Presumed Consent and Organ Donation

A New York assemblyman wants NY to adopt a presumed consent law for organ donation. 

The legislation, introduced by Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, a Westchester Democrat, is in two parts: the first step would end the right of the next of kin to challenge the decisions of their dead or dying relatives to donate their organs.

In a second measure, which is far more contentious, people would have to indicate in official documents – their driver’s licenses, most commonly – that they specifically don’t want to donate organs. If the box is not checked, it is presumed the person wants to donate.

The first thing to note about this proposal is that contrary to what Brodsky suggests, the problem isn't families who refuse to follow the wishes of the potential donor–as a rule, families who know, follow.  The problem is that families often don't know what their loves ones would have wanted because many people don't sign their organ donor cards.  

In fact, the way presumed consent actually works is not by overriding the wishes of the family it's by making the wishes of the potential donor more clearly known to her family.  In most presumed consent countries the family still has the ultimate say in practice because what doctor is going to want to go against the wishes of the family in a time of grief?  Instead, presumed consent increases the probability that families say yes by changing their background information from my loved one didn't opt-in to my loved one didn't opt-out. 

So under presumed consent we get more families saying yes–but not all–and there are other constraints such as the number of people who die in a way that makes their organs available for transplant and the availability of transplant surgeons and facilities to do the operation and so forth.

In a roundtable on this issue with Sally Satel, Art Kaplan and others, Kieran Hiely notes:

Spain’s success is due to effective management of the transplant
system, not a simple legal rule. Similarly, Italy’s donation rate grew
rapidly in the 1990s thanks to investment in its system, not because of
its long-standing presumed consent law. Some countries, notably
Austria, do have “true” presumed consent, with no kin veto. But they do
not outperform countries like the U.S. by any great margin.

I'm actually a bit more positive than Kieran, the best evidence is that presumed consent raises donation rates by perhaps 20-30%.  Not bad, but not enough to eliminate the shortage.  To do that, as Satel notes in her contribution to the roundtable it will take live donation.

Kieran also writes:

It’s also worth remembering that, since the 1970s, the U.S.
“transplant community” has worked hard to allay public concerns that
surgeons might be too eager to harvest organs, or that the state might
play too calculating a role in deciding what happens to the bodies of
potential donors.

The latter point is especially important in the United States.  Brazil, for example, switched to presumed consent and then switched back to opt-in when people became fearful and outraged and donation rates fell.  It's not hard to imagine similar blowback in the United States.

It's also worth remembering that considered as a whole the U.S. system is the best in the world.  Spain does have a very high rate of deceased donation, but it does poorly on live donation.  Iran leads the world on live donation because it compensates donors but due to religious feelings about the sacredness of the body Iran, like other Muslim countries, does poorly on deceased donation.  The US does well on both deceased and live donation and in total leads the world.

We can do better but we do need to tread carefully.

OrganDonationRatesWorld

Hedge funds as charities

This one is from the new blog, Constructive Economics, written by Abraham Othman.  The premise of the post is to imagine a hedge fund devoted to altruism — not profits — and ask how the fund could operate most effectively:

  • It would attempt to move market prices as much as possible. For instance, imagine a binary security the hedge fund has calculated should be priced at x but is instead trading at y. A normal hedge fund would try to optimize their trading to move the price as little as possible, in order to maximize their expected return. A charitable hedge fund would instead run the same optimization in reverse, trying to push the price as close to x as possible.

  • It would be an activist fund with a focus on jobs, or the environment, or some other charitable cause, instead of profits (or the lack thereof caused by managerial incompetence).

  • It would be selective about the short positions it takes. Inasmuch as market prices can be self-fulfilling prophecies (and I’d like to write more about this idea at some point), the fund would use this power selectively, to reward the good and punish the evil. So a charitable hedge fund would try to provoke raids on Halliburton but buy Greek bonds.

I tend to think the fund couldn't do much good.  What should it do?  Assume that it can only buy and sell securities, it cannot, say, try to assassinate the leader of North Korea.  Operating in liquid markets only subsidizes smarter traders without much lasting effect on price.  What illiquid market could it find to secretly manipulate?  Should it operate in markets where opposing traders cannot go short?  An extreme Hayekian might suggest the fund would help the world best by maximizing profits.  Should it punish socially irresponsible managers who otherwise are getting off scot-free, basically by shorting their stocks?

For the pointer I thank Bill Mill.

Addendum: Along not totally unrelated lines, here Henry Manne defends insider trading to Fama and French.

Spain fact of the day

The regional governments already account for 57 percent of Spain’s public spending, double the level of two decades ago, according to Carlos Sebastián, economics professor at Complutense University in Madrid.

There is more discussion here.  As in Greece (or for that matter the EU!), the fiscal difficulties are revealing political difficulties which have been papered over by excess and unsustainable levels of subsidy.  That's why this is more than just a straightforward financial crisis.

College students are working less hard, it seems

Philip Babcock and Mindy Marks report:

Using multiple datasets from different time periods, we document declines in academic time investment by full-time college students in the United States between 1961 and 2003. Full-time students allocated 40 hours per week toward class and studying in 1961, whereas by 2003 they were investing about 27 hours per week. Declines were extremely broad-based, and are not easily accounted for by framing effects, work or major choices, or compositional changes in students or schools. We conclude that there have been substantial changes over time in the quantity or manner of human capital production on college campuses.

