Category: Economics
“You see tech and AI everywhere but in the productivity statistics”
How many times have I heard versions of that claim? Erik Brynjolfsson picks up the telephone in the FT:
While initial reports suggested a year of steady labour expansion in the US, the new figures reveal that total payroll growth was revised downward by approximately 403,000 jobs. Crucially, this downward revision occurred while real GDP remained robust, including a 3.7 per cent growth rate in the fourth quarter. This decoupling — maintaining high output with significantly lower labour input — is the hallmark of productivity growth.
My own updated analysis suggests a US productivity increase of roughly 2.7 per cent for 2025. This is a near doubling from the sluggish 1.4 per cent annual average that characterised the past decade.
It is fine to suggest caution in interpreting such statistics, but they hardly push the other way.
Minimum Wages for Gig Workers Can’t Work
In 2017, I analyzed the Uber Tipping Equilibrium:
What is the effect of tipping on the take-home pay of Uber drivers? Economic theory offers a clear answer. Tipping has no effect on take home pay. The supply of Uber driver-hours is very elastic. Drivers can easily work more hours when the payment per ride increases and since every person with a decent car is a potential Uber driver it’s also easy for the number of drivers to expand when payments increase. As a good approximation, we can think of the supply of driver-hours as being perfectly elastic at a fixed market wage. What this means is that take home pay must stay constant even when tipping increases.
…If Uber holds fares constant, the higher net wage (tips plus fares) will attract more drivers but as the number of drivers increases their probability of finding a rider will fall. The drivers will earn more when driving but spend less time driving and more time idling. In other words, tipping will increase the “driving wage,” but reduce paid driving-time until the net hourly wage is pushed back down to the market wage.
A paper by Hall, Horton and Knoepfle showed that’s exactly what happened.
More recently, in 2024, Seattle implemented “PayUp”, a pay package for gig workers like DoorDash workers that required a minimum wage based on the time worked and miles travelled for each offer. Note that this is not a minimum wage for all workers but for one type of worker in a large market. For this reason, we can use the same analysis as with Uber tipping. The supply of workers is very elastic and essentially fixed at the market wage for workers of similar skill. Thus, we would expect a zero effect on net pay.
Here is a recent NBER paper by An, Garin and Kovak looking at the effects of the Seattle law:
We find that the minimum pay law raised delivery pay per task….At the same time, the policy led to a reduction in the number of tasks completed by highly attached incumbent drivers (but not an increase in exit from delivery work), completely offsetting increased pay per task and leading to zero effect on monthly earnings. We find evidence that drivers experienced more unpaid idle time and longer distances driven between tasks…Using a simple model of the labor market for platform delivery drivers, we show that our evidence is consistent with free entry of drivers into the delivery market driving down the task-finding rate until expected earnings return to their pre-reform level.
All of this is a general result of the Happy Meal Fallacy.
Malthus had real influence
From a recent paper by Eric Robertson:
Public officials often fail to implement government policy as directed, yet the role of economic ideas in shaping these implementation choices is poorly understood. This paper provides causal evidence that exposure to economic ideas can durably influence bureaucrat behavior. I study British colonial bureaucrats in India, exploiting a natural experiment created by the abrupt death of Thomas Malthus in 1834, replacing his economics instruction at a bureaucrat training college for that of a contemporary critic, Richard Jones. Whereas Malthus regarded economic distress as a natural mechanism for restoring equilibrium by reducing population growth, Jones disagreed with this view. Linking rainfall shocks to district-level fiscal responses, I show that officials trained by Malthus delivered less relief during droughts, providing 0.10-0.25 SD less aid across all major measures compared with officials taught by Jones. The results reveal that exposure to abstract economic ideas can shape real-world policy implementation for decades.
This may be a case where using rainfall shocks in a paper actually makes sense. Via Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski.
Natural and Artificial Ice
Excellent Veritasium video on the 19th century ice industry. Shipping ice from America to India would hardly seem like a wise idea—it’s hard to imagine ever getting a committee to approve such a venture—but entrepreneurs are free to try wacky ideas all the time, and sometimes they pay off, resulting in great riches. That’s the story of the “Ice King,” Frederic Tudor, who lost money for years before figuring out the insulation and logistics needed to make the trade profitable.
