Category: Economics
GDPR is worse than you had thought
We examine how data privacy regulation affects healthcare innovation and research collaboration. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aims to enhance data security and individual privacy, but may also impose costs to data collection and sharing critical to clinical research. Focusing on the pharmaceutical sector, where timely access and the ability to share patient-level data plays an important role drug development, we use a difference-in-differences design exploiting variation in firms’ pre-GDPR reliance on EU trial sites. We find that GDPR led to a significant decline in clinical trial activity: affected firms initiated fewer trials, enrolled fewer patients, and operated at fewer trial sites. Overall collaborative clinical trials also declined, driven by a reduction in new partnerships, while collaborations with existing partners modestly increased. The decline in collaborations was driven among younger firms, with little variation by firm size. Our findings highlight a trade- off between stronger privacy protections and the efficiency of healthcare innovation, with implications for how regulation shapes the rate and composition of subsequent R&D.
That is from Jennifer Kao and Sukhun Kang, here is the online abstract for the AEA meetings.
Agentic interactions
Do human differences persist and scale when decisions are delegated to AI agents? We study an experimental marketplace in which individuals author instructions for buyer-and seller-side agents that negotiate on their behalf. We compare these AI agentic interactions to standard human-to-human negotiations in the same setting. First, contrary to predictions of more homogenous outcomes, agentic interactions lead to, if anything, greater dispersion in outcomes compared to human-mediated interactions. Second, crossing agents across counterparties reveals systematic dispersion in outcomes that tracks the identity and characteristics of the human creators; who designs the agent matters as much as, and often more than, shared information or code. Canonical behavioral frictions reappear in agentic form: personality traits shape agent behavior and selection on principal characteristics yields sorting. Despite AI agents not having access to the human principal’s characteristics, demographics such as gender and personality variables have substantial explanatory power for outcomes, in ways that are sometimes reversed from human-to-human interactions. Moreover, we uncover significant variation in “machine fluency”-the ability to instruct an AI agent to effectively align with one’s objective function-that is predicted by principals’ individual types, suggesting a new source of heterogeneity and inequality in economic outcomes. These results indicate that the agentic economy inherits, transforms, and may even amplify, human heterogeneity. Finally, we highlight a new type of information asymmetry in principal-agent relationships and the potential for specification hazard, and discuss broader implications for welfare, inequality, and market power in economies increasingly transacted through machines shaped by human intent.
Here is the full paper by Alex Imas, Kevin Lee, and Sanjog Misra. Here is a thread on the paper.
My Conversation with the excellent Gaurav Kapadia
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Gaurav Kapadia has deliberately avoided publicity throughout his career in investing, which makes this conversation a rare window into how he thinks. He now runs XN, a firm built around concentrated bets on a small number of companies with long holding periods. However, his education in judgment began much earlier, in a two-family house in Flushing that his parents converted into a four-family house. It was there where a young Gaurav served as de facto landlord, collecting rent and negotiating late payments at age 10. That grounding now expresses itself across an unusual range of domains: Tyler invited him on the show not just as an investor, but as someone with a rare ability to judge quality in cities, talent, art, and more with equal fluency.
Tyler and Gaurav discuss how Queens has thrived without new infrastructure, what he’d change as “dictator” of Flushing, whether Robert Moses should rise or fall in status, who’s the most underrated NYC mayor, what’s needed to attract better mayoral candidates, the weirdest place in NYC, why he initially turned down opportunities in investment banking for consulting, bonding with Rishi Sunak over railroads, XN’s investment philosophy, maintaining founder energy in investment firms and how he hires to prevent complacency, AI’s impact on investing, the differences between New York and London finance, the most common fundraising mistake art museums make, why he collects only American artists within 20 years of his own age, what makes Kara Walker and Rashid Johnson and Salman Toor special, whether buying art makes you a better investor, his new magazine Totei celebrating craft and craftsmanship, and much more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Now, I don’t intend this as commentary on any particular individual, but what is it that could be done to attract a higher quality of candidate for being mayor of New York? It’s a super important job. It’s one of the world’s greatest cities, arguably the greatest. Why isn’t there more talent running after it?
