Category: Political Science
Adrian Wooldridge on Sweden and liberalism
Sweden is continuing to reap the rewards of this mixture of fiscal rectitude and pro-market reforms. GDP is projected to grow by 1.8% to 1.9% this year; headline inflation stands at 1.5%; debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the lowest in the world, at just above 35%.
There are some flies in this ointment, of course: The economy has recently endured a bout of stagnation, unemployment is at an uncomfortably high 9.4% and Sweden has one of Europe’s highest rates of household debt. But the business environment is healthy, particularly when it comes to business to business. Sweden has a diversified business scene — the highest number of unicorns per capita in Europe, with notable successes such as Spotify, but also a healthy manufacturing and engineering sector. Many of these established companies are thriving because of a surge in demand for both server farms and military equipment…
Sweden has recently experienced its first net emigration in 50 years, thanks to higher minimum wages for labor visas, tougher citizenship tests and, most controversially, financial payouts of up to $37,000 for refugees who volunteer to leave. It has also made progress against violent crime in the immigrant-heavy suburbs, increasing police numbers and toughening the penal code, including a boost to stop-and-search powers and a lowering in the age of criminal responsibility to 14. The number of shootings fell by 63%, from 390 in 2022 to 147 by the end of 2025.
Here is the full Bloomberg column. And here is Adrian’s new book on liberalism, self-recommending.
Important committees in history
Robin Hanson queries:
Missing book: Glorious Committees of History, on great committees that accomplished great things as committees.
GPT Pro has an impressive response, here is the start:
1. The King James Bible translation companies. This is maybe the purest literary example: 47 scholars organized into six companies at Westminster, Oxford, and Cambridge, with review procedures, producing one of the monuments of English prose. The committee form mattered because it blended scholarship, doctrinal acceptability, and a shared ear for cadence.
And Henry Oliver suggests The Great Exhibition?
Safety and nation-building in Mexico
That is the topic of my latest Free Press column, here is one excerpt:
Consider the special nature of Mexican politics. First and foremost, Mexico is still not a mature nation-state. By one estimate, drug gangs may control as much as one-third of its territory. That might sound bizarre, but from the standpoint of Mexican history, it is not new or unusual.
Start with the 19th century. When Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821, what we now call Central America joined the new country only briefly and then split off, even though that land was under the same Spanish jurisdiction. Those cultures and economies were not sufficiently unified to come along.
After independence, the state of Yucatán rebelled repeatedly, almost claiming its independence. In the 1840s, the U.S. declared war on Mexico and took away about half of its territory. Texas already had seceded to become an independent republic. In 1857, Mexico fought a civil war. The French invaded in 1861, and by 1864 they helped install a Habsburg, Maximilian, as emperor. Yet Maximilian never came close to controlling the entire country, and was quickly deposed and executed. The 1910 Mexican Revolution killed about 10 percent of the population by some estimates.
The rest of the 20th century was more peaceful, but much of Mexico never fell under unitary rule as did the U.S. and Western Europe. The more remote areas were mostly on their own, and they regarded the government as a potential oppressor rather than a savior. So when the drug trade heated up in Mexico in the 1990s as Colombian traffickers were partially thwarted, drug gangs were able to operate in many parts of Mexico with impunity. Eventually, they became the de facto rulers of those territories, supplying public goods such as general protection in addition to running their illegal businesses. All for a high price, of course, as extortion is still the ruling principle in those parts of the country. If you buy avocados from Mexico, for instance, there is a good chance that part of your money is going to pay tribute to drug gangs.
Another significant fact about Mexico is the size and power of its central government. It spends just short of 23 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), relatively low for a country of its level of development. By contrast, Brazil, which has roughly comparable living standards, has a central government that spends over 32 percent of that country’s GDP. If the Brazilian government is too large, Mexico’s is too weak and too small, most of all because Mexico cannot beat back its drug gangs by brute force or preempt them in the first place.
Mexico as a topic will never become obsolete, not for the United States at least.
Should you move to Argentina? (from my email)
My name is Josh Neuman, and I’m writing from Buenos Aires, Argentina where Peter Thiel’s move is all over the news here. He lives in [redacted], only a xx minute drive from my own apartment in Recoleta.
