Shorting Your Rivals: A Radical Antitrust Remedy
Conventional antitrust enforcement tries to prevent harmful mergers by blocking them but empirical evidence shows that rival stock prices often rise when a merger is blocked—suggesting that many blocked mergers would have increased competition. In other words, we may be stopping the wrong mergers.
In a clever proposal, Ayres, Hemphill, and Wickelgren (2024) argue that requiring merging firms to short the stock of a close competitor would powerfully realign incentives.
Suppose firms A and B want to merge. Regulators allow the merger on one condition: A-B must take a sizable short position in firm C, a direct competitor. If the merger is anti-competitive and leads to higher industry prices, C’s profits and stock price rise, and A-B takes a financial hit. But if the merger is pro-competitive and drives prices down, C’s stock falls and A-B profits.
A short creates two desirable effects:
- Selection Effect: Only those mergers that are expected to lower prices (and hurt rivals) are financially attractive to the merging parties.
- Incentive Effect: Post-merger, A-B has less incentive to raise prices because doing so boosts C’s stock price, triggering losses on the short.
The short isn’t perfect. Markets might be too shallow, or the rival’s stock could rise for unrelated reasons which imposes extra risk. The authors suggest fixes: instead of a short, require the firm to write Margrabe-style call option. These options have strike prices which float relative to another asset, for example a market or industry price. In this case, A-B would be penalized not if the market as a whole rose but only if the rival outperforms the market.
But the cleanest solution doesn’t require financial instruments at all. Just tie executive pay to relative performance—make the A-B CEO’s bonus depend on beating C’s performance. This is good for shareholders, aligns incentives even in private markets, and doesn’t require making big public bets.
Shorting your rivals sounds strange. But it’s a clever way to force firms to reveal whether their merger helps consumers—or just themselves. Or as I like to say, a bet is a tax on bullshit.
Hat tip: Kevin Lewis.
Addendum: See also this earlier paper, Incentive Contracts as Merger Remedies by Werden, Froeb and Tschantz.
The Sputnik vs. Deep Seek Moment: The Answers
In The Sputnik vs. DeepSeek Moment I pointed out that the US response to Sputnik was fierce competition. Following Sputnik, we increased funding for education, especially math, science and foreign languages, organizations like ARPA were spun up, federal funding for R&D was increased, immigration rules were loosened, foreign talent was attracted and tariff barriers continued to fall. In contrast, the response to what I called the “DeepSeek” moment has been nearly the opposite. Why did Sputnik spark investment while DeepSeek sparks retrenchment? I examine four explanations from the comments and argue that the rise of zero-sum thinking best fits the data.
Several comments fixated on DeepSeek itself, dismissing it as neither impressive nor threatening. Perhaps but DeepSeek was merely a symbol for China’s broader rise: the world’s largest exporter, manufacturer, electricity producer, and military by headcount. These critiques missed the point.
Some commenters argued that Sputnik provoked a strong response because it was seen as an existential threat, while DeepSeek—and by extension China—is not. I certainly hope China’s rise isn’t existential, and I’m encouraged that China lacks the Soviet Union’s revolutionary zeal. As I’ve said, a richer China offers benefits to the United States.
But many influential voices do view China as a very serious, even existential, threat—and unlike the USSR, China is economically formidable.
More to the point, perceived existential stakes don’t answer my question. If the threat were greater, would we suddenly liberalize immigration, expand trade, and fund universities? Unlikely. A more plausible scenario is that if the threat were greater, we would restrict harder—more tariffs, less immigration, more internal conflict.
Several commenters, including my colleague Garett Jones, pointed to demographics—especially voter demographics. The median age has risen from 30 in 1950 to 39 in recent years; today’s older, wealthier, more diverse electorate may be more risk-averse and inward-looking. There’s something to this, but it’s not sufficient. Changes in the X variables haven’t been enough to explain the change in response given constant Betas so demography doesn’t push that far but does it even push in the right direction?
Age might correlate with risk-aversion, for example, but the Trump coalition isn’t risk-averse—it’s angry and disruptive, pushing through bold and often rash policy changes.
A related explanation is that the U.S. state has far less fiscal and political slack today than it did in 1957. As I argued in Launching, we’ve become a warfare–welfare state—possibly at the expense of being an innovation state. Fiscal constraints are real, but the deeper issue is changing preferences. It’s not that we want to return to the moon and can’t—it’s that we’ve stopped wanting to go.
