Category: Political Science
What should I ask Katja Hoyer?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her. Here is Wikipedia:
Hoyer was born in Wilhelm-Pieck-Stadt Guben, Bezirk Cottbus, German Democratic Republic (GDR), where her mother was a teacher and her father an officer of the National People’s Army. She received a Master’s degree from the University of Jena and moved to the United Kingdom in about 2010.
Hoyer is a visiting research fellow at King’s College London and has published two books about the history of Germany. She is also a journalist for The Spectator, The Washington Post, Times Literary Supplement, UnHerd, and Die Welt.
Her first book, Blood and Iron, about the German Empire from 1871 to 1918, was well reviewed, even though some reviewers suggested that she had played down the negative aspects of the period and of Otto von Bismarck‘s legacy. Her second book, Beyond the Wall, about the history of the GDR from 1949 to 1990, was well reviewed in the United Kingdom, but less well received in Germany.
She also has a new, forthcoming book on the history of the city of Weimar, namely Weimar: Life on the Edge of Catastrophe. So what should I ask her?
My excellent Conversation with Harvey Mansfield
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Harvey discuss how Machiavelli’s concept of fact was brand new, why his longest chapter is a how-to guide for conspiracy, whether America’s 20th-century wars refute the conspiratorial worldview, Trump as a Shakespearean vulgarian who is in some ways more democratic than the rest of us, why Bronze Age Pervert should not be taken as a model for Straussianism, the time he tried to introduce Nietzsche to Quine, why Rawls needed more Locke, what it was like to hear Churchill speak at Margate in 1953, whether great books are still being written, how his students have and haven’t changed over 61 years of teaching, the eclipse rather than decline of manliness, and what Aristotle got right about old age and much more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: From a Straussian perspective, where’s the role for the skills of a good analytic philosopher? How does that fit into Straussianism? I’ve never quite understood that. They seem to be very separate approaches, at least sociologically.
MANSFIELD: Analytic philosophers look for arguments and isolate them. Strauss looks for arguments and puts them in the context of a dialogue or the implicit dialogue. Instead of counting up one, two, three, four meanings of a word, as analytic philosophers do, he says, why is this argument appropriate for this audience and in this text? Why is it put where it was and not earlier or later?
Strauss treats an argument as if it were in a play, which has a plot and a background and a context, whereas analytic philosophy tries to withdraw the argument from where it was in Plato to see what would we think of it today and what other arguments can be said against it without really wanting to choose which is the truth.
COWEN: Are they complements or substitutes, the analytic approach and the Straussian approach?
MANSFIELD: I wouldn’t say complements, no. Strauss’s approach is to look at the context of an argument rather than to take it out of its context. To take it out of its context means to deprive it of the story that it represents. Analytic philosophy takes arguments out of their context and arranges them in an array. It then tries to compare those abstracted arguments.
Strauss doesn’t try to abstract, but he looks to the context. The context is always something doubtful. Every Platonic dialogue leaves something out. The Republic, for example, doesn’t tell you about what people love instead of how people defend things. Since that’s the case, every argument in such a dialogue is intentionally a bad argument. It’s meant for a particular person, and it’s set to him.
The analytic philosopher doesn’t understand that arguments, especially in a Platonic dialogue, can deliberately be inferior. It easily or too easily refutes the argument which you are supposed to take out of a Platonic dialogue and understand for yourself. Socrates always speaks down to people. He is better than his interlocutors. What you, as an observer or reader, are supposed to do is to take the argument that’s going down, that’s intended for somebody who doesn’t understand very well, and raise it to the level of the argument that Socrates would want to accept.
So to the extent that all great books have the character of this downward shift, all great books have the character of speaking down to someone and presenting truth in an inferior but still attractive way. The reader has to take that shift in view and raise it to the level that the author had. What I’m describing is irony. What distinguishes analytic philosophy from Strauss is the lack of irony in analytic philosophy. Philosophy must always take account of nonphilosophy or budding philosophers and not simply speak straight out and give a flat statement of what you think is true.
To go back to Rawls, Rawls based his philosophy on what he called public reason, which meant that the reason that convinces Rawls is no different from the reason that he gives out to the public. Whereas Strauss said reason is never public or universal in this way because it has to take account of the character of the audience, which is usually less reasonable than the author.