I want to pitch a piece…arguing that Thiel is right to be in Argentina, but wrong about why. The libertarian revolution he thinks he’s found simply doesn’t exist in the way it’s being advertised in the international press. Milei has accomplished some real things since December 2023, such as lower inflation and a fiscal surplus, in part underwritten by Washington. But the effect of many of his policies has been exaggerated by both supporters and opponents alike, with widespread pessimism across all parts of society.
Much of the Argentine status quo he sought to abolish remains intact, such as retenciones on agricultural exports, union control over the labor market, while many of his reforms have had little impact beyond Buenos Aires, particularly in the northern provinces still dominated by entrenched Peronista governors. Distrust of the peso remains high, while much of the economy is still black market, with the informal sector still being around 40-50% of employment. The lines outside the Spanish and Italian consulates of Argentines reclaiming European citizenship are as long as ever, while major business figures like Marcos Galperin still live in neighboring Uruguay. Peronism as I’m sure you know has mutated several times throughout its history to each contemporary crisis, and will prove far more durable in the long run as a social identity as much as a political machine.
Argentina’s retenciones are export taxes levied on agricultural commodities like soybeans, wheat, and corn at the point of sale, before producers receive any income, which goes towards the government, and is how Argentine governments (especially Peronista ones) have historically paid for the country’s welfare state. The system also functions as a price mechanism because by taxing exports, the government keeps more supply in the domestic market, suppressing local food prices. The retenciones are deeply unpopular among the crop producers and landowners, and Milei campaigned on eliminating them. He has largely kept them, because he needs the revenue to maintain the fiscal surplus that is the centerpiece of his program.
But I think there’s a deeper cultural dynamic that I’m not sure Thiel understands. Argentine youth aspire much more towards la dolce vita than towards Weber’s protestant work ethic. They essentially want their country to be like Spain or Italy, with a chill work-life balance, high leisure and consumption, underwritten by a generous welfare state, even if that model is becoming fiscally and demographically unsustainable in Europe. I think it’s a completely reasonable and in many ways admirable goal, but companies like Paypal, Palantir, and Facebook did not come out of Spain or Italy.
Among my Argentine peers, I hardly meet anyone who aspires to move to the United States. When I tell friends that the American economy has been growing at twice the rate of Europe in recent years, I am met with genuine disbelief. I think Thiel may have been captivated by a small teleological elite in Milei’s inner circle who do not necessarily represent the country they govern. The average Argentine who voted for Milei did not vote for Austrian economics or for a libertarian revolution. They voted out of exhaustion with Peronism, as many of Milei’s supporters were former Peronists themselves, much as many Trump supporters in the American Rust Belt were former Obama voters.
Argentina’s genuine case for Thiel rests on things that have nothing to do with Milei: a younger demographic than Europe, world-class human capital, abundant lithium and rare earths, and geographic isolation from great power conflict. He may be right for entirely the wrong reasons, on a longer timeline than he expects, through considerably more turbulence than the current narrative suggests. Argentina’s laid-back mentality is precisely what makes it exciting to foreigners. But as a project for civilizational renewal? Unless you’re talking about surviving a nuclear war, absolutely not.
I’m an Argentine-American master’s student in international relations at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella…
Best,
Joshua Raoul Neuman
*In the Realm of the Last Man*
As Mark Lilla, a recovering Straussian, once remarked, they [the Straussians] were like craftsmen building a house brick by brick on a foundation that Leo Strauss had laid. But they would never become architects of that house, or decide that the house was too small for them to comfortably live in. Moreoever, Strauss disparaged social science and what he considered naive forms of positivism prevalent in American universities. This led some of his followers to disdain merely empirical accounts of current events. If you are more of a Hegelian, you need to pay attention to actual history if you are to give an account of how ideas play out in the real world.
That is from Frank Fukuyama’s forthcoming memoir, recommended of course.
“Wokeness has peaked. What followed is worse.”
That is the topic of my latest column for The Free Press. Excerpt:
It is important to distinguish between the positive side of wokeism and the unreasonable side. The positive side supported gay rights and discouraged racism in the public sphere. The unreasonable side brought us cancel culture, stifled discussion, insisted on very particular views of race and gender identity, boosted DEI and other race-discriminatory policies, and generally made America a more intolerant place. It was most of all about who had the right to steer the agenda of public discourse, and who had the right to push out dissenters.
