Category: Web/Tech

A model of girl happiness, a compensatory-use study

A statistical model was used to examine these relationships simultaneously by predicting the likelihood that a girl reports being very happy.

The model includes socioeconomic status, parent–child communication, screen-time limits, and an interaction between limits and communication.

The results reinforce the patterns in the figures. Parent–child communication dominates the model. Girls who report strong communication are about three to four times more likely to report being very happy than those who report none. Socioeconomic status shows a smaller independent association. Screen-time limits contribute little on their own and matter modestly only when strong communication is already present.

If phones were the central problem, limits would emerge as a robust solution across contexts. They do not…

What the compensatory-use model rejects is a stronger claim. It rejects the idea that smartphone exposure itself is the primary driver of youth distress and that prohibition is therefore the central remedy. If that causal story were correct, limits would show large and consistent benefits across households, including among those with the weakest communication and highest distress. They do not.

And to close:

The most reliable way to improve youth well-being is to meet individual needs through connection instead of control.

That work depends on cooperation, not compliance.

Here is the full essay by Owen Kellogg, of course this is only a single study.

Will AI Improve Undergraduate Economics Education?

From the excellent Matt Kahn:

For decades, undergraduate economics educators have followed a well-worn playbook featuring textbooks, lectures and problem sets. Students have passively listened, taken notes and studied for exams. AI disrupts this educational process. Some students are using this tool as a substitute for their own precious time. What is our best response? This paper provides a prospective analysis of how to restructure every phase of the undergraduate economics experience to improve the major and better prepare students for their uncertain future. Departments face a principal/agent issue in implementing major  curricular reforms. I discuss the incentive problems that arise both within economics departments and across departments. If we win this competition to reimagine the undergraduate experience, will the Deans reward us?

TC again: No.

Séb Krier, continued

Or more specifically Nenad TomaševMatija FranklinJulian JacobsSébastien Krier, and Simon Osindero:

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

Here is the link, this is some of the most important work of our time.  Here is the previous MR post on Krier.

My Conversation with Alison Gopnik

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler and Alison cover how children systematically experiment on the world and what study she’d run with $100 million, why babies are more conscious than adults and what consciousness even means, episodic memory and aphantasia, whether Freud got anything right about childhood and what’s held up best from Piaget, how we should teach young children versus school-age kids, how AI should change K-12 education and Gopnik’s case that it’s a cultural technology rather than intelligence, whether the enterprise of twin studies makes sense and why she sees nature versus nurture as the wrong framework entirely, autism and ADHD as diagnostic categories, whether the success of her siblings belies her skepticism about genetic inheritance, her new project on the economics and philosophy of caregiving, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: If it’s something like height, where there is clearly an environmental component, especially if the child is not well-fed, but it seems perfectly fine to say above a certain dietary level, it’s mostly genetic, right? No one says that’s ambiguous, and more and more traits will become like that.

GOPNIK: Well, first of all, I’m not sure that’s true. To a striking degree, the traits that people have looked at, like educational attainment, for example — we haven’t found consistent relationships to genetics. I think the reason for that is exactly because there’s this very complicated developmental process that goes from the genetics to the outcome.

Even if you think about fruit flies, for example. I have some geneticist colleagues who work on this — fruit fly sex determination. You’d think, “Well, that has to be just the result of genes.” It turns out that there’s this long developmental — long by fruit fly standards — developmental process that goes from the genetics to the proteins to the morphology, and there’s lots of possibility of variation throughout that. I think that hasn’t turned out to be a scientifically helpful way of understanding what’s going on in development.

The other thing, of course, is, from my perspective, the common features of, say, what kids are doing are much more interesting than the variations. What I really want to know is how is it that anyone could have a brain that enables them to accomplish these amazing capacities? Thinking about, is this child smarter than the other one, given how unbelievably smart all of them are to begin with, I just think it’s not an interesting question.

COWEN: But say, what you would call the lay belief that smarter parents give birth to smarter children, at least above subsistence — surely you would accept that, right?

GOPNIK: Again, what does smarter mean?

COWEN: How you would do on an IQ test.

GOPNIK: What does genetics mean? It’s interesting, Tyler, that IQ tests, for example — they have their own scholarly and scientific universe, but they’re not something that we would teach about or think about in a developmental psychology class, and there’s a good principled reason for that. The good principled reason — this has come up a lot in AI recently. There’s this idea in AI of artificial general intelligence, and that is assuming that there’s something called general intelligence.

