Category: Political Science
Liberal AI
Can AI be liberal? In what sense? One answer points to the liberal insistence on freedom of choice, understood as a product of the commitment to personal autonomy and individual dignity. Mill and Hayek are of course defining figures here, emphasizing the epistemic foundations for freedom of choice. “Choice Engines,” powered by AI and authorized or required by law, might promote liberal goals (and in the process, produce significant increases in human welfare). A key reason is that they can simultaneously (1) preserve autonomy, (2) respect dignity, and (3) help people to overcome inadequate information and behavioral biases, which can produce internalities, understood as costs that people impose on their future selves, and also externalities, understood as costs that people impose on others. Different consumers care about different things, of course, which is a reason to insist on a high degree of freedom of choice, even in the presence of internalities and externalities. AI-powered Choice Engines can respect that freedom, not least through personalization. Nonetheless, AI-powered Choice Engines might be enlisted by insufficiently informed or self-interested actors, who might exploit inadequate information or behavioral biases, and thus co5mpromise liberal goals. AI-powered Choice Engines might also be deceptive or manipulative, again compromising liberal goals, and legal safeguards are necessary to reduce the relevant risks. Illiberal or antiliberal AI is not merely imaginable; it is in place. Still, liberal AI is not an oxymoron. It could make life less nasty, less brutish, less short, and less hard – and more free.
The politics of using AI
Using new data from the Gallup Workforce Panel, we document a persistent partisan gap in self-reported AI use at work: Democrats are consistently more likely than Republicans to report frequent use. In 2025:Q4, for example, 27.8% of Democrats report using AI weekly or daily, compared with 22.5% of Republicans. Democrats also report deeper task-level integration, using AI in 16% more work activities than Republicans. Consistent with this, Democrats are employed in occupations with higher predicted AI exposure based on task-content measures and report larger perceived differences in AI-related job displacement risk. However, in regression models the partisan gap in AI use disappears once we control for education, industry, and occupation, indicating that observed differences primarily reflect compositional variation rather than political affiliation per se.
That is from a new paper by Nicholas Bloom and Christos Makridis.
Why is Singapore no longer “cool”?
To be clear, I am not blaming Singapore on this one. But it is striking to me how much Americans do not talk about Singapore any more. They are much, much more likely to talk about Europe or England, for instance. I see several reasons for this:
1. Much of the Singapore fascination came from the right-wing, as the country offered (according to some) a right-wing version of what a technocracy could look like. Yet today’s American political right is not very interested in technocracy.
2. Singapore willingly takes in large numbers of immigrants (in percentage terms), and tries to make that recipe work through a careful balancing act. That approach still is popular with segments of the right-wing intelligentsia, but it is hardly on the agenda today. For the time being, it is viewed as something “better not to talk about.” Especially in light of some of the burgeoning anti-Asian sentiment, for instance from Helen Andrews and some others. It is much more common that Americans talk about foreign countries mismanaging their immigration policies, for instance the UK and Sweden.
3. Singaporean government looks and feels a bit like a “deep state.” I consider that terminology misleading as applied to Singapore, but still it makes it harder for many people to praise the place.
4. Singapore is a much more democratic country than most outsiders realize, though they do have an extreme form of gerrymandering. Whatever you think of their system, these days it no longer feels transgressive, compared to alternatives being put into practice or at least being discussed. Those alternatives range from more gerrymandering (USA) to various abrogations of democracy (potentially all over). In this regard Singapore, without budging much on its own terms, seems like much more of a mainstream country than before. That means there is less to talk about.
4b. Singapore’s free speech restrictions, whatever you think of them, no longer seem so far outside the box. Trump is suing plenty of people. The UK is sending police to knock on people’s doors for social media posts, and so on. That too makes Singapore more of a “normal country,” for better or worse (I would say worse).
5. The notion of an FDI-driven, MNE-driven growth strategy seems less exciting in an era of major tech advances, most of all AI. Singapore seems further from the frontier than a few years ago. People are wishing to talk about pending changes, not predictability, with predictability being a central feature of many Singaporean service exports.
