Category: Data Source
Who believes in conspiracy theories?
While the psychological dispositions that underlie conspiracy thinking are well researched, there has been remarkably little research on the political preferences of conspiracy believers that go beyond self-reported ideology or single political issue dimensions. Using data from the European Voter Election Study (EVES), the relationship between conspiracy thinking and attitudes on three deeper-lying and salient political dimensions (redistribution, authoritarianism, migration) is examined. The results show a clear picture: Individuals with economically left-wing and culturally conservative attitudes tend to score highest on conspiracy thinking. People at this ideological location seem to long for both economic and cultural protection and bemoan a “lost paradise” where equalities had not yet been destroyed by “perfidious” processes of cultural modernization and economic neoliberalism. This pattern is found across all countries and holds regardless of socioeconomic characteristics such as education and income. While previous research has found that belief in conspiracies tends to cluster at the extremes of the political spectrum, our analysis opens up a more complex picture, showing that conspiracy thinking is not merely related to extremist orientations, but to specific combinations of political attitudes.
Here is the full article by Florian Buchmayr and André Krouwel, via the excellent Kevin Lewis, who is not obsessed with conspiracy theories.
The vanishing male writer
It’s easy enough to trace the decline of young white men in American letters—just browse The New York Times’s “Notable Fiction” list. In 2012 the Times included seven white American men under the age of 43 (the cut-off for a millennial today); in 2013 there were six, in 2014 there were six.
And then the doors shut.
By 2021, there was not one white male millennial on the “Notable Fiction” list. There were none again in 2022, and just one apiece in 2023 and 2024 (since 2021, just 2 of 72 millennials featured were white American men). There were no white male millennials featured in Vulture’s 2024 year-end fiction list, none in Vanity Fair’s, none in The Atlantic’s. Esquire, a magazine ostensibly geared towards male millennials, has featured 53 millennial fiction writers on its year-end book lists since 2020. Only one was a white American man.
Over the course of the 2010s, the literary pipeline for white men was effectively shut down. Between 2001 and 2011, six white men won the New York Public Library’s Young Lions prize for debut fiction. Since 2020, not a single white man has even been nominated (of 25 total nominations). The past decade has seen 70 finalists for the Center for Fiction’s First Novel Prize—with again, not a single straight white American millennial man. Of 14 millennial finalists for the National Book Award during that same time period, exactly zero are white men. The Wallace Stegner Fellowship at Stanford, a launching pad for young writers, currently has zero white male fiction and poetry fellows (of 25 fiction fellows since 2020, just one was a white man). Perhaps most astonishingly, not a single white American man born after 1984 has published a work of literary fiction in The New Yorker (at least 24, and probably closer to 30, younger millennials have been published in total).
Here is more from Jacob Savage at Compact.
Wind turbines lower Danish real estate prices
We analyze the impact of wind turbines on house prices, distinguishing between effects of proximity and shadow flicker from rotor blades covering the sun. By utilizing data from 2.4 million house transactions and 6,878 wind turbines in Denmark, we can control for house fixed effects in our estimation. Our results suggest strong negative impacts on house prices, with reductions of up to 12 percent for modern giant turbines. Homes affected by shadow flicker experience an additional decrease in value of 8.1 percent. Our findings suggest a nuanced perspective on the local externalities of wind turbines regarding size and relative location.
Here is the full paper by Carsten Andersen and Timo Hener, via the excellent Kevin Lewis. I rather like how they look, and would gladly buy a home near some, if only for the scenery. Though I would rather have a nearby gas station instead?
The New Geography of Labor Markets
We use matched employer-employee data to study where Americans live in relation to employer worksites. Mean distance from employee home to employer worksite rose from 15 miles in 2019 to 26 miles in 2023. Twelve percent of employees hired after March 2020 live at least fifty miles from their employers in 2023, triple the pre-pandemic share. Distance from employer rose more for persons in their 30s and 40s, in highly paid employees, and in Finance, Information, and Professional Services. Among persons who stay with the same employer from one year to the next, we find net migration to states with lower top tax rates and areas with cheaper housing. These migration patterns greatly intensify after the pandemic and are much stronger for high earners. Top tax rates fell 5.2 percentage points for high earners who stayed with the same employer but switched states in 2020. Finally, we show that employers treat distant employees as a more flexible margin of adjustment.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Mert Akan, et.al.
