Category: Philosophy
Preachers who are not believers
In Preachers who are not believers, a provocative new paper in Evolutionary Psychology, Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola interview five preachers who no longer believe in God. Here's one bit:
A gulf opened up between what one says from the pulpit and what one has been taught in seminary. This gulf is well-known in religious circles. The eminent biblical scholar Bart D. Ehrman’s widely read book, Misquoting Jesus (2005), recounts his own odyssey from the seminary into secular scholarship, beginning in the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, a famously conservative seminary which required its professors to sign a statement declaring the Bible to be the inerrant word of God, a declaration that was increasingly hard for Ehrman to underwrite by his own research. The Dishonest Church (2003), by retired United Church of Christ minister, Jack Good, explores this “tragic divide” that poisons the relationship between the laity and the clergy. Every Christian minister, not just those in our little study, has to confront this awkwardness, and no doubt there are many more ways of responding to it than our small sample illustrates. How widespread is this phenomenon? When we asked one of the other pastors we talked with initially if he thought clergy with his views were rare in the church, he responded, “Oh, you can’t go through seminary and come out believing in God!” Surely an overstatement, but a telling one. As Wes put it:
…there are a lot of clergy out there who — if you were to ask them — if you were to list the five things that you think may be the most central beliefs of Christianity, they would reject every one of them.
One can be initiated into a conspiracy without a single word exchanged or secret handshake; all it takes is the dawning realization, beginning in seminary, that you and the others are privy to a secret, and that they know that you know, and you know that they know that you know. This is what is known to philosophers and linguists as mutual knowledge, and it plays a potent role in many social circumstances. Without any explicit agreement, mutual knowledge seals the deal: you then have no right to betray this bond by unilaterally divulging it, or even discussing it.
It was interesting to me that this account is related to the ideas of preference falsification developed by Timur Kuran, sacrifice and stigma developed by Larry Iannaccone and common knowledge by Robert Aumann.
Robin Hanson responds on cryonics
Does Tyler think the world would be equally better off if foodies were to act contrary to type, express less via buying less fancy food, and give the difference to charity? If so, why has he never mentioned it in his hundreds of food posts?
Could it be Tyler knows that tech nerds are low status in our society and fair game for criticism? Is this really any different than rich folks complaining about inner city kids who buy $100 sneakers instead of saving their money or giving it to charity, even while they buy $1000 suits and dresses instead of saving their money or giving it to charity?
There is much more here. This is not essential to the points under discussion, but I should add that I consider tech nerds to be a relatively high status group in American society, at least above the age of thirty.
Why pick on cryonics?
A few of my lunch compadres have asked why I compare cryonics (unfavorably) to acts of charity, rather than comparing other acts of personal consumption (I enjoy the gelato here in Berlin) to charity. My view is this: the decision to have one's head frozen is not primarily instrumental but rather expressive. Look at the skewed demographics of the people who do it, namely highly intelligent male readers of science fiction, often with tech jobs. Is it that they love their lives especially much? Unlikely. Instead it's a chance to stand for something and in a way which sets them apart from many others. It's a chance to stand for instrumental rationality, for Science, for attitudes which go beyond traditional religion, for the conquering of limits, for probabilistic reasoning, and for the notion that the subject sees hidden possibilities and resources which more traditional observers do not.
It's like voting for a very unusual political candidate.
In my view the people interested in cryonics are often highly meritorious, as is Robin. So I'm very sympathetic with a) letting them do what they want, and b) praising them and their affiliations, simply because they are productive and smart and also not harming others. Those factors militate in favor of cryonics and indeed I am happy to endorse laissez-faire for the practice but still I don't find myself settling into really liking the idea.
Let's say I use another Hansonian construct and put everyone behind a contractarian veil of ignorance. I then ask: given that we don't know who will be born into which position, which expressive symbols do we want these highly intelligent individuals to send, and also to identify with, given that reputation is limited and publicity is scarce? Keep also in mind that society is insufficiently appreciative of intelligence and we would prefer that more people had greater respect for analytic thinking. There are also many worthy causes out there.
I don't see the positive deal here. I believe the world would be better off, and the relative status of the virtuous nerds higher, if instead the cryonics customers sent more signals which were perceived as running contrary to type. Ignoring cryonics, and promoting charity, would do more to raise the status of intelligence and analytical thinking than does cryonics.