6. If you want to talk about unusual, well-run small countries, UAE is these days a more novel case to consider, with more new news coming out of it.
Sorry Singapore, we are just not talking about you so much right now! But perhaps, in some significant ways, that is a blessing in disguise. At least temporarily. I wrote this post in part because I realize I have not much blogged about Singapore for some years, and I was trying to figure out why.
Addendum, from Ricardo in the comments:
Bryan Caplan on immigration backlash
Tyler tries to cure my immigration backlash confusion, but not to my satisfaction. The overarching flaw: He equivocates between two different versions of “backlash to immigration.”
Version 1: Letting in more immigrants leads to more resistance to immigration.
Version 2: Letting in more immigrants leads to so much resistance to immigration that the total stock of immigration ultimately ends ups lower than it would have been.
Backlash in the first sense is common, but no reason for immigration advocates to moderate. Backlash in the second sense is a solid reason for immigration advocates to moderate, but Tyler provides little evidence that backlash in this sense is a real phenomenon.
Do read the whole thing, but I feel I am obviously right here. Bryan should read newspapers more! If I did not provide much evidence that backlash is a significant phenomenon, it is because I thought it was pretty obvious. A few points:
1. I (and Bryan all the more so) want more immigration than most voters want. But I recognize that if you strongly deny voters their preferences, they will turn to bad politicians to limit migration. So politics should respect voter preferences to a reasonable degree, even though at the margin people such as myself will prefer more immigration, and also better immigration rules and systems.
2. The anti-immigrant politicians who get elected are very often toxic. And across a wide variety of issues. The backlash costs range far wider than just immigration policies. (I do recognize this does not apply in every case, for instance Meloni in Italy seems OK enough and is not a destructive force. She also has not succeeded in limiting migration, and probably cannot do so without becoming toxic. So maybe that story is not over yet. In any case, consider how many of the other populist right groups have a significant pro-Russia element, Russia being right now probably the most evil country in the world.)
3. If immigration runs “out of control” (as voters perceive it) in your country, there will be anti-immigrant backlash in other countries too. For instance in Japan and Poland. Bryan considers only backlash in the single country of origin. In Japan, for instance, voters just handed their PM a new and powerful mandate, in large part because of the immigration issue. The message was “what is happening in other countries, we do not want that happening here.” The globalization of communications and debate increases the scope and power of the backlash effect considerably.
Most of all, it is simply a mistake to let populist right parties become the dominant force in Europe, and sometimes elsewhere as well. You might think it is not a mistake because we need them to limit migration. Well, that is not my view, but I am arguing it is a mistake to get to that margin to begin with.
In short, we need to limit migration to prevent various democracies from going askew. Nothing in that argument contradicts the usual economic (and other) arguments for a lot of immigration being a good thing. And still it is a good thing to try to sell one’s fellow citizens on the case for more immigration. Nonetheless we are optimizing subject to a constraint, namely voter opinion. Why start off an intertemporal bargaining game by trying to seize as much surplus (immigration) as possible? That to me is obvious, more obvious every day I might add.
The polity that is Bolivia?
Bolivia’s new president is planning major reforms to unleash a mining and oil exploration boom, burying nearly 20 years of socialism in the Andean nation with a new policy — “capitalism for all”.
Rodrigo Paz, a pragmatic centrist former senator, said his team was working on a package of laws to boost foreign investment in natural resources that would be presented to congress for approval “in the coming days or months”.
“We need a new oil and gas law,” Paz told the Financial Times in an interview while attending an economic forum in Panama.
“Bolivia should go for 50-50 [risk-sharing with foreign investors]. I give you the space. You come in with technology and investment . . . I think it’s the basis for business in future.”
Bolivia has a fifth of the world’s reserves of lithium, according to the US Geological Survey, but with its state-owned company YLB lacking technical expertise and investment, it has struggled for years to produce commercial quantities of the battery metal and exports are currently dominated by neighbouring Chile.
