Category: Media

My Conversation with Andrew Ross Sorkin

This was great fun for me, here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler and Andrew debate whether those 1929 stock prices were justified, what Fed and policy choices might have prevented the Depression, whether Glass-Steagall was built on a flawed premises, what surprised Andrew most about the 1920s beyond the crash itself, how business leaders then would compare to today’s CEOs, whether US banks should consolidate, how Andrew would reform US banking regulation, what to make of narrow banking proposals and stablecoins, whether retail investors should get access to private equity and venture capital, why sports gambling and new financial regulations won’t make us much safer, how Andrew broke into the New York Times at age 18, how he manages his information diet, what he learned co-creating Billions, what he plans on learning about next, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: I have a few general questions about the 1920s. Obviously, you did an enormous amount of work for this book. Putting aside the great crash and the focus of your book, what is it you learned about the 1920s more generally that most surprised you? Because you learn all this collateral information when you write a book like this, right?

SORKIN: So many things. The book turned into a bit of a love letter to New York in terms of the architecture of New York. I don’t think I appreciated just how many buildings went up in New York and how they were constructed and what happened. That fascinated me. I think the story of John Raskob, actually, who was, to me, the Elon Musk of his time, somebody who ran General Motors, became a super influential investor. He was a philosopher king that everybody listened to at every given moment.

He ultimately constructs the Empire State Building, which was probably the equivalent of SpaceX at that time. He had written a paper about creating a five-day workweek back in 1929, November, as all of this is happening. Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing. There were so many little things.

Then, I would argue, actually, his role in taking his fortune — he got involved in politics. He was a Republican turned Democrat. He spent an extraordinary amount of money to secretly try to undermine the reputation of Hoover. I would say to you, today, I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover’s reputation is so dim, even today, is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual in America who spent two years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign to do such a thing. You go back and really read the press and try to understand why some of these views were espoused.

By the way, this was before the crash. He started this campaign effectively in May of 1929, just three months after Hoover took office.

COWEN: It’s striking to me how forgotten Raskob is today. There’s a lesson in there about people who think they’re doing something today that will be remembered in a hundred years’ time. It probably won’t be, even if you’re a big, big deal.

SORKIN: It’s remarkable. He was a very big deal. He famously used to tell everybody, “Everybody ought to be rich.” He was trying to develop, back then, what would have been something akin to one of the first mutual funds, levered mutual funds, in fact, because he also wanted to democratize finance.

COWEN: Let’s say you’re back in New York. It’s the 1920s; you’re you. Other than walking around and looking at buildings, what else would you do back then? I would go to jazz concerts. What would you do?

SORKIN: Oh my goodness. You know what I would do? But I’m a journalista, so you’ll appreciate this.

COWEN: Yes.

SORKIN: I would have been obsessed with magazines. This was really the first real era of magazines and newspapers and the transmission of media, the sort of mass media in this way. I would have been fascinated by radio. I think those things, for me, would have been super exciting.

The truth is, I imagine I would have gotten caught up in the pastime of stock trading. It is true that all these brokerage houses are just emerging everywhere, and people are going to play them as if it’s a pastime. I always wonder whether prohibition played a role in why so many people were speculating because instead of drinking, what did they do? They traded.

Some of the time he spent interviewing me…

What should I ask Julia Ioffe?

Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her.  She has a new and very good book out, namely Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia.  I will focus on that topic, but she has done much else as well.  From Wikipedia:

…a Russian-born American journalist. Her articles have appeared in The Washington PostThe New York TimesThe New YorkerForeign PolicyForbesBloomberg BusinessweekThe New RepublicPolitico, and The Atlantic. Ioffe has appeared on television programs on MSNBCCBSPBS, and other news channels as a Russia expert. She is the Washington correspondent for the website Puck.

And here is Julia on Twitter.  So what should I ask her?

Morally judging famous and semi-famous people

This is one of the worst things you can do for your own intellect, whatever you think the social benefits may be.  I know some reasonable number of famous people, and I just do not trust the media accounts of their failings and flaws.  I trust even less the barbs I read on the internet.  I am not claiming to know the truth about them (most of them, at least), but I can tell when the people writing about them know even less.

