Category: History

La ciudad lineal

When does it make sense to organize most of your urban activity on a (more or less) straight line?

If land transport is very costly, as in much earlier times, and a river is available, you might build much of the town right on the river bank.  You can see remnants of this if you travel along the Rhine, though those developments have since expanded in other directions.  Volgograd partially matches this description as well, or so I am told.  But since river transport has declined in importance, such modes of urban organization have fallen out of favor and for obvious reasons.

Might some new technology resurrect the relevance of linear spatial organization?

Perhaps a very rapid airport people mover can make linear organization non-crazy, but I do not see that it would privilege linear organization.  Does not Istanbul airport have a fairly linear structure?  But how scalable is that?

The Saudi plans for Neom attempt to resurrect a very strong and strict linear model, based on a new mode of transport.  From Wikipedia:

The Line is eventually planned to be 170 kilometres (110 miles) long. It could stretch from the Red Sea approximately to the city of Tabuk and could have nine million residents, resulting in an average population density of 260,000 per square kilometre (670,000/sq mi)…Early plans proposed an underground railway with 510-kilometre-per-hour (317 mph) trains that could travel from one end of The Line to the other in 20 minutes.

Supposedly all the shops and sites would be within a five-minute walk of line stops.

Of course this plan may not happen.  But the 317-mph train is essential to the idea.  Just hop on, and travel at super-rapid speeds to where you want to go.  Presumably there are enough tracks with enough stops, like those newish programmable elevators, that you won’t have to accelerate and decelerate too many times.  But, as the number of desirable stops proliferates, that ends up translating into an impractical number of separate individual train tracks.

The core problem seems to be that a linear city requires both super-rapid transport and not too many desirable stops.  It is hard to pull off that combination in the modern world.

Is Conakry the closest the world has to a truly linear city?

Probably that map is a bear sign for the idea.

To read about this topic, you might try:

von Thunen, The Isolated City.

Arturo Soria y Puig, La Ciudad Lineal.

Cerda, The Five Bases of the General Theory of Urbanization, edited by Arturo Soria y Puig.

N.A. Miliutin, Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities.

And ask your local GPT.

How to read a book using o1

You don’t have to upload any book into the system.  The Great Cosmic Mind is smarter than most of the books you could jam into the context window.  Just start asking questions.  The core intuition is simply that you should be asking more questions.  And now you have someone/something to ask!

I was reading a book on Indian history, and the author reference the Morley reforms of 1909.  I did not know what those were, and so I posed a question and received a very good answer, read those here.  I simply asked “What were the Morley reforms done by the British in India in 1909?”

Then I asked “did those apply to all parts of India?”

You can just keep on going.  I’ll say it again: “The core intuition is simply that you should be asking more questions.”

Most people still have not yet internalized this emotionally.  This is one of the biggest revolutions in reading, ever.  And at some point people will write with an eye toward facilitating this very kind of dialogue.

My excellent Conversation with Stephen Kotkin

It was so much fun we ran over and did about ninety minutes instead of the usual hour.  Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler sat down with Stephen to discuss the state of Russian Buddhism today, how shamanism persists in modern Siberia, whether Siberia might ever break away from Russia, what happened to the science city Akademgorodok, why Soviet obsession with cybernetics wasn’t just a mistake, what life was really like in 1980s Magnitogorsk, how modernist urban planning failed there, why Prokofiev returned to the USSR in 1936, what Stalin actually understood about artistic genius, how Stalin’s Georgian background influenced him (or not), what Michel Foucault taught him about power, why he risked his tenure case to study Japanese, how his wife’s work as a curator opened his eyes to Korean folk art, how he’s progressing on the next Stalin volume, and much more.

And here is one excerpt:

COWEN: What did you learn from Michel Foucault about power, or indeed anything else?

KOTKIN: I was very lucky. I went to Berkeley for a PhD program in 1981. I finished in 1988, and then my first job was at Princeton University in 1989. In the middle of it, I went for French history, and I switched into Habsburg history, and then finally, I switched into Russian Soviet history. I started learning the Russian alphabet my third year of the PhD program when I was supposed to take my PhD exams, so it was a radical shift.

