Horseshoe Theory: Trump and the Progressive Left
Many of Trump’s signature policies overlap with those of the American progressive left—e.g. tariffs, economic nationalism, immigration restrictions, and deep distrust of elite institutions. Trump governs less like Reagan, more like Perón. As Ryan Bourne notes, this ideological convergence has led many on the progressive left to remain silent or even tacitly support Trump policies, particularly on trade.
“[P]rogressive Democrats like Senator Elizabeth Warren have chosen to shift blame for Trump’s tariff-driven price hikes onto large businesses. Last week, they dusted off—and expanded—their pandemic-era Price Gouging Prevention Act. While bemoaning Trump’s ‘chaotic’ on-off tariffs, their real ire remains reserved for ‘greedy corporations,’ supposedly exploiting trade policy disruption to pad prices beyond what’s needed to ‘cover any cost increases.’
…The Democrats’ 2025 gouging bill is broader than ever, creating a standing prohibition against ‘grossly excessive’ price hikes—loosely suggested at anything 20 percent above the previous six-month average—but allowing the FTC to pick its price caps ‘using any metric it deems appropriate.’
…Instead of owning the pricing fallout from his trade wars, President Trump can now point to Democratic cries of ‘corporate greed’ and claim their proposed FTC crackdown proves that it’s businesses—not his tariffs—to blame for higher prices.
If these progressives have their way, the public debate flips from ‘tariffs raise prices’ to ‘the FTC must crack down on corporate greed exploiting trade policy reform,’ with Trump slipping off the hook.”
Trump’s political coalition isn’t policy-driven. It’s built on anger, grievance, and zero-sum thinking. With minor tweaks, there is no reason why such a coalition could not become even more leftist. Consider the grotesque canonization of Luigi Mangione, the (alleged) murderer of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson. We already have a proposed CA ballot initiative named the Luigi Mangione Access to Health Care Act, a Luigi Mangione musical and comparisons of Mangione to Jesus. The anger is very Trumpian.
A substantial share of voters on the left and the right increasingly believe that markets are rigged, globalism is suspect, and corporations are the real enemy. Trump adds nationalist flavor; progressives bring the regulatory hammer. The convergence of left and right in attacking classical liberalism– open markets, limited government, pluralism and the basic rules of democratic compromise–is what worries me the most about contemporary politics.
Partisan Bias in Professional Macroeconomic Forecasts
Here is a recent paper by Benjamin S. Kay, Aeimit Lakdawala, and Jane Ryngaert:
Using a novel dataset linking professional forecasters in the Wall Street Journal Economic Forecasting Survey to their political affiliations, we document a partisan bias in GDP growth forecasts. Republican-affiliated forecasters project 0.3-0.4 percentage points higher growth when Republicans hold the presidency, relative to Democratic-affiliated forecasters. Forecast accuracy shows a similar partisan pattern: Republican-affiliated forecasters are less accurate under Republican presidents, indicating that partisan optimism impairs predictive performance. This bias appears uniquely in GDP forecasts and does not extend to inflation, unemployment, or interest rates. We explain these findings with a model where forecasters combine noisy signals with politically-influenced priors: because GDP data are relatively more uncertain, priors carry more weight, letting ideology shape growth projections while leaving easier-to-forecast variables unaffected. Noisy information therefore amplifies, rather than substitutes for, heterogeneous political priors, implying that expectation models should account for both information rigidities and belief heterogeneity. Finally, we show that Republican forecasters become more optimistic when tax cuts are salient in public discourse, suggesting that partisan differences reflect divergent beliefs about the economic effects of fiscal policy.
Here is the SSRN link.
What should I ask George Selgin?
Yes, I will be having a Conversation with him, live at the Cato Institute on September 26th, here is some basic information:
Website: https://www.cato.org/events/false-dawn-new-deal-promise-recovery-1933-1947
Registration: https://register.cato.org/false-dawn-new-deal-promise-recovery-1933-1947/register
We will start with George’s new and excellent book False Dawn: The New Deal and the Promise of Recovery 1933-1947. But of course George has a long and distinguished record in monetary economics, free banking, macro, and ngdp ideas, as well as productivity norms for monetary policy.
So what should I ask him?
*The Economist* on the speed of AI take-off
A booming but workerless economy may be humanity’s ultimate destination. But, argues Tyler Cowen of George Mason University, an economist who is largely bullish about AI, change will be slower than the underlying technology permits. “There’s a lot of factors of production…the stronger the AI is, the more the weaknesses of the other factors bind you,” he says. “It could be energy; it could be human stupidity; it could be regulation; it could be data constraints; it could just be institutional sluggishness.” Another possibility is that even a superintelligence would run out of ideas. “ AI may resolve a problem with the fishermen, but it wouldn’t change what is in the pond,” wrote Philippe Aghion of LSE and others in a working paper in 2017.
