Category: Economics
Why are US Clinical Trials so Expensive?
Dave Ricks, CEO of Eli Lilly, speaking on the excellent Cheeky Pint Podcast (hosted by John Collison, sometimes joined by Patrick as in this episode) had the clearest discussion of why US clinical trial costs are so expensive that I have read.
One point is obvious once you hear it: Sponsors must provide high-end care to trial participants–thus because U.S. health care is expensive, US clinical trials are expensive. Clinical trial costs are lower in other countries because health care costs are lower in other countries but a surprising consequence is that it’s also easier to recruit patients in other countries because sponsors can offer them care that’s clearly better than what they normally receive. In the US, baseline care is already so good, at least at major hospital centers where you want to run clinical trials, that it’s more difficult to recruit patients. Add in IRB friction and other recruitment problems, and U.S. trial costs climb fast.
Patrick
I looked at the numbers. So, apparently the median clinical trial enrollee now costs $40,000. The median US wage is $60,000, so we’re talking two thirds. Why and why couldn’t it be a 10th or a hundredth of what it is?David (00:10:50):
Yeah, brilliant question and one we’ve spent a lot of time working on…“Why does a trial cost so much?” Well, we’re taking the sickest slice of the healthcare system that are costing the most. And we’re ingesting them. We’re taking them out of the healthcare system and putting them in a clinical trial. Typically we pay for all care. So we are literally running the healthcare system for those individuals and that is in some ways for control, because you want to have the best standard of care so your experiment is properly conducted and it’s not just left to the whims of hundreds of individual doctors and people in Ireland versus the US getting different background therapies. So you standardize that, that costs money because sort of leveling up a lot of things, but then also in some ways you’re paying a premium to both get the treating physicians and have great care to get the patient. We don’t offer them remuneration, but they get great care and inducement to be in the study because you’re subjecting yourself quite often, not all the case, but to something other than the standard of care, either placebo or this. Or, in more specialized care, often it’s standard care plus X where X could actually be doing harm, not good. So people have to go into that in a blinded way and I guess the consideration is you’ll get the best care.Patrick (00:12:51):
Of the $40,000. How much of that should I look at as inducement and encouragement for the patient and how much should I look at it as the cost of doing things given the regulatory apparatus that exists?David (00:13:02):
The patient part is the level up part and I would say 20, 30% of the cost of studies typically would be this. So you’re buying the best standard of care, you’re not getting something less. That’s medicine costs, you’re getting more testing, you’re getting more visits, and then there is a premium that goes to institutions, not usually to the physician, the institution to pay for the time of everybody involved in it plus something. We read a lot about it in the NIH cuts, the 60% Harvard markup or whatever. There’s something like that in all clinical trials too. Overhead coverage, whatnot. But it’s paying for things that aren’t in the trial.Patrick (00:13:40):
US healthcare is famously the most expensive in the world. Yes. Do you run trials outside the US?David (00:13:44):
Yeah, actually most. I mean we want to actually do more in the US. This is a problem I think for our country. Take cancer care where you think, okay, what’s the one thing the US system’s really good at? If I had cancer, I’d come to the US, that’s definitely true. But only 4% of patients who have cancer in the US are in clinical trials. Whereas in Spain and Australia it’s over 25%.And some of that is because they’ve optimized the system so it’s easier to run and then enroll, which I’d like to get to, people in the trials. But some of it is also that the background of care isn’t as good. So that level up inducement is better for the patient and the physician. Here, the standard’s pretty good, so people are like, “Do I want to do something where there’s extra visits and travel time?” There’s another problem in the US which is, we have really good standards of care but also quite different performing systems and we often want to place our trials in the best performing systems that are famous, like MD Anderson or the Brigham. And those are the most congested with trials and therefore they’re the slowest and most expensive. So there’s a bit of a competition for place that goes on as well.
But overall, I would say in our diabetes and cardiovascular trials, many, many more patients are in our trials outside the US than in and that really shouldn’t be other than cost of the system. And to some degree the tuning of the system, like I mentioned with Spain and Australia toward doing more clinical trials. For instance, here in the US, everywhere you get ethics clearance, we call it IRB. The US has a decentralized system, so you have to go to every system you’re doing a study in. Some countries like Australia have a single system, so you just have one stop and then the whole country is available to recruit those types of things.
