Leisure time is growing, and becoming more unequal

Julie Schor and others have spread the myth that people have less leisure time than before.  Here is yet another smackdown of that claim:

In this paper, we use five decades of time-use surveys to document trends in the allocation of time. We find that a dramatic increase in leisure time lies behind the relatively stable number of market hours worked (per working-age adult) between 1965 and 2003. Specifically, we show that leisure for men increased by 6-8 hours per week (driven by a decline in market work hours) and for women by 4-8 hours per week (driven by a decline in home production work hours). This increase in leisure corresponds to roughly an additional 5 to 10 weeks of vacation per year, assuming a 40-hour work week. Alternatively, the "consumption equivalent" of the increase in leisure is valued at 8 to 9 percent of total 2003 U.S. consumption expenditures. We also find that leisure increased during the last 40 years for a number of sub-samples of the population, with less-educated adults experiencing the largest increases. Lastly, we document a growing "inequality" in leisure that is the mirror image of the growing inequality of wages and expenditures, making welfare calculation based solely on the latter series incomplete.

Here is the paper, and the link.

Trading up

How is this for a scheme?:

My name is Kyle MacDonald and I am trying to trade one red paperclip for a house. I started with one red paperclip on July 12th, 2005 and I am making a series of trades for bigger or better things.  My current item up for trade is one year in Phoenix.  Do you want one year of FREE rent in Phoenix?  Pop your offer over to me at ([email protected])… You can see the current offers here.  I live in Montreal Canada but will go anywhere in the world for the right offer.

But has he melted down his pennies?  Here is the web site, which chronicles the trades so far.  No, I cannot prove this is real but the story seems to pan out.  Thanks to Robert Saunders for the pointer.

Should you melt down your pennies?

My much-beloved Financial Times gets one wrong:

It could soon be worth Americans melting down their pennies for scrap, if zinc and copper prices continue their current rate of increase.

Copper prices have risen 30 per cent so far this year, and zinc is up 55 per cent – a rise of about $550 a tonne in a little more than three weeks.

A rise by the same magnitude would make the metal content in the US one cent coin worth more than its face value.

The weight of 160 pennies – also known as a one cent coin – comes to a pound, worth a face value of $1.60. But – with each penny made of 97.5 per cent zinc and 2.5 per cent copper – based on current prices, the metal value is worth about $1.36. Therefore another 25 cents-a-pound rise in zinc, or about $551 a tonne, would see the metal value of the US penny worth more than the monetary value.

We all know, of course, that you should not exercise an option before its expiration.  The longer time runs, the greater the chance for price to bounce around.  Once you are "out of the money," further drops in price don’t hurt you any.  But "in the money," you gain from price movements in your favor.  So hold onto those pennies and wait.  Yes there are complications (what is the stochastic process governing these prices?) but most likely the standard result holds up.

Caught my eye

1. What is frustrating about non-economists.  "Guess."  "I don’t know."  "Just guess!"  "I don’t know."  "That is why they call it a probability!"  "How much do I have to pay you to guess?"

2. Travel notes from Haiti, and there is more behind the links.

3. Profile of economist David Colander, courtesy of www.politicaltheory.info.

4.  David Luenberger’s Information Science is a comprehensive look at…information science.  The best introduction I know.

Mexico fact of the day

Or is it China fact of the day?

…each doubling of distance reduces trade by 90%.  For example, the distance between Los Angeles and Tijuana is about 150 miles.  If Tijuana were on the other side of the Pacific instead of across the border in Mexico and if this distance were increased to 10,000 miles, the amount of trade would drop by a factor of 44.  Other things held constant, expect the amount of commerce between a Shanghai resident and an LA residence to be only about 2% of the commerce between Tijuana and LA.

That is from Ed Leamer’s review of Tom Friedman, cited by Alex.

Should we just build a big fence?

To keep out Mexicans, that is.

For purposes of argument, let us say you are anti-immigration.  And let us say the fence would cost nothing to build and maintain.  You still might not want one.

Mexicans illegals enter the U.S. through two major channels.  They run (or swim) across the border, or they buy illegal papers.  Usually the papers cost more than the hiring the crossing guide.  The papers make for an easier and safer journey, for obvious reasons.  Mexican women, I might add, are more likely to use false papers, given their (their father’s?) greater aversion to the physical strain of four days in the desert.

If you shut off the desert walks (assume the fence is impregnable, ha!), more Mexicans will use illegal papers. 

Did I add I would expect the cost of the papers to fall, not rise?  Many Mexicans don’t trust the purchase of papers, as opposed to the desert walk.  If the walk were impossible, networks for manufacture and sale of the papers would become much better developed.  The illegal papers would become much cheaper and much more widely used. 

In other words, more young women will come.  Many of the Mexican men will have wives here, not back home.  Many more young Mexicans will be born on U.S. soil. 