Foucault — I met him because he came to Berkeley in the ’80s, just like Derrida came, just like Habermas came, Claude Lévi-Strauss, the anthropologist, came through. It was California. They were Europeans, and there was a wow factor for them. Foucault was also openly gay, and San Francisco’s gay culture was extraordinarily attractive to him. It was, unfortunately, the epoch of the AIDS epidemic.

One time, I was at lunch with him, and he said to me, “Wouldn’t it be amazing if somebody applied my theories to Stalinism?” I’m sitting there, okay, I’m 23 years old. Imagine if you had traveled to Switzerland in the late 19th century, and you went up in those Engadin mountains, and you were at some café in the mountain air, and there’s this guy with a huge forehead and hair up in the air sitting there, and you went and introduced yourself. You said, “Hello, I’m Tyler,” and he said, “Hello, I’m Friedrich Nietzsche.” You would say, “Well, geez, this is interesting. I should have more conversations with you.”

So, that’s the experience I had. I had read Foucault in seminar because it was very fashionable to do so, obviously, especially at Berkeley, especially in a culture that tilts one way politically, and I think you’ll guess which way that might be. But I didn’t understand what he said, so I went up to him as a naïf with this book, Madness and Civilization, which we had been forced to read, and I started asking him questions. “What does this mean? What does this mean? What is this passage? This is indecipherable.”

He patiently explained to the moron that I was what he was trying to say. It sounded much more interesting coming from him verbally, sitting just a few feet away, than it had on the page. I was lucky to become the class coordinator for his course at Berkeley. He gave these lectures about the problem of the truth-teller in Ancient Greece.

It was very far removed from . . . I had no classical training. Yes, I had Latin in high school because I went to Catholic school, and it was a required subject. I started as an altar boy with the Latin Mass, which quickly changed because of what happened at Vatican II. But no Greek, so it was completely Greek to me. Forgive me, that wasn’t planned that I was going to say that. It just happened spontaneously.

Anyway, I just kept asking him more questions and invited him to go to things, and so we would have lunches and dinners. I introduced him to this place, Little Joe’s in Little Italy, part of San Francisco, which unfortunately is no longer there. It was quite a landmark back then, and then he would repair after dinner to the bathhouses in San Francisco by himself. I was not part of that. I’m neither openly nor closeted gay, so that was a different part of Foucault that I didn’t partake in, but others did.

Anyway, I would ask him these things, and he would just explain stuff to me. I would say, “What’s happening in Poland?” This is the 1980s, and he would say things to me like, “The idea of civil society is the opiate of the intellectual class.” Everybody was completely enamored of the concept of civil society in the ’80s, especially via the Polish case, and so I would ask him to elucidate more. “What does that mean, and how does that work?”

He told me once that class in France came from disease in Paris — that it wasn’t because of who was a factory worker, who wasn’t a factory worker, but it was your neighborhoods in Paris and who died from cholera and who didn’t die from cholera. A colleague of ours who was another fellow graduate in Berkeley ended up writing a dissertation using that aside, that throwaway line.

I was able to ask him these questions about everything and anything. What he showed me — this is your question — what he showed me was how power works, not in terms of bureaucracy, not in terms of the large mechanisms of governance like a secret police, but how all of that is enforced and acted through daily life. In other words, the micro versions of power. It’s connected to the big structures, but it’s little people doing this. That’s why I said totalitarianism is using your agency to destroy your own agency.

That means denouncing your neighbors, being encouraged to denounce your neighbors for heresies, and participating in that culture of denunciation, which loosens all social trust and social bonds and puts you in a situation of dependency on the state. You’re a gung-ho activist using your agency, and the next thing you know, you have no power whatsoever. So, those are the kinds of things that I could talk to him about.

After he passed away from AIDS in the summer of 1984 — it was the AIDS epidemic, horrific. He passed away, and we had a memorial for him. I was still a PhD student, remember. I didn’t finish until ’88. There was this guy, Michel de Certeau, who wrote a tribute to Foucault in French that he was going to deliver at the event. It was called “The Laughter of Foucault.” I had these conversations with de Certeau about his analysis of Foucault and the pleasure of analytic work, which had been a hallmark of Foucault.