Bolivia also has big reserves of silver, tin and antimony. Paz said the Bolivian people, who have a history of protesting against mining, would support fresh investment if they were shown they would benefit financially. He compared his country to its neighbours: “Peru last year had mining revenues of around $50bn. Chile had revenues with state and private companies of $65bn. And we . . . had just $6bn,” he said.
Here is more from Michael Stott at the FT. We will see, as they say. I am cautiously hopeful.
What should I ask Paul Gillingham?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. He is a Professor of History at Northwestern, specializing in Mexico and to some extent the Caribbean. He has translated a Mexican book on Edgar Allan Poe. I am learning a good deal from his new 700 pp. book Mexico: A 500-Year History, and I very much like his earlier work on Mexico and violence. Here is an NYT review of the new book.
So what should I ask him?
The United States as an Active Industrial Policy Nation
We document and characterize a new history of U.S. federal-level industrial policies by scanning all 12,167 Congressional Acts and 6,030 Presidential Orders from 1973 through 2022. We find several interesting patterns. First, contrary to a common perception, the United States has always been an active industrial policy nation throughout the period, regardless of which party is in power, with 5.4 laws and 3.4 Presidential Orders per year on average containing new industrial policies. Second, we identify roughly 300% more instances of industrial policies than those in the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database during 2008-2022, despite using essentially the same definition. Third, industrial policies in practice are as likely to be justified by national security as by economic competitiveness. Fourth, many U.S. industrial policies incorporate design features that help mitigate potential drawbacks, such as explicit expiration dates and pilot programs for emerging technologies. Finally, based on stock market reactions and firm performance, the identified policies are recognized as economically significant in shifting resource allocations.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
So if I were designing an “industrial policy” for America, my first priority would be to improve and “unstick” its procurement cycles. There may well be bureaucratic reasons that this is difficult to do. But if it can’t be done, then perhaps the U.S. shouldn’t be setting its sights on a more ambitious industrial policy.
A second form of American industrial policy is the biomedical grants and subsidies associated with the National Institutes of Health.
Published in 2019, but still relevant today.
My podcast with Frank Fukuyama
Shikha Dalmia moderates, here is the link. Excerpt from the summary:
One reason for the populist revolt in America is the notion of the “deep state”—that an unaccountable bureaucracy is secretly ruling the country. Frank and Tyler come from very different intellectual traditions. Frank, a centrist, is a student of Max Weber and Tyler is a limited government libertarian. Yet they have both argued that liberal states in complex modern societies need a functional bureaucracy—a.k.a. state capacity—to deliver public goods and solve collective action problems. But they also have a ton of disagreements, especially on just how broken American governance is—and they duke it out in a spirited discussion.
And an excerpt from me:
Cowen: I don’t think American state capacity historically is that weak. We built this incredible empire, often unjustly. We put a man on the moon. We developed the atom bomb. We’re leaders in aviation and computers in part because of government. A lot of our state governments work really quite well. It’s a mixed bag, but I think we’d be in the world’s top 10 easily. Noah Smith had a great blog post on this.
Self-recommending! And yes with tons of disagreement, the dialogue is a good overview of where my views are at in this moment, stated super clearly as usual. There is a transcript at the link, it is easy to read through the slight typos.
What should I ask Julia Ioffe?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her. She has a new and very good book out, namely Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia. I will focus on that topic, but she has done much else as well. From Wikipedia:
…a Russian-born American journalist. Her articles have appeared in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Yorker, Foreign Policy, Forbes, Bloomberg Businessweek, The New Republic, Politico, and The Atlantic. Ioffe has appeared on television programs on MSNBC, CBS, PBS, and other news channels as a Russia expert. She is the Washington correspondent for the website Puck.
And here is Julia on Twitter. So what should I ask her?
Seb Krier
I think this is spot on. The most useful work in the coming years will be about leveraging AI to help improve and reform liberal democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers, free speech, coordination, and constitutional safeguards.