What I hadn’t fully appreciated is how the ice trade reshaped shipping, diet, and city design before the invention of mechanical refrigeration. Ice created the cold chain, and the cold chain made it possible to move fresh meat, fish, and produce over long distances. That in turn enabled cities to grow far beyond what local agriculture could support and shifted the American diet from salted and smoked provisions toward fresh food.
The profits of the ice trade encouraged investment in artificial ice which initially was met with resistance—natural ice is created by God!—a classic example of incumbents wrapping their economic interests in moral language, a pattern we see repeated with every disruptive technology from margarine to ridesharing.
Lots of lessons in the video about option value, permissionless innovation, and creative destruction. New technologies destroy old industries and create new ones that no one could have foreseen. The moral panic over artificial ice replacing the natural kind is no doubt familiar.
Hat tip: Naveen Nvn
The economics of corporate espionage
Weprovide systematic evidence on the economic damages from espionage to US firms and industries. Compiling a comprehensive dataset of publicly disclosed espionage incidents from 1995-2024, we establish that espionage has substantial negative effects on targeted f irms. In an event-study design, revenues and R&D expenditures at targeted firms decline by roughly 40% within five years, with effects persisting for up to a decade. These effects do not appear for firms unsuccessfully targeted for espionage, supporting a causal interpretation. These firm-level damages translate into measurable aggregate effects on US industry: exports in targeted sectors decline by 60% over a decade. Given these substantial damages, we investigate whether firms restrict knowledge sharing in response to espionage. Across a wide range of outcomes, we find no evidence of such restrictions. Firms do not reduce their patenting with foreign inventors, and do not discriminate in employment based on perceived espionage risk. Overall, espionage has clear economic harms to targeted firms and US industry, but firms are puzzlingly unresponsive in how they manage innovation.
That is from a new paper by Andrew Kao and Karthik Tadepalli. Via Kris Gulati.
Taxing Beta, Exempting Alpha: A Benchmark-Based Inheritance Regime
This paper proposes a generational benchmark inheritance regime as a structural replacement for the federal estate tax. By distinguishing between systemic market returns (Beta) and active value creation (Alpha), the regime captures the passive growth of capital at generational boundaries while fully exempting idiosyncratic surplus. Using a Pareto tail interpolation (α ≈ 1.163) calibrated to Federal Reserve wealth data, we estimate baseline annual revenue of approximately $295 billion under conservative assumptions. This revenue is sufficient to finance a 2.1 percentage point reduction in the OASDI payroll tax, shifting the fiscal burden from labor to underperforming dynastic capital. Unlike continuous wealth taxes, the regime requires no new valuation machinery, relying exclusively on existing estate and gift tax procedures. We situate the proposal within the Jeffersonian principle of usufruct and the modern literature on optimal inheritance taxation.
Minimum wage hikes and robots
This paper studies how minimum wage policy affects firms’ adoption of automation technologies. Using both state-level measures of robot exposure and novel plant-level data on industrial robot imports linked to U.S. Census microdata from 1992-2021, we show that increases in minimum wages raise the likelihood of robot adoption in manufacturing. Our preferred identification exploits discontinuities at state borders, comparing otherwise similar firms exposed to different wage floors. Across specifications, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases robot adoption by roughly 8 percent relative to the mean.
That is from Erik Brynjolfsson, et.al., including Andrew Wang. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
By the way, a photo from our textbook Modern Principles of Economics:
Changes in the Gender Wage Gap for Business Professionals
In the United States, much of the gap in earnings between men and women is due to the persistent gap for high wage earners. This paper explores changes in the gender wage gap for MBAs graduating from a large public university over 30 years. We document large gender wage gaps on average, which grow in the course of men’s and women’s careers. Comparing graduates at identical career stages across time periods to address composition concerns, we show that the raw gender wage gap has shrunk by 33 to 50 percent over the last two decades. Additionally, the temporal pattern of the gap has fundamentally shifted: while gaps only emerged over time in earlier decades, significant gaps now emerge immediately. Convergence in labor supply factors, particularly hours worked, explains much of the narrowing gap, alongside shifts in industry composition. However, unexplained wage gaps persist for recent graduates from the very start of their careers, suggesting different underlying mechanisms across cohorts. These findings highlight both progress in gender wage equity among business professionals and concerning patterns that emerge earlier in careers than in previous decades.
