Category: Data Source
Globalization and the Expanding Moral Circle
In 1869 the Irish historian William Lecky (1838-1903) wrote that moral progress is about extending the moral circle.
At one time the benevolent affections embrace merely the family, soon the circle expanding includes first a class, then a nation, then a coalition of nations, then all humanity…
What is the effect of globalization on the moral circle? Does trade melt barriers and expand the moral circle or does globalization make "the other" a more salient division allowing politicians to demonize and control through xenophobia?
Two pieces of evidence, one anecdotal the other experimental, suggests that globalization expands the moral circle. The anecdotal evidence is the cover story of this month's Wired titled "1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. This is where your gadgets come from? Should you care?"
Now from a rational point of view this is absurd. Put aside that the suicide rate is higher among American college students than Chinese workers at Foxconn, even odder is that the writer cares about 17 suicides but not say the million plus deaths in China due to lung disease. But no one said that the moral circle grows for rational reasons. In this case, the writer, Joel Johnson, found that the purchase of the cell phone extended his moral circle to workers who assembled the phone half a world away:
I was burdened by what felt like an outsize provision of guilt–an existential buyer’s remorse for civilization itself. I am here because I want to know: Did my iPhone kill 17 people?
What about the experimental evidence? In an excellent paper, Buchan et al. discuss results from a public good dilemma game that they ran on thousands of people in six countries around the world: Iran, South Africa, Argentina, Russia, Italy and the United States.
In each country the players could contribute to themselves, to a local group or to a world group. Local contributions were doubled and world contributions were tripled such that the world-group maximizing strategy would be for all contributions to go to the world account, the local-group maximizing strategy would be for all contributions to go to the local account and (as usual) the dominant strategy was to contribute to self only. (Local contributions also paid more to self than did contributions to the world account).
The authors find two strong effects. First, the rate of donation to the world account increased significantly with the extent of a country's globalization, as measured by a globalization index. Second, within countries the rate of donation to the world acount increased with an individual's globalization index (based on measures such as whether the individual worked for an international firm, watched foreign movies, called people abroad etc.) Thus, globalization increases the potential for global cooperation.
The authors conclude:
…not only is living in a more globalized country associated with more cooperation at the world level, but the same relationship holds as the degree of individual global connectedness increases as well. The cosmopolitan hypothesis receives clear support from our experiments.
… our findings suggest that humans' basic “tribal social instincts” may be highly malleable to the influence of the processes of connectedness embedded in globalization.
Genetic Factors and the Religious Life
It's getting late but for the record you can find a good study of genetics and religion in Do Genetic Factors Influence Religious Life? Findings from a Behavior Genetic Analysis of Twin Siblings. PSYDIR offers a good summary:
It's a fairly standard twin study. They took a sample of around 600 identical and non-identical twins from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS), and looked at a number of religious characteristics.
Basically, their analysis allows them to tease out the variations that are shared by identical twins but not by non-identical ones (genetic factors), by non-identical twins (family factors or shared environment), and that differed even among non-identical twins. This last factor was put down to the effects of external environment (i.e. things that happen in you life that aren't shared by your twin).
I've put the results in the graph. First off, look at childhood religiosity. The biggest factor is your family, and not your genetics. It's not until adulthood that the effects of genetics really start to shine through. No surprises there!
The 'salience', or importance of religion in your life is about one-quarter defined by genetics, as is your spirituality. The most important factor here, however, is the external environment. You get similar results for religious attendance.
When you get to more personal beliefs, the patterns start to shift. There are three factors that are about 40% driven by genetics, with your family upbringing having hardly any effect. These factors are: how often you turn to religion for guidance, whether or not you take the bible literally, and whether people should stick to one faith, or experiment with others (exclusivist beliefs).
It is true that there are tricky statistical issues with twin research and it is certainly possible that results like these will be overturned in the future. If that happens, however, it will be because of better twin/adoption and direct genetic studies. The type of evidence that Tyler cites is simply not capable of answering the fundamental questions that are being asked by this type of research. It is also true that these results are conditional on an environment, that is a time and place. (But that is the relevant measure for parenting today.)
I would also note that if you think the statistics get the numbers wrong you also have to deal with the fact that the patterns make sense. Parents have the biggest influence on childhood religiosity, non-shared environment has the biggest influence on attendance, genetics has the biggest influence on being "born-again." (Even the word suggests nature.) Bryan's book reviews a number of studies like this which are broadly similar.
