Category: Data Source
The Rise in American Pain
A significant literature has documented trend increases in pain among Americans over the last two or three decades. There is no single explanation seeming to work well for the increase. We show that, rather than resulting from a smooth upward trend, the increase was almost entirely concentrated in the 2007-2010 period, the time of the Great Recession, a result not uncovered in prior work. The disproportionate increase in pain among the less educated is also shown to have occurred primarily at the time of the Recession, with either little or no trend before or after. The Recession jump occurred only at older ages and, by cohort, primarily only at the ages when they experienced the Recession. However, the jump is difficult to explain, for while there was a temporary decline in employment during the Recession, it is unclear why there it should be followed by a permanent increase in pain. We assess a number of explanations related to family structure, the deterioration of family life, hysteresis, and biopsychosocial channels. While some factors have potential explanatory power, the rise in pain continues to be mysterious and deserves further research in light of our new findings.
Very important in my view. That is from a new NBER working paper by Sneha Lamba and Robert A. Moffitt.
David J. Deming now has a Substack
Forked Lightning, he is from the Harvard Kennedy School, and he is a co-author on the piece with Chetty and John N. Friedman featured on MR earlier today.
In his inaugural post he explains some further results from the paper in more detail:
The second part [of the paper] shows the impact of attending an Ivy-Plus college. Do these colleges actually improve student outcomes, or are they merely cream-skimming by admitting applicants who would succeed no matter where they went to college?[2]
We focus on students who are placed on the waitlist. These students are less qualified than regular admits but more qualified than regular rejects. Crucially, the waitlist admits don’t look any different in terms of admissibility than the waitlist rejects. We verify this by showing that being admitted off the waitlist at one college doesn’t predict admission at other colleges. Intuitively, getting in off the waitlist is about class-balancing and yield management, not overall merit. The college needs an oboe player, or more students from the Mountain West, or whatever. It’s not strictly random, but it’s unrelated to future outcomes (there are a lot of technical details here that I’m skipping over, including more tests of balance in the waitlist sample – see the paper for details). We also show that we get similar results with a totally different research design that others have used in past work (see footnote 2).
Almost everyone who gets admitted off an Ivy-Plus college waitlist accepts the offer. Those who are eventually rejected go to a variety of other colleges, including other Ivy-Plus institutions. We scale our estimates to the plausible alternative of attending a state flagship public institution. In other words, we want to know how an applicant’s life outcomes would differ if they attended a place like Harvard (where I work) versus Ohio State (the college I attended – I did not apply to Harvard, but if I did I surely would have been *regular* rejected!)
We find that students admitted off the waitlist are about 60 percent more likely to have earnings in the top 1 percent of their age by age 33. They are nearly twice as likely to attend a top 10 graduate school, and they are about 3 times as likely to work in a prestigious firm such as a top research hospital, a world class university, or a highly ranked finance, law or consulting firm. Interestingly, we find only small impacts on mean earnings. This is because students attending good public universities typically do very well. They earn 80th-90th percentile incomes and attend very good but not top graduate schools.
The bottom line is that going to an Ivy-Plus college really matters, especially for high-status positions in society.
In a further Substack post, Deming explains in more detail why the classic Dale and Kruger result (that, adjusting for student quality, you can go to the lesser school) no longer holds, due to limitations in their data. Of course all this bears on the “education as signaling” debates as well.
By the way, it took the authors more than five years to write that paper. Deming adds: “The paper is 125 pages long. It has 25 main exhibits (6 tables and 19 figures), and another 36 appendix exhibits.”
Here is Deming’s home page. He is a highly rated economist, yet still underrated.
Is the rising youth suicide rate overstated?
Rising reports of suicidal behaviors in children and adolescents have led to the recognition of a youth mental health crisis. However, reported rates can be influenced by access to screening and changes in reporting conventions, as well as by changes in social stigma. Using data on all hospital visits in New Jersey from 2008-2019, we investigate two inflection points in adolescent suicide-related visits and show that a rise in 2012 followed changes in screening recommendations, while a sharp rise in 2016-2017 followed changes in the coding of suicidal ideation. Rates of other suicidal behaviors including self-harm, attempted suicides, and completed suicides were essentially flat over this period. These results suggest that underlying suicide-related behaviors among children, while alarmingly high, may not have risen as sharply as reported rates suggest. Hence, researchers should approach reported trends cautiously.
That is from new research by Adriana Corredor-Waldron and Janet Currie.
The Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges
This is a long abstract, but it is meaty, and note that papers by these authors have held up well:
Leadership positions in the U.S. are disproportionately held by graduates of a few highly selective private colleges. Could such colleges — which currently have many more students from high-income families than low-income families — increase the socioeconomic diversity of America’s leaders by changing their admissions policies? We use anonymized admissions data from several private and public colleges linked to income tax records and SAT and ACT test scores to study this question. Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. In contrast, children from high-income families have no admissions advantage at flagship public colleges. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families. Using a new research design that isolates idiosyncratic variation in admissions decisions for waitlisted applicants, we show that attending an Ivy-Plus college instead of the average highly selective public flagship institution increases students’ chances of reaching the top 1% of the earnings distribution by 60%, nearly doubles their chances of attending an elite graduate school, and triples their chances of working at a prestigious firm. Ivy-Plus colleges have much smaller causal effects on average earnings, reconciling our findings with prior work that found smaller causal effects using variation in matriculation decisions conditional on admission. Adjusting for the value-added of the colleges that students attend, the three key factors that give children from high-income families an admissions advantage are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with post-college outcomes, whereas SAT/ACT scores and academic credentials are highly predictive of post-college success. We conclude that highly selective private colleges currently amplify the persistence of privilege across generations, but could diversify the socioeconomic backgrounds of America’s leaders by changing their admissions practices.
I’ll just pull out and bold a key sentence from there:
Adjusting for the value-added of the colleges that students attend, the three key factors that give children from high-income families an admissions advantage are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with post-college outcomes, whereas SAT/ACT scores and academic credentials are highly predictive of post-college success.
It would be so easy to change all this, right? Use scores and grades more, legacy less, extracurriculars less, and athletics less for admission purposes. Yet so many of them won’t make that switch. Why not? Model that!
The NBER working paper is by Raj Chetty, David J. Deming, and John N. Friedman. Here is some NYT coverage of the piece.
Global (and American) happiness these days
Our world, in a nutshell, good and bad:
Neither the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) nor data used in the World Happiness Report from the Gallup World Poll shifted much in response to negative shocks. The HDI has been rising in the last decade or so reflecting overall improvements in economic and social wellbeing, captured in part by real earnings growth, although it fell slightly after 2020 as life expectancy dipped. This secular improvement is mirrored in life satisfaction which has been rising in the last decade. However, so too have negative affect in Europe and despair in the USA.
That is from a new NBER working paper by David G. Blanchflower and Alex Bryson.
Mental health and European economics departments
We study the mental health of graduate students and faculty at 14 Economics departments in Europe. Using clinically validated surveys sent out in the fall of 2021, we find that 34.7% of graduate students experience moderate to severe symptoms of depression or anxiety and 17.3% report suicidal or self-harm ideation in a two-week period. Only 19.2% of students with significant symptoms are in treatment. 15.8% of faculty members experience moderate to severe depression or anxiety symptoms, with prevalence higher among nontenure track (42.9%) and tenure track (31.4%) faculty than tenured (9.6%) faculty. We estimate that the COVID-19 pandemic accounts for about 74% of the higher prevalence of depression symptoms and 30% of the higher prevalence of anxiety symptoms in our European sample relative to a 2017 U.S. sample of economics graduate students. We also document issues in the work environment, including a high incidence of sexual harassment, and make recommendations for improvement.
That is from a new paper by Elisa Macchi, Clara Sievert, Valentin Bolotnyy, and Paul Barreira.
Progress
Mass incarceration fundamentally altered the life course for a generation of American men, but sustained declines in imprisonment in recent years raise questions about how incarceration is shaping current generations. This study makes three primary contributions to a fuller understanding of the contemporary landscape of incarceration in the United States. First, we assess the scope of decarceration. Between 1999 and 2019, the Black male incarceration rate dropped by 44%, and notable declines in Black male imprisonment were evident in all 50 states. Second, our life table analysis demonstrates marked declines in the lifetime risks of incarceration. For Black men, the lifetime risk of incarceration declined by nearly half from 1999 to 2019. We estimate that less than 1 in 5 Black men born in 2001 will be imprisoned, compared with 1 in 3 for the 1981 birth cohort. Third, decarceration has shifted the institutional experiences of young adulthood. In 2009, young Black men were much more likely to experience imprisonment than college graduation. Ten years later, this trend had reversed, with Black men more likely to graduate college than go to prison. Our results suggest that prison has played a smaller role in the institutional landscape for the most recent generation compared with the generation exposed to the peak of mass incarceration.