In my view, the best explanation for the starkly different responses to the Sputnik and DeepSeek moments is the rise of zero-sum thinking—the belief that one group’s gain must come at another’s expense. Chinoy, Nunn, Sequiera and Stantcheva show that the zero sum mindset has grown markedly in the U.S. and maps directly onto key policy attitudes.
Zero sum thinking fuels support for trade protection: if other countries gain, we must be losing. It drives opposition to immigration: if immigrants benefit, natives must suffer. And it even helps explain hostility toward universities and the desire to cut science funding. For the zero-sum thinker, there’s no such thing as a public good or even a shared national interest—only “us” versus “them.” In this framework, funding top universities isn’t investing in cancer research; it’s enriching elites at everyone else’s expense. Any claim to broader benefit is seen as a smokescreen for redistributing status, power, and money to “them.”
Zero-sum thinking doesn’t just explain the response to China; it’s also amplified by the China threat. (hence in direct opposition to some of the above theories, the people who most push the idea that the China threat is existential are the ones who are most pushing the zero sum response). Davidai and Tepper summarize:
People often exhibit zero-sum beliefs when they feel threatened, such as when they think that their (or their group’s) resources are at risk…Similarly, working under assertive leaders (versus approachable and likeable leaders) causally increases domain-specific zero-sum beliefs about success….. General zero-sum beliefs are more prevalent among people who see social interactions as a competition and among people who possess personality traits associated with high threat susceptibility, such as low agreeableness and high psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism.
Zero-sum thinking can also explain the anger we see in the United States:
At the intrapersonal level, greater endorsement of general zero-sum beliefs is associated with more negative (and less positive) affect, more greed and lower life satisfaction. In addition, people with general zero-sum beliefs tend to be overly cynical, see society as unjust, distrust their fellow citizens and societal institutions, espouse more populist attitudes, and disengage from potentially beneficial interactions.
…Together, these findings suggest a clear association between both types of zero-sum belief and well-being.
Focusing on zero-sum thinking gives us a different perspective on some of the demographic issues. In the United States, for example, the young are more zero-sum thinkers than the old and immigrants tend to be less zero-sum thinkers than natives. The likeliest reason: those who’ve experienced growth understand that everyone can get a larger slice from a growing pie while those who have experienced stagnation conclude that it’s us or them.
The looming danger is thus the zero-sum trap: the more people believe that wealth, status, and well-being are zero-sum, the more they back policies that make the world zero-sum. Restricting trade, blocking immigration, and slashing science funding don’t grow the pie. Zero-sum thinking leads to zero-sum policies, which produce zero-sum outcomes—making the zero sum worldview a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Tariff Shenanigans
In our textbook, Tyler and I give an amusing example of how entrepreneurs circumvented U.S. tariffs and quotas on sugar. Sugar could be cheaply imported into Canada and iced tea faced low tariffs when imported from Canada into the U.S., so firms created a high-sugar iced “tea” that was then imported into the US and filtered for its sugar!
Bloomberg reports a similar modern workaround. Delta needs new airplanes but now faces steep tariffs on imported European aircraft. As a result, Delta has been stripping European planes of their engines, importing the engines at low tariff rates, and installing them on older aircraft.
Blame Canada! Measles Edition
Polimath has a good post on measles. The recent spike in U.S. cases has drawn alarm. As the New York Times reports:
There have now been more measles cases in 2025 than in any other year since the contagious virus was declared eliminated in the United States in 2000, according to new data released Wednesday by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The grim milestone represents an alarming setback for the country’s public health and heightens concerns that if childhood vaccination rates do not improve, deadly outbreaks of measles — once considered a disease of the past — will become the new normal.
But as Polimath notes, U.S. vaccination rates remain above 90% nationally. The problem isn’t broad domestic anti-vax sentiment but rather concentrated gaps in coverage, often within insular religious communities. These local shortfalls do explain how outbreaks spread once they begin—but how do they begin in the first place, given these communities are islands within a largely vaccinated country? Polimath says blame Canada! (and Mexico!)
The greater concern in my mind is not the problem of low measles vaccination coverage in the United States, but among our immediate neighbors. In Ontario, the MMR vaccination rate among 7-year-olds is under 70%. As in the examples above, this rate seems to be particularly low “in specific communities”, whatever that is supposed to mean. This has resulted in the ongoing spread of measles such that Ontario’s measles infection rate is 40 times higher than the United States. Canada officially “eliminated” measles in 1998. But with vaccine rates as low as they are, it seems like Canada is at risk for losing that “elimination” status and becoming an international source for measles.