De Certeau taught me a phrase called “the little tactics of the habitat,” which became one of the core ideas of my dissertation and then book, Magnetic Mountain, about this micropower stuff. Even though Foucault was gone, I was able to extend the beginning of the conversations with Foucault through de Certeau.

I learned how power works in everyday life, and how the language that you use, and the practices like denunciation that you enact or partake in, help form those totalitarian structures, because the secret police are not there every minute of every day, so what’s in your head? How are you motivated? What type of behavior are you motivated for?

We say, “Okay, what would Stalin do in this situation?” Many people approach their lives — they’ve never met Stalin; they’ll never meet Stalin — but they imagine what Stalin might do. That gets implanted in their way of thinking; it becomes second nature. I learned to discuss and analyze that through Foucault.

I have to say, I didn’t share his analysis that Western society was imprisoning, that the daily life practices of free societies were a form of imprisonment in its own way. I never shared that view, so it wasn’t for me his analysis of the West that I liked. It was the analytical toolkit that I adapted from him to apply to actual totalitarianism in the Soviet case.

Excellent throughout.

Using AI to analyze changes in pedestrian traffic

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one bit:

Fortunately, there is new research. We have entered the age where innovative methods of measurement, such as computer vision and deep learning, can reveal how American life has changed.

Researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research compiled footage of four urban public spaces, two in New York and one each in Philadelphia and Boston, from 1979-1980 and again in 2008-2010. These snapshots of American life, roughly 30 years apart, reveal how changes in work and culture might have shaped the way people move and interact on the street.

The videos capture people circulating in two busy Manhattan locations, in Bryant Park in midtown and outside the Metropolitan Museum of Art on the Upper East Side; around Boston’s Downtown Crossing shopping district; and on Chestnut Street in downtown Philadelphia. One piece of good news is that at least when it comes to our street behavior, we don’t seem to have become more solitary. From 1980 to 2010 there was hardly any change in the share of pedestrians walking alone, rising from 67% to 68%.

A bigger change is that average walking speed rose by 15%. So the pace of American life has accelerated, at least in public spaces in the Northeast. Most economists would predict such a result, since the growth in wages has increased the opportunity cost of just walking around. Better to have a quick stroll and get back to your work desk.

The biggest change in behavior was that lingering fell dramatically. The amount of time spent just hanging out dropped by about half across the measured locations. Note that this was seen in places where crime rates have fallen, so this trend was unlikely to have resulted from fear of being mugged. Instead, Americans just don’t use public spaces as they used to. These places now tend to be for moving through, to get somewhere, rather than for enjoying life or hoping to meet other people. There was especially a shift at Boston’s Downtown Crossing. In 1980, 54% of the people there were lingering, whereas by 2010 that had fallen to 14%.

Consistent with this observation, the number of public encounters also fell. You might be no less likely to set off with another person in tow, but you won’t meet up with others as often while you are underway. The notion of downtown as a “public square,” rife with spontaneous or planned encounters, is not what it used to be.

I prefer the new arrangements, but of course not everybody does.  The researchers are Arianna Salazar-Miranda, Zhuangyuan Fan, Michael B. Baick, Keith N. Hampton, Fabio Duarte, Becky P.Y. Loo, Edward L. Glaeser & Carlo Ratti.

The Nicholas Fox Weber biography of Mondrian

Definitive, this is by far the best biography of Mondrian we have or are likely to get.  I am a longstanding Mondrian fan, and have read much about him, but learned new things on virtually every page.  The book is also fun, here is one excerpt:

Initially Mondrian did not respond at all [to a question about surrealism].  There was prolonged silence following Breton’s inquiry.  Then, in the void, Duchamp added: “What, for example, do you think of the work of our friend Yves Tanguy here?”  Mondrian’s reply, after more thoughtful chin stroking, came firmly, but calmly: “I enjoy conversational games as much as you do, but I shall not indulge in them.  I have seen Tanguy’s exhibition at Pierre Matisse several times and found it very beautiful but very puzzling.  Yves’ work is much too Abstract for me.”

You can order the book here.  How is it that Weber — the author of numerous fine books on modernist art — does not have a Wikipedia page of his own?

Does Money Affect Creativity in the History of Western Classical Music?