Here is the full piece, of interest throughout.
Thursday assorted links
1. Alvin Lucier’s brain is still making music. He died in 2021.
4. America’s AI action plan. Full plan here.
5. Charles Mann on what keeps the lights on.
6. A historical political economy of Kenya.
7. How much does education benefit the global poor?
8. ACX grants.
USA fact of the day
…fraction of children living with two parents is highest it’s been since 1991 (which wouldn’t be surprising with less teen/v young pregnancy)…
That is from Kevin Bryan, here is the source material.
My excellent Conversation with Helen Castor
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Helen explore what English government could and couldn’t do in the 14th century, why landed nobles obeyed the king, why parliament chose to fund wars with France, whether England could have won the Hundred Years’ War, the constitutional precedents set by Henry IV’s deposition of Richard II, how Shakespeare’s Richard II scandalized Elizabethan audiences, Richard’s superb artistic taste versus Henry’s lack, why Chaucer suddenly becomes possible in this period, whether Richard II’s fatal trip to Ireland was like Captain Kirk beaming down to a hostile planet, how historians continue to discover new evidence about the period, how Shakespeare’s Henriad influences our historical understanding, Castor’s most successful work habits, what she finds fascinating about Asimov’s I, Robot, the subject of her next book, and more.
Here is an excerpt from the opening sequence:
COWEN: Richard II and Henry IV — they’re born in the same year, namely 1367. Just to frame it for our listeners, could you give us a sense — back then, what was it that the English government could do and what could it not do? What is the government like then?
CASTOR: I think people might be surprised at quite how much government could do in England at this point in history because England, at this point, was the most centralized state in Europe, and that has two reasons. One is the Conquest of 1066 where the Normans have come in and taken the whole place over. Then, the other key formative period is the late 12th century when Henry II is ruling an empire that stretches from the Scottish border all the way down to southwestern France.
He has to have a system of government and of law that can function when he’s not there. By the late 14th century, when Richard and Henry — my two kings in this book — appear on the scene, the king has two key functions which appear on the two sides of his seal. On one side, he sits in state wearing a crown, carrying an orb and scepter as a lawgiver and a judge. That is a key function of what he does for his people. He imposes law. He gives justice. He maintains order.
On the other side of the seal, he’s wearing armor on a warhorse with a sword unsheathed in his hand. That’s his function as a defender of the realm in an intensely practical way. He has to be a soldier, a warrior to repel attacks or, indeed, to launch attacks if that’s the best form of defense. To do that, he needs money.
For that, the institution of parliament has developed, which offers consent to taxation that he can demonstrate is in the national interest. It has also come to be a law-making forum. Wherever he needs to make new laws, he can make statute law in Parliament that therefore, in its very nature, has the consent of the representatives of the realm.
COWEN: What is it, back then, that government cannot do?
CASTOR: What a government doesn’t have in the medieval period is, it doesn’t have a monopoly of force. In other words, it doesn’t have a police force. It doesn’t have a professional police force, and it doesn’t have a standing army, or at least by the late Middle Ages, England does have a permanent garrison in Calais, which is its outpost on the northern coast of France, but that’s not a garrison that can be recalled to England with any ease.
So, enforcement is the government’s key problem. To enforce the king’s edicts, it therefore relies on a hierarchy of private power on the landed, the great landowners of the kingdom, who are wealthy because of their possession of land, but crucially, also have control over people, the men who live and work on their land. If you need to get an enforcement posse — this is medieval English language that we use when we talk of sheriffs and posses — the county posse, the power of the county.
If you need to get men out quickly, you need to tap into those local power structures. You don’t have modern communications. You don’t have modern transport. The whole hierarchy of the king’s theoretical authority has to tap into and work through the private hierarchy of landed power.
COWEN: Why do those landed nobles obey the king? They’re afraid of the future raising of an army? Or they’re handed out some other benefit? What keeps the incentives all working together to the extent they stay working together?
CASTOR: They have a very important pragmatic interest in obeying the king because the king is the keystone of the hierarchy within which they are powerful and wealthy. Of course, they want more power and more wealth for themselves and for their dynasty, but importantly, they don’t want to risk everything to acquire more if it means serious danger that they might lose what they already have.
They have every interest in maintaining the hierarchy as it already is, within which they can then . . . It’s like having a referee…
A very good episode, definitely recommended. I enjoyed all of Helen’s books, most notably the recent
That was then, this is now, AI edition
COWEN: They can now do Math Olympiad problems. There’s one forecast by someone working on this that, within a year, they’ll win Math Olympiads. It could be wrong, but when you say that it’s only a year away, I would take that pretty seriously.