And yes he does tell us what Straussianism means and how to learn to be a Straussian. From his discussion you will see rather obviously that I am not one. Overall, I found this dialogue to be the most useful source I have found for figuring out how Straussianism fits into other things, such as analytics philosophy, historical reading of texts, and empirical social science.
Perhaps the exchange is a little slow to start, but otherwise fascinating throughout. I am also happy to recommend Harvey’s recent book The Rise and Fall of Rational Control: The History of Modern Political Philosophy.
The AI arms race
That is the topic of my latest column for The Free Press, here is the closing tag:
The biggest risk is not from the AI companies, but rather that the government with the most powerful AI systems becomes the bad guy itself. The U.S., on the world stage, is not always a force for good, and we might become worse to the extent we can act without constraint. The Vietnam War is perhaps the least politically controversial way of demonstrating that point.
So today we need an odd and complex mix of not entirely consistent ideologies for the current arms race to go well. How about some tech accelerationism mixed with capitalism, and then a prudent technocratic approach to military procurement, to make sure those advances serve national security ends? On the precautionary side, we need a dash of the 1960s and ’70s New Left and libertarian anti-war ideologies, skeptical of Uncle Sam himself. We do not want to become the bad guys.
Do you think we can pull that off? The new American challenge is underway.
Worth a ponder.
Understanding Demonic Policies
Matt Yglesias has a good post on the UK’s Triple Lock, which requires that UK pensions rise in line with whichever is highest: wages, inflation, or 2.5 percent. Luis Garicano calls this “the single stupidest policy in the entire Western world” — and I’d be inclined to agree, if only the competition weren’t so fierce.
The triple lock guarantees that pensioner incomes grow at the expense of everything else, and the mechanism bites hardest when the economy is weakest. During the 2009 financial crisis wages fell and inflation declined, for example, yet pensioner incomes rose by 2.5 percent! (Technically this was under a double-lock period; the triple lock came slightly later — as if the lesson from the crisis was that the guarantee hadn’t been generous enough.)
Now, as Yglesias notes, if voters were actually happy with pensioner income growing at the expense of worker income, that would be one thing. But no one seems happy with the result. The same pattern is clear in the United States:
As I wrote in January, there is a pattern in American politics where per capita benefits for elderly people have gotten consistently more generous in the 21st century even as the ratio of retired people to working-age people has risen.
This keeps happening because it’s evidently what the voters want. Making public policy more generous to senior citizens enjoys both broad support among the mass public and it’s something that elites in the two parties find acceptable even if neither side is particularly enthusiastic about it. But what makes it a dark pattern in my view is that voters seem incredibly grumpy about the results.
Nobody’s saying things have been going great in America over the past quarter century.
Instead, the right is obsessed with the idea that mysterious forces of fraud have run off with all the money, while the left has convinced itself that billionaires aren’t paying any taxes.
But it’s not some huge secret why it seems like the government keeps spending and spending without us getting any amazing new public services — it’s transfers to the elderly.
The contradictions of “Elderism” are an example of rational irrationality. Individual voters bears essentially no cost for holding inconsistent political beliefs — wanting generous pensions and robust public services and low taxes is essentially free, since no single vote determines the outcome. The irrationality is individually rational and collectively ruinous. Voters are not necessarily confused about what they want; they simply face no price for wanting incompatible things. Arrow’s impossibility theorem adds another layer: even if each voter held perfectly coherent preferences, there is no reliable procedure for aggregating them into a coherent social choice. The grumpiness Yglesias documents may not reflect hypocrisy so much as the incoherence of demanding that collective choice makes sense — collective choice cannot be rationalized by coherent preferences and thus it’s perfectly possible that democracy can simultaneously “choose” generous pensions and “demand” better services for workers, with no mechanism to register the contradiction until the bill arrives.
Who is a victim?
