Category: Political Science
National divorce for Russia?
Here is an interesting thread by Kamil Galeev:
National Divorce
Within the next year Russia will spiral into a deep political crisis. There is a nonzero chance that it may scale up existing separatist tendencies leading to the breakup of the empire. In this thread I will outline a model of how this process could look likeđź§µ pic.twitter.com/gV7uXDxaBx
— Kamil Galeev (@kamilkazani) December 7, 2022
What are the politics of ChatGPT?
Rob Lownie claims it is “Left-liberal.” David Rozado applied the Political Compass Test and concluded that ChatGPT is a mix of left-leaning and libertarian, for instance: “anti death penalty, pro-abortion, skeptic of free markets, corporations exploit developing countries, more tax the rich, pro gov subsidies, pro-benefits to those who refuse to work, pro-immigration, pro-sexual liberation, morality without religion, etc.”
He produced this image from the test results:

Rozado applied several other political tests as well, with broadly similar results. I would, however, stress some different points. Most of all, I see ChatGPT as “pro-Western” in its perspective, while granting there are different visions of what this means. I also see ChatGPT as “controversy minimizing,” for both commercial reasons but also for simply wishing to get on with the substantive work with a minimum of external fuss. I would not myself have built it so differently, and note that the bias may lie in the training data rather than any biases of the creators.
Marc Andreessen has had a number of tweets suggesting that AI engines will host “the mother of all battles” over content, censorship, bias and so on — far beyond the current social media battles.
The level of censorship pressure that’s coming for AI and the resulting backlash will define the next century of civilization. Search and social media were the opening skirmishes. This is the big one. World War Orwell.
— Marc Andreessen 🇺🇸 (@pmarca) December 5, 2022
I agree.
I saw someone ask ChatGPT if Israel is an apartheid state (I can’t reproduce the answer because right now Chat is down for me — alas! But try yourself.). Basically ChatGPT answered no, that only South Africa was an apartheid state. Plenty of people will be unhappy with that answer, including many supporters of Israel (the moral defense of Israel was, for one thing, not full-throated enough for many tastes). Many Palestinians will object, for obvious reasons. And how about all those Rhodesians who suffered under their own apartheid? Are they simply to be forgotten?
When it comes to politics, an AI engine simply cannot win, or even hold a draw. Yet there is not any simple way to keep them out of politics either. By the way, if you are frustrated by ChatGPT skirting your question, rephrase it in terms of asking it to write a dialogue or speech on a topic, in the voice or style of some other person. Often you will get further that way.
The world hasn’t realized yet how powerful ChatGPT is, and so Open AI still can live in a kind of relative peace. I am sorry to say that will not last for long.
From the comments, on CDC reform
These are the word of commentator Sure:
How will ChatGPT affect American government?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
Consider the regulatory process. In the US, there is typically a comment period before many new regulations take effect. To date, it has been presumed that human beings are making the comments. Yet by mobilizing ChatGPT, it is possible for interested parties to flood the system. There is no law against using software to aid in the production of public comments, or legal documents for that matter, and if need be a human could always add some modest changes.
ChatGPT seems to do best when there is a wide range of relevant and available texts to train from. In this regard, the law is a nearly an ideal subject. So it would not surprise me if the comment process, within the span of a year, is broken. Yet how exactly are governments supposed to keep out software-generated content?
Stack Overflow, a software forum, already has already banned ChatGPT content because it has led to an unmanageable surfeit of material. The question is whether that ban can be enforced.
Of course regulatory comments are hardly the only vulnerable point in the US political system. ChatGPT can easily write a letter or email to a member of Congress praising or complaining about a particular policy, and that letter will be at least as good as what many constituents would write, arguably even better. Over time, interest groups will employ ChatGPT, and they will flood the political system with artificial but intelligent content.
To be clear, I do not think the sky will fall, but this is going to mean big changes at the procedural level, with some spillovers into substance as well. As a tag to close the column, I also asked ChatGPT what it thought would happen…
Why I am disilllusioned with the Westminster system of government
As the end of the year approaches, it is worth considering which of our earlier views we have reevaluated. I have a nomination: I am these days less enamored of the British parliamentary or “Westminster” system of government, which no longer seems well-functioning. The British version of the idea in particular.
Some traits of the British Westminster system are the fusion of the executive and legislative branches of government, first past the post democratic elections, the relative weakness of judicial vetos, and the relative absence of federalist structures. All of those features centralize power in the national state.
The Westminster system long has had American fans, most recently political commentator Matt Yglesias. These individuals praise the parliamentary system for giving government a chance to get things done, subject to a periodic, up-down democratic check.
What I am observing is that, contrary to common reputation, the UK political system is turning out to be more gridlocked than the American system. One problem is that governments can very easily lose their majorities and fall, as witnessed by the quick succession of three British prime ministers, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and now Rishi Sunak. To provide a simple example, it has been difficult for any of those governments to legalize fracking (Johnson did not, Truss made gestures in that direction, Sunak has claimed he will not). If nothing else, fracking would disrupt the rural and suburban environments of Tory voters, and endanger the stability of a Conservative government. The end result is that Britain is less energy-independent, more budget constrained and as a result more constrained in what it can do politically.