Here is the full article, via a loyal MR reader. The causes of this advance should be a greater topic of discussion.
The politics of neuroticism and unhappiness
2/ …the increasing ideological differences on these measures are far larger and more numerous pic.twitter.com/UTl87O1wtS
— Zach Goldberg (@ZachG932) July 14, 2023
I’ve said this before, but the evidence for the proposition continues to mount: current political debate in America cannot be understood without the concept of neuroticism — as a formal concept from personality psychology — front and center.
And also as I’ve said before — neurotic isn’t the same thing as wrong!
Perhaps more importantly yet, even if a political ideology has a dominant vibe, the variance of temperaments within that ideology remains high, and high relative to the differences across ideologies. I wonder whether, as the “vibes” of particular ideologies become more public and more salient through social media, whether this does not lead to partial secessions? (Is Nate Silver one example of this?)
Imagine a future — or how about a present — where “people with a positive attitude” is actually an organizing intellectual and ideological principle? Yes, that world can be ours, we need only to will it so.
On white flight (from the comments)
Are whites fleeing from Asian-heavy California public schools? One recent paper suggested maybe so, but abc raises some doubts:
I don’t want to dismiss the paper out of hand, as I have seen time and again the challenges communities face both in and outside of the school setting in accommodating demographic change.
However, I don’t think the headline result in this paper is particularly credible. First, there isn’t a well-articulated research question to guide the choice of regression. Second, the authors implicitly rely on the “an instrument is always better” fallacy rather than explaining why their instrument yields more reliable estimates than naive OLS for the (unstated) question of interest. Taken together, the paper is undergrad-thesis level material elevated only by a click bait topic and result. If we want to make bold claims about White animosity towards Asians (a claim that also constructive of such animosity and counter-animosity from Asians towards Whites) we should demand substantive evidence. This paper does not present such evidence.
Some key takeaways:
(1) The authors note that a mechanical housing market replacement would suggest a one-for-one effect, but say that their -1.47 effect is above that threshold. However, if we check the confidence interval using a conservative 1.96 critical value and the estimated standard error of the coefficient estimate, we have -1.47 + 1.96*0.268 = -0.96 so that we are not statistically significantly different from -1 by this measure.
(2) The naive OLS estimate in high-SES regions is -0.6, well below the fixed enrollment effect of -1. The authors speculate that OLS may be biased downward because the error term include unmeasured district quality changes that draw in both Asians and Whites. (Note such a correlation only operates if enrollment is not capped, so inconsistent with that model.) The authors don’t document any of these omitted variable issues, however, and just assert that their instrument will be better.
(3) Authors do not substantively engage issues with their IV. First, the IV doesn’t account for changes in composition of immigrants over time (increasing wealth and education of Asian arrivals relative to earlier waves) nor does it account for movement of second-generation Asian families. If there is no omitted variable bias but the instrumented entry is lower than the actual entry, then mechanically the coefficient will have to be higher to offset this effect and restore least-squares minimization.
(4) The instrumented Asian inflows coefficient could pick up effects from Asian-agglomeration effects. A one unit increase in Asian enrollment from pure fixed-pattern immigration flows made lead to shifts of previously settled Asians or shift the direction of subsequent immigration. For example, a settled Korean in Riverside who sees large increases in Korean population in Orange County may see OC as being more attractive than before and move into the area. This induced shift may be only partially captured by the first-stage prediction, leaving the 2nd stage coefficient of interest to increase in magnitude.
(5) Various sensitivities lead to surprising results. First, the instrument behaves poorly in some subsamples, e.g. the bottom-half of the SES scale. Why should we believe an instrument in one data subset when it plainly fails in the complement? Second, the instrument is insignificant in the Bottom Tercile of the above-median SES group (appendix table 2). Third, the IV estimate is only -0.841 in the top tercile of the above-median SES group, again below the key -1 threshold if enrollment caps are binding. Taken together, are we to think that we can identify white flight using this instrument only for the 66.6th to 83.3th percentile bucket?
(6) There’s just a big background trend issue that one has to worry about here. The theory of white flight begs the question of “flight to where?” However if we just look at Appendix Figure 2 during this time period there is a big drop in total White enrollment (and a small decline in Black enrollment) while Asian and Hispanic enrollment see big increases. To what extent are we just finding that aging out of whites in high-SES regions is being replaced disproportionately by Asians?
