Assorted links
1. The economics of speech (video).
2. Harold Bloom recommends Five Books, and diagnoses the Tea Party.
3. Guy keeps Manhattan parking spot for 11 years, feeds the meter every day for $36, via Annie Lowrey.
“Why did U.S. banks invest in highly-rated securitization tranches?”
That is a new paper by Isil Erel, Taylor D. Nadauld, and Rene M. Stulz, and it is one of the more instructive papers on the financial crisis:
We estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches of mortgage securitizations of American deposit-taking banks ahead of the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain these holdings. We find that holdings of highly-rated tranches were economically trivial for the typical bank, but banks with greater holdings performed more poorly during the crisis. Though univariate comparisons show that banks with large trading books had greater holdings, the holdings of highly-rated tranches are not higher for banks with large trading books in regressions that control for bank size. The ratio of highly-rated tranches holdings to assets increases with bank assets, but not for banks with more than $50 billion of assets. This evidence is inconsistent with explanations for holdings of highly-rated tranches that emphasize the incentives of banks deemed “too-big-to-fail”. Further, the evidence does not provide support for “bad incentives” theories of holdings of highly-rated tranches. We find, however, that banks active in securitization held more highly-rated tranches. Such a result can be consistent with regulatory arbitrage as well as with securitizing banks holding highly-rated tranches to convince investors of the quality of these securities. Our evidence supports the latter hypothesis.
In other words, it was not “too big to fail moral hazard” and it also was not venal corporate incentives. It was possibly some regulatory arbitrage but also just plain, flat stupidity and complacency.
What I’ve been reading
1. David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War. This would appear to be a new angle on WWII, arguing that Britain circa 1940 was not the lame duck — either economically or technologically — that it is often made out to be. Readable, persuasive to this non-expert, and it does help explain why the Nazis didn’t just take them over.
2. Robert F. Moss, Barbecue: The History of an American Institution. This is in fact the first serious history of barbecue, as a historian might write it, and it is a good one.
3. E.A. Wrigley, Energy and the Industrial Revolution. This is both one of the best books on the history of energy and one of the best books on the Industrial Revolution, definitely recommended to anyone who reads in economic history.
4. Simon Reynolds, Retromania: Pop Culture’s Addiction to its Own Past. Imagine TGS applied to musical aesthetics, excerpt: “Pitchfork writer Eric Harvey recently observed that the 2000s may be destined to be “the first decade of pop music…remembered by history for its musical technology rather than the actual music itself.” Napster Soulseek Limewrire Gnutella iPod YouTube Last.fm Pandora MySpace Spotify…these super-brands took the place of super-bands…It’s glaringly obvious that all the astounding, time-space rearranging developments in the dissemination, storing and accessing of audio data have not spawned a single new form of music.”
Ridley Scott to make another Bladerunner movie
Ridley Scott is returning to his roots, revisiting his definitive — and beloved — cyberpunk film “Blade Runner,” for Alcon Entertainment, TheWrap has confirmed.
Filmmakers have not yet revealed whether the movie will be a prequel or a sequel to the original movie, according a statement by Alcon, who secured the rights to “Blade Runner” for prequels, sequels and other projects last March.
Here is the link.
War and Peace
In fact, the last decade has seen fewer war deaths than any decade in the past 100 years…If the world feels like a more violent place than it actually is, that’s because there’s more information about wars — not more wars themselves.
From Joshua Goldstein in Foreign Policy. Cato Unbound covered some of the reasons for the outbreak of peace earlier this year.
Hat tip: Mike Makowsky.
Assorted links
1. Advice for a budding neuroscientist.
3. Korean markets in everything, and umbrella markets in everything.
4. Will the U.S. again become the world energy capital?
5. Der Theoretiker des Stillstands, Handelsblatt profile of me. And how a German politician apologizes for an affair with a 16-year-old (in German), no hope for the eurozone, hat tip Yana. In English, Kenneth Silber reviews TGS.
A note on Casey Mulligan
Mulligan writes:
There is still no evidence to confirm the fundamental Keynesian proposition that supply doesn’t matter.
Oddly, for all of his apparent skepticism of Paul Krugman, Mulligan is completely suckered on this one. This is Krugman’s current version of Keynesian economics (and even then only sometimes), not Keynesian economics more broadly construed. There is nothing in the (very useful) data cited by Mulligan, in his posts on supply and employment, which runs against the Keynesian story. Of course I am a fan of the blogosphere, but sometimes it frightens me when I see it having influence over research interpretations. We’re just a small number of apes sitting at computers, relative to the overall literature. When it comes to Keynesian economics, I don’t always see us apes as reflecting the broader literature very well, yet we are read by a relatively large number of apes. We can expect this problem to get worse, as people learn the “blogosphere versions” of different points of view. Karl Smith comments. And, as you might expect, Scott Sumner makes perfect sense.
