchase their products and by competition. Successful firms must continuously meet our desires and needs to survive. When Apple fails to do so, it will face the same fate as countless firms before it—obsolescence and failure.
Markets do hold lessons about governance, but Yarvin draws the wrong conclusions. Democracy, not monarchy, is the political system most analogous to capitalism. As Mises observed, “The market is a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote.” The analogy works both ways: voting in a democracy mirrors spending in a market. Both systems empower individuals—consumers or voters—to shape outcomes, whether by determining market success or selecting leaders.
Democracy and capitalism are both examples of open-access orders, systems characterized by dispersed power, low barriers to entry, and transparent, universally applicable rules. Such features foster adaptability, accountability, and broad participation—qualities essential to both economic and political success.
The West does face a modest “crisis” of democracy, but the root of this crisis lies in expecting democracy to do too much. We have collectivized decisions which are best left in the hands of individuals and markets but democracy is not a good way of making collective decisions.
Democracy is best understood as a constraint on government power, akin to a Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Democracy’s virtue is in providing a mechanism to remove bad rulers without resorting to bloodshed and its primary value lies in preventing catastrophic outcomes like mass famines and democide—a significant and undeniable merit. Autocracies and monarchies perform much less well on the big issues and, contrary to what many people think, autocracies do not grow faster, win more wars, or perform better on any meaningful comparison that has been investigated.
It is also essential to recognize that “democracy” encompasses a wide range of structures—parliamentary, presidential, constitutional, and more—and there is plenty of room for improved choice within the broader category. We can improve our democracy.
The real lesson from markets is not to create monarchs but to design systems that create choice and competition and allow citizens to remove leaders when they fail.
Hat tip for discussion: Connor.
The case for democracy (from the comments)
“Be careful what you wish for, you might get it!”
I said that to Ezra Klein about the current rightward vibes shift. What are some of the scenarios I had in mind?:
1. If the Republicans regulate social media companies to discriminate less against “the Right,” those regulations may someday be used against them.
2. Personal presidential issuance of crypto assets is not always (ever?) a good thing or lead to the right incentives. In the meantime, it might serve as a daily referendum on how much of a lame duck presidency we are having, a mixed blessing.
3. The conspiracy theorizing promoted by Trump and various minions could someday come back to bite them, or to sink Vance, or…I guess we will see. Don’t think you can keep this genie in the bottle, or use it only for preferred ends.
4. DOGE successes might centralize power in the executive branch in a manner that the Republicans later regret. That centralization can be more easily be used to expand government regulatory power than to contract it.
5. If there is a pandemic under Trump’s term, the cultivated anti-vaccine sentiment could make it much worse.
6. Rhetoric on taxes and central bank independence could (further) raise real interest rates, damaging the economy and also Republican electoral prospects.
7. The dwindling of various “safeguards” on rhetoric, as the Woke are dismantled, could end up harming later Republican or right-leaning targets of harmful rhetoric, including from other right-wingers. Some of you may feel this is absurd, but just wait.
8. I don’t think we really know what it would mean (will mean?) to put feminization seriously in reverse. I would note I see myself as a significant beneficiary of our more feminized society. I am pleased if more women decide to become “trad wives,” but it is not the circle I will hang around in either. This one really needs much further thought from its advocates, it is not enough to be fed up with the recent excesses. A lot of the people who claim to want more “trad wives” actually want more super talented women who can do that and be very successful in a career at the same time. I am all for that, but I also recognize when I am asking for a free lunch of sorts. I am not sure how elastic the supply is there. Nor am I sure how much such a change might boost birth rates — Iran anybody?
9. To the extent Trump succeeds, American politics will become all the more personality-driven. I see that as a mixed blessing, most likely more negative than positive in the longer run.
10. If Trump does something good for a foreign country you like or favor, he may ask for his pound of flesh in return.
Those are only a few options, the list is really pretty long. I am not panicked about the status quo, but I see it as fraught and unstable. And we haven’t even touched upon AGI advances.
More generally, I would stress that even the most optimistic person should not relinquish his or her sense of the tragic. A lot of Democrats were pretty ecstatic when Obama won a second term, but how happy are they now? Is that just them, or could it be you too?
I’ll say it again — be careful what you wish for, you might get it. The celebratory perspective can be important for getting things done, or for maintaining ideological coherence, but accuracy matters too, and the more accurate perspective should take all this into account.
Ezra Klein on the vibe shift
In July of 2024, Tyler Cowen, the economist and cultural commentator, wrote a blog post that proved to be among the election’s most prescient. It was titled “The change in vibes — why did they happen?” Cowen’s argument was that mass culture was moving in a Trumpian direction. Among the tributaries flowing into the general shift: the Trumpist right’s deeper embrace of social media, the backlash to the “feminization” of society, exhaustion with the politics of wokeness, an era of negativity that Trump captured but Democrats resisted, a pervasive sense of disorder at the border and abroad and the breakup between Democrats and “Big Tech.”
I was skeptical of Cowen’s post when I first read it, as it described a shift much larger than anything I saw reflected in the polls. I may have been right about the polls. But Cowen was right about the culture.