That is from a recent NBER working paper by
The import of cross-task productivity
Given that LLMs seem to be able to automate so many small tasks, why don’t we see large productivity effects?
I drafted a short paper recently exploring the possibility that it’s for the same reason (or at least one of the reasons) that labor is typically bundled into multi-task jobs, instead of transacted by the task, in the first place: because performing a task increases one’s productivity not only at the task itself but at related tasks.
For example, say you used to spend half your time coding and half your time debugging, and the LLM can automate the coding but you still have to do the debugging. If you’re more productive at debugging code you write yourself, this (1) explains why “coder” and “debugger” aren’t separate jobs, and (2) predicts that the LLM won’t save half your time. If you’re half as productive at debugging code you didn’t write, or less, the LLM saves you no time at all.
So I was excited to see @judyhshen and @alextamkin’s paper from a week or two ago finding basically just that!
At least the way I’m thinking about it, “cross-task learning” should make the productivity impacts of automating tasks more convex: – Automating the second half of a job should be expected to have much more of an impact than automating the first half; and – If the machines can learn from their and each others’ experience, as a worker learns by doing from her own experience, then automating two jobs will have more than twice the impact of automating one.
That is from Philip Trammell. Here is his short piece. Here is the Shen and Tamkin paper. This is all very important work for why the AI growth take-off will be much slower than the power of the models themselves might otherwise indicate. The phrase “…and then all at once” nonetheless applies. But when?
These short pieces and observations are likely among the most important outputs economists will produce this year. But are they being suitably rewarded?
Oliver Kim reviews *How Africa Works*
That is the new book by Joe Studwell, my podcast with him should be coming out pretty soon. Here is Oliver’s new review. Excerpt:
Botswana is Studwell’s poster child for a successful democratic developmental coalition. (For this reason, it featured heavily in Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail as an example of “inclusive institutions”.)
Under the sound leadership of Seretse Khama, local chiefs were carefully co-opted at independence and the Botswana Democratic Party built up into a genuine national force. Khama also created a capable civil service, initially staffed by remaining Europeans, but gradually Africanized with sterling Batswana talent. This meant that when diamonds were discovered just around independence, the windfall was carefully managed, avoiding the worst effects of Dutch Disease. These mining revenues helped raise Botswana to upper middle-income status, making it the fourth-richest country in continental Africa.
Botswana’s chief failing, in Studwell’s view, was adhering too much to responsible policy orthodoxy—i.e., not enough industrial policy. There was no vision for large-scale industrialization, no coherent plan to create large numbers of factory jobs. Moreover, the political dominance of large cattle owners (Botswana was a society of pastoralists rather than farmers) meant that redistribution was never in the cards. The result is a relatively rich society, but one that is highly unequal.
You will be hearing my views on these issues soon enough. Oliver, of course, writes one of the very best Substacks in all of economics.
Past Automation and Future A.I.: How Weak Links Tame the Growth Explosion
From Charles I. Jones and Christopher Tonetti:
How muchof past economic growth is due to automation, and what does this imply about the effects of A.I. and automation in the coming decades? We perform growth accounting using a task-based model for key sectors in the U.S. economy. Historically, TFP growth is largely due to improvements in capital productivity. The annual growth rate of capital productivity is at least 5pp larger than the sum of labor and factor-neutral productivity growth. The main benefit of automation is that we use rapidly-improving machines instead of slowly-improving humans on anincreasing set of tasks. Looking to the future, we develop an endogenous growth model in which the production of both goods and ideas is endogenously automated. We calibrate this model based on our historical evidence. Two key findings emerge. First, automation leads economic growth to accelerate over the next 75 years. Second, the acceleration is remarkably slow. By 2040, output is only 4% higher than it would have been without the growth acceleration, and by 2060 the gain is still only 19%. A key reason for the slow acceleration is the prominence of “weak links” (an elasticity of substitution among tasks less than one). Even when most tasks are automated by rapidly improving capital, output is constrained by the tasks performed by slowly-improving labor.