What is the state employee union wage premium?
How much does collective bargaining matter? On Twitter, Will Wilkinson asks for data. I find this web site specifying the average Virginia state employee to be earning $50,298. Rortybomb says that for Wisconsin the comparable number is $48,267.
Yet Wisconsin had collective bargaining for state employees and Virginia does not. Of course this comparison is a gross one and it is not holding constant the composition of each work force, seniority, cost of living differences, and it also does not seem to pick up possible differences in benefits. Furthermore it does not consider the 48 other states. Yet, crude as this one-to-one comparison may be, it is more empirically sophisticated than most (all?) other discussions I have seen.
This David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson paper (see pp.9-10), using 1980s data, finds a union wage premium, for state employees, of 14.5 percent, with the premium being strongest for unskilled workers, as is the case in the private sector as well. (NB: I am not sure if they are adjusting for differential benefits but I think not.) Alan Krueger tells us that the union/non-union wage gap is smaller in the public sector than in the private sector ("overwhelming evidence").
I'm not pushing any particular answer, I'd just like to put the question on the table. What else do you all know?
Addendum: from Adam Ozimek: "The regression coefficients on page 8 of the report show that the union wage premium is between 15% to 16%, while the public sector wage discount is around 11%, meaning unionized public sector employees are paid 4% to 5% wage premium." Adam also provides further references and discussion.
Libya fact of the day
How do most people split the rent?
I receive this question from readers fairly often, but I don't usually have much of an answer, or for that matter much experience (when I roomed with Daniel Klein, he and I split the rent evenly). Now there is an interesting study. There are 42 datapoints and definitely some selection bias, but it's better than anything else I've seen. It examines for instance whether people first pick rooms and then set the prices, or first set the prices and then pick the rooms, or draw from a hat. It measures which factors most affect the rent splitting, with "No door" and "Private shower" coming in first and second respectively. The factor of importance for an apartment with the biggest standard deviation is size of the common area. In the survey, personal space is what people are willing to pay the most extra for. Opinions about the importance of windows have a high variance.
Here is their rent calculator, based on the above study.
Budget sentences to ponder
The regression coefficient of -0.07 suggests that in countries where revenues as a share of GDP were 10 percentage points lower in 1979, health care spending increased as a share of GDP by 0.7 less in the next 30 years. This association is consistent with the hypothesis that high tax rates limit the further growth of public contributions to health spending because of the much larger economic costs…and because of political pressures against high tax rates, a result also found in a cross-country study…
That is from the scary paper by Katherine Baicker and Jonathan Skinner, "Health Care Spending Growth and the Future of U.S. Taxes." (Can anyone find an ungated copy? Can we all say a hail to James M. Buchanan?)
As for today's announced budget, Kevin Drum serves up some relevant remarks.
The Pharaoh and the Commanding Heights
The Egyptian military is, for now, looking like a force for democratization. It should not be forgotten, however, that the military is an oligarchy which controls huge swaths of the Egyptian economy.
SFChronicle: It owns companies that sell everything from fire extinguishers and medical equipment to laptops, televisions, sewing machines, refrigerators, pots and pans, butane gas bottles, bottled water and olive oil.
Its holdings include vast tracts of land, including the Sharm el-Sheikh resort, where ex-President Hosni Mubarak now resides in one of his seaside palaces. Bread from its bakeries has helped head off food riots.
Another source of the military's untold wealth is its hold on one of this densely populated country's most precious commodities: public land, which is increasingly being converted into gated communities and resorts. The military has other advantages: it does not pay taxes and does not have to deal with the bureaucratic red tape that strangles the private sector.
…The revenue streams from its various holdings help the military maintain the lifestyle its officers have grown accustomed to, including an extensive network of luxurious social clubs as well as comfortable retirements – all of which helps ensure officer loyalty.
Not surprisingly, the military has opposed privatization and economic liberalization. The Egyptian military currently commands a great deal of respect in Egypt but what happens when a nascent democracy tries to reform an entrenched oligarchy?
What conservatives want (don’t want)
This is from a poll of self-identified conservative Republicans:
When we asked last month about their thoughts on the best way to reduce the deficit, here’s how they replied:
†¢ 56 percent said cut spending across the board
†¢ 27 percent said cut spending from all government budgets except the military
†¢ 10 percent said pass a balanced budget amendment
†¢ 3 percent said cut taxes
†¢ 3 percent said fix Social Security and Medicare so they don’t pay out more than they take in
That was pretty revealing. Social Security and Medicare will drive our long-term structural deficits and crush our economy along the way. But even though the issue is getting some play in the media, it doesn’t seem to be getting through to the grassroots.
