Category: Current Affairs

Who Loses from Immigration Restrictions?

A good summary from the excellent Jeffrey Miron on the effects of the Indian Chinese Exclusion Act (repeated here, no indent):

A long-standing concern about immigration is that it might reduce job opportunities for native workers:

In 1882, the US government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned laborers born in China from entering the United States and prevented individuals born in China already residing in the United States from obtaining citizenship or reentering the country. … Proponents argued that Chinese workers—who constituted 12 percent of the male working-age population and 21 percent of all immigrants in the Western United States—reduced economic opportunities for white workers.

Yet in 1882, similarly to now,

… many business owners opposed the Act. They worried that highly productive Chinese labor could not be easily replaced and that a sweeping ban would lead to significant economic losses.

So what were the Act’s effects? According to recent research,

… the Act reduced the Chinese labor supply by 64 percent. A reduction occurred for both skilled and unskilled workers. …

This is presumably what the Act’s supporters intended. In addition, however,

the Act reduced the white male labor supply by 28 percent and lowered this group’s lifetime earnings. …

Further, and relevant to current debates,

the Act reduced total manufacturing output by 62 percent and the number of manufacturing establishments by 54–69 percent.

What is the explanation? Reduced immigration means higher labor costs. This implies reduced output, and thus reduced demand for native labor, even if businesses partially substitute native for immigrant labor. Reduced immigration can therefore be “lose-lose,” hurting native workers and businesses, in addition to harming immigrants.

The slide toward growing protectionism?

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one part of the argument:

Start with the distinction between trade in goods and trade in services. When a US manufacturer sells tractors overseas, that’s goods. When a US software firm creates an AI medical diagnostic tool and sells access via the internet to foreigners, that’s services.

It is much easier to keep trade “free” for the first category than for the second. The tractor crosses a border at a specific place and time. It may face additional regulation once inside the foreign country, but the transaction is relatively clean.

An online medical service, by contrast, could “cross the border” — that is, be used by someone outside the US — hundreds or thousands of times per day. It may also face licensing requirements, foreign liability law, extensive testing and, if the country has multiple jurisdictions, layers of regulation. In the European Union, the website itself would be subject to extensive regulation through laws regarding data, privacy and AI. Even within the EU, a supposed free-trade area, there are restrictions on trade in legal, medical and notary services, to name a few examples.

The wisdom or foolishness of these regulations is not the point. They exist, and most are not going away anytime soon. In fact, they will become only more important as the provision of services expands as a share of the global economy.

In the US, much of this growth occurs in education, health care and, especially, technology. Nvidia, for instance, depending on fluctuations in share prices that day, is often worth more than the entire German and Italian stock markets combined. Efforts to “harmonize” (i.e., increase) corporate taxation thus are more harmful to US interests than would have been the case a decade ago.

Any world trading order that broadly stays put is thus weighted against the exporting interests of the US. That is essential background for understanding the debate over trade prompted by President Donald Trump’s various proposals.

Recommended.

Congratulations to Christopher Rufo and Richard Hanania

As most of you already know, the Trump administration through Executive Orders has taken major steps against affirmative action and also DEI.  We will see how the details play out, but each of these developments seems highly significant and not just “expressive.”

Those two individuals played a decisive role in what happened, in both cases taking considerable flak along the way.  And so they deserve this hat tip.  Here Richard and Bryan Caplan discuss what happened.  Coleman Hughes too.

Democracy, Capitalism and Monarchy (Yarvin)

The Yarvin interview in the NYTimes magazine illustrates the change in vibes, but frankly, I was bored. It’s amusing when Yarvin tweaks liberals by pointing out that FDR was an authoritarian, but Liberal Fascism did it better.

More generally, much of Yarvin’s thinking is superficial. He thinks, for example, that capitalism works because firms are monarchies.

Yes. I think that having an effective government and an efficient government is better for people’s lives. When I ask people to answer that question, I ask them to look around the room and point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy, because these things that we call companies are actually little monarchies. You’re looking around, and you see, for example, a laptop, and that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy.