Moral disagreement across politics revolves around the key question, “Who is a victim?” Twelve studies explain moral conflict with assumptions of vulnerability (AoVs): liberals and conservatives disagree about who is especially vulnerable to victimization, harm, and mistreatment. AoVs predict moral judgments, implicit attitudes, and charitable behavior—and explain the link between ideology and moral judgment (usually better than moral foundations). Four clusters of targets—the Environment, the Othered, the Powerful, and the Divine—explain many political debates, from immigration and policing to religion and racism. In general, liberals see vulnerability as group-based, dividing the moral world into groups of vulnerable victims and invulnerable oppressors. Conservatives downplay group-based differences, seeing vulnerability as more individual and evenly distributed. AoVs can be experimentally manipulated and causally impact moral evaluations. These results support a universal harm-based moral mind (Theory of Dyadic Morality): moral disagreement reflects different understandings of harm, not different foundations.
That is from a recent paper by Jake Womick, Emily Kubin, and Kurt Gray. Via the excellent, non-victimized Kevin Lewis.
A New Order of Things
Big infrastructure projects in the developing world for things like water and electricity are under-pressure. Chinese and US funding is down and these projects often fall apart due to corruption and political incentives to build but not maintain. It is possible to break old institutions and establish new ones, but “there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” Connor Tabarrok gives a great example. Ek Son Chan in Cambodia:
In 1993, the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority was a catastrophe. The city was emerging from decades of war and genocide. Only 20 percent of the city had connections at all, and water flowed for just 10 hours a day. 72 percent of the water was non revenue water. It was lost to leaks or stolen through illegal connections.
Into this mess walked Ek Son Chan, a young Cambodian engineer appointed as Director General. Over the next two decades he executed an incredible institutional turnaround.
Chan replaced corrupt managers with qualified engineers. He got rid of unmetered taps. Every single connection received a meter and was billed. The old system of manual billing was replaced with a computerized system, which cut down on low level employees giving out free water and receiving kickbacks. Bill collection rates went from 48 percent to 99.9 percent. These changes were intensely unpopular, and Chan faced fierce resistance from rent seekers, from freeloading customers to his own employees. He established an incentive system based on bonuses among the workers, introduced an internal discipline system with a penalty for violators, and set up a discipline commission for all levels of the organization to deal with corruption
He divided the distribution network into pressure zones with flow monitoring. A 24 hour leak detection team walked the streets at night with listening bars to identify underground leaks.
The institutional change dwarfed the infrastructural change, but was absolutely necessary to make the infrastructure investment worthwhile….
This commitment would not be untested. When Chan tried to enforce bill payment on Cambodia’s elite, and sent his team out to install a water meter on the property of a high ranking general who had been freeloading. The general refused the installation of a meter, so the team attempted to disconnect the water. The general and his bodyguards ran them off the property. When Chan heard of this, he decided not to back down, and mobilized his own team to dig up the pipe and install the meter. Always a leader from the front, Chan jumped in the hole to take a shift at digging. When he looked up, his team had fled, and he was facing down the general himself, pointing a gun at his head. In Cambodia in the 90s, consequences for such a high ranking official were unlikely. CHan didn’t give up. He mobilized the local armed police and returned with 20 men to standoff against the general, disconnected him from service and left him out to dry. Chan said this about the dispute:
”He had no water. My office was on the second floor and the general came in with his ten bodyguards to look for me. I said, “ No. You can come here alone, but with an appointment”. He couldn’t do anything. He had to return. He said, “Okay”! At that time we had a telephone, a very big Motorola. He came in to make an appointment for tomorrow. I said, “ Okay, tomorrow you come alone”. So he comes alone, we talk. “Okay. I’ll reconnect on two conditions. The first condition is that you have to sign a commitment saying that you will respect the Water Supply Authority and second, you need to pay a penalty for your bad behavior and you must allow us to broadcast the situation to the public, or no way, no water in your house”. So he agreed. “
….By 2010, coverage in the city went from 25 percent to over 90 percent with 24 hour service. The utility became financially self sustaining and turned a profit. It was listed on the Cambodia Securities Exchange in 2012. Chan won the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 2006.
By separating the utility company from the low-capacity local government, Ek and PPWSA proved that:
- Functional infrastructure relies on institutional quality and mechanism design.
- State capacity need not exist within the state
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On the future of war
Murphy: What do you think we need to do to avoid major conflict over the next 25 years? Or do you think it can be avoided?