Similarly, Mexico is having a measles outbreak that is substantially worse than the US outbreak. Importantly, the Mexican outbreak has been the worst in the Chihuahua province (over 3,000 cases), which borders Texas and New Mexico.
I’m less interested in blame than in the useful reminder that not all politics is American politics. Vaccination rates have dipped worldwide and not in response to U.S. politics or RFK Jr. In fact, despite RFK Jr. the U.S. is doing better than some of its North American and European peers. Outbreaks here may be triggered by cross-border exposure, not failures in U.S. public health alone. Not all politics is American—and not all American outcomes are made in America.
Hat tip: the excellent Stephen Landry.
Technology Transfer and Development Economics
The Sputnik vs. DeepSeek Moment: Why the Difference?
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik triggering a national reckoning in the United States. Americans questioned the strength of their education system, scientific capabilities, industrial base—even their national character. The country’s self-image as a global leader was shaken, creating the Sputnik moment.
The response was swift and ambitious. NSF funding tripled in a year and increased by a factor of more than ten by the end of the decade. The National Defense Education Act overhauled universities and created new student loan programs for foreign language students and engineers. High schools redesigned curricula around the “new math.” Homework doubled. NASA and ARPA (later DARPA) were created in 1958. NASA’s budget rocketed upwards to nearly 5% of all federal spending and R&D spending overall increased to well over 10% of federal spending. Immigration rules were liberalized (perhaps not in direct response to Sputnik but as part of the ethos of the time). Foreign talent was attracted. Tariff barriers continued to fall and the US engaged with international organizations and promoted globalization..
The U.S. answered Sputnik with bold competition not an aggrieved whine that America had been ripped off and abused.
America’s response to rising scientific competition from China—symbolized by DeepSeek’s R1 matching OpenAI’s o1—has been very different. The DeepSeek Moment has been met not with resolve and competition but with anxiety and retreat.
Trump has proposed slashing the NIH budget by nearly 40% and NSF by 56%. The universities have been attacked, creating chaos for scientific funding. International collaboration is being strangled by red tape. Foreign scientists are leaving or staying away. Tariffs have hit highs not seen since the Great Depression and the US has moved away from the international order.
Some of this is new and some of it is an acceleration of already existing trends. In Launching the Innovation Renaissance, for example, I said that by the Federal budget numbers, America is a warfare-welfare state not an innovation state. However, to be fair, there are some bright spots. Market‑driven research might partially offset public cuts. Big‑tech R&D now exceeds $200 billion annually—more than the entire federal government spending on R&D. Not everything we did post-Sputnik was wise nor is everything we are doing today foolish.
Nevertheless, the contrast is stark: Sputnik spurred investment and ambition. America doubled down. DeepSeek has sparked defensiveness and retreat. We appear to be folding.
Question of the hour. Why has America responded so differently to similar challenges? Can understanding that pivot help to reverse it? Show your work.
GAVI’s Ill-Advised Venture Into African Industrial Policy
GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance has saved millions of lives by delivering vaccines to the world’s poorest children at remarkably low cost. It’s frankly grotesque that RFK Jr. cites “safety” as a reason to cut funding—when the result of such cuts will be more children dying from preventable diseases. Own it.
You can find plenty of RFK Jr. criticism elsewhere, however, and GAVI is not above criticism. Thus, precisely because GAVI’s mission is important, I want to focus on a GAVI project that I think is ill-motivated and ill-advised, GAVI’s African Vaccine Manufacturing Accelerator (AVMA).
The motivation behind the AVMA is to “accelerate the expansion of commercially viable vaccine manufacturing in Africa” to overcome “vaccine inequity” as illustrated during the COVID crisis. The problem with this motivation is that most of Africa’s delay in receiving COVID vaccines was driven by funding issues and demand rather than supply. Working with Michael Kremer and others, I spent a lot of time encouraging countries to order vaccines and order early not just to save lives but to save GDP. We were advisors to the World Bank and encouraged them to offer loans but even after the World Bank offered billions in loans there was reluctance to spend big sums. There were supply shortages in 2021 in Africa, as there were elsewhere, but these quickly gave way to demand issues. Doshi et al. (2024) offer an accurate summary:
Several reasons likely account for low coverage with COVID-19 vaccines, including limited political commitment, logistical challenges, low perceived risk of COVID-19 illness, and variation in vaccine confidence and demand (3). Country immunization program capacity varies widely across the African Region. Challenges include weak public health infrastructure, limited number of trained personnel, and lack of sustainable funding to implement vaccination programs, exacerbated by competing priorities, including other disease outbreaks and endemic diseases as well as economic and political instability.