The unreasonable side, since it was about power and control, had negative vibes built into its core. Fortunately, American society pushed back against many of the most objectionable manifestations of those negative vibes, but did we get rid of the negative vibes themselves? I do not think so. The American people still seem pretty low in trust, unhappy with America’s position in the world, glum about the economy and cost of living, and increasingly skeptical of both AI and billionaires. That is all happening at a time when the American economic situation, while mixed, is by no means as terrible as it was in, say, 2009. Happiness and mental health seem to be lagging behind the country’s actual achievements.
So what has been happening? The forces behind wokeism no longer command so much public attention and respect when they argue about terms and pronouns. Instead, left-adjacent movements have arisen with a contrasting emphasis on action, and often action of a terrible sort. California is considering, for instance, an unworkable tax on billionaires in the state, one that even most left-leaning Democratic politicians do not support. It might nevertheless pass through via referendum…
What’s more, it is possible we are entering an era with a new culture of assassinations. There have been assassinations of Charlie Kirk, of healthcare CEO Brian Thompson, and several attempts on the life of President Trump. It can be debated how many of these killers had direct connections to the political left, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that left-wing rhetoric about democracy destruction helped make such actions conceivable.
The social energies of the American left have moved away from the realm of speech and into plans for concrete action, whether in politics, through attempted wealth confiscations, or through organizing violence. In retrospect, wokeism, for all its problems, was a relatively harmless way of distracting activists and keeping them Negative busy with wars over words—a less-bad allocation of social energies than what we are now seeing. So while I would not say I long for the return of high wokeism, I recognize it has been replaced by a left-adjacent movement that is worse.
Worth a ponder, do read the whole thing. I should note I do not let the right off the hook either, though the column is mainly about what has succeeded Wokeism. Negative emotional contagion has affected both the left and right wings today. Here is one simple case in point.
Weapons, Wealth, and the Fates of Societies
Why do weapons sustain durable peace in some societies but provoke perpetual violence in others? We develop a theory in which the value of human life and the frequency of violence are jointly determined by weapons technology and economic conditions. Lethal weapons deter conflict but raise mortality, taxing the future returns to investing in one’s livelihood. When those returns are high, deterrence dominates and peace and investment reinforce each other. When those returns are low, the mortality tax dominates, agents divest from the future, the value of life falls, and violence deepens, a trap that deadlier weapons worsen. Whether weapons pacify or destabilize depends on the interaction between their offensive characteristics and the baseline prosperity of the society they enter. The theory illuminates four historical episodes: how Medieval Iceland (930–1262) sustained stateless order without a sovereign; why Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868) contained firearms within an institutional order that sustained two centuries of peace and growth; why firearms traded into West Africa and among Native American nations (17th–18th century) produced escalating violence and persistent underdevelopment rather than deterrence; and why the Comanche of the southern plains (c.~1750–1850) rose to regional dominance on horse and gun complementarities and then collapsed as sustained raiding into northern Mexico hollowed out the prosperity base on which their own order depended. The model also refines the logic of nuclear deterrence and generates testable predictions about urban gun violence in high-poverty neighborhoods.
That is from a new paper by Samuel Lee, Ilari Passivirta, and Alexander Zentefis, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Public Choice Outreach!
Just a few spots left! Lots of great speakers including Tyler, myself, Bryan Caplan, Robin Hanson, Jon Klick, Shruti Rajagopalan and more.
Please apply and encourage your students to apply.
Do Americans really hate AI?
We might be heading towards a populist backlash towards AI, but we’re not there yet. Outside the tech bubble, Americans really don’t care about AI yet.
AI is Americans’ 29th most important issue, according to the fantastic survey @davidshor ran that everyone is rightly looking at.
It’s not surprising that Americans will answer sentiment questions about AI negatively, as they’ve been negative towards tech for a while. But it’s a big leap from negative sentiment to meaningful political action.
Americans have been negative on social media for 10 years, and there has been no meaningful political action. And that’s despite all the other hallmarks of backlash people are saying about AI—violent extremists (people forget there was a shooting at YouTube HQ), protests, etc.
My prediction: we will get real populist backlash to AI when the unemployment moves by, say, 2 percentage points and people see it as caused by AI.