That is the subtitle of a new paper by Karol J. Borowiecki, Yichu Wang, and Marc T. Law.  Here is the abstract:

How do financial constraints affect individual innovation and creativity? Understanding this relationship is essential, especially when innovation and creativity rely on the capacity to take risks. To investigate this, we focus on Western classical composers, a unique group of innovators whose lives offer a rich historical case study. Drawing on biographical data from a large sample of composers who lived between 1750 and 2005, we conduct the first systematic empirical exploration of how composers’ annual incomes correlate with measures of the popularity (as viewed from posterity), significance, and stylistic originality of their music. A key contribution is the development of novel measures of composers’ financial circumstances, derived from their entries within Grove Music Online, a widely used music encyclopedia. We find that financial insecurity is associated with reduced creativity: relative to the sample mean, in low income years, composers’ output is 15.7 percent lower, 50 percent less popular (based on Spotify’s index), and generates 13.9 percent fewer Google search results. These correlations are robust to controlling for factors influencing both income and creativity, with no evidence of pre-trends in creativity prior to low-income years, suggesting that reverse causality is unlikely. Case studies of Mozart, Beethoven, and Liszt show that low income periods coincide with declines in stylistic originality. Notably, the negative impact of low income is concentrated among composers from less privileged backgrounds, implying that financial support is crucial for fostering creativity and innovation. While we cannot make definitive causal claims, the consistency of our findings underscores the importance of financial stability for fostering innovation and risk-taking in creative fields.

Of course those results remind me of my own earlier book In Praise of Commercial Culture.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Thanksgiving and the Lessons of Political Economy

It’s been a while so time to re-up my 2004 post on thanksgiving and the lessons of political economy. Here it is with no indent:

It’s one of the ironies of American history that when the Pilgrims first arrived at Plymouth rock they promptly set about creating a communist society.  Of course, they were soon starving to death.

Fortunately, “after much debate of things,” Governor William Bradford ended corn collectivism, decreeing that each family should keep the corn that it produced.  In one of the most insightful statements of political economy ever penned, Bradford described the results of the new and old systems.

[Ending corn collectivism] had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have been thought great tyranny and oppression.

The experience that was had in this common course and condition, tried sundry years and that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato’s and other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if they were wiser than God. For this community (so far as it was) was found to breed much confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. For the young men, that were most able and fit for labour and service, did repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men’s wives and children without any recompense. The strong, or man of parts, had no more in division of victuals and clothes than he that was weak and not able to do a quarter the other could; this was thought injustice. The aged and graver men to be ranked and equalized in labours and victuals, clothes, etc., with the meaner and younger sort, thought it some indignity and disrespect unto them. And for men’s wives to be commanded to do service for other men, as dressing their meat, washing their clothes, etc., they deemed it a kind of slavery, neither could many husbands well brook it. Upon the point all being to have alike, and all to do alike, they thought themselves in the like condition, and one as good as another; and so, if it did not cut off those relations that God hath set amongst men, yet it did at least much diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them. And would have been worse if they had been men of another condition. Let none object this is men’s corruption, and nothing to the course itself. I answer, seeing all men have this corruption in them, God in His wisdom saw another course fitter for them.

Among Bradford’s many insights it’s amazing that he saw so clearly how collectivism failed not only as an economic system but that even among godly men “it did at least much diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them.”  And it shocks me to my core when he writes that to make the collectivist system work would have required “great tyranny and oppression.”  Can you imagine how much pain the twentieth century could have avoided if Bradford’s insights been more widely recognized?

Environmental “Justice” Recreates Redlining

It’s been said that the radical left often ends up duplicating the policies of the radical right, just under different names and justifications, e.g. separate but equal, scientific thinking is “white” thinking and so forth. Here’s another example from Salim Furth: the re-creation of redlining. Redlining was the practice of making it more difficult to access financial products such as mortgages by grading some neighborhoods as “hazardous” for investment. Either by design or result, redlining was often associated with minority populations.

Salim shows that Massachusetts has created a modern redlining system.