The Anatomy of Marital Happiness
How can I not link to a new Sam Peltzman piece on such a topic? Here goes:
Since 1972, the General Social Survey has periodically asked whether people are happy with Yes, Maybe or No type answers. Here I use a net “happiness” measure, which is percentage Yes less percentage No with Maybe treated as zero. Average happiness is around +20 on this scale for all respondents from 1972 to the last pre-pandemic survey (2018). However, there is a wide gap of around 30 points between married and unmarried respondents. This “marital premium” is this paper’s subject. I describe how this premium varies across and within population groups. These include standard socio demographics (age, sex, race education, income) and more. I find little variety and thereby surface a notable regularity in US socio demography: there is a substantial marital premium for every group and subgroup I analyze, and this premium is usually close to the overall 30-point average. This holds not just for standard characteristics but also for those directly related to marriage like children and sex (and sex preference). I also find a “cohabitation premium”, but it is much smaller (10 points) than the marital premium. The analysis is mainly visual, and there is inevitably some interesting variety across seventeen figures, such as a 5-point increase in recent years.
Via the excellent, and married, Kevin Lewis.
NIMBY contrarianism
The standard view of housing markets holds that the flexibility of local housing supply–shaped by factors like geography and regulation–strongly affects the response of house prices, house quantities and population to rising housing demand. However, from 2000 to 2020, we find that higher income growth predicts the same growth in house prices, housing quantity, and population regardless of a city’s estimated housing supply elasticity. We find the same pattern when we expand the sample to 1980 to 2020, use different elasticity measures, and when we instrument for local housing demand. Using a general demand-and-supply framework, we show that our findings imply that constrained housing supply is relatively unimportant in explaining differences in rising house prices among U.S. cities. These results challenge the prevailing view of local housing and labor markets and suggest that easing housing supply constraints may not yield the anticipated improvements in housing affordability.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Schuyler Louie, John A. Mondragon, and Johannes Wieland.
Have humans passed peak brain power?
In one particularly eye-opening statistic, the share of adults who are unable to “use mathematical reasoning when reviewing and evaluating the validity of statements” has climbed to 25 per cent on average in high-income countries, and 35 per cent in the US.
A new measurement for the value of free goods
The welfare contributions of new goods and free goods are not well-measured in our current national accounts. We derive explicit terms for the contributions of these goods and introduce a new framework and metric, GDP-B which quantifies their benefits. We apply this framework to several empirical examples including Facebook and smartphone cameras and estimate their valuations through incentive-compatible choice experiments. We find that including the gains from Facebook adds 0.05 to 0.11 percentage points to welfare growth per year while improvements in smartphones adds approximately 0.63 percentage points per year.
That is from a new AEJ piece by Erik Brynjolfsson, Avinash Collis, W. Erwin Diewert, Felix Eggers, and Kevin J. Fox.
Chad fact of the day
Chad’s PM2.5 levels were more than 18 times higher than the WHO guideline, with mineral dust in the Sahara Desert as the primary source of air pollutants.
Here is the full article, most of all noting that six of the world’s ten most polluted cities are in India. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
Model this, child care vs. college costs
The cost of child care now exceeds the price of college tuition in 38 states and the District of Columbia, according to a new analysis conducted by the Economic Policy Institute.
The left-leaning think tank, based in Washington, D.C., used 2023 federal and nonprofit data to compare the monthly cost of infant child care to that of tuition at public colleges.
The tally increased five states since the pandemic began. EPI’s last analysis relied on 2020 data, which showed child care costs outstripped college costs in 33 states and Washington, D.C., said EPI spokesperson Nick Kauzlarich.
The organization released a state-by-state guide on Wednesday showing the escalating cost of child care. Average costs range from $521 per month in Mississippi to as much as $1,893 per month in Washington, D.C., for households with one 4-year-old child, EPI found.
Here is the full story, via Anecdotal.
Sentences to ponder
The daughters of immigrants enjoy higher absolute mobility than daughters of locals in most destinations, while immigrant sons primarily enjoy this advantage in countries with long histories of immigration.
That is from a new and very interesting paper by Leah Boustan, et.al. You have pondered the implied policy recommendations, right?
The Role of Unrealized Gains and Borrowing in the Taxation of the Rich
Of relevance to some recent debates:
We have four main findings: First, measuring “economic income” as currently-taxed income plus new unrealized gains, the income tax base captures 60% of economic income of the top 1% of wealth-holders (and 71% adjusting for inflation) and the vast majority of income for lower wealth groups. Second, adjusting for unrealized gains substantially lessens the degree of progressivity in the income tax, although it remains largely progressive. Third, we quantify for the first time the amount of borrowing across the full wealth distribution. Focusing on the top 1%, while total borrowing is substantial, new borrowing each year is fairly small (1-2% of economic income) compared to their new unrealized gains, suggesting that “buy, borrow, die” is not a dominant tax avoidance strategy for the rich. Fourth, consumption is less than liquid income for rich Americans, partly because the rich have a large amount of liquid income, and partly because their savings rates are high, suggesting that the main tax avoidance strategy of the super-rich is “buy, save, die.”