(7) A couple other wrinkles: how are mixed-race students handled? how would demographic shifts in total enrollment by district affect the 1-to-1 threshold? If child population is shrinking over time (e.g. because families are leaving CA, children per family is declining) then normal churn would predict more than 1-to-1 replacement of new-cohort race versus previous-cohort race.
So perhaps the right answer is “no”?
Intergenerational transmission of mental health problems
We estimate health associations across generations and dynasties using information on healthcare visits from administrative data for the entire Norwegian population. A parental mental health diagnosis is associated with a 9.3 percentage point (40%) higher probability of a mental health diagnosis of their adolescent child. Intensive margin physical and mental health associations are similar, and dynastic estimates account for about 40% of the intergenerational persistence. We also show that a policy targeting additional health resources for the young children of adults diagnosed with mental health conditions reduced the parent-child mental health association by about 40%.
That is from a new NBER working paper from Aline Bütikofer, Krzysztof Karbownik, and Fanny Landaud.
China estimate of the day
The paper’s title is “The Largest Insurance Expansion in History: Saving One Million Lives Per Year in China”:
The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) rolled out in China from 2003-2008 provided insurance to 800 million rural Chinese. We combine aggregate mortality data with individual survey data, and identify the impact of the NCMS from program rollout and heterogeneity across areas in their rural share. We find that there was a significant decline in aggregate mortality, with the program saving more than one million lives per year at its peak, and explaining 78% of the entire increase in life expectancy in China over this period. We confirm these mortality effects using micro-data on mortality, other health outcomes, and utilization.
It is striking how few Westerns have even heard of this policy, one of the more important global events in recent years. I do however wish to ask if this estimate is in accord with other, more general estimates from the literature. The Amish, for instance, don’t see doctors so often and their life expectancy seems to be perfectly fine. The new paper is from Jonathan Gruber, Mengyun Li, and Junjian Yi.
The order of spousal names on tax returns
Married couples filing a joint return put the male name first 88.1% of the time in tax year 2020, down from 97.3% in 1996. The man’s name is more likely to go first the larger is the fraction of the couple’s allocable income that goes to him, and the older is the couple. Based on state averages, putting the man’s name first is strongly associated with conservative political attitudes, religiosity, and a survey-based measure of sexist attitudes. Risk-taking and tax noncompliance are both associated with the man’s name going first.
Here is the full NBER working paper by Emily Y. Lin, Joel Slemrod, Evelyn A. Smith, and Alexander Yuskavage.
Privacy-invading horse nationalism (ask and ye shall receive)
The census will request information on each horse’s equine identification document (passport) number, microchip number, age, current residence, second career, and more to provide a robust view of the 2023 British retired racehorse population.
The six-month census has been launched in partnership with Retraining of Racehorses (RoR), British Racing’s official aftercare charity, funded by the Racing Foundation, and is supported by World Horse Welfare and Weatherbys General Stud Book.
Here is the full story, and here are previous installments in “Horse Nationalism.” And here are the British organizations authorized to issue horse passports. A’la Orwell, someday they will subject humans to this indignity as well!
GRE scores by university major
Which university major is the smartest? A study of composite GRE scores by PhD program subject found that physicists were the smartest, followed by engineers and mathematicians. pic.twitter.com/pgtsmAPlfS
— Joseph Bronski (@BronskiJoseph) June 29, 2023
Via Diana S. Fleischman. If you click and read the entire tweet, you can see who comes in at the very bottom.
Long-term relatedness and income distribution
This article explores the role of long-term relatedness between countries, captured by an index of genetic distance, in driving worldwide differences in income inequality. The main hypothesis is that genetic distance gives rise to barriers to the international diffusion of redistributive policies and measures, and institutions, leading to greater income disparities. Using cross-country data, I consistently find that countries that are genetically distant to Denmark—the world frontier of egalitarian income distribution—tend to suffer from higher inequality, ceteris paribus. I also demonstrate that genetic distance is associated with greater bilateral differences in income inequality between countries. Employing data from the European Social Survey, I document that second-generation Europeans descending from countries with greater genetic distance to Denmark are less likely to exhibit positive attitudes towards equality. Further evidence suggests that effective fiscal redistribution is a key mechanism through which genetic distance to Denmark transmits to greater income inequality.
That is from a newly published paper by Trung V Vu.