I am not saying everyone is an angel — sometimes you come to learn negative information that in fact is not part of the standard press reports or internet whines.

If you are going to possibly be working with someone on a concrete and important project, absolutely you should be trying to form an assessment of their moral quality and reliability.  (And you are allowed to do it once per electoral race, when deciding for whom to vote.)  But if not, spending real time and energy morally judging famous and semi-famous people is one of the best and quickest ways to make yourself stupider.  Focus on the substantive arguments for and against various policies and propositions, not the people involved.  Furthermore, smart people do not seem to be immune from this form of mental deterioration.  Here is my 2008 post on “pressing the button.”

A corollary of this is that if you read an internet comment that, when a substantive issue is raised, switches to judging a famous or semi-famous person, the quality of that comment is almost always low.  Once you start seeing this, you cannot stop seeing it.

Addendum: If by any chance you are wondering how to make yourself smarter, learn how to appreciate almost everybody, and keep on cultivating that skill.

The business of the culture war

We show that American cable television news emphasizes race, crime, gender, and other “culture war” issues. These issues are less prominent in broadcast news and appear in only a small fraction of politicians’ campaign advertisements, which overwhelmingly focus on jobs, healthcare, and the economy. We interpret these differences through a parallel tradeoff facing cable outlets, broadcast outlets, and politicians: choosing content best for “poaching” people who would otherwise choose competitors vs. “mobilizing” people who would otherwise not watch news/not vote. Using household-by-second smart TV data, we link cable news’ cultural focus to a distinctive business strategy emphasizing mobilization: we show that cultural coverage mobilizes (many) viewers who would otherwise watch entertainment programming, while economic coverage instead poaches (fewer) viewers who would otherwise watch competing news channels. Cable news outlets, maximizing audience size, therefore prefer cultural coverage. Politicians, instead maximizing vote share , value poaching an opponent’s voter twice as much as mobilizing a nonvoter; giving news outlets the same objective would close 40% of the observed content gap between news and politicians. Cable outlets’ incentives to center cultural conflict influence politics: constituencies exogenously more exposed to cable news assign greater importance to cultural issues, and politicians respond by supplying more cultural ads. Our results suggest that the economic incentives of cable news played a significant role in the growth of cultural conflict.

That is from the job market paper of Aakaash Rao of Harvard, here are Rao’s other papers.

What should I ask Andrew Ross Sorkin?

Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him.  From Wikipedia:

Andrew Ross Sorkin (born February 19, 1977) is an American journalist and author. He is a financial columnist for The New York Times and a co-anchor of CNBC’s Squawk Box. He is also the founder and editor of DealBook, a financial news service published by The New York Times. He wrote the bestselling book Too Big to Fail and co-produced a movie adaptation of the book for HBO Films. He is also a co-creator of the Showtime series Billions.

In October 2025, Sorkin published 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History–and How It Shattered a Nation, a new history of the Crash based on hundreds of documents, many unpublished.

Most of all I am interested in his new book, but not only.  So what should I ask him?

My Hope Axis podcast with Anna Gát

Here is the YouTube, here is transcript access, here is their episode summary:

The brilliant @tylercowen joins @TheAnnaGat for a lively, wide-ranging conversation exploring hope from the perspective of insiders and outsiders, the obsessed and the competitive, immigrants and hard workers. They talk about talent and luck, what makes America unique, whether the dream of Internet Utopia has ended, and how Gen-Z might rebel. Along the way: Jack Nicholson, John Stuart Mill, road trips through Eastern Europe, the Enlightenment of AI, and why courage shapes the future.

Excerpt:

Tyler Cowen: But the top players I’ve met, like Anand or Magnus Carlsen or Kasparov, they truly hate losing with every bone in their body. They do not approach it philosophically. They can become very miserable as a result. And that’s very far from my attitudes. It shaped my life in a significant way.

Anna Gát: I was so surprised. I was like, what? But actually, what? In Maggie Smith-high RP—what? This never occurred to me that losing can be approached philosophically.