On the practical side, while I am a non-believer, I also think that charity has a greater chance of bringing a longer life to one's self – or immortality — than does signing a cryonics contract. That's an even stronger triumph for probabilistic thinking than what the cryonics customers have on tap.
Addendum: If you haven't already, do go back and read both Quentin and #44 on these issues. Bracing stuff.
Profile of Robin Hanson and Peggy Jackson (his wife)
Shortly after they met, Peggy and Robin decided to read each other’s favorite works of literature. Peggy asked Robin to read “The Brothers Karamazov,” and he asked her to read “The Lord of the Rings.” She hated it. “I asked him why he loved it, and he said: ‘Because it’s so full of detail. This guy has invented this whole world.’ He asked me why I hated it, and I said: ‘Because it’s so full of detail. There was nowhere for the reader to imagine her own interpretation.’ ” Robin, less one for telling stories, describes their early days more succinctly. “There was,” he says not without tenderness, “a personality-type convergence.”
That's from the NYT, by Kerry Howley, most of it is on cryonics and attitudes toward death. For the pointer I thank Michelle Dawson. Here is Robin himself on the article. Here is Bryan on Kerry on Robin. My question is: why not save someone else's life instead?
There is more I could say…but I won't!
James Crimmins on the portfolio approach
He writes to me:
While dogmatism seemingly requires balance so do most of life’s activities mental or otherwise. Show me the adventurous eater or traveler and I will show you a stick in the mud reader, investor, dresser. Show me the wide-eyed dreamer in one area and the odds are she or he has an anchor to windward somewhere else, if only what they wear to work or play. Human beings who are wildly adventurous in one area, say sports, tend to dine on hamburgers, but think they are adventurous in all things. he same applies to free thinkers who are downright sodden when it comes to design. The chance takers forget they also have their safe sides. We tend to huddle with like chance takers, somehow our security blankets are seldom shared.
I am likely to bring up such points, especially to some of my colleagues who think of themselves as non-conformists.
Who should a utilitarian root for in the World Cup?
The very excellent Sandor writes to me:
From a maximum utility point of view, who's the right team to root for in the 2010 FIFA World Cup (TM)?
The off-the-top-of-head first order model seems something like
num_native_fans * (joy_of_native_fans_upon_winning –
misery_upon_losing) + num_foreign_fans * (joy – misery),where the second term is probably negligible compared to the first,
except maybe for Uruguay and Paraguay. The "joy" term probably is larger the longer it's been since the team won? But maybe the misery is less for teams that have never gotten far—wouldn't Ghanaians be
pretty thrilled with a loss in the semifinal?What are the second order and higher effects? Germany's lost productivity from a long tournament run is worth more in absolute terms but maybe less in utility terms? Do we need terms for foreign anti-fans?—I've heard a surprising number of people express extreme anti-Germany and anti-Brazil feelings, the former for past crimes, the latter for general arrogance.
I'm attracted to the Netherlands and the two 'Guays, which are probably the lowest three in utility terms. Maybe I'm just a misanthrope.
Does Derek Parfit like football?
My view is that a Brazilian victory does the most to maximize happiness, although I worry about the effects on second-order violence.
If you wish to rationalize the victory of a small country team, try the argument that too many young people invest career time in becoming athletes. By having a small nation grab the glory, this wasteful effect is minimized.
Are there hidden codes in Plato?
Take this one with a grain of salt, but here is the latest:
Kennedy's breakthrough, published in the journal Apeiron this week, is based on stichometry: the measure of ancient texts by standard line lengths. Kennedy used a computer to restore the most accurate contemporary versions of Plato's manuscripts to their original form, which would consist of lines of 35 characters, with no spaces or punctuation. What he found was that within a margin of error of just one or two percent, many of Plato's dialogues had line lengths based on round multiples of twelve hundred.
The Apology has 1,200 lines; the Protagoras, Cratylus, Philebus and Symposium each have 2,400 lines; the Gorgias 3,600; the Republic 12,200; and the Laws 14,400.
Kennedy argues that this is no accident. "We know that scribes were paid by the number of lines, library catalogues had the total number of lines, so everyone was counting lines," he said. He believes that Plato was organising his texts according to a 12-note musical scale, attributed to Pythagoras, which he certainly knew about.