Thus, lack of domestic vaccine production wasn’t the real problem—remember, most developed countries had little or no domestic production either but they did get vaccines relatively quickly. The second flaw in the rationale for the AVMA is its pan-African framing. Africa is a continent, not a country. Why would manufacturing capacity in Senegal serve Kenya better than production in India or Belgium? There’s a peculiar assumption of pan-African solidarity, as if African countries operate with shared interests that go beyond those observed in other countries that share a continent.
Both problems with the rationale for AVMA are illustrated by South Africa’s Aspen pharmaceuticals. Aspen made a deal to manufacture the J&J vaccine in South Africa but then exported doses to Europe. After outrage ensued it was agreed that 90% of the doses would be kept in Africa but Aspen didn’t receive a single order from an African government. Not one.
Now to the more difficult issue of capacity. Africa produces less than .1% of the world’s vaccines today. The African Union has what it acknowledges is an “ambitious goal” to produce over 60 percent of the vaccines needed for Africa’s population locally by 2040. To evaluate the plausibility of this goal do note that this would require multiple Serum‑of‑India‑sized plants.
More generally, vaccines are complex products requiring big up-front investments and long lead times:
Vaccine manufacturing is one of the most demanding in industry. First, it requires setting up production facilities, and acquiring equipment, raw materials, and intellectual property rights. Then, the manufacturer will implement robust manufacturing processes and manage products portfolio during the life cycle. Therefore, manufacturers should dispose of an experienced workforce. Manufacturing a vaccine is costly and takes seven years on average. For instance, it took about 5–10 years to India, China, and Brazil to establish a fully integrated vaccine facility. A longer establishment time can be expected for African countries lacking dedicated expertise and finance. Manufacturing a vaccine can costs several dozens to hundreds of million USD in capital invested depending on the vaccine type and disease indication.
All countries in Africa rank low on the economic complexity index, a measure of whether a country can produce sophisticated and complex products (based on the diversity and complexity of their export basket). But let us suppose that domestic production is stood up. We must still ask, at what price? If domestic manufacturing ends up being more expensive than buying abroad (as GAVI acknowledges is a possibility even with GAVI’s subsidies), will African countries buy “locally” and pay more or will solidarity go out the window?
Finally, even if complex vaccines are produced at a competitive price, we still haven’t solved the demand problem. GAVI again has a rather strange acknowledgment of this issue:
Secondly, adequate country demand is another critical enabler. For AVMA to be successful, African countries will need to buy the vaccines once they appear on the Gavi menu. The Secretariat is committed to ongoing work with the AU and Member States on demand solidarity under Pillar 3 of Gavi’s Manufacturing Strategy.
So to address vaccine inequity, GAVI is investing in local production….but the need to manufacture “demand solidarity” among African governments reveals both the flaw in the premise and the weakness of the plan.
Keep in mind that the WHO only recognizes South Africa and Egypt as capable of regulating the domestic production of vaccines (and Nigeria as capable of regulating vaccine imports). In other words, most African governments do not have regulatory systems capable of evaluating vaccine imports let alone domestic production.
GAVI wants to sell the AVMA as if were an AMC (Advance Market Commitment) but it isn’t. It’s industrial policy. An AMC would offer volume‑and‑price guarantees open to any manufacturer in the world. An AMC with local production constraints is a weighted down AMC, less likely to succeed.
None of this is to imply that GAVI has no role to play. In addition to a true AMC, GAVI could arrange contracts to pay existing global suppliers to maintain idle capacity that can pivot to African‑priority antigens within 100 days. GAVI could possibly also help with regulatory convergence. There is an African Medicines Agency which aims to operate like the EMA but it has only just begun. If the AMA can be geared up, it might speed up vaccine approval through mutual recognition pacts.
The bottom line is that the $1.2 billion committed to AVMA would likely better more lives if it was directed toward GAVI’s traditional strengths in pooled procurement and distribution, mechanisms that have proven successful over the past two decades. Instead, AVMA drags GAVI into African industrial policy. A poor gamble.
The Paradox of India
Tyler often talks about cracking cultural codes. India is the hardest—and therefore the most fascinating—cultural code I’ve encountered. The superb post The Paradox of India by Samir Varma helps to unlock some of these codes. Varma is good at describing:
In 2004, something extraordinary happened that perfectly captured India’s unique nature: A Roman Catholic woman (Sonia Gandhi) voluntarily gave up the Prime Ministership to a Sikh (Manmohan Singh) in a ceremony presided over by a Muslim President (A.P.J. Abdul Kalam) in a Hindu-majority country.