That is part of a longer tweet from Andy Hall.
The ‘Ordinary Men’ of the Nazi Party
We digitize and analyze the near-universe of National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) membership records and link them to population and industrial censuses. Four findings emerge. First, as the party expanded, its membership came to resemble the broader population more closely in occupational, demographic, and religious terms. Second, SS members’ characteristics remained different: younger, more educated, and more fanatical, as measured by the display of Nazi insignia in membership portraits. Third, within communities, coworkers, and families, early membership generated hysteresis, with subsequent entrants drawn from the same groups. Finally, local increases in party membership are associated with subsequent deportations of Germany’s Jews.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
How Reform Happens
What determines whether and how regulations are reformed? We use a newly constructed data set of 3,590 successful and failed regulatory reforms in 189 countries, between 2005 and 2022, to address this question. We document that regulations have become more business friendly in some regulatory domains but not others. We also show that regulations are more business friendly in richer than in poorer countries, and that holding initial regulatory levels constant, richer countries also reform more. We present a model in which the successful passage of reforms is shaped by the number of veto points in the approval process, the social returns to reform, and the cost of compensating losers from reform, and then test it using our new data set. We find that richer countries have both higher reform attempt and success rates, but less impact of individual reforms on regulation than poorer countries. These findings are consistent with the model if richer countries are better at reform, perhaps because they can compensate losers more efficiently. Across the world, reform attempt rates are strongly correlated with reform success rates but not with reform impact levels. Within countries, a higher share of technological reform attempts is successful, compared to administrative or legal reforms, consistent with the importance of veto points.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
I appear on the Coleman Hughes podcast
Republican Congressional deference to Trump is in fact democratic
That does not mean it is good! From Jeffrey M. Stonecash:
Congress is portrayed as compliant with President Donald J. Trump’s agenda because he is intimidating its members. This neglects an alternative explanation that focuses on the increased congruence of presidential and congressional electoral bases. Trump is the beneficiary of a geographical realignment that took decades and has created a high degree of overlap of the two bases. This analysis tracks that process from 1952 to 2024. It has produced a situation in which policy concerns overlap and encourage congressional compliance.
Social Security Should Be a Forced Savings Program Not a Welfare Program
There is a growing movement to eliminate the wage cap on Social Security taxes while capping benefits. The argument, often from the center-right, is that Social Security is insolvent and that “tough” choices are needed to save it. But this moves the system in exactly the wrong direction.
One of the better features of Social Security is that it has never been purely redistributive. It has also functioned, in part, as a forced-savings program. The Social Security Administration itself emphasizes that benefits depend on earnings history: earn more, retire with more. Why do some people receive large Social Security checks? Because they paid a lot more into the system.
Eliminating the wage cap while capping benefits weakens, and in the limit destroys, that connection. It turns Social Security away from forced saving and toward retirement welfare financed by a broader tax on earnings. That is a bad idea.
The problem is not just that this creates another welfare program. It also worsens marginal incentives. A tax that buys you a claim on future benefits is not the same as a pure tax. Suppose 10 percent of your salary goes into a 401(k). That reduces current consumption, but it is not simply money lost to the state. You receive an asset in return. It is closer to a purchase than to a tax–a reason to work more not a reason to work less.
Social Security is not a personal retirement account, but it does contain that logic. There is a connection between taxes paid and benefits received. To the extent that workers understand that connection, the payroll tax is less distortionary than an ordinary tax of the same size. Part of what workers pay is offset by the expectation of future benefits.
Gut that connection, however, and the tax becomes more distortionary even if total taxes paid and total benefits received stay the same. The averages can remain unchanged while the marginal incentives deteriorate. Once additional taxes no longer generate additional benefits, the system looks much more like a straight tax on work.
A much better reform would move in the opposite direction: strengthen the link between contributions and benefits. Make Social Security more like what many people already think it is—an individual account that accumulates benefits over time. The stronger that link, the lower the effective tax wedge.
This would also improve the politics of the system. A welfare program invites zero-sum conflict: my benefit comes at your expense. A claim-based system is less divisive. It ties benefits more clearly to contributions and makes rising prosperity good for everyone. In that kind of system, we can all become richer—including low-wage immigrants—without treating retirement policy as a fight over who gets to pick whose pocket.