Do note this:
Kennedy believes his findings restore what was the standard, mainstream view which held for 2,000 years "from the first generation of Plato's followers, up through the renaissance". This held that "he wrote symbolically and that if you worked hard and became wise you could understand the symbols and penetrate his text to his underlying philosophy." Only in the last few hundred years has an emphasis on the literal meanings of texts led to a neglect of their figurative meanings.
It also explains why it is that Aristotle, Plato's pupil, emphatically claimed that Plato was a follower of Pythagoras, to the bafflement of most contemporary scholars.
I used to consider allegiance to this idea (Montaigne, also, for symbolic codes) as one of my absurd beliefs, but maybe now it is looking better. I will have to look elsewhere.
Profile of David Mitchell
Here is one good bit of many:
“I can’t bear living in this huge beautiful world,” Mitchell said, gesturing to the rolling green hills and the glittering calm sea, “and not try to imitate it as best I can. That’s the desire and the drive. But it’s maybe closer to hunger or thirst. The only way I can quench it is to try to duplicate it on as huge a scale as I can possibly do. I want to capture that,” he said, turning in a circle on the sand and gesturing beyond the beach and the hills, “all the way around the world and all the way to your home and all the way around and back. I want to do all of that here and transmit it through ink.”
David Hume on signaling
Longterm Guy, a long-standing MR reader, sends me this:
A Treatise Of Human Nature, by David Hume, Volume Two
BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS
PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY
SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALSIt is plain, that almost in every species of creatures, but especially of the nobler kind, there are many evident marks of pride and humility. The very port and gait of a swan, or turkey, or peacock show the high idea he has entertained of himself, and his contempt of all others. This is the more remarkable, that in the two last species of animals, the pride always attends the beauty, and is discovered in the male only. The vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing have been commonly remarked; as likewise that of horses in swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of the bull and cock in strength, and of every other animal in his particular excellency. Add to this, that every species of creatures, which approach so often to man, as to familiarize themselves with him, show an evident pride in his approbation, and are pleased with his praises and caresses, independent of every other consideration. Nor are they the caresses of every one without distinction, which give them this vanity, but those principally of the persons they know and love; in the same manner as that passion is excited in mankind. All these are evident proofs, that pride and humility are not merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal creation.
The second best sentence against narrativity I read today
There are deeply non-Narrative people and there are good ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative.
Here is much more and I thank Eric John Barker for the pointer. You will find similar themes in my The Age of the Infovore, the new title for the paperback version of Create Your Own Economy.
Optimizing Kidney Allocation: LYFT for LIFE
Under the current system, kidneys are allocated to patients primarily based on the time that the patient has been on the waiting list and the quality of the match. If we evaluate these criteria "locally" there's nothing obviously wrong but if we step back and think globally, that is think about what the ultimate goal of the transplant system should be, then the current system is deeply misguided. Suppose that we want the transplant system to maximize total life expectancy or, as it is known in the literature, to maximize the life-years from transplant (LYFT).
The current system does not maximize life expectancy. In the current system, a 60 year old patient can be given a 20 year old kidney–that's a waste because the life expectancy of the kidney is longer than that of the patient; it's like putting a new clutch in a car that is rusting away. If we had 20 year-old kidneys to spare, this wouldn't be a big problem. But we don't have 20-year old kidneys to spare, so we also give 20-year old patients 60-year old kidneys which means the kidney is likely to die early taking the patient along with it. If we want to maximize total life expectancy, younger people should get younger kidneys.
Here is a simple example to illustrate the principle. Suppose that the life expectancy of both patients and kidneys is 75 years of age so everyone dies when they are 75 or when their kidney is 75, whichever comes first. Thus, if we allocate the 20 year old kidney to the 60 year old patient and vice-versa we gain a total of 30 years of life expectancy.
| Kidney Age |
Patient Age | Life Years | |
| 20 | 60 | 15 | |
| 60 | 20 | 15 | |
| 30 years | Total |
But if we allocate the 60 year old kidney to the 60 year old patient and the 20 year old kidney to the 20 year old patient we more than double life expectancy to 70 years in total.
| Kidney Age |
Patient Age | Life Years | |
| 60 | 60 | 15 | |
| 20 | 20 | 55 | |
| 70 years | Total |
It's not just age that matters, it turns out that the longer a patient has been on dialysis the less is their life expectancy after transplant (dialysis stresses the body so the sooner we get someone a transplant the better). Although it may seem unfair, if we want to maximize total life expectancy we are doing the wrong thing by giving more points to patients who have been on the list longer.