And nobody commented on it.
Think about that. In how many countries could this happen without it being THE story? In India, the headlines focused on economic policy and coalition politics. The religious identities of the key players were barely mentioned because, well, what would be the point? This is how India works.
This wasn’t tolerance—it was something deeper. It was the lived experience of a civilization where your accountant might be Jain, your doctor Parsi, your mechanic Muslim, your teacher Christian, and your vegetable vendor Hindu. Where festival holidays meant everyone got days off for Diwali, Eid, Christmas, Guru Nanak Jayanti, and Good Friday. Where secularism isn’t the absence of religion but the presence of all religions.
But goes beyond that:
You might be thinking: “This is fascinating, but I’m not Indian. I can’t draw on 5,000 years of civilizational memory. How does any of this help me navigate my increasingly polarized world?”
Here’s what I’ve learned from watching India work its magic: The mental moves that make pluralism possible aren’t mystical—they’re learnable. Think of them as cognitive tools:
The And/And Instead of Either/Or: When faced with contradictions, resist the Western urge to resolve them. Can something be both sacred and commercial? Both ancient and modern? Both yours and mine? Indians instinctively answer yes.
Contextual Truth Over Universal Law: What’s right for a Jain isn’t right for a Bengali, and that’s okay. Truth can be plural without being relative. Multiple valid perspectives can coexist without canceling each other out.
Strategic Ambiguity as Wisdom: Not everything needs to be defined, categorized, and resolved. Sometimes the wisest response is a head waggle that means yes, no, and maybe all at once.
Code-Switching as a Life Skill: Indians don’t just switch languages—they switch entire worldviews depending on context. At work, modern. At home, traditional. With friends, fusion. This isn’t hypocrisy; it’s sophisticated social navigation.
The lesson isn’t “be more tolerant.” It’s “develop comfort with unresolved multiplicity.” In a world demanding you pick sides, the Indian model suggests a radical alternative: Don’t.
In our age of rising nationalism and cultural purism, when countries are building walls and communities are retreating into echo chambers, India stands as a glorious, maddening, inspiring mess—proof that diversity isn’t just manageable but might be the secret to civilizational immortality.
After all, it’s hard to kill something that contains multitudes. When one part struggles, another thrives. When one tradition calcifies, another innovates. When one community turns inward, another builds bridges.
It’s not a bug. It’s a feature.
And maybe, just maybe, it’s exactly what the world needs to remember right now.
Read the whole thing. Part 1 of 3.
Trump Accounts are a Big Deal
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act was signed into law on July 4, 2025. It’s so big that many significant features have been little discussed. Trump Accounts are one such feature under which every newborn citizen gets $1000 invested in the stock market. These accounts could radically change social welfare in the United States and be one important step on the way to a UBI or UBWealth. Here are some details:
- Government Contribution: A one-time $1,000 contribution per eligible child, invested in a low-cost, diversified U.S. stock index fund.
- Eligibility: U.S. citizen children born between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2028 (with a valid Social Security number and at least one parent with a valid Social Security number).
- Employer Contributions: Employers can contribute up to $2,500 annually per employee’s child, and these contributions are excluded from the employee’s gross income for tax purposes. These are subject to the overall $5,000 annual contribution limit (indexed for inflation) per child (which includes parental contributions).
The employer contribution strikes me as important. Suppose that in addition to the initial $1000 government payment that on average $1000 is added per year for 18 years (by a combination of parent and parent employer contributions). Note that this is below the maximum allowed annual contribution of $5000. At a historically reasonable 7% real rate of return these accounts will be worth ~36k at age 18 (when the money can be fully withdrawn), $58k at age 25 and $875k at age 65 subject to uncertainty of course as indicated below.
The $1000 initial payment is available only for newborns but, as I read the text, the parent and employer donations can be made for any child under the age of 18 so this is basically an IRA for children. It’s slightly complicated because if the child or parents put after-tax money into the account that is not taxed at withdrawal (you get your basis back) but everything else is taxed on withdrawal as ordinary income like an IRA. There are approximately 3.5 million citizen births a year so the program will have direct costs of $3.5 billion plus indirect costs from reduced taxes due to the tax-free yearly contribution allowance, which as noted could be quite large as it can go to any child. Thus the program could be quite expensive. On the other hand, it’s clear that the accounts could reduce reliance on social security if held for long periods of time. The $1000 initial contribution is limited to four years but once 14 million kids get them, the demand will be to make them permanent.