Get the picture?  Hispanamerica is coming, like it or not.  Let’s deal with it constructively.

Opposite day: Tyrone on resource pessimism

Tyler, you are always so optimistic.  But your own "dismal science" offers neither empirics nor analysis to back this attitude up.

The standard economic arguments about resources focus on the margin, while the real problem is infra-marginal.  Don’t be misled by all that talk of prices and substitution.  We are running out of resources and soon. 

Think about eating your beloved dark chocolate, Tyler.  Let’s say you have only four squares left of Lindt in the cupboard.  Yes, as you eat more the shadow price of each remaining square goes up.  Big deal.  You are still going to eat all the chocolate before dinner.  Economics tells us only that you will end up on the Pareto frontier, but that frontier still has some pretty miserable points.  We are about to approach them.  Who cares if prices mean that we meet our doom while equating private first-order conditions?  We are simply too voracious for the resources at our disposal.

Market signals and property rights do not work for the globe as a whole, unless you have monopoly ownership of the entire world (hmm…).   Property rights work best for local problems, such as fishing in a single lake or who should wash the dishes.  Private property won’t cure the problems of bad air, poisoned oceans, global warming, or the overall carrying capacity of the planet.  We will get doom, doom, and more doom.

The real question is empirical: are global demands for resources big enough so that the problem resembles you with your four squares of chocolate?  Yes.  The environment is toast, sooner or later and probably sooner.  And it is doomed precisely because capitalism is such a wonderful productive machine.  Do you really think you can fill the planet with so much rapacious human biomass without significant and indeed overpowering external effects?  Our only hope is that we all become plugged-in machines who don’t need much of an environment any longer.

It is true that resources prices have been falling, on average, for some time now.  But the Industrial Revolution is a remarkably recent development and we are just getting started.  Mankind’s current productive powers truly are unprecedented, a fact which you libertarians love to stress in other contexts, just not this one.

It would be mere luck if energy-saving technologies outraced nature-destroying ones.  And even if this were the case for a while, energy-saving technologies, in the long run, simply encourage us to raise our rapaciousness up another notch.  The infra-marginal becomes even more infra- than we ever dreamed.

Now let us get speculative.  Did I mention that in the economics of the future — once we are in exponential growth modes — the concept of price will hardly matter?  It will be more like an engineering problems where 10x of today’s gdp is produced every week, and we have to see whether this wrecks the globe in ten or rather twenty years’ time.  Don’t even bother recycling.  Furthermore all you futuristic nerds out there should downgrade the relevance of price theory, given the size of the changes you have in mind.

My parting shot: Maybe you think I am a pessimist.  But it probably is better if resource pessimism is true.  Life as a hunter-gatherer is still life.  And those Pygmies produced some pretty good vocal music.  If the price of energy were to keep falling, that would mean everyone could, within a few generations time, own the destructive power of a nuclear weapon in his or her iPod.  Now that’s scary.

As I have said in the past, Tyrone really is a pessimistic fellow.  If that dark chocolate is gone, it is usually because I ate it in advance, knowing he would otherwise steal my supply.  There are only so many cupboards in the kitchen, and Tyrone has learned all my hiding places.  And why didn’t I buy more at the store in the first place?  It is simple: I had to take Tyrone to his Zen Buddhism class; this sad sack doesn’t own a car.

Musical profiling

I am in trouble:

Security staff at a British airport stopped a businessman from catching a flight because the songs he had asked a taxi driver to play on the car stereo made the driver suspicious, police said.

The songs: "London Calling" by The Clash, and "Immigrant Song" by Led Zeppelin, here are the offending lyrics and the story.

Addendum: Daniel Strauss Vasques points my attention to a slightly different version of the story, where the guy was just singing along.

When is it normal to be weird?

Are Germans pushier when waiting in line?  (Or are Italians more emotional with family members?)  Under one view, this is a cultural difference.  Germans aren’t pushier "on the inside," their society simply has a different standard for how a given temperament should manifest itself in public.  Under another view, Germans really are pushier.  Yes their culture is different but that is because they are pushy.

Let’s say (for purposes of argument alone) you are weird.  Could you ever excuse your own weirdness on the grounds that, well, you are weird all the time? (Hat tip to Derek Parfit.) No matter what you think of the Germans, the first approach to their pushiness is in principle possible.  Maybe they simply have a standard with different calibration.  Why should the application of such principles be restricted to the group level?

Whenever you see or hear of me doing something weird, think twice.  I am actually behaving normally, and no offense is intended.  Quite the contrary, I am flattering you by behaving normally in your presence.  You just haven’t yet solved the signal extraction problem which would allow you to differentiate between my actual weirdness and my different standards for what weirdness should be.

Are people who are only sometimes weird "weirder" than those who are weird all the time?  What if, for this reason, you seek "weirdness all the time" — to prove your normality — but overshoot?