There is more at the link. You might think that the desire for across the board spending cuts is picking up the fiscal conservatism, but the follow-up questions don't show a great desire to limit Social Security or Medicare. Only thirty-five percent of the recipients favor both raising the retirement age for benefits and also means-testing.
You may recall that fiscal conservative Paul Ryan didn't mention Social Security or Medicare in his response to Obama's State of the Union address.
Addendum: Here is a related poll.
The history of U.S. productivity, in a nutshell
There have been some recent confusions in the comments about the historical record on productivity. The excellent Alexander J. Field sets it straight, after noting that TFP (Total Factor Productivity) growth in the interwar years was remarkably strong:
…TFP persisted at high although more modest rates during the golden age (1948-73). But then it ground to an almost complete halt between 1973 and 1995. Output per hour continued to rise, albeit much more slowly, but this was almost entirely attributable to physical capital deepening. Data are now available for the entire century, and it is no longer possible to interpret the high rate of TFP advance during the interwar years that prompted the Abramowitz/Solow generalization [TC: the generalization was about knowledge-based progress] as a defining characteristic of the century as a whole.
In this context, think of TFP as the growth due to new ideas, rather than just throwing capital or labor at a problem or production process. Here is a related Field paper. It's also wrong to think of the post-WWII period as the peak of progress, rather as Field shows high TFP growth starts post Civil War and the time after WWII is somewhat slower than many previous decades. The early 19th century, by the way, was not so splendid for TFP.
The critical responses to The Great Stagnation prefer to attack median income measures and in general they are reluctant to talk about total factor productivity. Yet we are pointed very much toward the same conclusion. My first post on TGS also considered these issues and you will find some relevant Charles Jones papers here.
Were bankers fools or knaves?
This is a long "Control C" for a blog post, but it's worth it. Via Simon Johnson:
New evidence in favor of the second interpretation [knaves] has just become available, thanks to the efforts of Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton, who went carefully through the compensation structure of executives at the top 14 financial institutions in the United States from 2000 to 2008.
The key finding is that chief executives were “30 times more likely to be involved in a sell trade compared with an open-market buy trade” of their own bank’s stock and “the dollar value of sales of stock by bank C.E.O.’s of their own bank’s stock is about 100 times the dollar value of open market buys.” (See page 4 of the report.)
If the chief executives had really believed in what their banks were doing, they would have wanted to hold this stock – or even buy more.
And:
Professors Bhagat and Bolton argue that if this incentive problem is important, we should see chief executives make a great deal of money while long-term buy-and-hold shareholders lose money.
Table 4 in their paper (Pages 45-48) shows the amounts of money involved, and they are simply staggering. Collectively, the people who headed these 14 institutions pocketed – in hard cash terms – more than $2.6 billion during 2000-8. It’s true that the paper value of their wealth dropped in 2008, although this was an unrealized paper loss. Even including that notional loss, the chief executives made an impressive $650 million profit [emphasis from TC].
In contrast, long-term shareholders in these 14 banks did very badly, particularly in 2008 (see Figure 1 on Page 61 of the paper). Professors Bhagat and Bolton show that shareholders in the biggest banks – where chief executives got their hands on more cash – did significantly worse than investors in smaller banks.
Interestingly, chief executives in the smallest banks in their sample did not sell much stock relative to their purchases of their own bank’s stock. The big bank-small bank contrast is quite striking.
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan used to call them "banksters."
www.flushtracker.com
Ben Goldacre writes:
I'm an infrastructure nerd. When someone's digging up the road, I want to peer in. When someone comes to fix the house, I want to see what happens under the floor. When I flush a poo away, I want to see where it goes next.
Visit the site here, and there are related links at the post. For the pointer I thank a loyal MR reader.