Genetic Counseling is Under Hyped
In an excellent interview (YouTube; Apple Podcasts, Spotify) Dwarkesh asked legendary bio-researcher George Church for the most under-hyped bio-technologies. His answer was both surprising and compelling:
What I would say is genetic counseling is underhyped.
What Church means is that gene editing is sexy but for rare diseases carrier screening is cheaper and more effective. In other words, collect data on the genes of two people and let them know if their progeny would have a high chance of having a genetic disease. Depending on when the information is made known, the prospective parents can either date someone else or take extra precautions. Genetic testing now costs on the order of a hundred dollars or less so the technology is cheap. Moreover, it’s proven.
Since the early 1980s the Jewish program Dor Yeshorim and similar efforts have screened prospective partners for Tay-Sachs and other mutations. Before screening, Tay-Sachs struck roughly 1 in 3,600 Jewish births; today births with Tay-Sachs have fallen by about 90 percent in countries that adopted screening programs. As more tests are developed they can be easily integrated into the process. In addition to Tay-Sachs, Dor Yeshorim, for example, currently tests for cystic fibrosis, Bloom syndrome, and spinal muscular atrophy among other diseases. A program in Israel reduced spinal muscular atrophy by 57%. A study for the United States found that a 176 panel test was cost-effective compared to a minimal 5 panel test as did a similar study on a 569 panel test for Australia.
A national program could offer testing for everyone at birth. The results would then be part of one’s medical record and could be optionally uploaded to dating websites. In a world where Match.com filters on hobbies and eye color, why not add genetic compatibility?
Do it for the kids.
Addendum: See also my paper on genetic insurance (blog post here).
Amazon’s Robotic Revolution
Amazon now employs almost as many robots as humans leading to huge productivity improvements. From the second graph, “end-to-end” packages handled by Amazon rose from 175 in 2015 to nearly 4000 in 2025. Incredible. Excellent piece in the WSJ.
Hat tip: Edward Conard.
Massive Rent-Seeking in India’s Government Job Examination System
In India, government jobs pay far more than equivalent jobs in the private sector–so much so that the entire labor market and educational system have become grossly distorted by rent seeking to obtain these jobs. Teachers in the public sector, for example, are paid at least five times more than in the private sector. It’s not just the salary. When accounting for lifetime tenure, generous perks, and potentially remunerative possibilities for corruption, a government job’s total value can be up to 10 times that of an equivalent private sector job. (See also here).
As a result, it’s not uncommon for thousands of people to apply for every government job–a ratio far higher than in the private sector. In one famous example, 2.3 million people submitted applications for 368 “office boy” positions in Uttar Pradesh.
The consequences of this intense competition for government jobs are severe. First, as Karthik Muralildharan argues, the Indian government can’t afford to pay for all the workers it needs. India has all the laws of say the United States but about 1/5 th the number of government workers per capita leading to low state capacity. But there is a second problem which may be even more serious. Competition to obtain government jobs wastes tremendous amounts of resources and distorts the labor and educational market.
If jobs were allocated randomly, applications would be like lottery tickets with few social costs. Government jobs, however, are often allocated by exam performance. Thus, obtaining a government job requires an “investment” in exam preparation. Many young people spend years out of the workforce studying for exams that, for nearly all of them, will yield nothing. In Tamil Nadu alone, between one to two million people apply annually for government jobs, but far less than 1% are hired. Despite the long odds, the rewards are so large that applicants leave the workforce to compete. Kunal Mangal estimates that around 80% of the unemployed in Tamil Nadu are studying for government exams.
Classical rent-seeking logic predicts full dissipation: if a prize is worth a certain amount, rational individuals will collectively spend resources up to that amount attempting to win it. When the prize is a government job, the ‘spending’ is not cash, but years of a young person’s productive life. Mangal calculates that the total opportunity cost (time out of the workforce) that job applicants “spend” in Tamil Nadu is worth more than the combined lifetime salaries of the available jobs (recall jobs are worth more than salaries so this is consistent with theory). Simply put, for every ₹100 the government spends on salaries, Indian society burns ₹168 in a collective effort of rent-seeking just to decide who gets them. The winners are happy but the loss to Indian society of unemployed young, educated workers who do nothing but study for government exams is in the billions. Indeed, India spends about 3.86% of GDP on state salaries (27% of state revenues times 14.3% of GDP). If we take Mangal’s numbers from Tamil Nadu, a conservative (multiplier of 1 instead of 1.68) back of the envelope number suggests that India could be wasting on the order of 1.4% of GDP annually on rent seeking. (Multiply 3.86% of GDP by 15 (30 years at 5% discount) to get lifetime value and take .025 as annual worker turnover.) Take this with a grain of salt but regardless the number is large.