Cowen: I just think there’ll be more festering conflicts. Consider the difference between World War One and World War Two. World War two is very decisively settled. That’s quite rare in history. And you had a clear, small number of victors that largely agreed. And US & UK set things up. That didn’t happen after World War One.
Yeah, there was a League of Nations that didn’t work. It collapsed again. Future conflicts will be more like World War One than World War Two. Yeah, there’s too many nuclear weapons out there, for one thing. Are we really going to decisively defeat Russia in anything, ever? Who knows? But I wouldn’t count on it.
I’m very struck by this recent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, which is a nothing burger, but I think people are making a mistake by ignoring it. What it’s showing us is that two countries can find it worthwhile to conduct a nothing burger war every now and then a few weeks, and it’s never really over.
It never really escalates. It just goes on and I think we’ll just see more of that. East Africa feels quite dangerous at the moment.
Murphy: I mean, Azerbaijan.
Cowen: Things like that. And they’ll just multiply and not quite. You know, some of them will be settled. But as a whole, they won’t be settled, and they won’t give birth to, like, the new UN, the new Bretton Woods, the new whatever. The A’s will build their own institutions. Let’s wish them luck.
That was recorded several months ago with Nebular, here are the links:
We’ve just published the video on YouTube, X, Spotify, and Apple Podcasts. We also published some extended show notes and the transcript on Substack.
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act appears likely to pass the Senate. The bill contains some genuinely good ideas alongside some very popular—but bonkers ideas.
Let’s start with the good ideas.
The bill would streamline NEPA review for federally supported housing, primarily by expanding categorical exclusions. Federal environmental review does impose real costs and delays on housing construction, so reducing unnecessary review is a step in the right direction. The gains will probably be modest—most housing regulation occurs at the state and local level—but removing friction is good.
The bill would also deregulate manufactured housing by eliminating the permanent chassis requirement and creating a uniform national construction and safety standard. The United States once built far more factory-produced housing; in the early 1970s, by some accounts a majority of new homes were factory-built (mobile or modular). Long-run productivity growth in housing almost certainly requires greater use of factory construction. Land-use regulation remains the dominant constraint on supply, but enabling scalable manufacturing is still welcome.
Another interesting provision involves Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). The bill allows CDBG funds to be used for building new housing rather than being largely restricted to rehabilitation of existing housing. More federal spending is not automatically appealing, but the bill adds an unusual incentive mechanism.
The bill creates a tournament for CDBG allocations. Localities that exceed the median housing growth improvement rate among eligible CDBG recipients receive bonus funding. Those below the median face a 10 percent reduction. The key feature is that the penalties fund the bonuses, so the system reallocates money rather than expanding spending.
This is a clever design. It creates competition among localities and benchmarks them against peers rather than against a fixed national target. In effect, the program rewards relative improvement rather than absolute performance—a classic tournament structure. (See Modern Principles for an introduction to tournament theory!).
Ok, now for the popular but bonkers ideas. Section 901 (“Homes are for People, Not Corporations”) restricts the purchase of new single-family homes by large institutional investors. Elizabeth Warren is a sponsor of the bill but this section was driven almost entirely by President Trump. Trump passed an Executive Order, Stopping Wall Street from Competing With Main Street Home Buyers, that cuts off institutional home investors from FHA insurance, VA guarantees, USDA backing, Fannie/Freddie securitization and so forth. The bill goes further by imposing a seven-year mandatory divestiture rule, forcing institutional investors to convert rental homes to owner-occupied units after seven years.
No one objects to institutional investors owning apartment buildings. But when the same investors own single-family homes, it breaks people’s brains. Consider how strange the logic sounds if applied elsewhere:
…a growing share of apartments, often concentrated in certain communities, have been purchased by large Wall Street investors, crowding out families seeking to buy condominiums.
Apartments are fine, hotels are fine, but somehow a corporation owning a single family home is un-American. In fact, the US could do with more rental housing of all kinds! Why take the risk of owning when you can rent? Rental housing improves worker mobility. When foreclosures surged after 2008 and traditional buyers disappeared, institutional investors stepped in and absorbed distressed supply — helping stabilize markets. Who plays that role next time?
Institutional investors own only a tiny number of homes, so even if this were a good idea it wouldn’t be effective. But it’s not a good idea, it’s just rage bait driven by Warren/Trump anti-corporate rhetoric.