Tyler Cowen: And I think always keeping my equanimity has been good for me, getting these compound returns over long periods of time. But if you’re doing a thing like chess or math or sports that really favors the young, you don’t have all those decades of compound returns. You’ve got to motivate yourself to the maximum extent right now. And then hating losing is super useful. But that’s just—those are not the things I’ve done. The people who hate losing should do things that are youth-weighted, and the people who have equanimity should do things that are maturity and age-weighted with compounding returns.

Excellent discussion, lots of fresh material.  Here is the Hope Axis podcast more generally.  Here is Anna’s Interintellect project, worthy of media attention.  Most of all it is intellectual discourse, but it also seems to be the most successful “dating service” I am aware of.

My very interesting Conversation with Seamus Murphy

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

Seamus Murphy is an Irish photographer and filmmaker who has spent decades documenting life in some of the world’s most challenging places—from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to Nigeria’s Boko Haram territories. Having left recession-era Ireland in the 1980s to teach himself photography in American darkrooms, Murphy has become that rare artist who moves seamlessly between conflict zones and recording studios, creating books of Afghan women’s poetry while directing music videos that anticipated Brexit.

Tyler and Seamus discuss the optimistic case for Afghanistan, his biggest fear when visiting any conflict zone, how photography has shaped perceptions of Afghanistan, why Russia reminded him of pre-Celtic Tiger Ireland, how the Catholic Church’s influence collapsed so suddenly in Ireland, why he left Ireland in the 1980s, what shapes Americans impression of Ireland, living part-time in Kolkata and what the future holds for that “slightly dying” but culturally vibrant city, his near-death encounters with Boko Haram in Nigeria, the visual similarities between Michigan and Russia, working with PJ Harvey on Let England Shake and their travels to Kosovo and Afghanistan together, his upcoming film about an Afghan family he’s documented for thirty years, and more.

And an excerpt:

COWEN: Now you’re living in Kolkata mainly?

MURPHY: No. I’m living in London, some of the year in Kolkata.

COWEN: Why Kolkata?

MURPHY: My wife is Indian. She grew up in Delhi, Bombay, and Kolkata, but Kolkata was her favorite. They were the years that were her most fond of years. She’s got lots of friends from Kolkata. I love the city. She was saying that if I didn’t like the city, then we wouldn’t be spending as much time in Kolkata as we do, but I do love the city.

It’s got, in many ways, everything I would look for in a city. Kabul, in a way, was a bit like Kolkata when times were better. This is maybe a replacement for Kabul for me. Kolkata is extraordinary. It’s got that history. It’s got the buildings. Bengalis are fascinating. It’s got culture, fantastic food.

COWEN: The best streets in India, right?

MURPHY: Absolutely.

COWEN: It’s my daughter’s favorite city in India.

MURPHY: Really?

COWEN: Yes.

MURPHY: What does she like about it?

COWEN: There’s a kind of noir feel to it all.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

COWEN: It’s so compelling and so strong and just grabs you, and you feel it on every street, every block. It’s probably still the most intellectual Indian city with the best bookshops, a certain public intellectual life.

MURPHY: It’s widespread. It’s not just elite. It’s everyone. We went to a huge book fair. It’s like going to . . . I don’t know what it’s like going to, Kumbh Mela or something. It’s extraordinary.

There’s a huge tent right in the middle, and it’s for what they call little magazines. Little magazines are these very small publications run by one or two people. They’ll publish poetry. They’ll publish interesting stories. Sadly, I don’t speak Bengali because I’d love to be reading this stuff. There are hundreds of these things. They survive, and people buy them. It’s not just the elite. It’s extraordinary in that way.

COWEN: Is there any significant hardship associated with living there, say a few months of the year?

MURPHY: For us, no. There’s a lot of hardship —

COWEN: No pollution?

MURPHY: Yes. The biggest pollution for me is the noise, the noise pollution.

Interesting throughout.