In Massachusetts, the context is that MEPA (its mini-NEPA) requires projects of a certain size to go through either a moderately-expensive or a quite-expensive process. Some types of projects automatically [require] the quite-expensive Environmental Impact Review process. The #maleg passed a 2021 “Environmental Justice” law, which defined certain people – oh euphemism treadmill! – as “Environmental Justice populations.”…So any housing (or other) project that requires a permit from a state agency and is within 1 mile of a “Environmental Justice population” now automatically triggers the expensive EIR process….How expensive? I was told it can run from $150k to $1m, and take 6 to 12 months. That’s a lot of additional delay in a state where delays are already extreme.

If there’s a, uh, silver lining here, it’s that “EJ Population” is defined so capaciously that it includes super-rich areas of Lexington (32% Asian, $206k median hh income), because all “minorities” are automatically disadvantaged. So it’s much less targeted to disinvested places than the original redlining. But the downside is that it’s *extremely well targeted* to discourage investment anywhere near transit or jobs. The non-EJ places are the sprawly exurbs. So maybe they *tried* to reinvent redlining, but all they really accomplished was reinventing subsidies for sprawl and raising housing costs along the way!

…This is a good, sobering reminder that for every 1 step forward by pro-housing advocacy, the blue states can manage 2 steps backward via wokery, proceduralism and anti-market ideas…

My Conversation with Russ Roberts on Vasily Grossman’s *Life and Fate*

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Russ and I agreed to read the book in its entirety and then discuss it.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Russ and Tyler cover Grossman’s life and the historical context of Life and Fate, its themes of war, totalitarianism, freedom, and fate, the novel’s polyphonic structure and large cast of characters, the parallels between fascism and communism, the idea of “senseless kindness” as a counter to systemic evil, the symbolic importance of motherhood, the psychology of confession and loyalty under totalitarian systems, Grossman’s literary influences including Chekhov, Tolstoy, Dante, and Stendhal, individual resilience and moral compromises, the survival of the novel despite Soviet censorship, artificial intelligence and the dehumanization of systems, the portrayal of scientific discovery and its moral dilemmas, the ethical and emotional tensions in the novel, the anti-fanatical tone and universal humanism of the book, Grossman’s personal life and connections to its themes, and the novel’s enduring relevance and complexity.

Here is one bit from me:

COWEN: Amongst Soviet authors, he is the GOAT, one could say, to refer to our earlier episode. But this, to me, is one of the very few truly universal novels. The title itself, Life and Fate — it is about life and fate, but the novel is about so much more. It’s about war. It’s about slavery. It’s about love, motherhood, fatherhood, childbirth, rape, friendship, science, politics. How many novels, if any, can you think of that have all of those worlds in them in an interesting and insightful manner? Very few.

The one that comes closest to it is, in fact, his model. That’s Tolstoy’s War and Peace, a three-word title with an and in the middle and two important concepts. They’re both about war. They’re both about the invasions of Russia or the USSR. There’s a central family in both stories. The notion of what is fate or destiny is highly important to Tolstoy, as it is to Grossman, though they have different points of view.

Napoleon plays a significant role in War and Peace. In Life and Fate, Hitler and Stalin make actual appearances in the novel, which I find shocking when I read it, like, here they are on the page, and it’s actually somewhat plausible. So, he’s modeling this, I think, after War and Peace. He actually pulls it off, which is a miracle. I think it is a novel comparable in quality and scope and import to Tolstoy’s War and Peace, which is sometimes called the greatest novel ever. So that is a pretty amazing achievement.

And on some non-book issues:

COWEN: I think I should have said it’s a bimodal distribution, that you go one way or another. Look at it this way: In the simplest Bayesian model, your views should be a random walk, that the recent evolution of your views shouldn’t predict where you’ll end up tomorrow. But that’s not the case, really, with anyone that I’ve ever met. There’s some kind of trend in your views. You’re either getting more fanatical, getting more moderate, getting more religious, more or less something.

And that, to me, is one of the most interesting facts about human belief, is how hard it is to find belief as a random walk. So, what’s wrong with all of us? If you’re getting more moderate all the time, that’s wrong too. That’s a funny kind of, you could say, almost fanaticism, where you ought to say, “Well, I see the trend so I’m just going to leap to where I ought to be.” Then the next day, maybe 50 percent chance I’ll take a step back toward being more dogmatic or less moderate. But again, that’s not what we see from the moderates either.

