David Splinter on how much tax billionaires pay
Here is his comment on the paper presented here:
Summary: The U.S. tax system is highly progressive. Effective tax rates increase from 2% for the bottom quintile of income to 45% for the top hundredth of one percent. But rates may be lower among those with the highest wealth. This comment starts with the “top 400” tax rate estimates by wealth in Balkir, Saez, Yagan, and Zucman (2025, BSYZ), and adjusts these to account for Forbes family wealth being spread across multiple tax returns, to avoid double-counting capital income, to include missing taxes, and to apply standard tax and income definitions. This results in “top 400” effective tax rates exceeding overall tax rates by 13 percentage points. Still, the “top 400” tax rate is lower than for the top hundredth of one percent, suggesting a modest decline in effective tax rates at the very top when ranking by wealth. However, this is an unsurprising deviation from progressive rates because the tax system targets income, not wealth. Compared to the annual estimates in BSYZ, longer-run estimates are more appropriate for top wealth groups, which have volatile wealth and concentrate charitable giving into end-of-life bequests. End-of-life giving suggests long-run top 400 effective tax-and-giving rates could exceed 75%.
USA counterfactual estimate of the day
With zero net immigration, Apollo Chief Economist Torsten Slok estimates, the U.S. economy would be able to sustainably add only about 24,000 nonfarm jobs a month, compared with an average 155,000 from 2015 through 2024.
Here is the full WSJ article. It really helps an economy to have both aggregate supply and aggregate demand increasing at the same time.
How Much Tax Do US Billionaires Pay?
We estimate income and taxes for the wealthiest group of US households by matching Forbes 400 data to the individual, business, estate, and gift tax returns of the corresponding group in 2010–2020. In our benchmark estimate, the total effective tax rate—all taxes paid relative to economic income—of the top 0.0002% (approximately the “top 400”) averaged 24% in 2018–2020 compared with 30% for the full population and 45% for top labor income earners. This lower total effective tax rate on the wealthiest is substantially driven by low taxable individual income relative to economic income. First, the C-corporations owned by the wealthiest distributed relatively little in dividends, limiting their individual income tax unless they sell their stocks. Second, top-owned passthrough businesses reported negative taxable income on average in spite of positive book income, further limiting their individual income tax. The top-400 effective tax rate fell from 30% in 2010–2017 to 24% in 2018–2020, explained both by a smaller share of business income being taxed and by that income being subject to lower tax rates. Estate and gift taxes contributed relatively little to their effective tax rate. Top-400 decedents paid 0.8% of their wealth in estate tax when married and 7% when single. Annual charitable contributions equalled 0.6% of wealth and 11% of economic income in 2018–20.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Addendum: Here is a comment from David Splinter.
How Retrainable are AI-Exposed Workers?
We document the extent to which workers in AI-exposed occupations can successfully retrain for AI-intensive work. We assemble a new workforce development dataset spanning over 1.6 million job training participation spells from all US Workforce Investment and Opportunity Act programs from 2012–2023 linked with occupational measures of AI exposure. Using earnings records observed before and after training, we compare high AI exposure trainees to a matched sample of similar workers who only received job search assistance. We find that AI-exposed workers have high earnings returns from training that are only 25% lower than the returns for low AI exposure workers. However, training participants who target AI-intensive occupations face a penalty for doing so, with 29% lower returns than AI-exposed workers pursuing more general training. We estimate that between 25% to 40% of occupations are “AI retrainable” as measured by its workers receiving higher pay for moving to more AI-intensive occupations—a large magnitude given the relatively low-income sample of displaced workers. Positive earnings returns in all groups are driven by the most recent years when labor markets were tightest, suggesting training programs may have stronger signal value when firms reach deeper into the skill market.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Monday assorted links
1. Some economics of AI subscription pricing.
2. “Cat food made by Michelin star chef is on sale… and people think it’s delicious.”
3. Is video to blame for gender polarization?
4. Those new service sector jobs?
5. “An innovative contest by a city in formerly communist east Germany to curb depopulation by offering a fortnight of free housing has stunned local officials with its success.” Link here.
6. Benjamin Yeoh visits Accra.
7. Banks are making a regulatory pushback against stablecoins (FT).
Is religion actually declining in emerging economies?
