Category: Games
What I learn from chess and computers
I take these points to be a jumping off place for thinking about computers and future economic growth, and wages, more generally. The AI revolution basically came first to chess! Of course chess is sustained by a mix of donations, corporate and political sponsorship, wage labor (e.g., lessons), and volunteer labor, so it is hardly a metaphor for the economy as a whole; still we can see how computer labor and human labor might fit together:
1. Databases equalize preparation opportunities for the top players. Those who rise to the very top have very strong creative skills. In relative terms, being a chess “grind” is worth less than in times past.
2. If the computer is set at 2200 strength, “me plus the computer” (I override it every now and then) almost always beats “the computer alone.” Often we beat “the computer alone” very badly. If the computer is set at full strength, my counsel is worth much less, although it is not valueless.
3. With a computer set at full strength, the useful “team” requires a much stronger human team member than I. The required education level — for the team’s “wage premium” — is ratcheted up.
4. Chess is an area where educational reform has been extremely rapid and extremely successful. Chess education today revolves around learning how to learn from the computer, and this change has come within the last ten to fifteen years. No intermediaries were able to prevent it or slow it down. Humans now teach themselves how to team with computers, and the leading human players have to be very good at this. The computers which most successfully team with humans are those which replicate most rapidly.
5. There are many more chess prodigies than ever before, and they mature at a more rapid pace.
6. We used to think that computers would play chess like we did, only “without the mistakes.” We now know that playing without the mistakes involves a very different style from what we had imagined. A lot of human positional intuitions are garbage, and the computer can make sense out of ugly-looking moves. A lot of the human progress since then has involved unlearning previous positional rules and realizing how contingent they are. Younger players, who grew up playing chess with computers, are especially good at this. For older players, it is a good way to learn how unreliable your intuitions can be.
7. Highly exact and concrete analysis, and calculation of variations, is now the centerpiece of grandmaster chess at top levels. We have learned how to become more like the computers. The computers have taught us well.
8. Chess-playing computers still are not meta-rational. They do not understand what they do not understand very well, for instance blocked positions and long sequences of repetition. That is one reason why human-computer teams are so important and so productive.
Here is Kasparov on Watson. Here is Kasparov on AI and chess. Here is a good treatment of human-computer teams.
Western intellectuals and Gadhafi
Robert Putnam was once called to a meeting with Gadhafi. Here is an excerpt from his account:
Students of Western political philosophy would categorize Col. Gadhafi as a quintessential student of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: He made clear that he deeply distrusted any political group that might stand between individual citizens and the "General Will" as interpreted by the Legislator (i.e., Col. Gadhafi himself). When I argued that freedom of association could enhance democratic stability, he vehemently dismissed the idea. That might be so in the West, he insisted, but in Libya it would simply strengthen tribalism, and he would not stand for disunity.
Throughout, he styled our meeting as a conversation between two profound political thinkers, a trope that approached the absurd when he observed that there were international organizations for many professions nowadays, but none for philosopher-kings. "Why don't we make that happen?" he proposed with a straight face. I smiled, at a loss for words. Col. Gadhafi was a tyrant and a megalomaniac, not a philosopher-king, but our visit left me convinced that he was not a simple man.
Was this a serious conversation or an elaborate farce? Naturally, I came away thinking–hoping–that I had managed to sway Col. Gadhafi in some small way, but my wife was skeptical. Two months later I was invited back to a public roundtable in Libya, but by then I had concluded that the whole exercise was a public-relations stunt, and I declined.
Hat tip goes to Monkey Cage and ultimately, the fabled Daniel Lippman. But that's not all — Benjamin Barber also had some visits to meet with the Libyan leader, here is his account:
Written off not long ago as an implacable despot, Gaddafi is a complex and adaptive thinker as well as an efficient, if laid-back, autocrat. Unlike almost any other Arab ruler, he has exhibited an extraordinary capacity to rethink his country's role in a changed and changing world.
And:
Surprisingly flexible and pragmatic, Gaddafi was once an ardent socialist who now acknowledges private property and capital as sometimes appropriate elements in developing societies. Once an opponent of representative central government, he is wrestling with the need to delegate substantial authority to competent public officials if Libya is to join the global system. Once fearful of outside media, he has permitted satellite dishes throughout his country, and he himself surfs the Internet.