ROBERTS: I wonder how much of it is the fact that it’s really convenient to have a system, gives you something to shove into the box. You’ve got this black box that you take the world’s events and you’ve decided how they should be processed. Then something new comes along, and you know how to deal with that because you’ve got this box; you’ve got all these great examples from the past.

At some point for me, I just started thinking that maybe the box doesn’t work all the time. I think a lot of people love the box. It’s a great source of comfort, whether it’s religion or ideology or other things. Maybe there’s just something peculiar about me. When you’re younger, certainty is deeply comforting because the world’s a bit too complicated to deal with. It still is, but I’m just less certain.

COWEN: There’s also a more charitable interpretation of what you’re describing. Think of yourself as working through problems, which is fine. Working through problems takes some time. You can’t every day pick up a new problem. The problems you’re working through as you — I wouldn’t say solve them, but as you somewhat make progress on them — that’s going to give you some persistence in the deltas of how your beliefs change.

I’m not sure — the pure Bayesian model might just be wrong. It’s so far from actual human practice. Maybe we shouldn’t just damn humans for not meeting it, but realize there are structures to how you work through things, and they are going to imply certain trends that go on for periods of time.

Recommended, obviously.

*Kaput: The End of the German Miracle*

By Wolfgang Münchau, this book is the best and most detailed account of the German economic decline to date.  Excerpt:

In 2018, the federal government promised that Germany would become a world leader in artificial intelligence.

As if they don’t understand that such efforts are more than just a play toy.  The overall lesson I took away from this book (my interpretation, not the author’s) is that if a country does not have enough ambition and seriousness in its businesses and education systems, sooner or later it will not have that in its government either.

Another lesson is that the world, overall, is working less well than you might think.

I am sad to recommend this one.  My primary reservation is that the author does not do enough to diagnose Germany’s obvious cultural malaise as an underlying root cause.

My Conversation with the excellent Neal Stephenson

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

In Neal’s second appearance, Tyler asks him why he sometimes shifts from envisioning the future to illustrating the past, the rise of history autodidacts, the implications of leaked secrets from the atomic age to today’s AI, the logistics of faking one’s death, why he still drafts novels in longhand, Soviet idealism among Western intellectuals, which Soviet achievements he admires, the lag in AR development, how LLMs might boost AR, whether social media is increasingly giving way to private group chats, his continuing influence on technologists, why AI-generated art might struggle to connect with readers, the primer from The Diamond Age in light of today’s LLMs, the prospect of AGI becoming an unnoticed background tool, what Neal believes the world really needs more of, what lies ahead in Polostan and the broader “Bomb Light” series, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: How effectively could you stage your own death? You. Say you really want to do it, and you’re willing to do it.

STEPHENSON: To fake it or to actually —

COWEN: Fake it, but everyone thinks it’s real. I read about it in the papers. “Neal is gone.” I nod my head, I weep, and then I forget about it. I don’t mean I forget about you, but you understand what I’m saying.

STEPHENSON: Wait, there’s not that many circumstances under which all physical traces of someone can be obliterated. That’s a fairly hard thing to do. It would have been easier a hundred years ago, but now we’ve got cameras everywhere, and we’ve got DNA testing and other ways to prove or to disprove that somebody’s actually dead. I guess it would have to be something like a plane crash into the ocean.

COWEN: But then how do you survive it?

STEPHENSON: Oh, yes. Okay.

COWEN: To kill yourself is one thing, but to pretend you’ve killed yourself and stay alive seems harder.

STEPHENSON: You could parachute out if it was a small plane, not a jet airline full of people, but a single-seater. I guess that might work.

COWEN: So, hire a private plane, have it crash, parachute out into somewhere where you —

STEPHENSON: You’re witnessed getting into the plane and taking off, but then there’s no way to recover the evidence for some reason. It’s pretty hard to do. If someone really wanted to, if they were just determined to go and find the . . . You see the efforts that people have gone to to go down to the Titanic. Well, if you can go find that thing and check it out with a submarine, then it’s pretty hard to really find a place that can’t be accessed in that way.