Addendum: James Buchanan first made these points here. John Cochrane gets the economics right, of course.
My excellent Conversation with Paul Gillingham
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Tyler calls Paul Gillingham’s new book, Mexico: A 500-Year History, the single best introduction to the country’s past—and one of the best nonfiction books of 2026. Paul brings both an outsider’s eye and ground-level knowledge to Mexican history, having grown up in Cork — a place he’d argue gave him an instinctive feel for fierce local autonomy and land hunger —earning his doctorate on the Mexican Revolution under Alan Knight at Oxford, and doing his fieldwork in the pueblos of Guerrero.
He and Tyler range across five centuries of Mexican history, from why Mexico held together after independence when every other post-colonial superstate collapsed, to why Yucatán is now one of the safest places on earth, what two leaders from Oaxaca tell us about Mexican politics, how Mexico avoided the military coups that plagued the rest of Latin America, what Cárdenas’s land reform actually achieved versus what it promised, whether the ejido system held Mexico back, why Mexico worried too much about land and not enough about human capital, how Mexico’s fertility rate fell below America’s, why Guerrero has been violent for two centuries, why the new judicial reforms are a disaster, where to find the best food in Mexico and Manhattan, what a cache of illicit Mexican silver sitting on a ship in the English Channel has to do with his next book, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Now, after independence in 1821, why did not the rest of Mexico fragment the way Central America did a few years later, where it splits off from the Mexican empire? What determines the line? What sticks together with Mexico, and what does not?
GILLINGHAM: That’s a very good question because it’s one of the things that really makes Mexico stand out in that period, those histories, is that after independence, the rest of the Americas, you get a series of super-states. You get Gran Colombia, which is most of the Andes, and going across what’s now Venezuela. You get the United Provinces of the Rio Plate. These are huge, very difficult to conceive of super-states, and they fail within a decade. Elsewhere, you look at other post-colonial states, thinking particularly of India, within a couple of years, you’re fragmented and failed. Mexico doesn’t. Mexico actually stands up with the exceptions you put of Central America, which is formally part of it, in fact, but leaves within short order.
It’s one of these questions of what Álvaro Enrigue calls the miracle that Mexico exists. To explain it is a paradox. To make a try at it, I think that there is a common theme in Mexican history, which runs across most of those five centuries, which is a remarkable degree of hands-off government. It’s imposed. Mexico has a lot of mountains. It’s very difficult to rule from any central pole. Savvy governments, or governments with no choice, which are quite often the same thing, are very hands-off. Federalism is built into Mexico’s soul. I think that’s one of the reasons, from early on, Mexico actually out-punches the rest of the Americas in terms of sticking together as a territorial unit.
COWEN: As you know, in the early 19th century, there are rebellions in Yucatán, the Caste Wars, but Yucatán does not split off from Mexico. What keeps that together?
GILLINGHAM: Yucatán has always felt itself to be a different country, effectively, and that runs through to the present. You can see the cultural reasons, obviously, and the Maya and the other great, sophisticated urban culture of the 16th century and before. It makes sense that they should feel themselves very different from the rest of what becomes Mexico. In fact, it comes through in small but revealing ways. Back in the 20th century, people find themselves being asked whether they want a Yucatán beer or a foreign beer, and a foreign beer being anything in Mexico outside Yucatán.
Why doesn’t Yucatán leave? I think that it came extremely close. In fact, there’s a moment in the 1840s when Mexico and Texas form an alliance, and Texas is chartering warships out to Yucatán to try and prevent any naval incursions. Why on earth does Yucatán stay? I think it’s because of the absence of an alternative capital, because Yucatán is profoundly racially divided. It’s one of the few places in Mexico where you could say that really is a fairly stark racial divide. You have a plantocracy, in some ways, like the US South before the Civil War.
You’ve got a relatively small white plantocracy centered in Mérida. They have no interest whatsoever in leading an independent struggle. While the Maya achieve an underestimated level of sophistication as a state, it’s still not at the point where you would get, for more than a couple of years, a really joined-up independence movement spanning all races, all areas, and the entire peninsula.
Recommended, interesting and substantive throughout. In the United States at least, Mexico remains a greatly underdiscussed nation.