India’s most educated young people—precisely those it needs in the workforce—are devoting years of their life cramming for government exams instead of working productively. These exams cultivate no real-world skills; they are pure sorting mechanisms, not tools of human capital development. But beyond the staggering economic waste, there is a deeper, more corrosive human cost. As Rajagopalan and I have argued, India suffers from premature imitation: In this case, India is producing Western-educated youth without the economic structure to employ them. In one survey, 88% of grade 12 students preferred a government job to a private sector job. But these jobs do not and cannot exist. The result is disillusioned cohorts trained to expect a middle-class, white-collar lifestyle, convinced that only a government job can deliver it. India is thus creating large numbers of educated young people who are inevitably disillusioned–that is not a sustainable equilibrium.
Mangal valiantly proposes redesigning the exams to reduce waste, but this skirts the core issue: India’s wildly skewed public wage structure. Government salaries far exceed what is justified by GDP per capita or job requirements, distorting education, employment, and unemployment throughout the entire economy in deeply wasteful ways. The only real solution is to bring public sector pay back in line with economic fundamentals.
Privatize Federal Land!
I’ve long advocated selling off some federal land—an idea that reliably causes mass fainting spells among the enlightened. How could we possibly part with our national patrimony, our land, our sacred wilderness? Calm down. Most of this “public land” is never used by the public. Selling some of it would actually make it more accessible and useful to real people.
Moreover, most of you wailing about selling some Federal land are probably very happy we sold the “public” airwaves for your private cell phone use. Privatizing the airwaves made them much more useful to the public. (Thank you Reed!).
AEI has an excellent map of the lands that could be sold and developed in the Mike Lee bill. Here’s their conclusion:
The data show a significant opportunity. Our analysis finds that developing just 135-180 square miles of the most suitable BLM land, a minuscule fraction of the total, could yield approximately 1 million new homes over ten years. This would substantially address the West’s housing shortage while generating an estimated $15 billion for the U.S. Treasury from land sales.
Here’s an example of the some of the land potentially developable around Las Vegas.
Here’s a Google satellite image of the bit around Mountain’s Edge. Enjoy your fishing on these public lands!
And here’s a very crude but useful scatter plot showing the correlation between median home prices in a state and Federal land ownership. Should home prices in Utah (63.1% Federally owned) really be 71% higher than in Texas (1.8% Federally owned)? Of course, Texas is famously an urban hellscape with no parks, no open space, and nowhere to hunt or fish.
Flying on Frying Oil
The ever-excellent Matt Levine points us to the amusing economic policies that connect the international jet-set to Malaysian street hawkers of fried noodles. The EU and the US have created strong economic incentives to create sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and a good way to do this is to recycle used cooking oil (UCO). What could be better, right? Take a waste product and turn it into jet fuel! The EU and US policies, however, are so strong that all the EU and US used cooking oil cannot meet the demand. Here’s a great sentence, “Europe simply cannot collect enough used cooking oil to fly its planes.”
In the US, credits under the Inflation Reduction Act can account for up to $1.75 to $1.85 per gallon of SAF. Meanwhile cooking oil is subsidized in some 
parts of the world. The result?
It turns out that restaurants, street food stalls and home cooks in Malaysia — which is “among the world’s leading suppliers of both UCO and virgin palm oil” — will pay less for fresh cooking oil than the international market will pay for used cooking oil. Fresh cooking oil is more useful to cooks than used cooking oil (it tastes better), but it is less useful to refiners and airlines than used cooking oil (it doesn’t reduce their carbon impact). Also fresh cooking oil is subsidized by the government in Malaysia: “Subsidised cooking oil sells for RM2.50 per kg versus the UCO trading price of up to RM4.50 per kg.” So if you run a restaurant, you can buy fresh cooking oil for about $0.60 (USD), use it to fry food a few times, and then sell it to a refiner for $1, which is a nice little subsidy for the difficult, risky, low-margin business of running a restaurant.
The noodle hawkers in Kuala Lumpur are getting a nice little bump in profit but who is going stall to stall to check that the oil is in fact used? And what counts as used? One fry or two? Clever entrepreneurs have cut out the middleman. Virgin palm oil can be substituted for used cooking oil and voila! Sustainable aviation fuel is contributing to deforestation in Malaysia. Malaysia exports far more “used” cooking oil than oil that it uses. No surprise.