An earlier, different and ungated version is here.  A closely related paper, by the same authors, is here.

Changing Views on Organ Prohibition

I spoke recently at the Kidney and Urology Foundation of America on using incentives to increase organ donation.  Also speaking was Nancy Scheper-Hughes, the courageous UC Berkeley detective/anthropologist responsible for busting international rings of organ traffickers.

Scheper-Hughes is well known as an opponent of kidney vending, especially because it has often involved the exploitation of poor people in the developing world (fyi, there is no question that exploitation has occurred even if you take the view, as I do, that payment per se is not exploitation.)  In her impassioned talk, Scheper-Hughes presented many pictures of poor people with large scars.  

Thus, I was very surprised that Scheper-Hughes favors a trial of compensation for deceased donation and is even supportive of a trial for compensated live donation saying:

"There are penalties for buying, selling and brokering the sale of organs in this country, but still it goes on, often with an attitude of 'don't ask, don't tell.' I believe that if the laws are not going to be followed, then the laws should change. First, though, a controlled study must take place, in an ethical manner, with a sample of volunteer organ donors being compensated appropriately."

As with alcohol and drug prohibition, many people who do not favor organ sales are coming to recognize that a regulated market or compensation system could be preferable to an illegal market.

Addendum: My powerpoint slides Using Incentives to Increase Organ Donation, cover the problem and some potential solutions which are being adopted around the world.  Also included at the end are some slides especially designed for teaching this material in a principles of economics class.

India black markets in everything

A dirty little secret that most Indian politicians don't discuss is the thriving cow smuggling trade from their Hindu-majority nation, home of the sacred cow, to Muslim-majority Bangladesh, where many people enjoy a good steak. The trade is particularly robust around the Muslim festival of Eid.

India has outlawed cattle exports, but that hasn't prevented well-organized traffickers from herding millions of the unlucky beasts each year onto trains and trucks, injecting them with drugs on arrival so they walk faster, then forcing them to ford rivers and lumber into slaughterhouses immediately across the border.

The story is here.  Here is information on the price differential:

A $100 medium-size cow in Jharkhand is worth nearly double that in West Bengal and about $350 in Bangladesh. Indian residents along the border complain that the markup also attracts illegal migrants from Bangladesh, who steal cows at night and dart back home.

In a bid to stem the rustling, the Murshidabad local government announced a cow-licensing system in 2007. Cows were issued photo IDs.

In theory the "border is sealed" but in reality the guards are often corrupt and accept bribes to allow the illegal migration.

Scott Sumner reports

I actually looked at all 32 economies with per capita income above $20,000/year (i.e. as rich as Portugal.)  Interestingly, just as Denmark was number one in both markets and civic virtue, the same country placed dead last in both the free markets and civic virtue rankings.  And what is the country with both the lowest level of civic virtue and the least reformed statist economic system among 32 developed countries on four different continents?

You’ve probably guessed it by now . . . Greece.

Read the whole post, which is interesting throughout and more about economic liberalism than about Greece.

The best 100 Arabic books?

Here is one list and here are the top five:

1 The Cairo Trilogy by Egyptian (Nobel-prize winning) author Naguib Mahfouz. Yes, of course it’s available in English: Trans. William Maynard Hutchins, Everyman’s Library, 2001.

2 In Search of Walid Masoud by the Palestinian author Jabra Ibrahim Jabra. This is available in English, translated by by Adnan Haydar & Roger Allen. Syracuse University Press, 2000. Also, Ghassan Nasr’s translation of Ibrahim Jabra’s The Journals of Sarab Affan, published by Syracuse University Press, was a runner-up for the Banipal translation prize in 2008.

3 Honor, by the great Egyptian writer Sonallah Ibrahim. As far as I can turn up, this has never been translated into English. Ibrahim’s Zaat, The Committee, and Stealth are easily available from AUC Press, AUC Press, and Aflame Books. The Smell of It was translated, too, but it’s long since out of print.

4 War in the Egyptian Homeland, by the Egyptian Yousef Al-Qaeed has not been translated. (Oops! Hilary notes that War in the Land of Egypt by Yusuf al-Qa’id–see where a non-standard transliteration will get me–was published by Interlink in 1997, translated by Olive and Lorne Kenny and Christopher Tingley. Yes, and my title translation was lame. Worse, I’ve read that translation….)

5 Men in the Sun, by the Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani, was translated by Hilary Kilpatrick and published by Lynne Rienner Publishers in 1998.

Hat tip goes to Literary Saloon.

The legal system in Zimbabwe

Victims of crime in Zimbabwe's capital city Harare are now allowed to ferry the alleged perpetrators of those crimes from prisons to court after the state prisons service ran out of fuel, according to local reports Thursday.

Conditions have improved significantly in Zimbabwe's 42 jails since last year when an estimated 1,000 inmates had died in the first six months of the year of disease and neglect. But the Department of Prison Services still cannot provide transport to take prisoners awaiting trial to court.

The story is here (or try this link) and I thank Craig Richardson for the pointer.  Here is Craig on the collapse of Zimbabwe.