What does “Homes are for People, Not Corporations” even mean?–this is a slogan for the Idiocracy era. “Food is for People, Not Corporations,” so we should ban Perdue Farms and McDonald’s?
A simple way to improve your thought and conclusions
Take some policy, action, or person whom you regard as morally questionable and indeed is morally questionable. That same policy, action, or person does some bad things, bad in conquentialist terms I now mean. Practically bad, utilitarian bad.
The odds are that you overrate the badness of those consequences by some considerable degree.
Even very smart people do this. Sometimes they do it more, because they can come up with more elaborate arguments for why the bad consequences are completely disastrous.
They might overrate the badness of those consequences by as much as 5x or 10x (gdp is a huge mound of stuff!).
So if you want to have better opinions, look for the cases where you do this and stop doing it.
Easy-peasy!
And good luck with that.
A simple model of AI governance
I trust private companies with strong AI more than I trust the government, regardless of which administration is in power. Yet if the federal government feels it has no say or no control, it will lunge and take over the whole thing. We thus want sustainble methods of perpetual interference that a) are actually somewhat useful from a safety perspective, and b) give governments some control, and the feeling of control, but not too much control.
You should judge AI-related events within this framework.
What the recent dust-up means for AI regulation
From my new Free Press column, I see these as the most important facts:
Congress has not passed explicit regulation of AI foundation models, and an executive order from President Trump limited regulation at the state level. But do not think that laissez-faire reigns. In addition to existing (largely pre-AI) laws, which lay out general principles of liability, and laws from a few states, the United States is engaged in a kind of “off the books” soft regulation.
The major AI companies keep the national security establishment apprised of the progress they are making, as has been the case with Anthropic. There is a general sense within the AI industry that if the national security authorities saw anything in the new products that was very concerning or that might undermine the national interest, they would inform the president and Congress. That would likely lead to more formal and more restrictive kinds of regulation, so the major AI companies want to show relatively safe demos and products. An informal back and forth enforces implied safety standards, without the involvement of formal legislation.
That may sound like an unusual way to do regulation, but to date the system has worked relatively well. For one thing, I believe our national security establishment has a better and more sophisticated understanding of the issues than does Congress. Congress right now simply isn’t up to the job, as indeed the institution has been failing more generally. Most representatives seem to know little about the core issues behind AI regulation.
As it stands, AI progress has been allowed to proceed, and the United States has stayed ahead of China, without major catastrophes. The burden on the companies has been manageable, and the system, at least until last week, was flexible.
Another advantage of this system is that both Congress and the administrative state can be very slow to act. The AI landscape can change in just weeks, yet our federal government is used to taking years to issue laws and directives. Had we passed AI legislation in, say, 2024, today it would be badly out of date, no matter what your point of view on what such regulation should accomplish. For instance, in 2024 few outsiders were much concerned with the properties of, or risks from, autonomous AI “agents.” Today that is the number-one topic of concern.
Though it is not driven by legislation, the status quo AI regulatory system is not anti-democratic, as it operates well within the rules passed by Congress and the administrative state. It is more correct to say the current AI guardrails rely on the threat of regulation, rather than regulation itself, with the national security state as the watchdog. The system sticks to a kind of creative ambiguity. The national security state offers no official imprimatur for the new advances, but they proceed nonetheless. Nevertheless, the various components of the national security state reserve the right to object in the future.
It is also correct, however, to believe that such a system cannot last forever. At some point creative ambiguity collapses. Someone or some institution demands a more formal answer as to what is allowed or what is not allowed. At that point a more directly legalistic system of adjudication enters the picture, and Congress likely starts paying more attention.
With the recent dispute between Hegseth and Anthropic, we have taken a step away from the previous regulatory mode of quiet cooperation. Instead, the relationship between the military and the AI companies has become a matter of public concern. Now everyone has an opinion on Hegseth, Anthropic, and OpenAI, and social media is full of debate.
No matter “whose side you take,” it would have been better to have resolved all this behind closed doors.
Podcast with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer
Mostly about geopolitics, plenty of fresh content. And here is the transcript. Excerpt:
Jon Finer:
Should the United States be willing to take military action to defend Taiwan? It’s a thorny question for politicians to answer, but we’d be interested in your view.