Building on large-scale survey data and recent scholarship, we document persistent and, in many regions, increasing levels of religiosity…we analyze the determinants and consequences of religious behavior, showing how income volatility, financial insecurity, and cultural transitions sustain demand for religion. Third, we explore the institutional and political dimensions of religion in EDCs, emphasizing the role of religious institutions as public goods providers and as politically influential actors. This discussion offers a framework for understanding religious organizations as adaptive, competing platforms in pluralistic religious marketplaces. Overall, our findings suggest that religious adaptation, rather than decline, is central to understanding the future of religion and its economic implications in the developing world.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Sara Lowes, Benjamin Marx, and Eduardo Montero.
India, Greece, Brazil: How High Government Pay Wastes Talent and Drains Productivity
Compensation for government jobs is higher relative to GDP per capita the poorer the country. In other words, government workers are most overpaid in poor countries. Excessive public-sector compensation in low- and middle-income countries distorts labor markets on two margins: queues (rent-seeking to win jobs) and misallocation (talent and taxes diverted from the private sector).
In my two posts Massive Rent-Seeking in India’s Government Job Examination System and The Tragedy of India’s Government-Job Prep Towns I drew attention to the first margin, rent-seeking losses from the queues. India’s most educated young people—precisely those it needs in the workforce—often devote years of their life cramming for government exams instead of working productively. These exams cultivate no real-world skills and entire towns have become specialized in exam preparation. I argued using a back-of-the-envelope calculation that the rent seeking losses alone could easily be on the order of 1.4% of GDP annually. More tragically, large numbers of educated young people are inevitably disillusioned. Finally, because pay is so high, the state can’t staff up; India has all the laws of a rich country with roughly one‑fifth the civil servants per capita.
Two macro papers quantify the other margin of loss: who ends up where.
In The unintended consequences of meritocratic government hiring, Geromichalos and Kospentaris (GK) look at the consequences of excessively high government salaries in Greece. In (MIS)Allocation Effects of an Overpaid Public Sector, Cavalcanti and Santos look at the case of Brazil. Both papers model the allocation of labor between the private and public sectors and focus on the cost of drawing too many high-productivity workers into government jobs.
GK summarize their results for Greece:
In many countries, public employees enjoy considerable job security and generous compensation schemes; as a result, many talented workers choose to work for the public sector, which deprives the private sector of productive potential employees. This, in turn, reduces firms’ incentives to create jobs, increases unemployment, and lowers GDP…. [Calibrating the model to Greece] we find that a 10% drop in public sector wages results in a 3.8% increase in private sector’s productivity, a 7.3% drop in unemployment, and a 1.3% increase in GDP.
CS report similar distortions in Brazil:
Our counterfactual exercises demonstrate that public–private earnings premium can generate important allocation effects and sizeable productivity losses. For instance, a reform that would decrease the public–private wage premium from its benchmark value of 19% to 15% and would align the pension of public sector workers with the one in place for private sector workers could increase aggregate output by 11.2% in the long run without any decrease in the supply of public infrastructure.
Interestingly, in the GK model there is no rent-seeking waste because workers are assumed to forecast exam outcomes perfectly and sort directly into private or public streams. In my India model, by contrast, the waste comes precisely from the years of futile exam preparation. GK also find that reducing the number of public jobs can raise efficiency, while my take is that in India high salaries make the public sector paradoxically too small (thus to some extent limiting misallocation). CS also focus on allocation but, unlike GK, they estimate that rent-seeking losses are massive—about triple my conservative estimate:
The aggregate cost of job applications to public jobs, which we label as the rent seeking cost, is large in the baseline economy…roughly 3.61 percent of output.
Across India, Greece, and Brazil the story converges: overpaying government workers distorts education, job search, and firm dynamics. The waste shows up as socially unproductive effort devoted to entering the echelons of government employment and a private sector which is drained of top talent causing it to be less productive and to grow more slowly. In short, rent seeking and misallocation from overly generous government compensation generate large macroeconomic losses. As relative compensation tends to be higher the poorer the economy, high government pay can be a development trap.
What I’ve been reading
David Woodman, The First King of England: Aethelstan and the Birth of a Kingdom. An excellent work. One of the best books on early English history, and also one of the best books on how the Dark Ages morphed into early Medieval times. Usually I find treatments in both areas difficult to follow, but this one produces a coherent and also non-exaggerated narrative. It also will make you want to visit Northumbria.
Edmund Phelps, My Journeys in Economic Theory. A fascinating memoir, I had not known he was so obsessed with Rawls and Nagel. He also loved the tenor Franco Corelli, and was a Birgit Nilsson fan too. Recommended, for those who like this sort of thing, and who already are familiar with the cast of characters.