KAPADIA: It is something that I’ve thought about a great deal. I think there’s a bunch of little things that accumulate, but the main thing that happens in New York City is, people automatically assume they can’t win because it’s such a big and great city. Actually, the last few presidential elections and also the current mayoral election have taught people that anyone could win. I think that, in and of itself, is going to draw more candidates as we go forward.
What happened as an example, this time, people just assumed that one candidate had the race locked up, so a lot of good candidates, even that I know, decided not even to run. It turns out that that ended up not being the case at all. Now that people put that into their mental model, the new Bayesian analysis of that would be, “Oh, more people should run.”
The second thing: New York has a bunch of very peculiar dynamics. It’s an off-year election, and the primaries are at very awkward times. I believe there’s a history of why the primary shifted to basically the third week of June, in which there’s a very low turnout. The third week of June in New York City, when the private schools are out and an off-year election. You’re able to win the Democratic nomination and therefore the mayoral election with tens of thousands of votes in a city this big. That is absolutely insane.
A couple of things that I would probably do would be to make the primary more normal, change the election timing to make it on-cycle, even number of years. You’d have to figure out how to do that. Potentially have an open primary as well.
COWEN: If we apply the Gaurav Kapadia judgment algorithm to mayoral candidates, what’s the non-obvious quality you’re looking for?
KAPADIA: Optimism.
COWEN: Optimism.
KAPADIA: Optimism.
COWEN: Is it scarce?
KAPADIA: Extraordinarily scarce. I think there’s much more doomerism everywhere than optimism. At the end of the day, people are attracted to optimism. If you think about the machinery of the city and the state, having a clear plan — of course, you need all the basics. You need to be able to govern. It’s a very complicated city. There’re many constituents.
But I think beyond that, you have to have the ability to inspire. For some reason, almost all of the candidates, over the last couple of cycles, have really not had that — with the exception of probably one — the ability to inspire. I think that is the most underrated quality that one will need.
COWEN: I have my own answer to this question, but I’m curious to see what you say. What is, for you, the weirdest part of New York City that you know of that doesn’t really feel like it belongs to New York City at all?
Definitely recommended.
Did market power go up so much?
It seems not:
De Loecker et al. (2020) (DEU) estimate that markups increased significantly in the United States from 1955 to 2016. We find this result is sensitive to unreported sample restrictions that drop 27% of the available observations. Applying the methodology as described in the article to the full sample, markup increases are more muted until late in the sample period, and are almost entirely driven by Finance and Insurance firms. If these firms are removed, markup increases are modest. We conclude that the DEU methodology and data, as they are described in the article, do not support the conclusion that broad-based increases in market power have occurred in recent decades.
That is from a recent NBER working paper by Benkard, Miller, and Yurukoglu.
Three Nobel lectures in economic science
Crime and the Welfare State
Several recent papers claim that expanding programs like Medicaid reduces crime (e.g. here). I’ve been skeptical, not because of weaknesses in any particular paper, but just because the results feel a bit too aligned with social-desirability bias and we know that the underlying research designs can be fragile. As a result, my priors haven’t moved much. The first paper using a genuine randomized controlled trial now reports no effect of Medicaid expansion on crime.
Those involved with the criminal justice system have disproportionately high rates of mental illness and substance-use disorders, prompting speculation that health insurance, by improving treatment of these conditions, could reduce crime. Using the 2008 Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, which randomly made some low-income adults eligible to apply for Medicaid, we find no statistically significant impact of Medicaid coverage on criminal charges or convictions. These null effects persist for high-risk subgroups, such as those with prior criminal cases and convictions or mental health conditions. In the full sample, our confidence intervals can rule out most quasi-experimental estimates of Medicaid’s crime-reducing impact.
Finkelstein, Miller, and Baicker (WP).
It could still be the case that very targeted interventions–say making sure that released criminals get access to mental health care–could do some good but there’s unlikely to be any general positive effect.
A similar story is found in Finland where a large RCT on a guaranteed basic income found zero effect on crime
This paper provides the first experimental evidence on the impact of providing a guaranteed basic income on criminal perpetration and victimization. We analyze a nationwide randomized controlled trial that provided 2,000 unemployed individuals in Finland with an unconditional monthly payment of 560 Euros for two years (2017-2018), while 173,222 comparable individuals remained under the existing social safety net. Using comprehensive administrative data on police reports and district court trials, we estimate precise zero effects on criminal perpetration and victimization. Point estimates are small and statistically insignificant across all crime categories. Our confidence intervals rule out reductions in perpetration of 5 percent or more for crime reports and 10 percent or more for criminal charges.