Patrick (00:15:31):
You said you want to talk about enrollment?David (00:15:32):
Yeah, yeah. It’s fascinating. So drug development time in the industry is about 10 years in the clinic, a little less right now. We’re running a little less than seven at Lilly, so that’s the optimization I spoke about. But actually, half of that seven is we have a protocol open, that means it’s an experiment we want to run. We have sites trained, they’re waiting for patients to walk in their door and to propose, “Would you like to be in the study?” But we don’t have enough people in the study. So you’re in the serial process, diffuse serial process, waiting for people to show up. You think, “Wow, that seems like we could do better than that. If Taylor Swift can sell at a concert in a few seconds, why can’t I fill an Alzheimer’s study? There seem to be lots of patients.” But that’s healthcare. It’s very tough. We’ve done some interesting things recently to work around that. One thing that’s an idea that partially works now is culling existing databases and contacting patients.Patrick (00:16:27):
Proactive outreach.
See also Chertman and Teslo at IFP who have a lot of excellent material on clinical trial abundance.
Lots of other interesting material in this episode including how Eli Lilly Direct—driven largely by Zepbound—has quickly become a huge pharmacy. The direct-to-consumer model it represents could be highly productive as more drugs for preventing disease are developed. I am not as anti-PBM as Ricks and almost everyone in the industry are but I will leave that for another day.
Here is the Cheeky Pint Podcast main page.
The spatial construction of Incan monies?
Money can be many things, but this to me is a new one. Or is it?
Stretching for 1.5km and consisting of approximately 5200 precisely aligned holes, Monte Sierpe in southern Peru is a remarkable construction that likely dates to at least the Late Intermediate Period (AD 1000–1400) and saw continued use by the Inca (AD 1400–1532). Yet its function remains uncertain. Here, the authors report on new analyses of drone imagery and sediment samples that reveal numerical patterns in layout, potential parallels with Inca knotted-string records and the presence of crops and wild plants. All this, the authors argue, suggests that Monte Sierpe functioned as a local, Indigenous system of accounting and exchange.
That is newly published research from Jacob L. Bongers, et.al. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Was Brexit worse than we had thought?
This paper examines the impact of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) in 2016. Using almost a decade of data since the referendum, we combine simulations based on macro data with estimates derived from micro data collected through our Decision Maker Panel survey. These estimates suggest that by 2025, Brexit had reduced UK GDP by 6% to 8%, with the impact accumulating gradually over time. We estimate that investment was reduced by between 12% and 18%, employment by 3% to 4% and productivity by 3% to 4%. These large negative impacts reflect a combination of elevated uncertainty, reduced demand, diverted management time, and increased misallocation of resources from a protracted Brexit process. Comparing these with contemporary forecasts – providing a rare macro example to complement the burgeoning micro-literature of social science predictions – shows that these forecasts were accurate over a 5-year horizon, but they underestimated the impact over a decade.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
*The Science of Second Chances*
The author is economist Jennifer Doleac, and the subtitle is A Revolution in Criminal Justice. Excerpt:
We found that adding anyone charged with a felony to the law enforcement DNA database in Denmark reduced future criminal convictions by over 40 percent. Again, people responded to the higher probability of getting caught by committing fewer crimes. Being added to the database also increased enrollment in school and rates of employment — signs that folks really were on a better path. This effect was largest for the youngest men, those ages eighteen to twenty-four.
Incentives matter. An excellent book, recommended, due out next year.
“Some Economics of Artificial Super Intelligence”
I promised to pass along serious models of pending AI doom, especially if they are peer-reviewed or at least headed for such. The AI doomer types still are dropping the ball on this, but one economist has made a contribution and so here it is from Henry A. Thompson:
Conventional wisdom holds that a misaligned artificial superintelligence (ASI) will destroy humanity. But the problem of constraining a powerful agent is not new. I apply classic economic logic of interjurisdictional competition, all-encompassing interest, and trading on credit to the threat of misaligned ASI. Using a simple model, I show that an acquisitive ASI refrains from full predation under surprisingly weak conditions. When humans can flee to rivals, inter-ASI competition creates a market that tempers predation. When trapped by a monopolist ASI, its “encompassing interest” in humanity’s output makes it a rational autocrat rather than a ravager. And when the ASI has no long-term stake, our ability to withhold future output incentivizes it to trade on credit rather than steal. In each extension, humanity’s welfare progressively worsens. But each case suggests that catastrophe is not a foregone conclusion. The dismal science, ironically, offers an optimistic take on our superintelligent future.
You may or may not agree, but as usual the point is to build out a literature, not to regard any single paper as the final word. Via the excellent Joy Buchanan.
Waymo
Waymo now does highways in the Bay area.
Expanding our service territory in the Bay Area and introducing freeways is built on real-world performance and millions of miles logged on freeways, skillfully handling highway dynamics with our employees and guests in Phoenix, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. This experience, reinforced by comprehensive testing as well as extensive operational preparation, supports the delivery of a safe and reliable service.
The future is happening fast.
Prediction markets in everything? Tariff refund edition
Oppenheimer changed its terms from offers earlier this year. The firm said it would consider bids starting at 20 percent per refund claim pertaining to “reciprocal” or IEEPA tariffs and 10 percent for tariffs tied to fentanyl.