Bench Ansfield, Born in Flames: The Business of Arson and the Remaking of the American City. Whenever a book demonstrates what people in New Jersey have known for decades, usually it is a good book.
Andrew Sean Greer, Less: A Novel. I do not like much in contemporary American fiction, but so far I am quite enjoying this one.
Bernd Roeck, The World at First Light: A New History of the Renaissance. 934 pp. of text, covers too many topics in too desultory a fashion?
Pablo A. Pena, Human Capital for Humans: An Accessible Introduction to the Economic Science of the People, is a good popular-level introduction to human capital theory.
There is Carl Benedikt Frey, How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations.
Sunday assorted links
1. A defense of prediction markets.
2. Ezra on GPT-5 (NYT).
3. Is complex animal life much older than we had thought?
4. “How much have murder rates increased since 2000 in the four European countries that get the most attention for their immigrant crime — Sweden, France, Germany and UK? Answer: They haven’t increased. Murder rates have declined since 2000 in all four countries.” Link here.
Did the United States grow its way out of WWII debt?
Not as much as you might think:
ABSTRACT: The fall in the U.S. public debt/GDP ratio from 106% in 1946 to 23% in 1974 is often attributed to high rates of economic growth. This paper examines the roles of three other factors: primary budget surpluses, surprise inflation, and pegged interest rates before the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951. Our central result is a simulation of the path that the debt/GDP ratio would have followed with primary budget balance and without the distortions in real interest rates caused by surprise inflation and the pre-Accord peg. In this counterfactual, debt/GDP declines only to 74% in 1974, not 23% as in actual history. Moreover, the ratio starts rising again in 1980 and in 2022 it is 84%. These findings imply that, over the last 76 years, only a small amount of debt reduction has been achieved through growth rates that exceed undistorted interest rates.
That is from a recent paper by Julien Acalin and Laurence Ball. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
What should I ask John Amaechi?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. Here is Wikipedia on John:
John Uzoma Ekwugha Amaechi // ⓘ, OBE (/əˈmeɪtʃi/; born 26 November 1970) is an English psychologist, consultant and former professional basketball player. He played college basketball for the Vanderbilt Commodores and Penn State Nittany Lions, and professional basketball in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Amaechi also played in France, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Since retiring from basketball, Amaechi has worked as a psychologist and consultant, establishing his company Amaechi Performance Systems.
In February 2007, Amaechi became the first former NBA player to publicly come out as gay after doing so in his memoir Man in the Middle.
John has a new book coming out, namely It’s Not Magic: The Ordinary Skills of Exceptional Leaders. So what should I ask him?
The history of American corporate nationalization
I wrote this passage some while ago, but never published the underlying project:
The American Constitution is hostile to nationalization at a fundamental level. The Fifth Amendment prohibits government “takings” without just compensation to the owners, and that is sometimes called the “takings clause.” Since the United States did not start off with a large number of state-owned enterprises, there is no simple and legal way for the country to get from here to there. Government nationalization of private companies would prove expensive, most of all to the government itself. More importantly, the strength of American corporate interests has taken away any possible pressures to eliminate or ignore this amendment.
The lack of interest in state-owned enterprises reflects some broader features of the United States, most of all a kind of messiness and pluralism of control. An extreme federalism has bred a large number of regulators at federal, state, and local levels, often with overlapping jurisdictions. Each level of government digs its claws into the regulatory morass, and not always for the better, but this preempts nationalization, which would centralize power and control in one level of government. That is not the American way.