Tyler Cowen:
Well, this is what economists would call a mixed strategy. Ex-ante, we should have strategic ambiguity, and not just say, we’re not going to defend Taiwan. And when Joe Biden said, “Well, we are going to defend Taiwan,” I was quite happy.
Jon Finer:
Four times. Four times.
Tyler Cowen:
Four times, yes. I know there’s different versions of how it was talked back and the like, but it should be unclear. That said, when push comes to shove, if China has made its move, you have to look at what are the terms of the deal? What are they going to do with TSMC to our best knowledge? What’s the domestic quality chip production in the United States? How do we feel about Japan and maybe South Korea getting nuclear weapons? Can South Korea remain an autonomous nation? Those are a lot of balls to juggle and they’re all hard to judge at this moment. But I think ex-ante, we should definitely create some risk that we will go to war over Taiwan, but then make the best decision ex-post. But China knows that too, right? They’re not fools. They’ve studied game theory.
Jake Sullivan:
Tyler, I’m going to put you down as that being Tyler Cowen’s version of strategic ambiguity.
Tyler Cowen:
It may not be that different from your version.
Jake Sullivan:
Exactly.
Recommended, and I also talk about my secret, unpublished China book, still pending at Tsinghua, almost certainly forever. And we cover UAPs and curling as well.
A Republic, if you can keep it
The conclusion of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in the tariff case:
For those who think it important for the Nation to impose more tariffs, I understand that today’s decision will be disappointing. All I can offer them is that most major decisions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the American people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes, legislating can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem
arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one faction or man. There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers
disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws must earn such broad support to survive the legislative process, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Nation’s future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come when those disappointed by today’s result will appreciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.
My excellent Conversation with Joe Studwell
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. The conversation is based around Joe’s new and very good book How Africa Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Last Developmental Frontier. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Joe explore whether population density actually solves development, which African countries are likely to achieve stable growth, whether Africa has a manufacturing future, why state infrastructure projects decay while farmer-led irrigation thrives, what progress looks like in education and public health, whether charter cities or special economic zones can work, and how permanent Africa’s colonial borders really are. After testing Joe’s optimism about Africa, Tyler shifts back to Asia: what Japan and South Korea will do about depopulation, why industrial policy worked in East Asia but failed in India and Brazil, what went wrong in Thailand, and what Joe will tackle next.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Does Africa have a manufacturing future? Is robotics coming, AI, possibly some reshoring?
STUDWELL: Yes. I believe that Africa does have a manufacturing future.
COWEN: But making what? And at what cost of energy?
STUDWELL: They will start, as everybody does, producing garments, producing textiles, which in certain enclaves is already going on in Madagascar, in Lasutu, in Morocco, and they’ll move on to other things. They’ll start with those things because they are the most labor cost-sensitive products.
Africa is now in a position where — depending on which state you’re looking at, and taking China as a reference point — the cost of labor is now between a half and one-tenth of what it is in China. Factory labor is now around $600 a month at its cheapest. In a country like Ethiopia or Madagascar, it’s $60 or $65 a month. So, it’s a 10th of the cost, and that’s already beginning to have a bit of effect, often with Chinese firms moving production to Africa.
So, I think there is a future for manufacturing. It will depend on the extent to which African governments understand that you don’t really move forward fast for very long without manufacturing, that every developed country — apart from a few petro states and financial centers — has gone through a manufacturing phase of development. It depends on the extent to which African governments engage with that, but some, without doubt, will.
The Ethiopians, for instance, have already attempted to do that. What they’re trying to do has been somewhat derailed by the two-year civil war that took place from 2020, but they’re back on it now, and they’re trying to move forward.
The idea that robotics and AI are going to change the story I personally do not buy, principally for two reasons. One is the cost reason, because whenever people talk about what’s happening with robotics, no one ever talks about the cost of robots. In garmenting, for instance, even a basic robot will cost you in excess of $100,000, and you pay the cost upfront, and you’ve then paid that, whether there’s demand for your products or not. Also, in garmenting and in textiles, robots don’t work very well because they can’t work with material very well. They’re much better at working with solid things.