Gabriel Rodriguez, the president and co-founder of A Customs Brokerage, in Doral, Fla., and a recipient of several emails from Oppenheimer, said he believed Oppenheimer was offering to pay the equivalent of 80 cents on the dollar per claim.
Here is more from the NYT, via Amy.
One-Third of US Families Earn Over $150,000
It’s astonishing that the richest country in world history could convince itself that it was plundered by immigrants and trade. Truly astonishing.
From Jeremy Horpedahl who notes:
This is from the latest Census release of CPS ASEC data, updated through 2024 (see Table F-23 at this link).
In 1967, only 5 percent of US families earned over $150,000 (inflation adjusted).

And even though it says so in the chart and in the text let me say it again, this is inflation adjusted and so yes it’s real and no the fact that housing has gone up in price doesn’t negate this, it’s built in. We would have done even better had NIMBYs not reduced the supply of housing.
See also Asness and Strain.
Addendum: Note it isn’t the rise of dual-earner households which haven’t increased for over 30 years.
European Stagnation
Excellent piece by Luis Garicano, Bengt Holmström & Nicolas Petit.

The continent faces two options. By the middle of this century, it could follow the path of Argentina: its enormous prosperity a distant memory; its welfare states bankrupt and its pensions unpayable; its politics stuck between extremes that mortgage the future to save themselves in the present; and its brightest gone for opportunities elsewhere. In fact, it would have an even worse hand than Argentina, as it has enemies keen to carve it up by force and a population that would be older than Argentina’s is today.
Or it could return to the dynamics of the trente glorieuses. Rather than aspire to be a museum-cum-retirement home, happy to leave the technological frontier to other countries, Europe could be the engine of a new industrial revolution. Europe was at the cutting edge of innovation in the lifetime of most Europeans alive today. It could again be a continent of builders, traders and inventors who seek opportunity in the world’s second largest market.
The European Union does not need a new treaty or powers. It just needs a single-minded focus on one goal: economic prosperity.
I’ve quoted the call to arms but there is much more substantive and deep analysis. Naturally, I approve of this theme “If a product is safe enough to be sold in Lisbon, it should be safe enough for Berlin.” Not the usual fare, read the whole thing.
More From Less: Optimizing Vaccine Doses
During COVID, I argued strongly that we should cut the Moderna dose in order to expand supply. In a paper co-authored with Witold Więcek, Michael Kremer and others, we showed that a half dose of Moderna was more effective than a full dose of AstraZenecs and that doubling the effective Moderna supply could have saved many lives.
It’s not just about COVID. My co-author on the COVID paper, Witold Więcek, has found other examples where a failure to run dose optimization trials cost lives:
Take the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine. For years after its introduction, countries administered it as a three-dose series. Then additional evidence emerged; eventually, a single dose proved to be non-inferior. This policy shift, driven by updated World Health Organization (WHO) guidance, has been a game-changer—massively reducing delivery costs while expanding coverage in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). But it took 16 years from regulatory approval to WHO recommendation. Had this change been implemented just five years earlier, the paper estimates that 150,000 lives could have been saved.
Knowing the potential for dose optimization should encourage us to take a closer look at what we can do now. Więcek points to two high-opportunity projects:
- The pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) is already Gavi’s top cost driver, consuming $1 billion of its 2026–2030 budget. But new WHO SAGE guidance, from March 2025, suggests that in countries with consistently high coverage (≥80–90 percent over five years), either one of three shots could be dropped, or each of the three doses can be lowered to 40 percent of the standard dose. While implementation requires sufficient epidemiological surveillance, its cost would be offset by significant savings in vaccine costs: a retrospective analysis suggests that for the 2020–25 period this approach could have led to as much as $250 million in savings.
- New tuberculosis vaccines, currently in phase 2–3 trials, are another high-impact example. Given initial promising results, a future vaccine could prove highly effective, but may also become a significant cost driver for countries and/or Gavi—and optimization may prove highly beneficial both in terms of health and economic value.
Witold’s new paper is here and here is excellent summary blog post from which I have drawn.
Addendum: See also my paper on Bayesian Dose Optimization Trials and from Mike Doherty Particles that enhance mRNA delivery could reduce vaccine dosage and costs.
How has Japan managed its debt ratio?
They have been using an implicit sovereign wealth fund, even in light of rising debt levels:
Since 2012, the social security fund has increased its exposure to riskier assets. In 2013, a government panel recommended a major reallocation of government-run pension funds into higher-yield investments (Hoshi and Yasuda 2015). Following this shift, three-quarters of public pension fund assets were allocated equally across three categories of risky assets: domestic equities, foreign equities, and foreign bonds (each at 25 percent). Over the past decade, these investments have generated strong realized returns, boosting the net asset position of public pension funds from around 40 percent of GDP to over 60 percent of GDP.