Does studying economics and business make students more conservative?
College education is a key determinant of political attitudes in the United States and other countries. This paper highlights an important source of variation among college graduates: studying different academic fields has sizable effects on their political attitudes. Using surveys of about 300,000 students across 500 U.S. colleges, we find several results. First, relative to natural sciences, studying social sciences and humanities makes students more left-leaning, whereas studying economics and business makes them more right-leaning. Second, the rightward effects of economics and business are driven by positions on economic issues, whereas the leftward effects of humanities and social sciences are driven by cultural ones. Third, these effects extend to behavior: humanities and social sciences increase activism, while economics and business increase the emphasis on financial success. Fourth, the effects operate through academic content and teaching rather than socialization or earnings expectations. Finally, the implications are substantial. If all students majored in economics or business, the college–noncollege ideological gap would shrink by about one-third. A uniform-major scenario, in which everyone studies the same field, would reduce ideological variance and the gender gap. Together, the results show that academic fields shape students’ attitudes and that field specialization contributes to political fragmentation.
That is a recent paper from Yoav Goldstein and Matan Kolerman. Here is a thread on the paper.
Colors of growth
This looks pretty tremendous:
We develop a novel approach to measuring long-run economic growth by exploiting systematic variation in the use of color in European paintings. Drawing inspiration from the literature on nighttime lights as a proxy for income, we extract hue, saturation, and brightness from millions of pixels to construct annual indices for Great Britain, Holland, France, Italy, and Germany between 1600 and 1820. These indices track broad trends in existing GDP reconstructions while revealing higher frequency fluctuations – such as those associated with wars, political instability, and climatic shocks – that traditional series smooth over. Our findings demonstrate that light, decomposed into color and brightness components, provides a credible and independent source of information on early modern economic activity.
That is new research by Lars Boerner, Tim Reinicke, Samad Sarferaz, and Battista Severgnini. Via Ethan Mollick.
Planning sentences to ponder
Planning assistance caused municipalities to build 20% fewer housing units per decade over the 50 years that followed.
Here is the full abstract:
We study how the federal Urban Planning Assistance Program, which subsidized growing communities in the 1960s to hire urban planners to draft land-use plans, affected housing supply. Using newly digitized records merged with panel data across municipalities on housing and zoning outcomes, we exploit eligibility thresholds and capacity to approve funds across state agencies to identify effects. Planning assistance caused municipalities to build 20% fewer housing units per decade over the 50 years that followed. Regulatory innovation steered construction in assisted areas away from apartments and toward larger single-family homes. Textual evidence related to zoning and development politics further shows that, since the 1980s, assisted communities have disincentivized housing supply by passing on development costs to developers. These findings suggest that federal intervention in planning helped institutionalize practices that complicate community growth, with subsequent consequences for national housing affordability.
Hail Martin Anderson! The above paper is by Tom Cui and Beau Bressler, via Brad, and also Yonah Freemark.
Two things that really matter
When analyzing the macro situations of countries or regions, I place more stress than many people do on the following two factors:
1. Human capital: How much active, ambitious talent is there? And how high are the averages and medians?
2. Matching market demands: Are you geared up to produce what the market really wants, export markets or otherwise?
Those may sound trivial, but in relative terms they remain undervalued. They are, for instance, the biggest reasons why I do not buy “the housing theory of everything.”
They are also, in my view, the biggest reasons why the UK currently is in economic trouble. Both #1 (brain drain) and #2 have taken a hit in recent times. The UK continues to deindustrialize, business consulting is not the future, and London as a financial centre was hurt by 2008, Brexit, and superior innovations elsewhere. More and more smart Brits are leaving for the US or Dubai.
You also will notice that #1 and #2, when they are in trouble, are not always easily fixed. That is why reforms, while often a good idea, are by no means an easy or automatic way out of trouble.
These two factors also are consistent with the stylized fact that growth rates from the previous decade are not so predictive of growth rates for the next decades. Human capital often drives levels more than growth rates. And matching market demands often has to do with luck, or with shifting patterns of demand that the supplying country simply cannot match. Once people abandon Toyotas for Chinese electric cars, Japan does not have an easy pivot to make up the loss.