And the end bit:
Cowen may have correctly called the shift in vibes, but he isn’t particularly comfortable with it. If 2024 was partly a backlash to the Democratic Party and culture of the last four years, what might a backlash to this more culturally confident and overwhelming form of Trumpism look like?
“I’ve taken to insisting to my friends on the right: ‘Be careful what you wish for,’ ” Cowen told me. “You might get it.”
Here is the full NYT column.
An Economic Approach to Homer’s Odyssey: Part I
I wrote this paper several years ago when preparing for my CWT with Emily Wilson. It is now being published by Liberty Fund, in parts. Here is part I. Here is an excerpt from the introduction:
In this series, I will use an economic approach to better understand the implicit politics and economics in The Odyssey. As a “naïve” reader with no training in ancient history, I find the comparative treatment of political regimes as one of the most striking features of the narrative, namely that Odysseus visits a considerable number of distinct polities, and experiences each in a different way. How does each regime operate, and how does it differ from the other regimes presented in the book? Economics forces us to boil down those descriptions and comparisons to a relatively small number of variables. Trying to model the polities in Homer’s Odyssey forces us to decide which are their essential, as opposed to accidental features, and what they might have in common, or which are the most important points of contrast.
And this:
In the world(s) of Homer’s Odyssey, in contrast [to standard economics], the assumptions about human behavior are different. In general terms I think of the core assumptions as looking more like the following:
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- 1. Humans pursue quests rather than consumption as traditionally defined.
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- 2. Humans are continually deceiving others and indeed often themselves. Gains from economic trade are scant, but the risk of death or imprisonment is high.
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- 3. Humans seek out states of intoxication.
Under the economic approach I am proposing, you can think of Homer’s Odyssey as what happens when you inject assumptions along the above lines (with some qualifiers) into a variety of settings.
The piece has numerous points of interest, and I will be covering later installments as they appear.
Thinking about Greenland critically (from the comments)
Well one thing that comes up is the Diego Garcia problem. It appears that Downing Street opted to relinquish sovereignty of an isolated territory remote from major population centers for reasons of domestic politics and perhaps international popularity.
As long as we might (continue to) see a major gulf between American and European norms regarding “international law” and politics, American policy makers can rest far more assured that their strategic interests in say Thule are not going to be sold out for concerns in Copenhagen.
And then, of course, there is the bidding war problem. Currently Greenland is run by a PM who formally wants independence. If Greenland votes that through (and they have been voting for more distance from Copenhagen by supermajority), US bases in Greenland are now subject to bidding on the open market. After all, a lot of US bases have had to be abandoned with changes in leadership and we are already seeing China dumping lots of cash to buy influence.
Best outcome, from a US perspective, is Trump waives around money, Greenland votes to accept, and everyone goes home with resolution of the fact that Greenland is likely more salient to US defense interests than Danish defense interests. A more likely scenario is that Greenland accelerates its independence, particularly if Trump can get together a package of mining setups, the US signs some bilateral treaties and perhaps leases directly with the folks who have the ultimate votes, and Denmark maintains some sort of affiliated roll.
But moral posturing over sovereignty and territory is costly. And from a hard nosed American perspective, the assurances that Greenland will not end up embroiled in some moral posturing like Diego Garcia are simply stronger with American or Independent Greenland than with Danish sovereignty.
That is from Sure. From yesterday’s WSJ:
The Danish government in recent days has privately sent a message to Donald Trump’s team that Copenhagen is happy to negotiate military and economic deals related to Greenland, but it wants the conversations to take place behind closed doors.
And from the WaPo:
But might Greenland be for rent? Or amenable to a Compact of Free Association? Just as the United States has in the Pacific with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau?
The odds are still against any deal, but this is not impossible either.
Should the U.S. recognize Somaliland?
I do not myself have a position on this issue, but I found this analysis by Ken Opalo interesting:
The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.
To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.
The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).
There is much more at the link.
Some game theory of Greenland
It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory. Along some dimensions that is likely. But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.
I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty. The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same. In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.
One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.” Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.
Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate. If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider. A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent. Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.
So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive. And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table. For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”
It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.
The Borda Count is the Best Method of Voting
It’s well known that the voting methods we use are highly defective, as they fail to meet fundamental criteria like positive responsiveness, the Pareto principle, and stability. Positive responsiveness (monotonicity) means that if a candidate improves on some voters’ ballots, this should not reduce the candidate’s chances of winning. Yet, many voting methods, including runoffs and ranked-choice voting, fail positive responsiveness. In other words, candidates who became more preferred by voters can end up losing when they would have won when they were less preferred! It’s even more shocking that some voting systems can fail the Pareto principle, which simply says that if every voter prefers x to y then the voting system should not rank y above x. Everyone knows that in a democracy a candidate may be elected that the minority ranks below another possible candidate but how many know that there are democratic voting procedures where a candidate may be elected that the majority ranks below another possible candidate or even that democratic voting procedures may elect a candidate that everyone ranks below another possible candidate! That is the failure of the Pareto principle and the chaos results of McKelvey–Schofield show that this kind of outcome should be expected.