A tradition of strong state-level regulation was built up during the mid- to late 19th century, when the federal government did not have the resources, the reach, or the scope to do much nationalizing. America developed some very large national commercial enterprises, such as the railroads, Bell (a phone company), and Western Union (a communications and wire service), which were quite large and far-ranging before the federal government itself had reached a mature size. At that time local government accounted for about half of all government spending in the country and the federal government had few powers of regulation. It wasn’t quite laissez-faire, but America could not rely on its federal government and this shaped the later evolution of the country. To handle these booming corporate entities, America created more state-level regulation of business than was typical for the other industrializing Western countries. That steered Americans away from nationalization as a means for distributing political benefits or disciplining corporations[1]
This policy decision to rely so much on multiple levels of federalistic regulation comes with a price. American failures in physical infrastructure have been the other side of the coin of American successes in business. A strong rule of law, combined with so many legal checks and balances and blocking points, has carved out a protected space for private American businesses. They can operate with relatively secure property rights. At the same time, those same laws and blocking points make it hard to get a lot of things built when a change in property rights is required, whether government or business or both are doing the building. The law is used to obstruct growth and change, and for NIMBYism — “Not In My Backward,” and more generally for giving any litigation-ready interest group a voice in any decision it cares about. Can you imagine a sentence like this being written about China?: “The [New York and New Jersey] Port Authority sent out letters inviting tribe representatives to join the environmental review project, inviting the Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma and the Sand Hills Nation of Nebraska.”[2]
In America background patriotism sustains a rule by general national consensus, and so the American government doesn’t need extensive state-owned companies to build or maintain political support through the creation of so many privileged insiders. The American paradox is this: the reliance on the law reflects a relatively strong and legitimate government, but the multiplication of that law renders government ineffective in a lot of practical matters, especially when it comes to the proverbial “getting things done,” a dimension where the Chinese government has been especially strong.
You should note that although the United States has not so many state-owned enterprises, the American government still has ways of expressing its will on business, or as the case may be, favoring one set of businesses over another. In these latter cases it can be said that American business is expressing its will over government through forms of crony capitalism, a concept which is spreading in both America and China.
The United States has evolved a subtle brand of corporatism and industrial policy that is mostly decentralized and also – this is an important point — relatively stable across shifts of political power. America uses its large country privileges to maintain access to world markets and to protect the property rights of its investors, usually without much regard for whether they are Democrats or Republicans. For instance the State Department works hard to maintain open world markets for films and other cultural goods and services. Toward this end America has used trade negotiations, diplomatic leverage, foreign aid, and also explicit arm-twisting, based on its military commitments to protect allied nations in Western Europe and East Asia. America already had successful entertainment producers, it just wanted to make sure they could earn more money abroad, and that is why the American government usually insists on open access for audiovisual products when it negotiates free trade treaties. Yet in these deals there is not much if any explicit favoritism for one movie or television studio over another, or for one political alliance over another. Democrats are disproportionately overrepresented in Hollywood, but Republican administrations protect the interests of the American entertainment sector nonetheless. It’s about the money and the jobs, not about shifting political coalitions. You’ll note that the independence from particular political coalitions gives the American business environment a particular stability and predictability, to its advantage internationally and otherwise.
[1] See Millward (2013, chapter nine, and p.222 on chartering powers).
[2] That is from Howard (2014, p.10).
Contemporary TC again: Let us hope that I was at least partially correct…
Saturday assorted links
Who gets into the best colleges and why?
We use anonymized admissions data from several colleges linked to income tax records and SAT and ACT test scores to study the determinants and causal effects of attending Ivy-Plus colleges (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago). Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. In contrast, children from high-income families have no admissions advantage at flagship public colleges. The high-income admissions advantage at Ivy-Plus colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, and (3) athletic recruitment. Using a new research design that isolates idiosyncratic variation in admissions decisions for waitlisted applicants, we show that attending an Ivy-Plus college instead of the average flagship public college increases students’ chances of reaching the top 1% of the earnings distribution by 50%, nearly doubles their chances of attending an elite graduate school, and almost triples their chances of working at a prestigious firm. The three factors that give children from high-income families an admissions advantage are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with post-college outcomes, whereas academic credentials such as SAT/ACT scores are highly predictive of post-college success.
That is from a new paper by Raj Chetty, David J. Deming, and John N. Friedman. One immediate conclusion is that standardized test scores help lower-income groups get into the best schools, compared to the alternatives.
Is it Possible to Raise National Happiness?
That is a new paper by Alberto Prati and Claudia Senik, here is the abstract:
We revisit the famous Easterlin paradox by considering that life evaluation scales refer to a changing context, hence they are regularly reinterpreted. We propose a simple model of rescaling based on both retrospective and current life evaluations, and apply it to unexploited archival data from the USA. When correcting for rescaling, we find that the well-being of Americans has substantially increased, on par with GDP, health, education, and liberal democracy, from the 1950s to the early 2000s. Using several datasets, we shed light on other happiness puzzles, including the apparent stability of life evaluations during COVID-19, why Ukrainians report similar levels of life satisfaction today as before the war, and the absence of parental happiness.
To give some intuition, the authors provide evidence that people are more likely engaging in rescaling than being stuck on a hedonic treadmill. I think they are mostly right.
Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.