An optimized allocation system that took into account these considerations would increase total life
expectancy (modestly but significantly, about 11,500 extra life years) but it wouldn't benefit every individual. Maximizing life expectancy would shift organs away from older people and people who have been on the waiting list a long time towards younger people. As a result, some patients have argued that LYFT is unfair. The Office of Civil Rights is even asking whether LYFT might violate age discrimination laws.
But consider, would the older patients have objected to LYFT when they were younger? If not, shouldn't their objections be discounted? More formally, consider how people would vote behind a veil of ignorance. By definition a LYFT approach maximizes total life expectancy, so without knowing the specifics of who you are or when you might need a transplant it's likely that behind a veil of ignorance just about everyone would favor LYFT. Thus, in my view LYFT is a fair and ethical system.
Here are previous MR posts on kidney transplant policy.
A philosopher dedicated to clear exposition
In 1984, my marriage to Cindy was in serious trouble. I had started once a week therapy with a McLean Hospital based psychiatrist named Lenore Boling, and I used the sessions really just to give voice to my unhappiness with what my relationship with Cindy had become. Despite the unhappiness, I do not think I ever shed a tear in those sessions over the shambles of the marriage. One day, however, I started talking about my work. I tried to explain to Dr. Boling that in all of my writing, whether it was on Kant's First Critique or Hume's Treatise or Das Kapital, my goal always was to plumb the depths of the author's central idea and recast it in a form so simple, so clear, so transparent that I could hold it before my students or my readers and show them its beauty. As I said these words, tears started to well up in me, and I finally had to stop talking because I could not finish. It was the only time in twenty years of psychotherapy that I cried openly in a session. Ever since that day, twenty-five years ago, I have understood that it is this intellectual intuition of the transparent beauty of an idea, not the desire for status or recognition or money, that has throughout my life been the driving force behind my writing and teaching. This is why it makes little difference to me whether reviewers agree with what I say, and it is why I am made somewhat uncomfortable by praise. The intrinsic beauty of the idea is the focus of my concern. It seems that I am, after all, more capable of shedding tears for the central argument of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding than I am for a failed marriage or even for a deceased parent. I am not at all sure that is admirable, but it is closer to the truth about myself than I have ever come before.
That's from Robert Paul Wolff, hat tip goes to The Browser.
Wikipedia on A.J. Ayer and Mike Tyson
He taught or lectured several times in the United States, including serving as a visiting professor at Bard College in the fall of 1987. At a party that same year held by fashion designer Fernando Sanchez, Ayer, then 77, confronted Mike Tyson harassing the (then little-known) model Naomi Campbell. When Ayer demanded that Tyson stop, the boxer said: "Do you know who the fuck I am? I'm the heavyweight champion of the world," to which Ayer replied: "And I am the former Wykeham Professor of Logic. We are both pre-eminent in our field. I suggest that we talk about this like rational men." Ayer and Tyson then began to talk, while Naomi Campbell slipped out.
The link is here and the pointer is from Daniel Klein.
Back in Berlin
The President of Germany had to resign over this? On the bright side, it doesn't seem as important as Lena winning the Eurovision contest.
And so I am back in Berlin and for a good bit of time. I've already blogged my 1985 visit to East Berlin with Kroszner, which remains one of my strongest and most influential memories. I also returned the summer after the Wall fell, and spent about two days walking and driving around the Eastern part, more or less pinching myself to see if it was real. The same people who had been afraid to talk to me five years before suddenly were friendly and open. It felt remarkably like West Germany…and yet not. I don't expect to personally witness a comparable liberation in my lifetime and those days too have stuck with me deeply. For a number of reasons, just stepping foot in Germany is for me an emotional experience.
Twenty years later, I experience Berlin as a normal city for the first time. But I just arrived, so we'll have to see.
It is striking how cheap rents are. I have a two-bedroom apartment, fully furnished, short-term, in a neighborhood comparable in quality to Manhattan's Upper East Side and yet it costs less than many a mediocre place in Fairfax.
Ramban, a 12th century Jewish Biblical Commentator
Doni Bloomfield sends me this passage:
Set aside a sum of money that you will give away if you allow yourself to be angered. Be sure that the amount you designate is sufficient to force you to think twice before you lose your temper… (Ramban: A letter for the Ages translated by Avrohom Chaim Feuer Reishit Chochmah, Shaar Ha'anavah Chapter 3)
The link to the source is here.