Libya under Gaddafi has embarked on a journey that could make it the first Arab state to transition peacefully and without overt Western intervention to a stable, non-autocratic government and, in time, to an indigenous mixed constitution favoring direct democracy locally and efficient government centrally.
Here is Barber's piece on Libya from 2011. It starts like this:
I offer my views about Libya here not just as a democratic theorist and HuffPost regular, but as a member of the International Board of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation until this morning, when I resigned.
*Endgame*, and the rationality of Bobby Fischer
The author is Frank Brady and the subtitle is Bobby Fischer's Remarkable Rise and Fall — from America's Brightest Prodigy to the Edge of Madness. It is sure to make my list of the best books of 2011 and it requires no real knowledge of chess. Here is an excerpt on the rationality of the young Fischer:
While they were waiting for the results, Bisguier asked Bobby why he's offered the draw to Shipman when he had a slight advantage and the outcome wasn't certain. If Bobby had won that game, he would have been the tournament's clear winner, a half point ahead of Bisguier. Bobby replied that he had more to gain than lose by the decision. He'd assumed that Bisguier would either win or draw his own game, and if so, Bobby would have at least a tie for first place. That meant a payday of $750 for each player, a virtual gold mine for Fischer. Recognizing Bobby's greater need for money than the capture of a title, however prestigious, Bisguier noted: "Evidently, his mature judgment is not solely confined to the chessboard."
Much later in Fischer's life:
…Bobby and Miyoko attended a screening [in Japan] of the American film Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese Zeroes began bombing the ships in Battleship Row and destroyed the USS Arizona, Bobby began clapping loudly. He was the only one in the theater to do do — much to the embarrassment of the Japanese. He said that he was shocked that no one else joined in.
There are many revelations in this book, including that Bobby turned to Catholicism in the last period of his life.
The elasticity of trust in the Middle East
From a new experimental paper, by Iris Bohnet, Benedikt Hermann, Mohamad Al-Ississ, Andrea Robbett (she is speaking at GMU today), Khalid Al-Yahi, and Richard Zeckauser, here is one bit from the conclusion:
Mechanisms aimed at mitigating the cost of betrayal, such as damages or insurance provision, seem to work better in the United States, and arrangements focusing on preventing the occurrence of betrayal, such as a punishment threat, have greater impact in the Arab Middle East. In our experiments, trust was promoted by decreasing the cost of betrayal in the United States but not in Jordan. Punishment functioned differently. Giving the first mover the option to take revenge at a price should she be betrayed enhanced trust in Saudi Arabia but not in the United States.
Women and alcohol
Is there a better blog post title? Here is the abstract of a new paper, "Women or Wine, Monogamy and Alcohol":
Intriguingly, across the world the main social groups which practice polygyny do not consume alcohol. We investigate whether there is a correlation between alcohol consumption and polygynous/monogamous arrangements, both over time and across cultures. Historically, we find a correlation between the shift from polygyny to monogamy and the growth of alcohol consumption. Cross-culturally we also find that monogamous societies consume more alcohol than polygynous societies in the preindustrial world. We provide a series of possible explanations to explain the positive correlation between monogamy and alcohol consumption over time and across societies.
That's by Mara Squicciarini and Jo Swinnen.
Think about the children
In today's world of now, now, now and me, me, me! It's nice to know that one company wants you to think about the next generation.
Hat tip: Daniel Lippman.
Advice for planning a wedding
A friend, and a prospective consumer of Hot Pot, inquires for tips on planning a wedding. I will offer a few:
1. Non-contractibility is a bigger problem than you think. You can agree on the number of people, and the amount you will spend on flowers, but ex post many questions will pop up at the margin. One of the two persons will care more about the right answer than the other. One party will be more willing to work on the wedding than the other. Contract in advance for a method of disagreement resolution, not just on the details of the wedding. Get ready for the fact that one person cares less about the wedding than the other and realize this is not the same as caring less about the marriage.
2. Refuse to accept the intransitivity of indifference: "If we invite Uncle Fester, we surely can't turn down Auntie Mame," etc. Just say no and (in vain) expect our federal government to do the same.