That was from my Nate Silver CWT taped on July 22, 2024. We just taped a new episode today…
Wednesday assorted links
1. State-level arts funding is to some extent substituting for federal arts funding.
2. Norwegian sovereign wealth fund deploys AI. And more thinking is not always good for the AI.
3. Some Amish settlements have TFR above 10. And Colombia is now at 1.2. And coupling rate vs. fertility rate.
China fact of the day
China alone accounts for almost 1000 hotels that include Vienna in their name, far more than any country, including Austria itself.
This article is more generally about what you learn when you study 25,000 hotel names and look for common patterns. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
USA fact of the day
Federal Reserve Board operating expenses have *quadrupled* from 2004 to 2023, reaching ~$1 billion in 2023, according to the Annual Reports of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
That is from Jon Hartley. It is of course correct that the other effects of the Fed far outweigh the size of these expenditures. Nonetheless, it is worth asking, given these numbers, whether the system in place is generating good decisions. That in turn said, we do not currently have an “appropriate set of askers.”
Markets in everything, bet on tariff repeal edition
Cantor Fitzgerald, a financial services company led by the sons of US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, has offered to buy the right to hundreds of millions of dollars in potential refunds from companies that have paid Trump’s tariffs.
The offer means that the sons of the pro-tariff commerce secretary, Kyle and Brandon, have made a way for investors to bet that President Donald Trump’s signature tariffs will be struck down in court.
Here is the full story.
Stablecoin podcast with Garett Jones
37 minutes, fresh material in here, see also Spotify under Bluechip Dialogues.
Tuesday assorted links
1. China fact of the day: “The 10 MSAs *hardest hit* by the China Shock all had positive real wage growth since 2001.” And: “Is that just average wage growth? No! Read the post. It’s positive growth at the median. And the 10th percentile. And the 25th, 75th, 90th percentile… across the distribution.”
2. “These Restaurants, Salons and Workouts Are Free for Hot People—if They Post About Them.” (WSJ)
3. A critique of how economic history is evolving. Column version here.
4. It seems chess.com bans 100,000 cheaters every month?
5. How AI can teach general education requirements, with specifics. And Gemini has gold medal results in the IMO. And how AI can help solve cyber problems.
6. More on the potential alchemy transmutation into gold claims (FT). Seems to be real!
Gross(ery) Confusion
Zephyr Teachout’s NYTs op-ed on grocery store prices is poorly argued.
The food system in the United States is rigged in favor of big retailers and suppliers in several ways. Big retailers often flex their muscles to demand special deals; to make up the difference, suppliers then charge the smaller stores more.
Let’s be clear about what is actually going on. Costco offers its suppliers lower prices in return for bigger orders. There is nothing anti-competitive about volume discounting. Moreover, are firms dismayed or are they eager to sell to big, bad Costco? Google AI gives a good answer:
…firms are eager to sell to Costco because of the immense potential for sales and brand exposure, but they must be prepared to meet stringent requirements, negotiate competitive pricing, and be able to handle high volume and demanding logistics.
Would Americans be better off without Costco? Doubtful given that more than one-quarter of all Americans pay for a Costco membership (either individually or as a family).
Teachout’s idea that suppliers “make up the difference” by charging smaller stores more is also economically incoherent. Profit-maximizing firms already charge what the market will bear. If Costco’s volume justifies a discount, that doesn’t mean suppliers can or should charge higher prices to other buyers. Yes, there are models where costs change with volume but costs could go down with volume and, in any case, those models don’t rely on the folk theory of “making up the difference.”
That’s one of the subtler mistakes. Here’s a more glaring one:
Consider eggs. At the independent supermarket near my apartment, the price for a dozen white eggs last week was $5.99. At a major national retailer a few blocks away, it was $3.99. (For an identical box of cereal, the price difference was $3.) Any number of factors may contribute to a given price, but market power is a particularly consequential one.
Read that again: the firm allegedly abusing market power is the one charging less.
It gets stranger:
New York City has a strong price gouging law on the books, which forbids anyone — suppliers and retailers — from jacking up prices during a state of emergency unless the seller’s own costs have gone up accordingly. The city couldn’t have stopped the bird flu that devastated flocks, but maybe it can stop suppliers from cynically exploiting a crisis to justify exorbitant prices.
This makes two errors. First, she acknowledges it’s not gouging if costs rise—then cites egg prices rising due to the bird flu devastating flocks. That’s literally a textbook case of a supply shock. Maybe some firms exploited the crisis—but eggs rising in price after millions of chickens are killed is the best example you’ve got???
Second, within the span of a few paragraphs, the op-ed veers from claiming large retailers charge prices that are unfairly low to blaming them for charging prices that are too high. I’m surprised she didn’t go for the trifecta and accuse them of colluding to charge the same price.