From the comments, on nominal wage stickiness
MR commentator Donald A. Coffin posts on the wage stickiness issue:
There is, as it turns out, some actual research on this issue in the job search literature. The bottom line is that reservation wages appear to fall relatively quickly with duration of unemployment. One common conclusion is that wage stickiness comes from the behavior of *employers.* Some citations:
“Reservation Wages, Offer Wages, and Unemployment Duration–Some New Empirical Evidence” http://ideas.repec.org/p/kie/kieliw/1095.html The authors conclude that offer wages fall faster than do reservation wages (not that reservations wages do not fall).
“The Relationship Between Unemployment Spells and Reservation Wages as a Test of Search Theory,” by Stephen R. G. Jones, QJE, V. 104, N. 4, 1988. “…the main finding is that reservation wages play a significant role in the determination of duration.”
“Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacancies, and Real Wages,” by C. A. Pissarides, AER, V. 75, N. 4, 1985.
“Efficiency Wage Models and Unemployment,: by J. L. Yellen, AER, V. 72, N2., 1984. The stickiness of wages is attributed to the reluctance of *employers* to reduce wages.
“Unemployment, Wage-Setting, and Insider-Outsider Relationships,” by A. Lindbeck, AER V. 76, N. 2, 1986. The stickiness of wages is again attributed to the reluctance of *employers* to reduce wages.
“Wage Dynamics: Reconciling Theory and Evidence,” by O. Blanchard and L. Katz, http://www.nber.org/papers/w6924 1999. “In this paper, we ask whether one can reconcile the empirical evidence with theoretical wage relations. We reach three main conclusions. First, we derive the condition under which the two can indeed be reconciled. We show the constraints that such a condition imposes on the determinants of workers’ reservation wages as well as the relative importance of workers’ outside options as opposed to match specific productivity in wage determination. Second, in the light of this condition, we reinterpret the presence of an “error correction” term in macroeconomic wage relations for most European economies but not in the United States. Third, we show that whether this condition holds or not has important implications for the effects of a number of variables — from real interest rates to oil prices to payroll taxes — on the natural rate of unemployment.”
“An Empirical Test Job-Search Model, with a Test of the Constant Reservation-Wage Hypothesis,” N. Keifer and G. Neumann, JPE, V. 87, N. 1m 1979. “Reservation wages are found to decline significantly with duration.”
“An Econometric Analysis of Reservation Wages,” by T. Lancaster and A. Chesher, Econometrica, V. 51, N. 6, 1983. Their table A-IV clearly shows reservation wages falling with duration of unemployment, from 21.28 pounds per week for durations less than 13 weeks to 17,74 pounds per week for durations exceeding 52 weeks,
I could go on, but go to Google Scholar and search on “reservation wages and duration of unemployment” if you want more.
If the employers don’t want you at the high wage, and don’t want you at the low wage, what might your perceived MP be, temporarily or not? Keep in mind, firms are flush with cash.
Just arrived, in my pile
Warren Samuels passes away
He was known to be a very fine man and a true and curious scholar. Here is his Wikipedia page:
Warren Joseph Samuels, (born 1933, New York City, (died 2011, Gainesville, FL) was an American economist and historian of economic thought. He received a BBA from University of Miami, Miami, FL and obtained his Ph.D. from University of Wisconsin–Madison. After holding academic posts in the University of Missouri, Georgia State University, Atlanta, and University of Miami, he was appointed Professor of Economics in Michigan State University in 1968, where he stayed until his retirement in 1998.
Warren Samuels has made many extremely valuable contributions to the history of economic thought and the methodology of economics. His work has been inspired primarily by his “…interest in generating greater clarity as to the economic role of government both in the history of economic thought and in contemporary economics”.[1]
Here is his home page, and here he is on scholar.google.com. I think of him as one of the economists who kept alive institutionalism, economic method, and history of thought as intellectually vital disciplines.
Addendum: Peter Boettke pens a fine appreciation.
Facts about Texas household debt
Texans have less than half the household debts of Californians, and 28 percent less than the national average, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
…Low debt levels do not necessarily make Texans better credit risks, however. Texas has the nation’s second-lowest credit scores. (Mississippi ranks last.) On a scale of 500 to 990, Experian says the average Texan’s score is 717. The national average is 749.
The lower score is due mainly to a history of late loan payments.
…Dana Johnson, chief economist with Dallas-based Comerica Bank, said lower unemployment and lower overall household debt should still make it easier for Texans to spur economic growth.
“Typical Texas workers are carrying less debt because they don’t have to – house prices are relatively modest,” he said.
“If Texans are less burdened with debt, it’s all the easier for them to make an acquisition of something like a car or some other durable purchase. I don’t think there’s any question,” Johnson said.
…Average mortgage debt in Texas is $23,999.
Here is the link, the question was posed by Ezra Klein on Twitter.
Sentences to ponder
I am coming more and more to think that with the government essentially paralyzed for the foreseeable future, the only way we’re going to get jobs is by turning to actual job creators: business itself.
That is from yesterday’s NYT.
Markets in everything
Annie Lowrey reports:
Mosque.com, Muhammad.com, and Allah.com on sale on eBay for the bargain price of $21 million.
Shipping is free and expedited, and it is described as a “once in a lifetime” offer.
Assorted links
Markets in everything
For the pointers I thank John Thorne, Trey Miller, Courtney Knapp, Catherine Rampell, and Chris Blattman.