Here is my earlier post on why weird men should marry foreign women.

Books that matter

Books that move men: Camus’s The Outsider, Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye and Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five.

Books that move women: Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, The Women’s Room by Marilyn French and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale.

The poll data are from the UK and the articles are interesting in their own right.  Thanks to www.politicaltheory.info for the pointers.

Will we attack Iran?

Matt Yglesias links to some who see an imminent attack.  Daniel Drezner offers commentary as well.  Here is Seymour Hersh.

The core economic issue is this: in the midst of a "chicken" game, which verbal cues should lead you to conclude that things are going well (poorly) for your side?  Alas, I don’t know a good treatment of this problem, whether theoretical or experimental.

Under one view, there is no correlation between rumors and real plans.  Disregard the rumors.

Alternatively, you may view current rumors as orchestrated.  But you might infer the probability of an attack as less likely.  The rumors could be an attempt to scare Iran and thus they are a substitute for attacking.  A true intent to attack might do better as a (relative) surprise.  Of course Iran knows this reasoning also, so why should orchestrated rumors succeed?

Another scenario: perhaps our government is anti-rational, perhaps by the nature of bureaucracy.  In this view, the rumors are orchestrated, we usually do what makes no sense, so that means an attack is coming. 

How about this?  We make lots of noise, hoping to scare Iran.  If the noise doesn’t work (which it won’t) then we might feel we must attack, having put our credibility on the line.  Fred Kaplan argues that a tough public stance locks us in; we should instead be letting Teheran receive secret signals that we mean business.  The lock-in effect is a danger.  But don’t assume a (supposedly) secret signal is better; it costs little to send and it might be regarded by the Iranians as a trick, again to be ignored.

What do the betting markets say?:  Over at www.tradesports.com, the implied probability of a U.S. or Israeli attack before December is running about 20 percent (look under "Current Events").  For before March 07 it is running about 25 percent.  These numbers are up from a few weeks ago. 

The bottom line: We will not win this game.

What is Massachusetts doing?

1. All but the very rich must buy health insurance.

2. Business that don’t offer health insurance to their employees will have to pay a tax.

3. Individuals can buy insurance with pre-tax dollars, eliminating the favoritism currently shown to employment-linked insurance.

4. Insurance companies will be subsidized to offer barebones policies to the current uninsured.

There is more, here is a Boston Globe summary.  Here is the LA TimesThe Washington Post surveys various reactions.

Arnold Kling is skeptical:

…the politicians’ plan will force insurance companies to offer
no-deductible health insurance to people on modest incomes, at premiums
ranging from $1000 to $2000 per year. My guess is that the insurance
companies will not be willing to pay for more than about $2000 per
person per year in claims, and they will demand that the state provide
reinsurance for the rest. Given average health care spending in
Massachusetts of $6000, "the rest" could be a big number.

Andrew Sullivan approves, mostly for general reasons — "let the states try."

My take: This kind of approach will prove increasingly popular.  You claim to cover everybody.  It doesn’t sound very socialistic and most of the costs are hidden.  It appeals to voters’ sense of justice; there is a general belief that many individuals and businesses are free-riding upon the ready availability of hospital emergency rooms.  It keeps private insurance rather than trying to eliminate it (single-payer plans) or eliminate its tax advantages (HSAs).  This latter feature I find appealing, since I think the private insurance mode, for all its flaws, is or at least should be, the future of the sector.  "Not enough private insurance" is the relevant externality relative to the social welfare function, not "too much private insurance."  Of course various lobbies — most of all the insurance companies — also will like this feature of the program.

In a political debate, this will, for better or worse, probably crush the more ambitious Democratic plans for national health insurance.

The crunch comes, as Kling points out, when you pretend that covering the uninsured will be cheap or can happen under current levels of program budgeting.  Can you imagine California or Texas, both of which have higher levels of uninsured than Massachusetts, trying such a plan?  The long-run future of the idea replaces the insurance company subsidies with health insurance vouchers for the poor.  They would be means-tested, of course, and the expense would require federal involvement.

To me the Massachusetts plan sounds messy and fragmented.  It is a series of concessions rather than a set of solutions.  It relies too heavily on unfunded mandates rather than improving incentives.  I am not sure it will make anyone healthier.  It does nothing to solve the number one problem of the sector, namely bringing competitive forces to bear on improving product quality, accessibility, and affordability.  I just bought a new Toyota Corolla for a lower nominal (much less real) price than I paid nine years ago for the same but inferior make without side air bags.  Why can’t we have more stories like that in health care?  It is the person who figures out how to point health care competition in the right direction who will deserve the brass ring. 

That all being said, the Massachusetts plan is better than I would have expected.  I am not convinced that the plan will work out badly, at least relative to feasible alternatives.