And an important sentence from the paper itself:
…, the key gain from automation is that it allows production of a task to shift away from slowly-improving human labor to rapidly-improving machines.
The authors stress that those are preliminary results, and the numbers are likely to change. For the pointer I thank the excellent Kurtis Hingl, who is also my research assistant.
*The Almighty Dollar*
The author is Brendan Greeley, and the subtitle is 500 Years of the World’s Most Powerful Money. A very well-timed book, excellent on the history of the dollar as it spans the centuries, I was happy to write a blurb for it.
Immigration and health for elderly Americans
We measure the impact of increased immigration on mortality among elderly Americans, who rely on the immigrant-intensive health and long-term care sectors. Using a shift-share approach we find a strong impact of immigration on the size of the immigrant care workforce: admitting 1,000 new immigrants would lead to 142 new foreign healthcare workers, without evidence of crowd out of native health care workers. We also find striking effects on mortality: a 25% increase in the steady state flow of immigrants to the US would result in 5,000 fewer deaths nationwide. We identify reduced use of nursing homes as a key mechanism driving this result.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Poverty reduction is slowing down
The basic reason why I’m not very optimistic about Africa’s growth prospects under current conditions is that the track record is extremely poor, and there’s little reason to think that anything fundamental has changed. Between 1992 and 2022, median income in China grew at an average annualized rate of 6.6 percent per year; in India it grew at a rate of 2.9 percent per year; but in sub-Saharan Africa it grew at just 1.6 percent per year, less than the rate of growth exhibited in the famously stagnant (and much wealthier) United Kingdom. But in much of the continent the picture has been worse than mere slow growth. Some countries that were relatively stable a few decades ago are now in a state of apparently permanent civil conflict, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Somalia; while other countries that have been blessed by relative stability, such as Kenya, Malawi, or Zambia, are poorer on a median income basis than they were in the ‘80s or ‘90s.
There are many things to say about why economic growth in Africa has been so disappointing, from the primacy of extractive resource sectors to the dominance of predatory elites to the poor state of human capital to the ubiquity of corruption to the absence, in many places, of a strong state monopoly on legitimate violence. But these are merely surface-level problems: the fact that these conditions exist in nearly every country in Africa, despite their widely varying historical experiences and the different ideologies with which their states have experimented, suggests that the fundamental problem is not so much with the state but the society underlying the state. If you were to describe this problem briefly, you could do quite well with something like “kinship groups crowd out effective institutions.” African societies have extraordinarily strong kinship ties, such that impersonal institutions and relationships are systematically subordinated to family, clan, and ethnic loyalties; as a result many African societies have found it extraordinarily difficult to build effective states and civil societies that are capable of doing what states and civil societies are supposed to do. (For a more complete elaboration of this view, see my article on why African nations don’t have large firms.) Solving that problem took Europe roughly a millennium; and that was when people didn’t have access to AK-47s.
Here is more from David Oks.
This security will be pricing *something* (but what?)
Alphabet has lined up banks to sell a rare 100-year bond, stepping up a borrowing spree by Big Tech companies racing to fund their vast investments in artificial intelligence this year.
The so-called century bond will form part of a debut sterling issuance this week by Google’s parent company, according to people familiar with the matter. Alphabet was also selling $15bn of dollar bonds on Monday and lining up a Swiss franc bond sale, the people said.
Century bonds — long-term borrowing at its most extreme — are highly unusual, although a flurry were sold during the period of very low interest rates that followed the financial crisis, including by governments such as Austria and Argentina.
Here is more from the FT, let us see how the yield comes in…