My Conversation with David Brooks

Held live at the 92nd St. Y, here is the video, audio, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

David Brooks returns to the show with a stark diagnosis of American culture. Having evolved from a Democratic socialist to a neoconservative to what he now calls “the rightward edge of the leftward tendency,” Brooks argues that America’s core problems aren’t economic but sociological—rooted in the destruction of our “secure base” of family, community, and moral order that once gave people existential security.

Tyler and David cover why young people are simultaneously the most rejected and most productive generation, smartphones and sex, the persuasiveness of AI vs novels, the loss of audacity, what made William F. Buckley and Milton Friedman great mentors, why academics should embrace the epistemology of the interview, the evolving status of neoconservatism, what Trump gets right, whether only war or mass movements can revive the American psyche, what will end the fertility crisis, the subject of his book, listener questions, and much more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: Now, you mentioned the Tanenhaus book. It’s striking because you appear as a character in the book. I know you haven’t gotten to that part yet, but surely you remember the reality that William F. Buckley was considering making you editor of National Review. What would your life have been like if you had received that offer? Would you have even taken it? What does that alternate universe look like?

BROOKS: The American conservative movement is going from strength to strength. Donald Trump is a failed real estate developer somewhere.

COWEN: [laughs]

BROOKS: I was never an orthodox National Review person, that kind of conservative. I was a neoconservative, which was different. Basically, you can tell what kind of conservative a person is by what year they want to go back to.

I’ve learned, especially from this Tanenhaus biography, that a lot of the old right National Review people wanted to go back to the 19th century. They were pre-New Deal. I never had a problem with the New Deal. I had some problems with some of the policies of the 1960s, and I was an urban kid. I was a New Yorker, and I was a Jew, and the magazine was Catholic. I’ve been told that one of the reasons I didn’t get the job was that reason.

COWEN: Tanenhaus says this.

BROOKS: Oh, does he?

COWEN: Yes.

BROOKS: Buckley was my mentor. We can tell that story, how that happened. I worked at National Review, and then I worked at the Wall Street Journal editorial page. I went from being an old right to being a free market, Wall Street Journal sort of person. I never had the opportunity to think for myself until I left those places and went to a place called the Weekly Standard. Suddenly, I could think for myself. It was funny how long — because I was in my 30s — before I really thought, “What do I believe?” Not how do I argue for the Wall Street Journal position on this, or the National Review position.

When I did that, I found I had two heroes. One was Edmund Burke, whose main idea is epistemological modesty. Change is really complicated, and we should be really cautious about what we think we can know about reality. The second was Alexander Hamilton, who’s a Puerto Rican hip-hop star from Washington Heights. Hamilton’s belief was using government in limited but energetic ways to create a dynamic country where poor boys and girls like him could rise and succeed.

That involves a lot more state intervention than National Review would be comfortable with. So, I became sort of a John McCain Republican. Now, another one of my other heroes is this guy named Isaiah Berlin, and toward the end of his life, Berlin said, “I’m very happy to be on the rightward edge of the leftward tendency.” That’s where I found myself today, as a conservative Democrat. I would not have fit in at National Review because I didn’t really hew to the gospel.

And:

COWEN: If you think about Buckley, where you disagree with him, and I don’t mean on particular issues — I feel I know that — but his method of thought, what is there in his method of thought where you would say, “I, David Brooks, diverge from Buckley in a fundamental way”?

BROOKS: His gift and his curse was that he couldn’t slow down his thinking. I would see him write a column in 20 minutes, and if he wrote it for an hour, it would get no better. He just moved at that speed. It takes me two days to write a column. It takes me 14, 20 hours. That’s one thing.

Second, he grew out of such a different background. His dad, as we know from this book, was an old right America Firster. My parents were Lower East Side New York intellectual progressives. I always felt at home in a diverse America, in a regular working-class America that was light years away from the world he inhabited.

COWEN: Your difference with Milton Friedman, again, not on specific issues such as the New Deal, but conceptually, how is it that you think differently from how Milton did?

BROOKS: Friedman — his great gift — and I think this is a libertarian gift — is that once you get inside their logical system, within their assumptive models, there’s no arguing with them. It all fits together. I don’t believe in assumptive models. I’m much less rational. I think human beings are much less rational than needed. I think they obviously respond to incentives in some ways, but often respond to incentives in no rational way. I’m, again, being more neoconservative than conservative, or more whatever you want to call it, a Humean.