I very much enjoyed Neal’s new book Polostan.  And here is my first Conversation with Neal Stephenson.

*Blitz* (no spoilers)

This is the Steve McQueen movie about the Nazi blitz against London.  I found it visually superb, countering clichés (mostly), showing a different and more varied side of civilian life in wartime, and perhaps the best screen treatment (ever?) of what life was like in the earlier “world of atoms”.  I objected to the overuse of Dickensian references.  In any case one of the best movies of this year, please note we live in a charmed time I hope you are enjoying it.

The 1970s Crime Wave

Tyler and I wrap up our series of podcasts on the 1970s with The 1970s Crime Wave. Here’s one bit:

TABARROK: …people think that mass incarceration is a peculiarly American phenomena, or that it came out of nowhere, or was due solely to racism. Michelle Alexander’s, The New Jim Crow, takes his view. In fact, the United States was not a mass incarceration society in the 1960s.

It became one in the 1980s and 1990s due to the crime wave of the 1970s. It was not simply due to racism. It is true Blacks do commit more crimes relative to their population than whites, but Blacks are also overrepresented as victims. The simple fact of the matter is that Black victims of crime, the majority group, demanded more incarceration of Black criminals. In 1973, the NAACP demanded that the government lengthen minimum prison terms for muggers, pushers, and first-degree murders.

The Black newspaper, the Amsterdam News, advocated mandatory life sentences for “the non-addict drug pusher of hard drugs.” The Black columnist, Carl Rowan, wrote that “locking up thugs is not vindictive.” Eric Holder, under Obama, he was the secretary of—

COWEN: Of something.

TABARROK: Yes, of something. He called for stop and frisk. Eric Holder called for stop and frisk. Back then, the criminal justice system was also called racist, but the racism that people were pointing to was that Black criminals were let back on the streets to terrorize Black victims, and that Black criminals were given sentences which were too light. That was the criticism back then. It was Black and white victims together who drove the punishment of criminals. I think this actually tells you about two falsehoods. First, the primary driver of mass imprisonment was not racism. It was violent crime.

Second, this also puts the lie, sometimes you hear from conservatives, to this idea that Black leaders don’t care about Black-on-Black crime. That’s a lie. Many Black leaders have been, and were, and are tough on crime. Now, it’s true, as crime began to fall in the 1990s, many Blacks and whites began to have misgivings about mass incarceration. Crime was a huge problem in the 1970s and 1980s, and it hit the United States like a brick. It seemed to come out of nowhere. You can’t blame people for seeking solutions, even if the solutions come with their own problems.

A lot of amazing stuff in this episode. Here’s our Marginal Revolution Podcast 1970s trilogy

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New results on tariff history do not favor protectionism

I cover these in my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

A new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research shows that tariffs probably did more harm than good. Using meticulously collected industry-level and state-level data, the paper traces the impact of specific tariff rates more clearly than before. The results are not pretty.

One core finding is that industries with higher tariffs did not have higher productivity — in fact, they had lower productivity. Tariffs did raise the number of US firms in a given sector, but they did so in part by protecting smaller, less productive firms. That was not the path by which the US became an industrial giant, nor is it wise to use trade policy to keep lower-productivity firms in business. Not only does it slow economic growth, it also keeps workers in jobs without much of a future.

These results contradict the traditional protectionist story — that tariffs allow the best firms to grow larger and capture the large domestic market. In reality, the tariffs kept firms smaller and probably lowered US manufacturing productivity.

The paper also finds that the tariffs of that era raised the prices for products released domestically. That lowers living standards, and should give a second Trump administration reason to pause, as he just won an election in which inflation was a major concern. The finding about inflation also counters another major protectionist argument: that tariffs eventually lower domestic prices because they allow US firms to expand and enjoy economies of scale. That is the opposite of what happened.

The paper also details how lobbying, logrolling and political horse-trading were essential features of the shift toward higher US tariffs. A lot of the tariffs of the time depended on which party controlled Congress, rather than economic rationality. Trump is fond of citing President William McKinley’s tariffs, but they are evidence of the primacy of political influence and rent-seeking, not of a well-thought out strategic trade policy.

The authors of the new research are Alexander Klein and Christopher M. Meissner.