3. The purchases are a classic Hansonian "showing that you care" problem and the capitalist suppliers are not on your side. Early, up front, do something to show that you don't care. Buy a cheap paper cup. Relish the feeling. Accept it. Celebrate it. Then let the other person see you still care. Break in the idea of showing that you don't care.
4. Googling to "advice for planning a wedding" is a nightmare of P > MC commercial promotions, not just in the ads but also in the main search results. Rely more on the reader advice, in the comments section, from a very good economics blog.
What am I forgetting?
A new problem in social choice theory
S.L., a loyal MR reader, asks:
Suppose aliens came and demanded one or more chess games, one move per
day, with humanity (maybe these aliens):
where humanity would be destroyed on losing, and a draw would lead to a replay. One move per day. What would be the best way for humanity to run our decision process? How would we actually run our process? ("The committee must include at least one grandmaster from each UN country…")
I opt for Kramnik, Anand, Kasparov, and Carlsen, using Rybka and two or three back-up machines, such as Junior (which seems to find different moves). The Grandmasters vote, with 3-1 or better required for a move, but all four deferring at least initially to the single human agenda-setter and Rybka as tie-breaker. They would be playing a version of advanced chess. The goal is to have some different perspectives, but not so many that it becomes unmanageable. Most of the time the computer would get its way, but the four would consider those instances where Rybka suggests misleading moves.
Or is there a better decision-making process? Could a decision-making process like this be used for other dilemmas?
How to encourage innovation?
Here is a new research paper:
We explore the relationship between attractiveness and risk taking in chess. We use a large international panel dataset on chess competitions which includes a control for the players’ skill in chess. This data is combined with results from a survey on an online labor market where participants were asked to rate the photos of 626 expert chess players according to attractiveness. Our results suggest that male chess players choose significantly riskier strategies when playing against an attractive female opponent, even though this does not improve their performance. Women’s strategies are not affected by the attractiveness of the opponent.
For the pointer I thank Bruce Bartlett.
Observations on computer chess spectatorship
1. People enjoy watching a live internet human vs. human game more, when they can watch a computer judging the human moves and evaluating the position.
2. Few people enjoy watching live computer vs. computer games, even though the quality of play is much higher and the likelihood of a complex, wild position is much higher. Even if you care at all, there is little in-progress suspense; you might as well look back at the moves once they are over. How many other activities would we enjoy watching or experiencing less if they were done by computers?
3. The quality of play in a computer vs. computer game is so high it is often difficult for humans to tell where the losing computer went wrong, even if the spectator human has the help of a chess-playing computer.
4. I find only the very best computer (Rybka) of interest, although I do not feel the same way about the human players. Furthermore the fifth best computer is still much better than the best human players.
5. The notion of a computer chess tournament taking place "in time" is an odd one. You can play all the games back-to-back or simply use multiple copies of the programs and finish the entire tournament in a few hours; see #2.
6. Watching a computer play chess is a window onto a world where, once the opening is past (often, computers are simply told what to do by a pre-programmed "openings book"), there are many fewer presuppositions than what a human mind will bring to bear on the problem. It's a very good way of learning, in convincing form (the computer will beat you), how much your intuitions lead you astray. It's not just your "bad moves" which cause you to lose, it's also the moves which still seem pretty good to you.
7. There are nonetheless many computer moves which I simply cannot believe are any good. It does seem that every now and then computers get stuck in a "dogmatic trap," usually because of their limited time horizons for evaluation. Playing against a computer, you will do best in the early middle game and then progressively fall apart as its combinatorial powers destroy you.
8. You can watch chess computers play against each other at www.chessbomb.com. Click on "enter" and then TCEC5.
A theory of optimal tattoos
David Stearns, a loyal MR reader, asks:
How would you pick a tattoo, if you decided you were going to get one? How would you pick something that your future self is most likely to be glad to have? A favorite piece of art? Follow Leeson's lead and get an economics-related tattoo? Names of family members are off-limits, as are answers like "get a small dot in my armpit that nobody would see."
I would pick a country which I loved visiting, such as Mexico or Brazil, both of which have distinct shapes. It would be an excuse to narrate previous visits and I don't think it would repulse many people, other than the fact that it is a tattoo. An artwork in tattoo form would look low-brow. A Celtic geometric design would be another option. The obvious alternative would be to pick something which looked criminal, but I don't think that would mesh well with my other strategies in life. For some men it would pay off.