There are many errors here. First, Apple is one firm among countless others most of which do not produce hugely successful products. The big question is not how Apple produces but how Apple is produced. Firms operate as planned entities but they are embedded in and constrained by a broader sea of market competition. It’s the competitive environment that drives innovation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.

Second, Mises was closer to the truth when he wrote in Planned Chaos that it’s the consumers not the producers who are monarchs:

In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality. It determines directly the prices of consumer goods and indirectly the prices of all producer goods, viz., labor and material factors of production. It determines the emergence of profits and losses and the formation of the rate of interest. It determines every individual’s income…The market adjusts the efforts of all those engaged in supplying the needs of the consumers to the wishes of those for whom they produce, the consumers. It subjects production to consumption.

Capitalist firms are disciplined by the necessity of persuading consumers to purchase their products and by competition. Successful firms must continuously meet our desires and needs to survive. When Apple fails to do so, it will face the same fate as countless firms before it—obsolescence and failure.

Markets do hold lessons about governance, but Yarvin draws the wrong conclusions. Democracy, not monarchy, is the political system most analogous to capitalism. As Mises observed, “The market is a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote.” The analogy works both ways: voting in a democracy mirrors spending in a market. Both systems empower individuals—consumers or voters—to shape outcomes, whether by determining market success or selecting leaders.

Democracy and capitalism are both examples of open-access orders, systems characterized by dispersed power, low barriers to entry, and transparent, universally applicable rules. Such features foster adaptability, accountability, and broad participation—qualities essential to both economic and political success.

The West does face a modest “crisis” of democracy, but the root of this crisis lies in expecting democracy to do too much. We have collectivized decisions which are best left in the hands of individuals and markets but democracy is not a good way of making collective decisions.

Democracy is best understood as a constraint on government power, akin to a Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Democracy’s virtue is in providing a mechanism to remove bad rulers without resorting to bloodshed and its primary value lies in preventing catastrophic outcomes like mass famines and democide—a significant and undeniable merit. Autocracies and monarchies perform much less well on the big issues and, contrary to what many people think, autocracies do not grow faster, win more wars, or perform better on any meaningful comparison that has been investigated.

It is also essential to recognize that “democracy” encompasses a wide range of structures—parliamentary, presidential, constitutional, and more—and there is plenty of room for improved choice within the broader category. We can improve our democracy. 

The real lesson from markets is not to create monarchs but to design systems that create choice and competition and allow citizens to remove leaders when they fail. 

Hat tip for discussion: Connor.

The Stargate Project

The Stargate Project is a new company which intends to invest $500 billion over the next four years building new AI infrastructure for OpenAI in the United States. We will begin deploying $100 billion immediately. This infrastructure will secure American leadership in AI, create hundreds of thousands of American jobs, and generate massive economic benefit for the entire world. This project will not only support the re-industrialization of the United States but also provide a strategic capability to protect the national security of America and its allies.

The initial equity funders in Stargate are SoftBank, OpenAI, Oracle, and MGX. SoftBank and OpenAI are the lead partners for Stargate, with SoftBank having financial responsibility and OpenAI having operational responsibility. Masayoshi Son will be the chairman.

Arm, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Oracle, and OpenAI are the key initial technology partners. The buildout is currently underway, starting in Texas, and we are evaluating potential sites across the country for more campuses as we finalize definitive agreements.

As part of Stargate, Oracle, NVIDIA, and OpenAI will closely collaborate to build and operate this computing system. This builds on a deep collaboration between OpenAI and NVIDIA going back to 2016 and a newer partnership between OpenAI and Oracle.

This also builds on the existing OpenAI partnership with Microsoft. OpenAI will continue to increase its consumption of Azure as OpenAI continues its work with Microsoft with this additional compute to train leading models and deliver great products and services.

All of us look forward to continuing to build and develop AI—and in particular AGI—for the benefit of all of humanity. We believe that this new step is critical on the path, and will enable creative people to figure out how to use AI to elevate humanity.