Again, I think, a lot like consciousness or life, it’s one of these lay ideas about how people work. When you actually look at children, for example, what you see is not just that there isn’t a single thing that’s general intelligence. You actually see different cognitive capacities that are in tension with one another. You mentioned one about the scientist who’s trying to think of some new idea versus the scientist who’s looking at a more specific idea, right? A classic example of this tension that I’ve talked about and studied is in computer sciences: exploration versus exploitation.

What do you count as IQ? In fact, most of what IQ is about is how well do you do in school? How well do you do on school tests? That’s actually, in many respects, in tension with how good are you at exploring the world around you? The kinds of things that you need to do to have particular goals, to accomplish them, the kinds of things that we emphasize a lot, say, in a school context, are actually in tension. This gets back to the point about babies being more conscious than we are — are actually in tension with the kinds of things that will let you explore.

Think about the Bayesian example. If you have a flatter prior, and you pay more attention to evidence, you are probably not going to do as well on an IQ test…

COWEN: There’s you — you’re tenured at Berkeley, you’re famous. There’s Blake, The Definitive Warhol Biography, and Adam, who’s amazing, writes for the New Yorker, and you don’t believe inheritability and IQ being very concrete things? I just don’t get it. I think you’re in denial.

GOPNIK: Actually, I think that example is maybe partly why I don’t believe in that. In fact, what I do believe is that the effect of caregiving is to increase variability, is to increase variation. Our family, our care — there were six of us in 11 years. My parents were graduate students, and even before they were graduate students, they were that great generation of immigrant kids.

We had this combination of a great deal of warmth, a great deal of love, an enormous amount of stuff that was around us — books and ideas. We got taken to the Guggenheim, when Adam was three and I was four, for the opening of the Guggenheim. We both remember this vividly. But we were also completely free. We were just in regular public schools. As was true in those days, in general, we came home after school, and we basically did whatever it was that we wanted. I was involved. The kids were taking care of each other a lot of the time.

The result is that you get a lot of variation. It’s an interesting example in our family where we have six kids who presumably all have somewhat similar genetics, all in that 11 years grow up in the same context, and they come out completely differently. They come out with really different strengths, really different weaknesses, things that they’re good at, things that they’re not good at. Even if you think about what Blake and Adam and I are like as thinkers, we’re all foxes instead of hedgehogs. We’re all people who have done lots of different things and thought about lots of different things.

So, my view is that what nurture will do is let you have variability. That’s the thing that, in a sense, is heritable. That’s contradictory, the idea that what’s heritable is the standard deviation instead of the mean, but that’s my view about that. I think my childhood did have the effect of making me suspicious of those simple nature-nurture oppositions.

Here are the books of Alison Gopnik.

An RCT on AI and mental health

Young adults today face unprecedented mental health challenges, yet many hesitate to seek support due to barriers such as accessibility, stigma, and time constraints. Bite-sized well-being interventions offer a promising solution to preventing mental distress before it escalates to clinical levels, but have not yet been delivered through personalized, interactive, and scalable technology. We conducted the first multi-institutional, longitudinal, preregistered randomized controlled trial of a generative AI-powered mobile app (“Flourish”) designed to address this gap. Over six weeks in Fall 2024, 486 undergraduate students from three U.S. institutions were randomized to receive app access or waitlist control. Participants in the treatment condition reported significantly greater positive affect, resilience, and social well-being (i.e., increased belonging, closeness to community, and reduced loneliness) and were buffered against declines in mindfulness and flourishing. These findings suggest that, with purposeful and ethical design, generative AI can deliver proactive, population-level well-being interventions that produce measurable benefits.

That is from a new paper by Julie Y.A. Cachia, et.al.  A single paper or study is hardly dispositive, even when it is an RCT.  But you should beware of those, such as Jon Haidt and Jean Twenge, who are conducting an evidence-less jihad against AI for younger people.

Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

How harmful is the decline in long-form reading?

That is the theme of my latest Free Press column, here is one excerpt:

Oral culture, in contrast, tends to be more fluid, harder to evaluate and verify, more prone to rumor, and it has fewer gatekeepers. Those features have their advantages, as a good stand-up comedian will get louder laughs than a witty author. Or an explanation from YouTube, with moving visuals, may stick in our minds more than a turgid passage from a textbook. We also just love talking, and listening, as those modes of communication reach back into human history much further than reading and writing do. Speech is part of how we bond with each other. Still, if any gross generalization can be made, it is that oral culture makes objectivity and analytic thought harder to establish and maintain.