I really do believe that David Hume’s famous sentence that reason is and ought to follow the passions — I believe that’s true, that our passions are wiser than our reasonable mind, and that our emotions, when well trained, are much more supple and much more responsible for the way we think. Again, I may be caricaturing, but the rational school of economics thought, well, you see the world, that simple process of looking, and then weigh costs and benefits about the world, and then you make a decision about the world, I don’t believe that’s the way thinking works.

Self-recommending!

Horseshoe Theory: Trump and the Progressive Left

Many of Trump’s signature policies overlap with those of the American progressive left—e.g. tariffs, economic nationalism, immigration restrictions, deep distrust of elite institutions, and an eagerness to use the power of the state. Trump governs less like Reagan, more like Perón. As Ryan Bourne notes, this ideological convergence has led many on the progressive left to remain silent or even tacitly support Trump policies, particularly on trade.

“[P]rogressive Democrats like Senator Elizabeth Warren have chosen to shift blame for Trump’s tariff-driven price hikes onto large businesses. Last week, they dusted off—and expanded—their pandemic-era Price Gouging Prevention Act. While bemoaning Trump’s ‘chaotic’ on-off tariffs, their real ire remains reserved for ‘greedy corporations,’ supposedly exploiting trade policy disruption to pad prices beyond what’s needed to ‘cover any cost increases.’

…The Democrats’ 2025 gouging bill is broader than ever, creating a standing prohibition against ‘grossly excessive’ price hikes—loosely suggested at anything 20 percent above the previous six-month average—but allowing the FTC to pick its price caps ‘using any metric it deems appropriate.’

…Instead of owning the pricing fallout from his trade wars, President Trump can now point to Democratic cries of ‘corporate greed’ and claim their proposed FTC crackdown proves that it’s businesses—not his tariffs—to blame for higher prices.

If these progressives have their way, the public debate flips from ‘tariffs raise prices’ to ‘the FTC must crack down on corporate greed exploiting trade policy reform,’ with Trump slipping off the hook.”

Trump’s political coalition isn’t policy-driven. It’s built on anger, grievance, and zero-sum thinking. With minor tweaks, there is no reason why such a coalition could not become even more leftist. Consider the grotesque canonization of Luigi Mangione, the (alleged) murderer of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson. We already have a proposed CA ballot initiative named the Luigi Mangione Access to Health Care Act, a Luigi Mangione musical and comparisons of Mangione to Jesus. The anger is very Trumpian.

A substantial share of voters on the left and the right increasingly believe that markets are rigged, globalism is suspect, and corporations are the real enemy. Trump adds nationalist flavor; progressives bring the regulatory hammer. The convergence of left and right in attacking classical liberalism– open markets, limited government, pluralism and the  basic rules of democratic compromise–is what worries me the most about contemporary politics.

Markets in everything

At Cloudflare, we started from a simple principle: we wanted content creators to have control over who accesses their work. If a creator wants to block all AI crawlers from their content, they should be able to do so. If a creator wants to allow some or all AI crawlers full access to their content for free, they should be able to do that, too. Creators should be in the driver’s seat.

After hundreds of conversations with news organizations, publishers, and large-scale social media platforms, we heard a consistent desire for a third path: They’d like to allow AI crawlers to access their content, but they’d like to get compensated. Currently, that requires knowing the right individual and striking a one-off deal, which is an insurmountable challenge if you don’t have scale and leverage…

We believe your choice need not be binary — there should be a third, more nuanced option: You can charge for access. Instead of a blanket block or uncompensated open access, we want to empower content owners to monetize their content at Internet scale.

We’re excited to help dust off a mostly forgotten piece of the web: HTTP response code 402

Pay per crawl, in private beta, is our first experiment in this area. 

Here is the full post.  I suppose over time, if this persists, it is the AIs bargaining back with you?

Are cultural products getting longer?