Here is the full OpenAI tweet, at the very least these are interesting times to be alive.  Here are some comments from Jeff Stein.

Keep an Eye on Crypto Regulation

Crypto regulation is likely to change very rapidly. I expect that SAB 121 will be overturned, perhaps even today. Overturning SAB 121 wouldn’t even be controversial because, as I wrote earlier, Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate both voted to overturn SAB 121 which was saved only by Biden’s veto.

Essentially, SAB 121 made it prohibitive for banks to offer custody services for crypto because that service would then impact all kinds of risk and asset regulations on the bank. Aside from singling out crypto, the SEC is not a regulator of banks so this seemed like a regulatory overreach.

I also hope that the tax rules on staking are simplified. Staking rewards paid in tokens should not be taxed until sold. Just as apples aren’t taxed when they grow on the tree but only when sold.

There are also a number of interesting cases working the way through the courts. Lewellen v. Garland seeks to clarify that crypto projects that don’t custody funds are not money transmitters (they can’t be since they never control funds and have no way of knowing the customer information that money transmitters must provide to the government). The case is particularly interesting to me because Lewellen, the plaintiff, is suing to set up a crypto based assurance contract based, in part, on my work (see also here with Cason and Zubrickas):

Pharos fills an important gap in the existing cryptocurrency financial system. Lewellen has seen that there are “public goods” that many people would be happy to contribute to financially, but only if supporters can be assured that the full amount to fund the public good will be raised. In other words, they will contribute if they can be assured that the public good will be deployed. Partial fundraising for these projects would not be acceptable. Examples include building infrastructure such as a bridge or hospital, building a war monument, funding an event like a festival or conference, funding a medical trial or scientific study, filing an advocacy lawsuit, or funding a movie production or other cultural good. Nobody wants to pay for these endeavours without knowing that others will pay enough to complete the project.

To address this dilemma, Pharos would deploy the concept of “assurance contracts.” An assurance contract is a system in which contributors commit money that is released to the planned recipient only if the fundraising goal is met by a certain date. Otherwise the money is returned to the would-be contributors. By promising a refund if the required amount is not raised, assurance contracts encourage more public goods to be funded through voluntary contributions. See Tabarrok, The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts, 96 Pub. Choice 345, 345-48 (1998).

Atlas Shrugged as Novel

The conversation between Henry Oliver and Hollis Robbins about Atlas Shrugged as a novel is excellent. I enjoyed especially the discussion of some of the minor characters and the meaning of their story arcs.

Hollis: There are some really wonderful minor characters. One of them is Cherryl Taggart, this shop girl that evil Jim Taggart meets one night in a rainstorm, and she’s like, “Oh, you’re so awesome,” and they get married. It’s like he’s got all this praise for marrying the shop girl. It’s a funny Eliza Doolittle situation because she is brought into this very wealthy society, which we have been told and we have been shown is corrupt, is evil, everybody’s lying all the time, it’s pretentious, Dagny hates it.

Cherryl Taggart is brought into this. In the beginning, she hates Dagny because she’s told by everybody, “Hate Dagny, she’s horrible.” Then she comes to her own mini understanding of the corruption that we understand because Dagny’s shown it in the novel, has shown it to us this entire time. She comes to it and she’s like, “Oh my God,” and she goes to Dagny. Dagny’s so wonderful to her like, “Yes. You had to come to this on your own, I wasn’t going to tell you, but you were 100% right.” That’s the end of her.

Henry: Right. When she meets Taggart, there’s this really interesting speech she has where she says, “I want to make something of myself and get somewhere.” He’s like, “What? What do you want to do?” Red flag. “What? Where?” She says, “I don’t know, but people do things in this world. I’ve seen pictures of New York,” and she’s pointing at like the skyscrapers, right? Whatever. “I know that someone’s built that. They didn’t sit around and whine, but like the kitchen was filthy and the roof was leaking.” She gets very emotional at this point. She says to him, “We were stinking poor and we didn’t give a damn. I’ve dragged myself here, and I’m going to do something.”