Almost all researchers in social choice understand the defects of common voting systems and indeed tend to agree that the most common system, first past the post voting, is probably the most defective! But, as no system is perfect, there has been less consensus on which methods are best. Ranked choice voting, approval voting and the Borda Count all have their proponents. In recent years, however, there has been a swing towards the Borda Count.
Don Saari, for example, whose work on voting has been a revelation, has made strong arguments in favor of the Borda Count. The Borda Count has voter rank the n candidates from most to least preferred and assigns (n-1) points to the candidates. For example if there are 3 candidates a voter’s top-ranked candidate gets 2 points, the second ranked candidate gets 1 point and the last ranked candidate 0 points. The candidate with the most points overall wins.
The Borda Count satisfies positive responsiveness, the Pareto principle and stability. In addition, Saari points out that the Borda Count is the only positional voting system to always rank a Condorcet winner (a candidate who beats every other candidate in pairwise voting) above a Condorcet loser (a candidate who loses to every other candidate in pairwise voting.) In addition, all voting systems are gameable, but Saari shows that the Borda Count is by some reasonable measures the least or among the least gameable systems.
My own work in voting theory shows, with a somewhat tongue in cheek but practical example, that the Borda Count would have avoided the civil war! I also show that other systems such as cumulative voting or approval voting are highly open to chaos, as illustrated by the fact that under approval voting almost anything could have happened in the Presidential election of 1992, including Ross Perot as President.
One reason the Borda Count performs well is that it uses more information than other systems. If you just use a voter’s first place votes, you are throwing out a lot of information about how a voter ranks second and third candidates. If you just use pairwise votes you are throwing out a lot of information about the entire distribution of voter rankings. When you throw out information the voting system can’t distinguish rational from irrational voters which is one reason why the outcomes of a voting system can look irrational.
Eric Maskin has an important new contribution to this literature. Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) says that if no voters change their rankings of x and y then the social ranking of x and y shouldn’t change. In other words, if no voter changes their ranking of Bush and Gore then the outcome of the election shouldn’t change regardless of how Nader is ranked (for the pedantic I exclude the case where Nader wins.) The motivation for IIA seems reasonable, we don’t want spoilers who split a candidate’s vote allowing a less preferred candidate, even a Condorcet loser to win. But IIA also excludes information about preference intensity from the voting system and throwing out information is rarely a good idea.
What Maskin shows is that it’s possible to keep the desirable properties of IIA while still measuring preference intensity with what he calls modified IIA, although in my view a better name would be middle IIA. Modified or middle IIA says that an alternative z should be irrelevant unless it is in the middle of x and y, e.g. x>z>y. More precisely, we allow the voting system to change the ranking of x and y if the ranking of z moves in or out of the middle of x and y but not otherwise (recall IIA would forbid the social ranking of x and y to change if no voter changes their ranking of x and y).
Maskin shows that the Borda Count is the only voting system which satisfies MIIA and a handful of other desirable and unobjectionable properties. It follows that the Borda Count is the only voting system to both measure preference intensity and to avoid defects such as a spoilers.
The debates over which is the best voting system will probably never end. Indeed, voting theory itself tells us that multi-dimensional choice is always subject to some infirmities and people may differ on which infirmities they are willing to accept. Nevertheless, we can conclude that plurality rule is a very undesirable voting system and the case for the Borda Count is strong.
The Greenland debates
I would say we have not yet figured out what is the best U.S. policy toward Greenland, nor have we figured out best stances for either Greenland or Denmark. I am struck however by the low quality of the debate, and I mean on the anti-U.S. side most of all. This is just one clip, but I am hearing very much the same in a number of other interchanges, most of all from Europeans. There is a lot of EU pearl-clutching, and throwing around of adjectives like “colonialist” or “imperialist.” Or trying to buy Greenland is somehow analogized to Putin not trying to buy Ukraine. Or the word “offensive” is deployed as if that were an argument, or the person tries to switch the discussion into an attack on Trump and his rhetoric.
C’mon, people!
De facto, you are all creating the impression that Greenland really would be better off under some other arrangement. Why not put forward a constructive plan for improving Greenland? It would be better yet to cite a current plan under consideration (is there one?). “We at the EU, by following this plan, will give Greenland a better economic and security future than can the United States.” If the plan is decent, Greenland will wish to break off the talks with America it desires. (To be clear, I do not think they desire incorporation. This FT piece strikes me as the best so far on the debates.)
Or if you must stick to the negative, put forward some concrete arguments for how greater U.S. involvement in Greenland would be bad for global security, bad for economic growth, bad for the U.S., or…something. “Your EU allies won’t like it,” or “Trump’s behavior is unacceptable” isn’t enough and furthermore the first of those is question-begging.
It is time to rise to the occasion.
p.s. I still am glad we bought the Danish West Indies in 1917. Nor do I hear many Danes, or island natives, complain about this.
That is from Hadur.