Given this background, both the good and the bad news is that the dominance of print culture has been in decline for a long time. Radio and cinema both became major communications media in the 1920s, and television spread in the 1950s. Those major technological advances have commanded the regular attention of billions, and still do so. Earlier in the 20th century, it suddenly became a question whether you take your ideas from a book or from the radio. And this was not always a welcome development, as Hitler’s radio speeches persuaded more Germans than did his poorly constructed, unreadable Mein Kampf.

The fact that books, newspapers, and reading still are so important reflects just how powerful print has been. How many other institutions can be in relative decline for over a hundred years, and still have such a hold over our hearts and minds?

The optimistic interpretation of our situation is that reading longer works has been in decline for a long time, and overall our civilization has managed the transition fairly well. Across history we have had various balances of written and oral cultures, and if some further rebalancing is required in the direction of the oral, we should be able to make that work, just as we have done in the past. The rise of television, whatever you may think of it, did not do us in.

A second and more pessimistic diagnosis is that print and reading culture has been hanging by a thread, and current and pending technological advances are about to give that thread its final cut. The intellectual and cultural apocalypse is near. Even if your family thinks of itself as well-educated, your kids will grow up unable to work their way through a classic novel. They will watch the Lord of the Rings movies, but never pick up the books. As a result, they are likely to have less scientific and analytic objectivity, and they will embody some of the worst and most volatile aspects of TikTok culture. They will, however, be able to sample large numbers of small bits of information, or sometimes misinformation, in a short period of time.

There is much more at the link.

Noah Smith on AI existential risk

Superintelligent AI would be able to use all the water and energy and land and minerals in the world, so why would it let humanity have any for ourselves? Why wouldn’t it just take everything and let the rest of us starve?

But an AI that was able to rewrite its utility function would simply have no use for infinite water, energy, or land. If you can reengineer yourself to reach a bliss point, then local nonsatiation fails; you just don’t want to devour the Universe, because you don’t need to want that.

In fact, we can already see humanity trending in that direction, even without AI-level ability to modify our own desires. As our societies have become richer, our consumption has dematerialized; our consumption of goods has leveled off, and our consumption patterns have shifted toward services. This means we humans place less and less of a burden on Earth’s natural resources as we get richer…

I think one possible technique for alignment would give fairly-smart AI the ability to modify its own utility function — thus allowing it to turn itself into a harmless stoner instead of needing to fulfill more external desires.

And beyond alignment, I think an additional strategy should be to work on modifying the constraints that AI faces, to minimize the degree to which humans and AIs are in actual, real competition over scarce resources.

One potential way to do this is to accelerate the development of outer space. Space is an inherently hostile environment for humans, but far less so for robots, or for the computers that form the physical substrate of AI; in fact, Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and others are already trying to put data centers in space.

Here is the full post.

“AI is everywhere but in the productivity statistics…”

These people are saying it is there too.  Though I am not quite sure what they (or anyone, for that matter) mean by AI:

First, we argue that AI can already be seen in productivity statistics for the United States. The production and use effects of software and software R&D (alone) contributed (a) 50 percent of the 2 percent average rate of growth in US nonfarm business labor productivity from 2017 to 2024 and (a) 50 percent of its 1.2 percentage point acceleration relative to the pace from 2012 to 2017. Second, taking additional intangibles and data assets into account, we calculate a long-run contribution of AI to labor productivity growth based on assumptions that follow from the recent trajectories of investments in software, software R&D, other intangibles, and productivity growth in both US and Europe. Our central estimates are that AI will boost annual labor productivity growth by as much as 1 percentage point in the United States and about .3 percentage point in Europe.

That is from Bontadini, Corrado, Haskel, and Jona-Lasinio, here is the complete abstract online.

GDPR is worse than you had thought

We examine how data privacy regulation affects healthcare innovation and research collaboration. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aims to enhance data security and individual privacy, but may also impose costs to data collection and sharing critical to clinical research. Focusing on the pharmaceutical sector, where timely access and the ability to share patient-level data plays an important role drug development, we use a difference-in-differences design exploiting variation in firms’ pre-GDPR reliance on EU trial sites. We find that GDPR led to a significant decline in clinical trial activity: affected firms initiated fewer trials, enrolled fewer patients, and operated at fewer trial sites. Overall collaborative clinical trials also declined, driven by a reduction in new partnerships, while collaborations with existing partners modestly increased. The decline in collaborations was driven among younger firms, with little variation by firm size. Our findings highlight a trade- off between stronger privacy protections and the efficiency of healthcare innovation, with implications for how regulation shapes the rate and composition of subsequent R&D.