Her story is very sad because she then gets mired in the corruption of Taggart’s. He’s basically bit lazy and a bit of a thief, and he will throw anyone under the bus for his own self-advancement. He is revealed to be a really sinister guy. I was absolutely hissing about him most of the time. Then, let’s just do the plot spoiler and say what happens to Cherryl, right? Because it’s important. When she has this realization and Taggart turns on her and reveals himself as this snake, and he’s like, “Well, what did you expect, you idiot? This is the way the world is.”

Hollis: Oh, it’s a horrible fight. It’s the worst fight.

Henry: Right? This is where the melodrama is so good. She goes running out into the streets, and it’s the night and there are shadows. She’s in the alleyway. Rand, I don’t have the page marked, but it’s like a noir film. She’s so good at that atmosphere. Then it gets a little bit gothic as well. She’s running through the street, and she’s like, “I’ve got to go somewhere, anywhere. I’ll work. I’ll pick up trash. I’ll work in a shop. I’ll do anything. I’ve just got to get out of this.”

Hollis: Go work at the Panda Express.

Henry: Yes. She’s like, “I’ve got to get out of this system,” because she’s realized how morally corrupting it is. By this time, this is very late. Society is in a– it’s like Great Depression style economic collapse by this point. There really isn’t a lot that she could do. She literally runs into a social worker and the social– Rand makes this leering dramatic moment where the social worker reaches out to grab her and Cherryl thinks, “Oh, my God, I’m going to be taken prisoner in. I’m going back into the system,” so she jumps off the bridge.

This was the moment when I was like, I’ve had this lurking feeling about how Russian this novel is. At this point, I was like, “That could be a short story by Gogol,” right? The way she set that up. That is very often the trap that a Gogol character or maybe a Dostoevsky character finds themselves in, right? That you suddenly see that the world is against you. Maybe you’re crazy and paranoid. Maybe you’re not. Depends which story we’re reading. You run around trying to get out and you realize, “Oh, my God, I’m more trapped than I thought. Actually, maybe there is no way out.” Cherryl does not get a lot of pages. She is, as you say, quite a minor character, but she illustrates the whole story so, so well, so dramatically.

Hollis: Oh, wow.

Henry: When it happens, you just, “Oh, Cherryl, oh, my goodness.”

Hollis: Thank you for reading that. Yes, you could tell from the very beginning that the seeds of what could have been a really good person were there. Thank you for reading that.

Henry: When she died, I went back and I was like, “Oh, my God, I knew it.”

Hollis: How can you say Rand is a bad writer, right? That is careful, careful plotting, because she’s just a shop girl in the rain. You’ve got this, the gun on the wall in that act. You know she’s going to end up being good. Is she going to be rewarded for it? Let me just say, as an aside, I know we don’t have time to talk about it here. My field, as I said, is 19th century African American novels, primarily now.

This, usually, a woman, enslaved woman, the character who’s like, “I can’t deal with this,” and jumps off a bridge and drowns herself is a fairly common and character. That is the only thing to do. One also sees Rand heroes. Stowe’s Dred, for example, is very much, “I would rather live in the woods with a knife and then, be on the plantation and be a slave.” When you think about, even the sort of into the 20th century, the Malcolm X figure, that, “I’m going to throw out all of this and be on my own,” is very Randian, which I will also say very Byronic, too, Rand didn’t invent this figure, but she put it front and center in these novels, and so when you think about how Atlas Shrugged could be brought into a curriculum in a network of other novels, how many of we’ve discussed so far, she’s there, she’s influenced by and continues to influence.

“Be careful what you wish for, you might get it!”

I said that to Ezra Klein about the current rightward vibes shift.  What are some of the scenarios I had in mind?:

1. If the Republicans regulate social media companies to discriminate less against “the Right,” those regulations may someday be used against them.