All of this illustrates a broader point: externalities suggest policy interventions may improve outcomes but markets are complex and politics is blunt. It’s easy to make things worse. If intervention is necessary, a uniform carbon tax beats a patchwork of production-specific subsidies. A price is a signal wrapped up in an incentive. Send everyone the same signal and the same incentive to ensure that the cheapest emissions are cut first and total costs are minimized.
Crucially, a carbon tax rewards any effective solution, even ones a planner would never think of–lighter planes and cleaner fuels sure but also operational tweaks like jet washes. In contrast, subsidies tether policy to specific technologies, like used cooking oil. That invites rent-seeking and inefficiency.
Tax carbon, not inputs. Avoid games with paperwork. One verification point at the fuel supply point is simpler than tracing global waste-oil chains. Don’t subsidize the fry oil and audit the street hawkers. Tax the emissions.
Have Appliances Declined in Durability?
Many Americans believe that their appliances have become less durable and reliable over recent decades. Rachel Wharton at Wirecutter has an excellent piece pushing back. Her conclusions mirror what I found when looking at clothing quality: yes, there has been a modest decline in durability, but the main drivers are customer preferences, regulatory shifts, and Baumol effects—not corporate malfeasance or cultural decline.
“Everybody talks about the Maytag washing machine that lasts 50 years,” said Daniel Conrad, a former product engineer at Whirlpool Corporation who is now the director of design quality, reliability, and testing for a commercial-refrigeration company. “No one talks about the other 4.5 million that didn’t last that long.”
The available evidence suggests that appliance lifespans have decreased only modestly over the past few decades. Recent research from the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers trade group shows that in 2010 most appliances lasted from 11 to 16 years. By 2019, those numbers had dropped, to a range of nine to 14 years. (In some cases, such as for gas ranges and dryers, the lifespans actually increased.)
The modest decline is partially explained by regulation:
Every appliance service technician I spoke to — each with decades of experience repairing machines from multiple brands — immediately blamed federal regulations for water and energy efficiency for most frustrations with modern appliances.
…The main culprit is the set of efficiency standards for water and energy use for all cooking, refrigeration, and cleaning appliances.
The regulations change often and push producers to make changes that consumers don’t necessarily want like switching to lighter plastic parts rather than metal or by adding sophisticated computer controls that increase efficiency but also introduce new break points. See my previous posts on these issues here and here.
But as with clothing, another reason for reduced durability is that many consumers don’t want durable appliances–instead consumers want the latest model with all the whizz-bang features. (Sure, I don’t want this and you don’t want it but heh, they sell!) In other words, appliances and their colors, features and styles have become items of fashion.
And people’s desire for new things only appears to be growing. Petrino Ball said her sales research at AJ Madison showed that today consumers are buying new appliances every eight years, even if what they had before hasn’t fully failed.
…Whitney Welch, a spokesperson for GE Appliances, told me that its research showed consumers are often replacing appliances for aesthetic reasons….
If many customers don’t want to keep appliances for more than 10 years then it doesn’t pay to make them last more than 10 years.
The big story isn’t declining durability but declining price:
In 1972, Sears sold a clothes washer for $220 and a dryer for $90, per 2022 research by AARP Magazine. That’s about $2,389 in 2025, adjusted for inflation. Today you can get a washer-and-dryer pair on sale from Sears for around $1,200.
The Baumol effect means that repair is rising in price relative to buying new which is another reason why we don’t keep products around as long as we did when we were poorer and it it made sense to fix broken goods:
….prices on most new models are so low, his first suggestion to customers is to just replace the appliance. “If the cost of repair is 50% of replacement, throw it cleanly away,” he said. “If it’s 40%, consider the option.”
“Labor is highly skilled,” he added. “It can’t compete with low prices.”
In many cases, it can’t compete with lost time, either. Repairs often require waiting a few days or weeks for parts, said Petrino Ball. “Even one day without a washer-dryer or fridge is really hard for many families,” she said, “but if you buy one, you can have it the next day.”
Moreover, as I argued with clothes, it is possible to find durable appliances if you shop carefully. Interestingly, Wharton notes that you can either go high or low. The top-of-the-line appliances from Sub-Zero and Wolf do last longer but they are very expensive and often do not include whizz-bang features. Alternatively, you can go low–buy a GE or Sears refrigerator and get it without frills–no ice or water dispenser, no electronics, no lux colors and chances are it will last a long time.
In short, appliance durability hasn’t collapsed—it’s evolved to meet consumer demand. We’re not being ripped off. We are getting better products at better prices. Rising incomes have simply redefined what “better” means.