One heuristic I have for AI is: if somone can instantiate their preference or desire really easily, if principal agent problems are materially reduced, if you can no longer rely on inefficiency or bloat as indirect hedge – then the ‘rules of the game’ matter more than ever.
These are all very difficult questions with or without AI. And I’m concerned with two things in particular: first, the easy appeal of anti-elite populism – people who just think ‘well let’s have vetocracy everywhere, let’s leverage the emotions of the masses for short term gain’.
And second, the appeal of scheme-y behaviour – instrumental convergence for political operators. This is harder to pin down, but basically a variant of “I want goal X, so anything that gets me closer to this goal is good” – what leads to all sorts of bad policy and unsavoury alliances.
And instead of trying to 4D chess it or try to recreate politics from first principles, I think technologists should actively enage with experts in all sorts of discplines: constitutional scholars, public choice economists, game theorists etc. Converesely, many of these experts should engage with technologists more instead of coping with obsolete op-eds about how AI is fake or something.
Lastly, improved AI capabilities means you can now use these systems for more things than you could have before. I couldn’t write software a year ago and now I can create a viable app in a day. This dynamic will continue, and will reward people who are agentic and creative.
Are you a local councillor? Well now you have 1000 agents at your disposal – what can you now that that was otherwise unthinkable? Are you someone who lives in their district? Now you have even better tools to hold them to account. Are you an academic? Great, now consider how the many bylaws, rules, structures, institutions, incentives are messing up incentives and progress, what should be improved, and how to get streamlined coordination rather than automated obstruction.
Here is the link. Here is the related Dean Ball tweet.
What Davos (and Mark Carney) get wrong
That is the topic of my latest Free Press column, here is one excerpt:
Though Donald Trump seems to be calling off his latest trade war, the United States has indeed retreated from free trade with a new era of tariffs. It’s a development I rue. But Canada just opened its market to Chinese cars. So Trump did in fact find the recipe to nudge an oft-protectionist Canada toward freer trade, though it is the opposite of what he might have been wishing for. Soon, Canada will have access to better and cheaper electric cars than what we can get in the United States. And even if you think that spyware could make those cars a security risk in Washington, D.C., due to spying possibilities, I am less worried about their proliferation in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Keep them out of Ottawa if need be.
The European Union just worked out a free trade agreement, pending final approval, with Mercosur, a trade bloc encompassing hundreds of millions of people in South America, a region that is likely to be more economically important in the future. The EU also announced it is likely to strike a free trade agreement with India, the most populous nation in the world and one of its fastest-growing economies. However imperfect these agreements may turn out to be, has there been any recent short period with so much progress in free trade?
And this on Mark Carney:
Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s speech on Tuesday garnered a lot of attention, but I think for the wrong reasons. He proclaimed the ability of “middle powers”—that is, Europe and countries like his own—to stand their ground against America and China, but he mentioned AI only in passing. He had no solution to an immediately pending world where Canada is quite dependent on advanced AI systems from American companies (often, incidentally, developed by Canadian researchers in the U.S.). That is likely to be the next major development in this North American relationship, and it will not increase the relative autonomy of Canada or of any other middle powers.
Carney has garnered praise for staking out such bold ground and standing up to Trump. The deeper reality is that Carney can “talk back” in the North American partnership because he knows America will defend Canada, including against Russia, no matter what. Most European countries cannot relax in the same manner, and thus they are often more deferential. What the reactions from Carney and the Europeans show is not any kind of growing independence for the middle powers, but rather a reality where you are either quite tethered to a major power—as Canada is to America—or you live in fear of being abandoned, which is the current status of much of Europe.
Recommended.