2. Personal presidential issuance of crypto assets is not always (ever?) a good thing or lead to the right incentives.  In the meantime, it might serve as a daily referendum on how much of a lame duck presidency we are having, a mixed blessing.

3. The conspiracy theorizing promoted by Trump and various minions could someday come back to bite them, or to sink Vance, or…I guess we will see.  Don’t think you can keep this genie in the bottle, or use it only for preferred ends.

4. DOGE successes might centralize power in the executive branch in a manner that the Republicans later regret.  That centralization can be more easily be used to expand government regulatory power than to contract it.

5. If there is a pandemic under Trump’s term, the cultivated anti-vaccine sentiment could make it much worse.

6. Rhetoric on taxes and central bank independence could (further) raise real interest rates, damaging the economy and also Republican electoral prospects.

7. The dwindling of various “safeguards” on rhetoric, as the Woke are dismantled, could end up harming later Republican or right-leaning targets of harmful rhetoric, including from other right-wingers.  Some of you may feel this is absurd, but just wait.

8. I don’t think we really know what it would mean (will mean?) to put feminization seriously in reverse.  I would note I see myself as a significant beneficiary of our more feminized society.  I am pleased if more women decide to become “trad wives,” but it is not the circle I will hang around in either.  This one really needs much further thought from its advocates, it is not enough to be fed up with the recent excesses.  A lot of the people who claim to want more “trad wives” actually want more super talented women who can do that and be very successful in a career at the same time.  I am all for that, but I also recognize when I am asking for a free lunch of sorts.  I am not sure how elastic the supply is there.  Nor am I sure how much such a change might boost birth rates — Iran anybody?

9. To the extent Trump succeeds, American politics will become all the more personality-driven.  I see that as a mixed blessing, most likely more negative than positive in the longer run.

10. If Trump does something good for a foreign country you like or favor, he may ask for his pound of flesh in return.

Those are only a few options, the list is really pretty long.  I am not panicked about the status quo, but I see it as fraught and unstable.  And we haven’t even touched upon AGI advances.

More generally, I would stress that even the most optimistic person should not relinquish his or her sense of the tragic.  A lot of Democrats were pretty ecstatic when Obama won a second term, but how happy are they now?  Is that just them, or could it be you too?

I’ll say it again — be careful what you wish for, you might get it.  The celebratory perspective can be important for getting things done, or for maintaining ideological coherence, but accuracy matters too, and the more accurate perspective should take all this into account.

Ezra Klein on the vibe shift

In July of 2024, Tyler Cowen, the economist and cultural commentator, wrote a blog post that proved to be among the election’s most prescient. It was titled “The change in vibes — why did they happen?” Cowen’s argument was that mass culture was moving in a Trumpian direction. Among the tributaries flowing into the general shift: the Trumpist right’s deeper embrace of social media, the backlash to the “feminization” of society, exhaustion with the politics of wokeness, an era of negativity that Trump captured but Democrats resisted, a pervasive sense of disorder at the border and abroad and the breakup between Democrats and “Big Tech.”

I was skeptical of Cowen’s post when I first read it, as it described a shift much larger than anything I saw reflected in the polls. I may have been right about the polls. But Cowen was right about the culture.

And the end bit:

Cowen may have correctly called the shift in vibes, but he isn’t particularly comfortable with it. If 2024 was partly a backlash to the Democratic Party and culture of the last four years, what might a backlash to this more culturally confident and overwhelming form of Trumpism look like?

“I’ve taken to insisting to my friends on the right: ‘Be careful what you wish for,’ ” Cowen told me. “You might get it.”

Here is the full NYT column.

Thinking about Greenland critically (from the comments)

Well one thing that comes up is the Diego Garcia problem. It appears that Downing Street opted to relinquish sovereignty of an isolated territory remote from major population centers for reasons of domestic politics and perhaps international popularity.

As long as we might (continue to) see a major gulf between American and European norms regarding “international law” and politics, American policy makers can rest far more assured that their strategic interests in say Thule are not going to be sold out for concerns in Copenhagen.