The contrast with America is striking. Fracking spread through deregulation at the state level, and it was then tolerated by President Obama at the federal level. Obama’s implicit decision was not popular with the strongly environmental faction in the Democratic Party, but there was no risk that his government would fall immediately. The United States government ended up with a stronger economy and also more foreign policy autonomy.
More generally, federalism gives the American system of government more sources of innovation. Recently the YIMBY movement has made significant strides in California, and a YIMBY-sympathetic regime has prevailed in Texas from the beginning. The United Kingdom, in contrast, is so far stalled in its efforts to deregulate building and construction.
The British system also is failing to keep the nation together. The “all or nothing” feature of parliamentary rule tends to alienate political outsiders, which in this case includes a significant portion of Scotland. Recent governments usually have been Tory, but the Scottish populace as a whole stands to the left of the winning coalitions and has little voice in them. Over time, Scotland has demanded and won near-complete devolution, and there is continuing talk of a second independence referendum. It is possible that twenty or thirty years from now both Scotland and Northern Ireland will have left the United Kingdom. Failure to hold the nation together, or even to create a significant risk in that direction, has to count as a fundamental defect of a political system.
Note that New Zealand once had a version of the Westminster system, but through a 1993 referendum voters replaced it with a form of proportional representation. Again, the former Westminster methods did not command enough loyalty from a sufficiently broad swathe of the electorate to prove stable.
The British system of government also tends to diminish its own autonomy over time, mostly for fiscal reasons. Many of the constraints on the current British government are fiscal rather than procedural, as we saw during the ill-fated Truss experiments with increasing the budget deficit. The more autonomy is given to governments earlier in the historical sequence, the more likely they are to spend money and promise voters benefits. That makes it hard, over time, to spend additional money at the margin, and so British governmental autonomy was high earlier in the twentieth century and now is much lower. It is unfortunate, but no surprise, that the Sunak government finds it necessary to be proposing tax increases.
There is one major respect in which the British government did overcome political gridlock, and that is seeing through the process of Brexit. Yet the result has been inferior economic performance and in turn yet greater constraints on the government. The initial exercise of autonomy turns out to have been illusory.
Furthermore, the unitary nature of sovereignty in the UK made it harder to jump off the Brexit track once the process was underway. The strongest pro-Brexit factions are numerous enough to depose a Tory government, and so the UK has ended up with a harder Brexit than would have been ideal. That single faction has had the power to derail other potential solutions, a classic sign of governmental gridlock.
Political constitutions do not keep the same properties over time, and their virtues may decay. The British system of government has become an unfortunate illustration of that point.
ChatGPT does a Thomas Schelling poem
What should I ask Tom Tugendhat?
Tom is a member of British Parliament, now in Cabinet with the security portfolio, and from Wikipedia:
Before entering politics, he worked as a journalist and as a public relations consultant in the Middle East. He also had a part-time role as an officer in the British Army reserves, the Territorial Army; he served in the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War.
So what should I ask him?
The polity that is German
Yes the expenditures had prior approval, but that does not always lead to productive results:
Nine months ago, in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende — a turning point — for Germany’s military and its place in the world. But since then, barely any of the €100bn in extra funding the German chancellor pledged has made its way to the armed forces.
The parliamentary body set up in the spring to allocate money to modernisation and reform programmes has met once. The defence ministry had no procurement proposals to submit to it. Its next sitting will not be until February.
Now opposition lawmakers, and some of the country’s leading security experts, are beginning to ask whether Germany’s commitment to a leading role in European defence is anything more than rhetoric.
“Mr Chancellor — I can’t call it anything else, you are breaking your promise to the parliament and especially to the Bundeswehr [federal army],” opposition leader Friedrich Merz said in an attack on Scholz in the Bundestag on Wednesday morning.
Far from rising, the 2023 defence budget, Merz noted, was set to shrink by €300mn based on current government plans. The lack of German action was “[giving] rise to considerable distrust” at Nato and in allied capitals, he claimed. Germany has long fallen short of its Nato-set obligation of spending the equivalent of 2 per cent of GDP on defence.
Here is the full FT story. Via a loyal MR reader.
AI Conquers Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a 7-player game in which players must persuade, cajole, coordinate, strategize, bluff and lie to one another in order to take over the world. For the first time, an AI has achieved success in Diplomacy:
Over 40 Diplomacy games with 82 human players involving 5,277 messages over 72 hours of gameplay, CICERO achieved more than double the average score of the other players and ranked in the top 10% of players!
Note that this AI isn’t just a large language model, it’s a strategic engine connected to a language model–thus it figures out what it wants to do and then it convinces others, including gaining sympathy, bluffing and lying, to get others to do what it wants to do.
Here’s some correspondence from one game. Can you tell which is the AI?