That is from Jennifer Kao and Sukhun Kang, here is the online abstract for the AEA meetings.

Agentic interactions

Do human differences persist and scale when decisions are delegated to AI agents? We study an experimental marketplace in which individuals author instructions for buyer-and seller-side agents that negotiate on their behalf. We compare these AI agentic interactions to standard human-to-human negotiations in the same setting. First, contrary to predictions of more homogenous outcomes, agentic interactions lead to, if anything, greater dispersion in outcomes compared to human-mediated interactions. Second, crossing agents across counterparties reveals systematic dispersion in outcomes that tracks the identity and characteristics of the human creators; who designs the agent matters as much as, and often more than, shared information or code. Canonical behavioral frictions reappear in agentic form: personality traits shape agent behavior and selection on principal characteristics yields sorting. Despite AI agents not having access to the human principal’s characteristics, demographics such as gender and personality variables have substantial explanatory power for outcomes, in ways that are sometimes reversed from human-to-human interactions. Moreover, we uncover significant variation in “machine fluency”-the ability to instruct an AI agent to effectively align with one’s objective function-that is predicted by principals’ individual types, suggesting a new source of heterogeneity and inequality in economic outcomes. These results indicate that the agentic economy inherits, transforms, and may even amplify, human heterogeneity. Finally, we highlight a new type of information asymmetry in principal-agent relationships and the potential for specification hazard, and discuss broader implications for welfare, inequality, and market power in economies increasingly transacted through machines shaped by human intent.

Here is the full paper by Alex Imas, Kevin Lee, and Sanjog Misra.  Here is a thread on the paper.

My Conversation with the excellent Gaurav Kapadia

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

Gaurav Kapadia has deliberately avoided publicity throughout his career in investing, which makes this conversation a rare window into how he thinks. He now runs XN, a firm built around concentrated bets on a small number of companies with long holding periods. However, his education in judgment began much earlier, in a two-family house in Flushing that his parents converted into a four-family house. It was there where a young Gaurav served as de facto landlord, collecting rent and negotiating late payments at age 10. That grounding now expresses itself across an unusual range of domains: Tyler invited him on the show not just as an investor, but as someone with a rare ability to judge quality in cities, talent, art, and more with equal fluency.

Tyler and Gaurav discuss how Queens has thrived without new infrastructure, what he’d change as “dictator” of Flushing, whether Robert Moses should rise or fall in status, who’s the most underrated NYC mayor, what’s needed to attract better mayoral candidates, the weirdest place in NYC, why he initially turned down opportunities in investment banking for consulting, bonding with Rishi Sunak over railroads, XN’s investment philosophy, maintaining founder energy in investment firms and how he hires to prevent complacency, AI’s impact on investing, the differences between New York and London finance, the most common fundraising mistake art museums make, why he collects only American artists within 20 years of his own age, what makes Kara Walker and Rashid Johnson and Salman Toor special, whether buying art makes you a better investor, his new magazine Totei celebrating craft and craftsmanship, and much more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: Now, I don’t intend this as commentary on any particular individual, but what is it that could be done to attract a higher quality of candidate for being mayor of New York? It’s a super important job. It’s one of the world’s greatest cities, arguably the greatest. Why isn’t there more talent running after it?

KAPADIA: It is something that I’ve thought about a great deal. I think there’s a bunch of little things that accumulate, but the main thing that happens in New York City is, people automatically assume they can’t win because it’s such a big and great city. Actually, the last few presidential elections and also the current mayoral election have taught people that anyone could win. I think that, in and of itself, is going to draw more candidates as we go forward.

What happened as an example, this time, people just assumed that one candidate had the race locked up, so a lot of good candidates, even that I know, decided not even to run. It turns out that that ended up not being the case at all. Now that people put that into their mental model, the new Bayesian analysis of that would be, “Oh, more people should run.”

The second thing: New York has a bunch of very peculiar dynamics. It’s an off-year election, and the primaries are at very awkward times. I believe there’s a history of why the primary shifted to basically the third week of June, in which there’s a very low turnout. The third week of June in New York City, when the private schools are out and an off-year election. You’re able to win the Democratic nomination and therefore the mayoral election with tens of thousands of votes in a city this big. That is absolutely insane.