Most other theories of growth rates, for instance those that assign a predominant weight to institutions, predict much more serial correlation of growth rates than we find in the data. That said, institutions do indeed matter, and in addition to their usual effects they will shape both #1 and #2 over the longer run.
Overall, I believe conclusions would be less pat and economic understandings would be more effective if people paid greater attention to these factors #1 and #2. Not putting enough weight on #1 and #2 is one of the biggest mistakes I see smart people — and indeed very smart people — making.
Addendum: You will note the contributions of Fischer Black here. Apart from his contributions to options pricing theory, which are widely known, he remains one of the most underrated modern economists.
Welcome to the Crazy CAFE
To let Americans buy smaller cars, Trump had to weaken fuel-efficiency standards. Does that sound crazy? Small cars, of course, have much higher fuel efficiency. Yet this is exactly how the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards work.
Since 2011, fuel-economy targets scale with a vehicle’s “footprint” (wheelbase × track width). Big vehicles get lenient targets; small vehicles face demanding ones. A microcar that gets 40 MPG might be judged against a target of 50-60 MPG, while a full-size truck doing 20 MPG can satisfy a 22 MPG requirement.. The small car is clearly more efficient, yet it fails the rule that the truck passes.
The policy was meant to be fair to producers of large vehicles, but it rewards bloat. Make a car bigger and compliance gets easier. Add crash standards built around heavier vehicles and it’s obvious why the US market produces crossovers and trucks while smaller and much less expensive city-cars, familiar in Europe and Asia, never show up. At a press conference rolling back CAFE standards, Trump noted he’d seen small “kei” cars on his Asia trip—”very small, really cute”—and directed the Transportation Secretary to clear regulatory barriers so they could be built and sold in America.
Trump’s rollback—cutting the projected 2031 fleet average from roughly 50.4 MPG to 34.5 MPG—relaxes the math enough that microcars could comply again. Only Kafka would appreciate a fuel-economy system that makes small fuel-efficient cars hard to sell and giant trucks easy. Yet the looser rules remove a barrier to greener vehicles while also handing a windfall to big truck makers. A little less Kafka, a little more Tullock.
Political pressure on the Fed
From a forthcoming paper by Thomas Drechsel:
This paper combines new data and a narrative approach to identify variation in political pressure on the Federal Reserve. From archival records, I build a data set of personal interactions between U.S. Presidents and Fed officials between 1933 and 2016. Since personal interactions do not necessarily reflect political pressure, I develop a narrative identification strategy based on President Nixon’s pressure on Fed Chair Burns. I exploit this narrative through restrictions on a structural vector autoregression that includes the President-Fed interaction data. I find that political pressure to ease monetary policy (i) increases the price level strongly and persistently, (ii) does not lead to positive effects on real economic activity, (iii) contributed to inflationary episodes outside of the Nixon era, and (iv) transmits differently from a typical monetary policy easing, by having a stronger effect on inflation expectations. Quantitatively, increasing political pressure by half as much as Nixon, for six months, raises the price level by about 7% over the following decade.
That is not entirely a positive omen for the current day.
Innovations in Health Care
The latest issue of the journal Innovations focuses on health care and is excellent. It’s a very special issue–a double Tabarrok issue!
My paper, Operation Warp Speed: Negative and Positive Lessons for New Industrial Policy, asks what can learn from the tremendous success of OWS about an OWS for X? What are the opportunities and the dangers?
My son Maxwell Tabarrok’s paper is Peptide-DB: A Million-Peptide Database to Accelerate Science. Max’s paper combines economics and science policy. Open databases are a public good and so are underprovided. A case in point is that there is no big database for anti-microbial peptides despite the evident utility of such a database for using ML techniques to create new antibiotics. The NIH and other organizations have successfully filled this gap with databases in the past such as PubChem, the HGP, and ProteinDB. A million-peptide database is well within their reach:
The existing data infrastructure for antimicrobial peptides is tiny and scattered: a few thousand sequences with a couple of useful biological assays are scattered across dozens of data providers. No one in science today has the incentives to create this data. Pharma companies can’t make money from it and researchers can’t produce any splashy publications. This means that researchers are duplicating the expensive legwork of collating and cleaning all of this
data and are not getting optimal results, as this is simply not enough information to take full advantage of the ML approach. Scientific funding organizations, including the NIH and the NSF, can fix this problem. The scientific knowledge required to massively scale the data we have on antimicrobial peptides is well established and ready to go. It wouldn’t be too expensive or take too long to get a clean dataset of a million peptides or more, and to have detailed information on their activity against the most important resistant pathogens as well as its toxicity to human cells. This is well within the scale of the successful projects these organizations have funded in the past, including PubChem, the HGP, and ProteinDB.