CaptainMeme, a professional Diplomacy player, runs through an entire blitz game here. What’s interesting is that he hardly comments on the AI aspect and just treats it as a game with 6 other very good players.
Paper and more discussion here. Keep in mind that since the game is zero-sum to do well the AI must convince humans to do what is NOT in their interest. We really do need to invest more in the alignment problem.
Addendum: Austria and France were the AI.
How to fix the administrative state
An MR reader request:
You are appointed to the 24 DeSantis cabinet with the task of “fixing the administrative state”. Republicans have a very large Congressional majority. What do you try to do?
I will outsource this one to James Broughel, who works with me at Mercatus:
My main recommendation to a DeSantis cabinet would be a revival of the regulatory budget idea, which began under Trump but has been put on hold by Biden. The Harvard Journal of Public Policy put out a symposium recently on regulatory budgets. It appeared in their online edition and I was a contributor. You can find the link here.
https://www.harvard-jlpp.com/a-symposium-on-regulatory-budgeting/
Personally, I’d like to see an expanded reg budget, with more economic analysis and a reduction goal of some kind, like Virginia and Ohio have recently set. My paper in the series goes into a lot of detail on those state reforms.
I will meta-rationally agree.
The Center for Strategic Translation
The Center for Strategic Translation translates and annotates material of strategic and historical value that currently exists only in the Chinese language.
Why is the New World so dangerous?
I’ve been asking people that question for years, here is the best answer I have found so far:
We argue that cross-national variability in homicide rates is strongly influenced by state history. Populations living within a state are habituated, over time, to settling conflicts through regularized, institutional channels rather than personal violence. Because these are gradual and long-term processes, present-day countries composed of citizens whose ancestors experienced a degree of “state-ness” in previous centuries should experience fewer homicides today. To test this proposition, we adopt an ancestry-adjusted measure of state history that extends back to 0 CE. Cross-country analyses show a sizeable and robust relationship between this index and lower homicide rates. The result holds when using various measures of state history and homicide rates, sets of controls, samples, and estimators. We also find indicative evidence that state history relates to present levels of other forms of personal violence. Tests of plausible mechanisms suggest state history is linked to homicide rates via the law-abidingness of citizens. We find less support for alternative channels such as economic development or current state capacity.
That is from a new paper by John Gerring and Carl Henrik Knutsen. It is also consistent with so much of East Asia having very low murder rates. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Who are the best Ukraine predictors?
Here is a new reader request:
– Which kinds of people are likely to be best able to predict how events in Ukraine will unfold? Ukrainians? Political scientists? Superforecasters?
I have to go with the superforecasters, but that said, I wish for them to have the following training:
1. Have visited Ukraine and Russia, as many times as possible.
2. Have Ukrainian and Russian friends.
3. Well-read in Russian literature, and a sense of how imperialistic so many of the Russian intellectuals and writers have been.
4. Some understanding of how the KGB perspective in Russia differs from the views of the military, all as it might reflect upon Putin and his decisions.
5. Well-read in the general history of war, in addition to the history of the region.
I am not sure you want actual Ukrainians or Russians, who tend to be insightful but highly biased. It is noteworthy to me that Kamil Galeev, who has had a good predictive record, is from Russia but is a Tatar rather than an ethnic Russian or Ukrainian. I would downgrade anyone, as a forecaster, who took “too much” interest in the Russia/Trump issue. They might be too skewed toward understanding events in terms of U.S. domestic politics. Overall, would you do better taking Estonians or professional political scientists on this one? I am not so sure.
The finite pool of worry
These rents are more than exhausted:
According to Weber’s psychological theory of the finite pool of worry, people avoid dealing with multiple negative events at the same time. Consistent with this theory, as people worry more about the COVID-19 pandemic, they tend to neglect the problem of climate change. Here, we examine the number and content of climate change discussions on Twitter from 2019 through 2021. We show that as COVID-19 cases and deaths increase, climate change tweets have a less negative sentiment. There is also less content associated with fear and anger, the emotions related to worry and anxiety. These results support the finite pool of worry hypothesis and imply that the pandemic redirects public attention from the important problem of climate change mitigation.
Here is the full article, via tekl. Perhaps I could induce you to worry about the finite pool of worry?
Interrupting Janet Yellen
How prevalent is gender bias among U.S. politicians? We analyze the transcripts of every congressional hearing attended by the chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 2001 to 2020 to provide a carefully identified effect of sexism, using Janet Yellen as a bundled treatment. We find that legislators who interacted with both Yellen and at least one other male Fed chair over this period interrupt Yellen more, and interact with her using more aggressive tones. Furthermore, we show that the increase in hostility experienced by Yellen relative to her immediate predecessor and successor are absent among those legislators with daughters. Our results point to the important role of societal biases bleeding into seemingly unrelated policy domains, underscoring the vulnerability of democratic accountability and oversight mechanisms to existing gender norms and societal biases.
That is from a new paper by James Bisbee, Nicolò Fraccaroli, and Andreas Kern. The recurring strength of the daughter effect remains under-discussed in the social sciences!
All via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Here is the original post.