And this:
In fact, Japan’s net liabilities decreased over the past ten years from 118.4 percent to 77.6 percent. However, these gains have come from taking risks — in particular, the risks of duration mismatch and currency mismatch.
That is from a new JEP article by Yili Chien, Wenxin Du, and Hanno Lustig. Good work, but of course that makes Japan correspondingly vulnerable in the event of a major global equities downturn.
In defense of Schumpeter
Factories of Ideas? Big Business and the Golden Age of American Innovation (Job Market Paper) [PDF]
This paper studies the Great Merger Wave (GMW) of 1895-1904—the largest consolidation event in U.S. history—to identify how Big Business affected American innovation. Between 1880 and 1940, the U.S. experienced a golden age of breakthrough discoveries in chemistry, electronics, and telecommunications that established its technological leadership. Using newly constructed data linking firms, patents, and inventors, I show that consolidation substantially increased innovation. Among firms already innovating before the GMW, consolidation led to an increase of 6 patents and 0.6 breakthroughs per year—roughly four-fold and six-fold increases, respectively. Firms with no prior patents were more likely to begin innovating. The establishment of corporate R\&D laboratories served as a key mechanism driving these gains. Building a matched inventor–firm panel, I show that lab-owning firms enjoyed a productivity premium not due to inventor sorting, robust within size and technology classes. To assess whether firm-level effects translated into broader technological progress, I examine total patenting within technological domains. Overall, the GMW increased breakthroughs by 13% between 1905 and 1940, with the largest gains in science-based fields (30% increase).
That is the job market paper of Pier Paolo Creanza, who is on the market this year from Princeton.
Educational for-profit charter schools do worse in Sweden
I estimate the long-run earnings impacts of for-profit and non-profit charter high schools in Sweden. Since the 1990s, privately managed schools have expanded dramatically—driven entirely by for-profit providers—and now enroll nearly half of urban high school students. Unlike in many other settings, there are no schools operating outside of the public system: all schools rely on equal public funding, cannot charge top-up fees, and are subject to the same regulation. Using a combination of value-added and regression discontinuity methods, I find that charter school attendance reduces long-run earnings by 2% on average—comparable to the returns to half a year of schooling in similar settings. For-profits generate these losses by hiring less-educated, lower-paid teachers, consistent with concerns around cost-cutting. By contrast, non-profits reduce earnings by specializing in arts programs: conditional on such specialization, they perform as or even better than public schools. In a discrete choice framework using rank-ordered school applications, I show that students’ preferences are weakly related to schools’ earnings impacts. Most of the for-profit market share is explained by student demand for attractive locations and study programs, presenting a trade-off between satisfying short-run demand and boosting long-run economic outcomes.
That is the job market paper from Petter Berg, from Stockholm School of Economics.
Housing costs and fertility
Many developed countries face low and falling birthrates, potentially affected by rising costs of housing. Existing evidence on the fertility-housing cost relationship typically uses geographic variation (raising selection issues), neglects unit size, and says little about policy. To progress on these fronts, I first specify a dynamic model of the joint housing-fertility choice allowing choices over location and house size, estimated using US Census Bureau data. I extend ‘micro-moment’ techniques (Petrin, 2002; Berry et al., 2004a) both to circumvent data constraints and to incorporate heterogeneous residuals, which can prevent misspecification. Housing choice estimates confirm a Becker quantity-quality model’s predictions: large families are more cost-sensitive, and so rising housing costs disincentivize fertility. To study the causal effect of rising housing costs on fertility, I vary them directly within the model, finding that rising costs since 1990 are responsible for 11% fewer children, 51% of the total fertility rate decline between the 2000s and 2010s, and 7 percentage points fewer young families in the 2010s. Policy counterfactuals indicate that a supply shift for large units generates 2.3 times more births than an equal-cost shift for small units: family-friendly housing is the more important policy lever.
That is from Benjamin K. Couillard, a job market candidate from University of Toronto.
Should USG support a 50-year mortgage?
More “affordability” from Trump!? From GPT-5:
Broad, government‑backed 50‑year mortgages would likely lower monthly payments but raise house prices, slow equity build‑up (and raise default risk in downturns), and increase interest‑rate risk in the financial system. As a general affordability policy for the U.S., that’s a poor trade‑off. If used at all, a 50‑year term should be tightly targeted (e.g., to loan modifications or to newly built homes only), not adopted wholesale for new purchases…
In the short run, sellers and incumbent owners capture much of the benefit via higher sale prices; first‑time buyers face higher entry prices…
Here is the whole answer. Albania has the right idea!