Racial stereotypes and death statistics
Andrew Noymer, Andrew Penner, and Allya Saperstein report:
Recent research suggests racial classification is responsive to social stereotypes, but how this affects racial classification in national vital statistics is unknown. This study examines whether cause of death influences racial classification on death certificates. We analyze the racial classifications from a nationally representative sample of death certificates and subsequent interviews with the decedents' next of kin and find notable discrepancies between the two racial classifications by cause of death. Cirrhosis decedents are more likely to be recorded as American Indian on their death certificates, and homicide victims are more likely to be recorded as Black; these results remain net of controls for followback survey racial classification, indicating that the relationship we reveal is not simply a restatement of the fact that these causes of death are more prevalent among certain groups. Our findings suggest that seemingly non-racial characteristics, such as cause of death, affect how people are racially perceived by others and thus shape U.S. official statistics.
The culture that is Italy?
It is not just birds, rabbits and wild boar who meet a sticky end in the Italian hunting season.
According to statistics published today, 35 people have also been killed in the past four months, and another 74 injured. Italy's anti-hunting league, the LAC, said all but one were hunters killed accidentally by their shooting companions.
But the 35th victim was a mushroom collector shot dead near Arezzo in Tuscany. Of the injured, 13 were also non-hunters, mostly people out for a walk in the woods or cycling down a country lane.
The annual bloodletting is a result of the unusual freedom allowed to shooting parties under Italian law. They can go on to private property and fire anywhere not within 50m of a road or 150m of a house.
Here is more.
World Income Inequality
Here, courtesy of Catherine Rampell of Economix, is a remarkable chart from Branko Milanovic's book The Haves and Have Nots. Along the horizontal axis are within-country income percentiles running from the bottom 5% (1st ventile) to the top 5% (20th ventile). Along the vertical axis are world income percentiles.
The graph shows that the bottom 5% of Brazilians are among the poorest people in the world but the top 5% are among the richest. Thus the vertical range of the curve tells us about within-country inequality.
Comparing between countries we see that the poorest 5% of Americans are among the richest people in the world (richer than nearly 70% of other people in the world). The poorest 5% of Americans, for example, are richer than the richest 5% of Indians.
Median-itis and The Great Stagnation
Here is my NYT column from today, on themes relevant to The Great Stagnation. I won't rehash this entire discussion, but I would like to focus on this one column excerpt:
From 1947 to 1973 – a period of just 26 years – inflation-adjusted median income in the United States more than doubled. But in the 31 years from 1973 to 2004, it rose only 22 percent. And, over the last decade, it actually declined.
I am noticing that some reviews or commentaries (and here) are citing per capita income growth as a response to my argument. It is true that per capita income grows at a slower rate post-1973, but my argument is about the slowing down of median income growth and that is a much stronger shift. The productivity data also tell a glum story.
CPI bias can change those numbers in absolute terms (see comments from Russ Roberts), but it also changes the pre-1973 median income growth numbers and arguably more so. The gap remains and TGS refers to the living standard for the average person or household in the United States, not the total amount of innovation, which remains quite high. They're just not innovations with the same trickle-down or broad-based effects as in an earlier era.
Kindle eBooks are themselves a good example. It's a real improvement for a lot of us — especially travelers – but even the median reader, much less the median American, doesn't have a Kindle or buy eBooks. As I argued in The Age of the Infovore, the big gains of late have gone to the extreme information-processors.
I've seen in the MR comments (and elsewhere) a lot of anecdotal comparison of recent gains vs. earlier gains in technology. Don't we now have this, don't we now have that, and so on. Of course. Median incomes have risen somewhat. But, when it comes to the average household, the published numbers for median income are adding up and trying to measure those gains and it turns out their recent rate of growth really has declined. Most serious researchers who work in this area use and accept these numbers as the best available (though they do not in general advocate my causal interpretation; see for instance Mark Thoma or Jacob Hacker).
If the numbers for median income growth are low we ought to take that seriously, as does Scott Sumner. We are not cheerleaders per se (BC: "I'm baffled why Tyler would focus on slight declines in American growth when the world just had the best decade ever." Is it then wrong to focus on any other problems at all? I also was one of the first people to make the "best decade ever" argument, which I still accept.) Medians also matter for the political climate, even though the median earner is not exactly the median voter. Adam Smith's welfare economics was basically that of the median, a point which David Levy has made repeatedly.
I'm also being called a "pessimist" a lot. Yet in my view our current technological plateau won't last forever. That's probably more optimistic than the Hacker-Pierson approach, which requires a Progressive revolution in economic policy (unlikely), although it is not more optimistic than denying the relevance of the numbers.
I'll soon blog some remarks on changing household size as another attempt to avoid confronting the facts about slow median income growth.