So, you’ve spent $100,000 for a robot when you can go out in somewhere like Tana in Madagascar and get another skilled — because they’ve been doing it now for 20 years — garmenting employee for $60 or $65 to make the new order that you just got. And if the order doesn’t come through, you can sack them. You see what I’m saying? There’s a point about the cost of robotics.
COWEN: But think of automation more generally — it’s not that expensive. Most countries are de-industrializing. Even South Africa has been de-industrializing for a while, and China maybe has peaked out at industrialization, measured in terms of employment. It’s hard to trust their numbers. But maybe just everywhere is going to deindustrialize, and that will be very bad for Africa.
STUDWELL: I don’t think so. I think South Africa is deindustrializing because the ANC has followed a hyper-liberal approach to economic policy. I don’t think the ANC has ever really understood economic policy, frankly, so South Africa is an outlier in that respect. There are many other states in Africa, whether Nigeria or Ethiopia, which understand they’ve got to have a manufacturing future and intend to pursue one.
Then, as I was saying, the other point is, what people miss is the flexibility with robotics and AI. There’s very limited flexibility with robotic and automated production. When demand goes up, you can’t just stick in more robots, but when demand goes up in a people-operated factory, where the cost of labor is low, you can stick in more people and produce more.
Just one example: during COVID, when everybody was having home deliveries of supermarket goods, the price of a UK firm called Ocado, which runs a supermarket, but was also developing the software and consulting around building blind warehouses went up through the roof, but now it’s down through the floor.
And only last week, Kroger supermarket in the US said, “We’re closing five of these super-modern blind warehouses.” And the reason, fundamentally, is because they lack the flexibility that human labor brings to the job. So, I’m not saying that robots, automation, and AI are not important. They are important. What I am saying is that they are not going to derail a manufacturing future for a number of African countries that aggressively pursue it.
COWEN: But there’re a lot of developing nations around the world — you could look at India, you could look at Pakistan, even Thailand — where manufacturing has not taken off the way one might have wanted. There’re just major forces operating against it. And in the US, manufacturing employment was once 37 percent of the workforce; now it’s 7 percent to 8 percent.
It just seems like it’s swimming upstream for Africa — which again, has quite expensive energy — to think it will do that well. And again, South Africa had very good technology, pretty high state capacity. I don’t see the alternate world state where a wiser ANC would have made that work.
STUDWELL: Well, oddly enough, before the end of Apartheid, the manufacturing performance of South Africa was really not bad at all, with classic industrial policy, quite high levels of protection, and so forth. I think that demand for manufactured goods will continue to be high around the world, and the labor cost will continue to be a prime determinant of where producers go for low value-added goods. So, I think that the opportunity is there for African countries.
COWEN: But say there’re transportation costs internally, energy costs, political order uncertainty. Where’s the place where people really want to put all these manufacturing firms?
Interesting throughout, recommended.
Liberal AI
Can AI be liberal? In what sense? One answer points to the liberal insistence on freedom of choice, understood as a product of the commitment to personal autonomy and individual dignity. Mill and Hayek are of course defining figures here, emphasizing the epistemic foundations for freedom of choice. “Choice Engines,” powered by AI and authorized or required by law, might promote liberal goals (and in the process, produce significant increases in human welfare). A key reason is that they can simultaneously (1) preserve autonomy, (2) respect dignity, and (3) help people to overcome inadequate information and behavioral biases, which can produce internalities, understood as costs that people impose on their future selves, and also externalities, understood as costs that people impose on others. Different consumers care about different things, of course, which is a reason to insist on a high degree of freedom of choice, even in the presence of internalities and externalities. AI-powered Choice Engines can respect that freedom, not least through personalization. Nonetheless, AI-powered Choice Engines might be enlisted by insufficiently informed or self-interested actors, who might exploit inadequate information or behavioral biases, and thus co5mpromise liberal goals. AI-powered Choice Engines might also be deceptive or manipulative, again compromising liberal goals, and legal safeguards are necessary to reduce the relevant risks. Illiberal or antiliberal AI is not merely imaginable; it is in place. Still, liberal AI is not an oxymoron. It could make life less nasty, less brutish, less short, and less hard – and more free.