Naturally, I am biased towards Tabarrok-articles but another important paper is Reorganizing the CDC for Effective Public Health Emergency Response by Gowda, Ranasinghe, and Phan. As Michael Lewis wrote in The Premonition by the time of COVID the CDC had became more akin to an academic department than a virus fighting agency:
The CDC did many things. It published learned papers on health crises, after the fact. It managed, very carefully, public perception of itself. But when the shooting started, it leapt into the nearest hole, while others took fire.
Gowda, Ranasinghe, and Phan agree.
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed significant weaknesses in the CDC’s response system. Its traditional strengths in testing, pathogen dentification, and disease investigation and tracking faltered. The legacy of Alexander Langmuir, a pioneering epidemiologist who infused the CDC with epidemiological principles in the 1950s, now seems a distant memory. Tasks as basic as collecting and providing timely COVID-19 data, along with data analysis and epidemiological modeling—both of which should have been the core capability of the CDC—became alarmingly difficult and had to be handled by nongovernmental organizations, such as the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center.
A closer examination of the CDC’s workforce composition reveals the root cause: a mere fraction of its employees are epidemiologists and data scientists. The agency has seen an increasing emphasis on academic exploration at the expense of on the-ground action and support for frontline health departments. (Armstrong & Griffin, 2022).
The authors propose to reinvigorate the CDC by integrating it with the more practical and active U.S. Public Health Service. This is a very good suggestion.
For one more check out Bai, Hyman and Silver as a primer on Improving Health Care. The entire issue is excellent.
My Conversation with the excellent Dan Wang
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Dan debate whether American infrastructure is actually broken or just differently optimized, why health care spending should reach 35% of GDP, how lawyerly influences shaped East Asian development differently than China, China’s lack of a liberal tradition and why it won’t democratize like South Korea or Taiwan did, its economic dysfunction despite its manufacturing superstars, Chinese pragmatism and bureaucratic incentives, a 10-day itinerary for Yunnan, James C. Scott’s work on Zomia, whether Beijing or Shanghai is the better city, Liu Cixin and why volume one of The Three-Body Problem is the best, why contemporary Chinese music and film have declined under Xi, Chinese marriage markets and what it’s like to be elderly in China, the Dan Wang production function, why Stendhal is his favorite novelist and Rossini’s Comte Ory moves him, what Dan wants to learn next, whether LLMs will make Tyler’s hyper-specific podcast questions obsolete, what flavor of drama their conversation turned out to be, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: When will Chinese suburbs be really attractive?
WANG: What are Chinese suburbs? You use this term, Tyler, and I’m not sure what exactly they mean.
COWEN: You have a yard and a dog and a car, right?
WANG: Yes.
COWEN: You control your school district with the other parents. That’s a suburb.
WANG: How about never? I’m not expecting that China will have American-style suburbs anytime soon, in part because of the social engineering projects that are pretty extensive in China. I think there is a sense in which Chinese cities are not especially dense. Indian cities are much, much more dense. I think that Chinese cities, the streets are not necessarily terribly full of people all the time. They just sprawl quite extensively.
They sprawl in ways that I think the edges of the city still look somewhat like the center of the city, which there’s too many high-rises. There’s probably fewer parks. There’s probably fewer restaurants. Almost nobody has a yard and a dog in their home. That’s in part because the Communist Party has organized most people to live in apartment compounds in which it is much easier to control them.
We saw this really extensively in the pandemic, in which people were unable to leave their Shanghai apartment compounds for anything other than getting their noses and mouths swabbed. I write a little bit about how, if you take the rail outside of major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, you hit farmland really, really quickly. That is in part because the Communist Party assesses governors as well as mayors on their degree of food self-sufficiency.