Here is the full piece by Edward G. Fox and Zachary D. Liscow. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
New results on AI and lawyer productivity
From a new piece by Daniel Schwarcz, et.al., here is part of the abstract:
This article examines two emerging AI innovations that may mitigate these lingering issues: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), which grounds AI-powered analysis in legal sources, and AI reasoning models, which structure complex reasoning before generating output. We conducted the first randomized controlled trial assessing these technologies, assigning upper-level law students to complete six legal tasks using a RAG-powered legal AI tool (Vincent AI), an AI reasoning model (OpenAI’s o1-preview), or no AI. We find that both AI tools significantly enhanced legal work quality, a marked contrast with previous research examining older large language models like GPT-4. Moreover, we find that these models maintain the efficiency benefits associated with use of older AI technologies. Our findings show that AI assistance significantly boosts productivity in five out of six tested legal tasks, with Vincent yielding statistically significant gains of approximately 38% to 115% and o1-preview increasing productivity by 34% to 140%, with particularly strong effects in complex tasks like drafting persuasive letters and analyzing complaints. Notably, o1-preview improved the analytical depth of participants’ work product but resulted in some hallucinations, whereas Vincent AI-aided participants produced roughly the same amount of hallucinations as participants who did not use AI at all.
Of course those are now obsolete tools, but the results should all the more for the more advanced models.
Male coaches increase the risk-taking of female teams—Evidence from the NCAA
Highlights from the article:
The coach’s gender has a sizable and significant effect on the team’s risk-taking, a finding that is robust to an instrumental variable approach.
Women’s teams with a male head coach make risky attempts 6 percentage points more often than women’s teams with a female head coach.
The difference is persistent within games and does not change with intermediate performance.
Risk-taking has a positive effect on winning a game and teams with a female coach would win more often if they chose risky attempts more often.
The gap in risk-taking of female teams by their coach’s gender is the greater, the more experienced their head coach is.
That is from a new paper by René Böheim, Christoph Freudenthaler, and Mario Lackner.
Stripe’s Annual Letter
Stripe’s Annual Letter is eminently quotable and insightful. As a payments company, Stripe has a unique data on the entire business landscape. But who else about the Collison brothers would cite the O-ring model in their annual report?
Businesses on Stripe generated $1.4 trillion in total payment volume in 2024, up 38% from the prior year, and reaching a scale equivalent to around 1.3% of global GDP.
The businesses on Stripe span every chromosome of the economic genome.
The US corporate sector is both a cradle of invention and a densely populated graveyard of companies that had fabulous futures in their pasts.
How is AI making it’s presence felt beyond chatbots?
…we started with ChatGPT, but are now seeing a proliferation of industry specific tools. Some people have called these startups “LLM wrappers”; those people are missing the point. The O ring model in economics shows that in a process with interdependent tasks, the overall output or productivity is limited by the least effective component, not just in terms of cost but in the success of the entire system. In a similar vein, we see these new industry specific AI tools as ensuring that individual industries can properly realize the economic impact of LLMs, and that the contextual, data, and workflow integration will prove enduringly valuable.
Examples in this vein include Abridge, Nabla, and DeepScribe, which are rethinking medical and patient care, while Studeo is reshaping how real estate businesses market property. Architects are using SketchPro to instantly render designs with simple text prompts, restaurants are using Slang.ai to take phone reservations, and property managers are unifying customer support with HostAl. Harvey, whose Al legal assistant is used by many Fortune 500 companies, quadrupled revenue in 2024.
AI and SAAS make small businesses competitive with big business:
From 2005 to 2017, independent pizzerias in the United States saw a decline in numbers as the industry franchised. Then that trend in 2017. By 2023, more independent pizzerias in America than in any other year on record.
We think the rise of vertical SaaS is at least partly responsible. From a platform like Slice, dedicated specifically to the needs of pizzerias, new businesses can get a logo, website, payment system, ordering system, marketing toolkit, and branded boxes—basically everything else they need to operate their pizza
business (except an oven and the perfect sauce). They can remain independent while still benefiting from a franchisee’s economies of scale.
Crypto has found product market fit with stablecoins, “room temperature superconductors for financial services”.
Why care about stablecoins? Improvements to the basic usability of money make economies more prosperous. Consider the transitions from coins to banknotes, from the gold standard to fiat currency, and from paper instruments to electronic payments. Stablecoins are a new branch of the money tree. Such transitions occur with some regularity over the centuries, and the effects tend to be large.
Stablecoins have four important properties relative to the status quo. They make money movement cheaper, they make money movement faster, they are decentralized and open-access (and thus globally available from day one), and they are programmable. Everything interesting follows from these
characteristics.
(See also my talk to Congressional staff with Garett Jones on stablecoins and President Trump’s Crypto Executive Order.)
Finally, Europe needs to wake up:
We don’t think that anyone in Europe deliberately made it a policy goal to discourage the creation or success of new firms, but this has been the inadvertent result. GDPR alone is estimated to have reduced profits for small tech firms in Europe by up to 12%. Those cookie banners hurt, whether you accept them or not.