Growth Experiences and Trust in Government*
From a new QJE paper by Timothy Besley, Christopher Dann, and Sacha Dray:
This paper explores the relationship between economic growth and trust in government using variation in GDP growth experienced over a lifetime since birth. We assemble a newly harmonized global dataset across eleven major opinion surveys, comprising 3.3 million respondents in 166 countries since 1990. Exploiting cohort-level variation, we find that individuals who experience higher GDP growth are more prone to trust their governments, with larger effects found in democracies. Higher growth experiences are also associated with improved perceptions of government performance and living standards. We find no similar channel between growth experience and interpersonal trust. Second, more recent growth experiences appear to matter most for trust in government, with no detectable effect of growth experienced during one’s formative years, closer to birth or before birth. Third, we find evidence of a “trust paradox” whereby average trust in government is lower in democracies than in autocracies. Our results are robust to a range of falsification exercises, robustness checks and single-country evidence using the American National Election Studies and the Swiss Household Panel.
Via Alexander Berger.
Negative political externalities from migration to Britain?
Following up on my recent post, which suggested less skilled immigration into the UK has not been a disaster, the question has been raised about long-term negative political externalities. Will not migrants enter the country and make electoral outcomes worse? I would offer a few points in response:
1. If this is the argument, one needs to admit that immigration has gone well enough in the UK to date. This argument is about the future, not the past.
2. The UK has indeed had a variety of poor leaders as of late. It is very difficult to hold immigrants responsible for them, mostly it is the native white Brits who have been at fault. You might not like how UK Muslims have shaped some of the Middle Eastern statements of Labour, but that is hardly a relevant factor behind the slowdown of the British economy, or of British gridlock.
3. There is a very real risk that Reform will win the next election and then implement bad economics policies, above and beyond whatever you think of their approach to immigration. But if that is the real fear, it would be good to limit their popularity by talking up the positive side of immigration. I am not suggesting that any of us should tell anything less than the full truth, but obviously there are many positive aspects of migration that even professional economists can get wrong. Does immigration mean “higher home prices” or “capital gains for domestic homeowners”? Well, both, but you hear much more about the former than the latter (even Gemini got that one wrong). Let’s redress the balance, and lower the risk of future bad economic policy while we are at it.
4. Sometimes immigration weakens the demand for welfare state transfers, since the immigrants are viewed as outsiders. In Britain, that would currently be a positive at current margins. I recognize that is by no means the only political effect, but in any case do not assume that all of the political externalities are negative.
Above all else, it is difficult to paint immigrants as major villains for Britain’s troubles so far. Just read through the original analysis again. It has not been seriously countermanded, and do most of their problems are indeed the fault of the white people.
That all said, I would readily admit, and indeed stress, that a better set of migration policies could have put Britain in a much better position than it is today.
They are solving for the (electoral) equilibrium
Social Security also got quietly more generous during this period. Each year, the Social Security Administration compares the C.P.I.-W (the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners) for the third quarter to the third quarter of the previous year and, if needed, adjusts benefits upward to compensate for inflation. There happen to have been three years during Obama’s presidency — 2009, 2010, and 2015 — when the mathematically correct cost-of-living adjustment would have been negative. What actually happens in this case is that seniors get zero cost-of-living adjustment, which means that, in real terms, benefits ratcheted upward.
Then during the Biden administration, Congress ended up passing the Social Security Fairness Act, which increased Social Security benefits for a disproportionately affluent set of retirees with access to other pensions with very little fanfare. This happened via a hugely bipartisan vote, so even organizations that were critical of the idea when it was first proposed were mostly silent as it actually happened. Then during the 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump proposed “no tax on Social Security,” which is really just a way of making Social Security benefits mildly more generous for high-income seniors.
That is from Matt Yglesias. It would be amazing if we got away with all of this!
Chairman Powell’s Statement
Whether an independent Fed is desirable is beside the point. The core issue is lawfare: the strategic use of legal processes to intimidate, constrain, and punish institutional actors for political ends. Lawfare is the hallmark of a failing state because it erodes not just political independence, but the capacity for independent judgment.
What sort of people will work at the whim of another? The inevitable result is toadies and ideological loyalists heading complex institutions, rather than people chosen for their knowledge and experience.