Cities like Shanghai and Beijing have to produce a lot of their own crops, both grains as well as vegetables, as well as fruits, as well as livestock, within a certain radius so that in case there’s ever a major devastating war, they don’t have to rely on strawberries from Mexico or strawberries from Cambodia, or Thailand. There’s a lot of farmland allocated outside of major cities. I think that will prevent suburban sprawl. You can’t control people if they all have a yard as well as a dog. I think the Communist Party will not allow it.
COWEN: Whether the variable of engineers matters, I went and I looked at the history of other East Asian economies, which have done very well in manufacturing, built out generally excellent infrastructure. None of these problems with the Second Avenue line in New York. Taiwan, like the presidents, at least if we believe GPT-5, three of them were lawyers and none of them were engineers. South Korea, you have actually some economists, a lot of bureaucrats.
WANG: Wow. Imagine that. Economists in charge, Tyler.
COWEN: I wouldn’t think it could work. A few lawyers, one engineer. Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, he’s a lawyer. He thinks in a very lawyerly manner. Singapore has arguably done the best of all those countries. Much richer than China, inspired China. Why should I think engineers rather than just East Asia, and a bunch of other accompanying facts about these places are what matter?
WANG: Japan, a lot of lawyers in the top leadership. What exactly was the leadership of Hong Kong? A bunch of British civil servants.
COWEN: Some of whom are probably lawyers or legal-type minds, right? Not in general engineers.
WANG: PPE grads. I think that we can understand the engineering variable mostly because of how much more China has done relative to Japan and South Korea and Taiwan.
COWEN: It’s much, much poorer. Per capita manufacturing output is gone much better in these other countries.
And:
WANG: Tyler, what does it say about us that you and I have generally a lot of similar interests in terms of, let’s call it books, music, all sorts of things, but when it comes to particular categories of things, we oppose each other diametrically. I much prefer Anna Karenina to War and Peace. I prefer Buddenbrooks to Magic Mountain. Here again, you oppose me. What’s the deal?
COWEN: I don’t think the differences are that big. For instance, if we ask ourselves, what’s the relative ranking of Chengdu plus Chongqing compared to the rest of the world? We’re 98.5% in agreement compared to almost anyone else. When you get to the micro level, the so-called narcissism of petty differences, obviously, you’re born in China. I grew up in New Jersey. It’s going to shape our perspectives.
Anything in China, you have been there in a much more full-time way, and you speak and read Chinese, and none of that applies to me. I’m popping in and out as a tourist. Then, I think the differences make much more sense. It’s possible I would prefer to live in Shanghai for essentially the reasons you mentioned. If I’m somewhere for a week, I’m definitely going to pick Beijing. I’ll go around to the galleries. The things that are terrible about the city just don’t bother me that much, because I know I’ll be gone.
WANG: 98.5% agreement. I’ll take that, Tyler. It’s you and me against the rest of the world, but then we’ll save our best disagreements for each other.
COWEN: Let’s see if you can pass an intellectual Turing test. Why is it that I think Yunnan is the single best place in the world to visit? Just flat out the best if you had to pick one region. Not why you think it is, but why I think it is.
Strongly recommended, Dan and I had so much fun we kept going for about an hour and forty minutes. And of course you should buy and read Dan’s bestselling book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future.
The importance of the internet
From my recent chat with Alex, mostly about fiscal policy:
TABARROK:To be clear, a 0.5% increase in the rate of productivity growth, that doesn’t seem like a lot, but that would be historically a bigger increase than we got from anything. A bigger increase than the internet. Sure, yes.
COWEN:It is the internet in a way, but yes.
TABARROK:It was founded on the internet, yes. The internet was the agar culturefor the growth of the AI.
COWEN:That’s why the internet’s important. We’re just beginning to realize this,right?
TABARROK:Exactly, yes.
COWEN:It’s why a lot of people can’t admit AI might be a good thing, because then they’d have to admit the internet was a good thing. They’re so committed to never saying that.
TABARROK:Is that why?
COWEN:That’s why, yes.Believe me. That’s why.
TABARROK:It is funny that I think historically, when we look back, I think you’re right, we’ll think about what was the internet. The growth culture was putting everything online, was for the AI. It wasn’t for us.