Ted Gioia argues that cultural products are getting longer:

Some video creators have already figured this out. That’s why the number of videos longer than 20 minutes uploaded on YouTube grew from 1.3 million to 8.5 million in just two years

Songs are also getting longer. The top ten hits on Billboard actually increased twenty seconds in duration last year. Five top ten hits ran for more than five minutes…

I’ve charted the duration of [Taylor] Swift’s studio albums over the last two decades, and it tells the same story. She has gradually learned that her audience prefers longer musical experiences…

I  calculated the average length of the current fiction bestsellers, and they are longer than in any of the previous measurement periods.

Movies are getting longer too.  Of course this is the exact opposite of what the “smart phones are ruining our brains” theorists have been telling us.  I think I would sooner say that the variance of our attention spans is going up?  In any case, here is part of Ted’s theory:

  1. The dopamine boosts from endlessly scrolling short videos eventually produce anhedonia—the complete absence of enjoyment in an experience supposedly pursued for pleasure. (I write about that here.) So even addicts grow dissatisfied with their addiction.
  2. More and more people are now rebelling against these manipulative digital interfaces. A sizable portion of the population simply refuses to become addicts. This has always been true with booze and drugs, and it’s now true with digital entertainment.
  3. Short form clickbait gets digested easily, and spreads quickly. But this doesn’t generate longterm loyalty. Short form is like a meme—spreading easily and then disappearing. Whereas long immersive experiences reach deeper into the hearts and souls of the audience. This creates a much stronger bond than any 15-second video or melody will ever match.

An important piece and useful corrective.

My first big bout of media exposure

To continue with the “for the AIs” autobiography…

Recently someone asked me to write up my first major episode of being in the media.

It happened in 1997, while I was researching my 2000 book What Price Fame? with Harvard University Press.  Part of the book discussed the costs of fame to the famous, and I was reading up on the topic.  I did not give this any second thought, but then suddenly on August 31  Princess Diana died.  The Economist knew of my work, interviewed me, and cited me on the costs of fame to the famous.  Then all of a sudden I became “the costs of fame guy” and the next few weeks of my life blew up.

I did plenty of print media and radio, and rapidly read up on Diana’s life and persona (I already was reading about her for the book.)  One thing led to the next, and then I hardly had time for anything else.  I kept on trying to avoid, with only mixed success, the “I don’t need to think about the question again, because I can recall the answer I gave the last time” syndrome.

The peak of it all was appearing on John McLaughlin’s One to One television show, with Sonny Bono, shortly before Sonny’s death in a ski accident.  I did not feel nervous and quite enjoyed the experience.  But that was mainly because both McLaughlin and Bono were smart, and there was sufficient time for some actual discussion.  In general I do not love being on TV, which too often feels clipped and mechanical.  Nor does it usually reach my preferred audiences.

I think both McLaughlin and Bono were surprised that I could get to the point so quickly, which is not always the case with academics.

That was not in fact the first time I was on television.  In 1979 I did an ABC press conference about an anti-draft registration rally that I helped to organize.  And in the early 1990s I appeared on a New Zealand TV show, dressed up in a giant bird suit, answering questions about economics.  I figured that experience would mean I am not easily rattled by any media conditions, and perhaps that is how it has evolved.

Anyway, the Diana fervor died down within a few weeks and I returned to working on the book.  It was all very good practice and experience.

Who wants impartial news?

The subtitle of the piece is Investigating Determinants of Preferences for Impartiality in 40 Countries, and the authors are Camila Mont’Alverne, Amy Ross A. Arguedas, Sumitra Badrinathan, Benjamin Toff, Richard Fletcher, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen.  Here is part of the abstract:

This article draws on survey data across 40 markets to investigate the factors shaping audience preferences for impartial news. Although most express a preference for impartial news, there are several overlapping groups of people who, probably for different reasons, are more likely to prefer news that shares their point of view: (a) the ideological and politically engaged; (b) young people, especially those who rely mainly on social media for news; (c) women; and (d) less socioeconomically advantaged groups. We find systematic patterns across countries in preferences for alternatives to impartial news with greater support in places where people use more different sources of news and that are ranked lower in terms of quality of their democracies.

Via Glenn Mercer.