Here is Dan Ariely on tattoos.
Political games
The vote- or seat-maximizing incentive for the Republican Party as a whole is to lay low, put forward no "Newt Gingrich" villain figure, and let Obama continue to take the blame for the ailing economy, while avoiding fights they can lose, because of the President's superior bully pulpit and media presence.
The incentive for individual Republican Congressmen is…different.
When it comes to marijuana legalization, I believe that the "anti-" forces will muster as many parental votes as they need to, to defeat it when they need to. The elasticity of supply is nearly infinite at relevant margins. Legalization may appear "close" for a long time, but in equilibrium it will not spread very far. The "no" votes will pop up as needed.
The Industrial Organization of the Miami Heat
A new study by Northwestern's Adam Galinsky looked at 11 NBA seasons and found that on average, teams that pay one star a lot and the rest not as much, win more games. "The study shows how pay is tied up with status," Galinsky says. Exhibit A: Kobe. He makes nearly 25 mil a year, roughly equal to all the subs combined. That payscale ensures his teammates know their roles, and that leads to better team play. In Miami, LeBron, Chris Bosh and D-Wade all earn about the same.
That is from the new ESPN magazine, not yet on-line. Here is one related bit:
“Status is such an important regulating force on people’s behavior, hierarchy solves so many problems of conflict and coordination in groups,” says Adam Galinsky, a psychologist at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management who did the research on social hierarchies on basketball teams. “In order to perform effectively, you often need to have some pattern of deference.”
Here is Galinsky's home page, and here, though I cannot find the NBA paper on-line.
When I look at the Miami Heat, I think of Bengt Holmstrom, and his models of why the input suppliers in a firm require strong external constraint. When I look at the Miami Heat, I think of Hart and Moore 1990 — their chef, skipper, and tycoon example – which suggests a successful small enterprise should not have three separate veto points.
Overall, I put greater stock in Holmstrom, Hart, and Moore (and Bryant) than I do in James, Bosh, and Wade.
Markets in everything, unexpected loopholes edition
"Crafted from 40,000-year old Woolly Mammoth Ivory, they capture the exquisite design and proportions of the original Staunton pattern Chess set, registered by Nathaniel Cook and produced by Jacques of London in 1849"
For more than 2,000 years, Mammoth Ivory has been traded and it remains a highly prized commodity across the world. While that demand for the Mammoth Ivory has always been higher than its supply, it skyrocketed in 1963 when the CITES agreement was enacted. This agreement banned all sales of new Elephant or Walrus Ivory, in an effort to protect the animals from extinction. As a result, Mammoth Ivory became the only type of animal-based ivory that is exempt from the international trade restrictions because it is considered to be a fossil.
The price is $9.995.00. If that's not offbeat enough for you, try "Endangered Parrots of the World Chess Set," for $4,790.00, although I suspect they would come down if you bought them in quantity.
Why don’t people rock the boat in early on-line dating encounters?
Well, some of them do. But many don't. Dan Ariely writes:
We picked apart emails sent between online daters, prepared to dissect the juicy details of first introductions. And we found a general trend supporting the idea that people like to maintain boring equilibrium at all costs: we found a lot of people who may, in actuality, have interesting things to say, but presented themselves as utterly insipid in their written conversations. The dialogue was boring, consisting mainly of questions like, “Where did you go to college?” or “What are your hobbies?” “What is your line of work?” etc.
…What we learned from this little experiment is that when people are free to choose what type of discussions they want to have, they often gravitate toward an equilibrium that is easy to maintain but one that no one really enjoys or benefits from.
First, email is a bad medium for making and negotiating outrageous claims. You can't communicate subtleties of tone and teasing and you can't easily do "repair work" if you offend the audience, even assuming you can notice the offense or keep the dialog going after an offense.
More generally, when I see cautious behavior I ask if some kind of threshold incentive is in place. Imagine a process where both the writing man and the writing woman have inferred they are above the other's minimum standard for a personal meeting, perhaps for having demonstrated looks, money, status, etc. Given that a relatively impressive credential already puts each person in the running, on the written exchange each is simply hoping to "break even" for the time being and avoid dismissal. Draw your own implications as to what attracts people in the on-line dating world.
Addendum: Robin Hanson offers related comment.