And then, of course, there is the bidding war problem. Currently Greenland is run by a PM who formally wants independence. If Greenland votes that through (and they have been voting for more distance from Copenhagen by supermajority), US bases in Greenland are now subject to bidding on the open market. After all, a lot of US bases have had to be abandoned with changes in leadership and we are already seeing China dumping lots of cash to buy influence.

Best outcome, from a US perspective, is Trump waives around money, Greenland votes to accept, and everyone goes home with resolution of the fact that Greenland is likely more salient to US defense interests than Danish defense interests. A more likely scenario is that Greenland accelerates its independence, particularly if Trump can get together a package of mining setups, the US signs some bilateral treaties and perhaps leases directly with the folks who have the ultimate votes, and Denmark maintains some sort of affiliated roll.

But moral posturing over sovereignty and territory is costly. And from a hard nosed American perspective, the assurances that Greenland will not end up embroiled in some moral posturing like Diego Garcia are simply stronger with American or Independent Greenland than with Danish sovereignty.

That is from Sure.  From yesterday’s WSJ:

The Danish government in recent days has privately sent a message to Donald Trump’s team that Copenhagen is happy to negotiate military and economic deals related to Greenland, but it wants the conversations to take place behind closed doors.

And from the WaPo:

Greenland is not for sale. That’s the dominant refrain from the people in the subzero capital of the world’s largest island.

But might Greenland be for rent? Or amenable to a Compact of Free Association? Just as the United States has in the Pacific with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau?

The odds are still against any deal, but this is not impossible either.

Should the U.S. recognize Somaliland?

I do not myself have a position on this issue, but I found this analysis by Ken Opalo interesting:

The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.

To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.

The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).

There is much more at the link.

Some game theory of Greenland

It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory.  Along some dimensions that is likely.  But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.

I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty.  The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same.  In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.

One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.”  Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.

Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate.  If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider.  A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent.  Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.

So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive.  And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table.  For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”

It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.

The Greenland debates

I would say we have not yet figured out what is the best U.S. policy toward Greenland, nor have we figured out best stances for either Greenland or Denmark. I am struck however by the low quality of the debate, and I mean on the anti-U.S. side most of all.  This is just one clip, but I am hearing very much the same in a number of other interchanges, most of all from Europeans.  There is a lot of EU pearl-clutching, and throwing around of adjectives like “colonialist” or “imperialist.”  Or trying to buy Greenland is somehow analogized to Putin not trying to buy Ukraine.  Or the word “offensive” is deployed as if that were an argument, or the person tries to switch the discussion into an attack on Trump and his rhetoric.

C’mon, people!

De facto, you are all creating the impression that Greenland really would be better off under some other arrangement.  Why not put forward a constructive plan for improving Greenland?  It would be better yet to cite a current plan under consideration (is there one?).  “We at the EU, by following this plan, will give Greenland a better economic and security future than can the United States.”  If the plan is decent, Greenland will wish to break off the talks with America it desires.  (To be clear, I do not think they desire incorporation.  This FT piece strikes me as the best so far on the debates.)

Or if you must stick to the negative, put forward some concrete arguments for how greater U.S. involvement in Greenland would be bad for global security, bad for economic growth, bad for the U.S., or…something.  “Your EU allies won’t like it,” or “Trump’s behavior is unacceptable” isn’t enough and furthermore the first of those is question-begging.

It is time to rise to the occasion.

p.s. I still am glad we bought the Danish West Indies in 1917.  Nor do I hear many Danes, or island natives, complain about this.

My podcast with Reason

With Liz Wolfe and Zach Weissmueller:

The link here contains the YouTube video, text description, and links to audio versions at reason.comhttps://reason.com/podcast/2025/01/10/tyler-cowen-why-do-we-refuse-to-learn-from-history/

Youtube page for embedding is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-Kpyg2mFU8

Lots of about libertarianism and state capacity libertarianism, and The Great Forgetting, food at the end…interesting throughout!