A couple of things that I would probably do would be to make the primary more normal, change the election timing to make it on-cycle, even number of years. You’d have to figure out how to do that. Potentially have an open primary as well.

COWEN: If we apply the Gaurav Kapadia judgment algorithm to mayoral candidates, what’s the non-obvious quality you’re looking for?

KAPADIA: Optimism.

COWEN: Optimism.

KAPADIA: Optimism.

COWEN: Is it scarce?

KAPADIA: Extraordinarily scarce. I think there’s much more doomerism everywhere than optimism. At the end of the day, people are attracted to optimism. If you think about the machinery of the city and the state, having a clear plan — of course, you need all the basics. You need to be able to govern. It’s a very complicated city. There’re many constituents.

But I think beyond that, you have to have the ability to inspire. For some reason, almost all of the candidates, over the last couple of cycles, have really not had that — with the exception of probably one — the ability to inspire. I think that is the most underrated quality that one will need.

COWEN: I have my own answer to this question, but I’m curious to see what you say. What is, for you, the weirdest part of New York City that you know of that doesn’t really feel like it belongs to New York City at all?

Definitely recommended.

Australia should not ban under-16s from internet sites

From me in The Free Press:

YouTube in particular, and sometimes X, are among the very best ways to learn about the world. To the extent that the law is effectively enforced, targeting YouTube will have a terrible effect on youth science, and the ability of young scientists and founders to get their projects off the ground will take a huge and possibly fatal hit. If you are only allowed to learn from the internet at age 16, you are probably not ready for marvelous achievements at age 18 or perhaps not even at 20. The country may become more mediocre.

The more serious concern is that this represents a major expansion of government control over tech services and also speech. Over time the government has to decide which are the approved tech companies and services and which are not. That becomes a politicized decision, as any chosen lines will be arbitrary, especially as online services evolve in their functionality. For instance, if excess video usage is what is problematic, it is possible for videos to be embedded more seamlessly into some future version of WhatsApp, an exempt service. Or Australian youth, even under the new law, will be able to access video on a laptop, simply by viewing it and not signing into their accounts…

I predict that either this law stops being effectively enforced, or the controls on companies and users have to become much, much tighter and more oppressive. In a large poll of Australian 9 to 16-year-olds, only 6 percent of them thought the new ban was going to work.

That is true for yet another reason. With gaming and messaging exempt from the ban, we can expect old-style “social media” to move into those areas. It already was the case that Fortnite and other gaming services served as social media networks, and that trend will be accelerated. Discord, for instance, is exempt from the ban, a glaring hole, and in a fast-changing market there probably will be some significant loopholes most of the time. For the ban to continue to work, it will have to spread. It is hard to think of an area of internet services that could not, in principle, serve social media–like functions, or produce the harms being attributed to online life. Regulation of artificial intelligence services is perhaps the next logical albeit misguided move here.

Who is in charge of the family anyway? If I have decided that my 15-year-old should be free to follow Magnus Carlsen on X and YouTube, should we have the boot of the state tell me this is forbidden? This is a big move in the direction of what Socrates advocated in The Republic, namely that the state takes priority over the family in deciding which stories can be told to the youth.

Over time, I expect this ban, again assuming it is kept and enforced, to become one of the biggest free speech restrictions on the internet. It is the incentive of government agencies to boost their budgets, spread their mandates, and enforce their dictates. What starts with a nation’s youth rarely ends there.

You might think that Australia’s regulatory guardians can be trusted to uphold free speech ideals, but has that been the case to date? Under Australian law, it is permissible to restrict free speech for reasons of public order, national security, and protection from harm. That includes limits on “hate speech,” prompting Elon Musk to exaggerate and call the country fascist. Nonetheless the country does not have anything comparable to America’s First Amendment free speech protections.

So why should we empower Australian regulators and restrict free speech further?

It is very defensible to worry that your kid is on his or her phone too much. Furthermore, school bans or limits on smartphone usage are likely to bring some measurable but small gains.

But if you think a massive expansion of state authority over online content is the answer, you ought to know that the associated gains from that decision will at best be modest. You will not be saving civilization or our youth; rather you will be joining the ever-growing parade against free speech.

Recommended, and in this recent piece Ben Yeoh surveys the research-based literature on social media and teen harm.