Tax the Envious
Tyler, Greg and Brad all forget the Coase theorem – all externalities are dual. The solution to envy is not to tax the rich but to tax the envious. To be envied is unpleasant. People want to be admired but not envied. To be envied is one step from being hated. (Consider how much crime is motivated by envy.) It’s envy which imposes an externality on the rich. Make the envious pay for their ugly preferences.
Surprising analysis? Not really – should gays be taxed because they make some people uncomfortable? Hell no. Tax the bigots for making gays feel unwelcome.
Oral Sex
This blog will not discuss oral sex. Unless, of course, it involves economics and the GMU economics department.
Sachs for President?
In my Inbox this morning:
Today the Sachs for President Draft Committee formally issued a call for Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs of Columbia University to run for president of the United States of America…
Victoria Zyp, a member of the board of directors of the Draft Committee, said…"We are confident that as more Americans learn about Professor Sachs’ work and qualifications, they are going to agree that he should be our next president. People are tired of politics as usual, and Professor Sachs is the kind of brilliant and dedicated individual that could put America back on a track," stated campaign volunteer Reema Hijazi….
The Sachs for President Draft Committee is a registered not-for-profit corporation dedicated to drafting Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs to run for President in 2008. The organization maintains no affiliation with Professor Sachs, nor is it aligned with any political party or organization. More information… at www.sachsforpresident.org.
We could will do a lot worse.
Business and the cost of health care
Don Boudreaux has a superb post over at Cafe Hayek whacking the myth that health care costs put America at a competitive disadvantage or that a government takeover per se would lower said costs. Don puts comparative advantage to good use in this clip:
Even if all American producers suffer production-cost increases of 15
(or whatever) percent, some American firms will nevertheless enjoy a
comparative advantage in production compared with foreign firms. The
continued relevance of the principle of comparative advantage does not
mean that such cost increases are inconsequential; Americans will be
poorer than otherwise if American producers are burdened with the need
to pay higher costs without any offsetting increase in quantity or
quality of output. But the problem isn’t international
"competitiveness"; many American firms will continue to export. The
problem is costs that are unnecessarily high — a problem that
ultimately is reflected in lower standards of living of consumers who
buy from, and workers who work for, American businesses.
But read the whole thing.
If you’re not so smart, why are you so rich?
Andrew Samwick asked a very good question last week: if Paul Krugman says that rising wages at the top are due to nasty Republican policies and not due to rising returns to education/skill how does he explain his own high income? Unfortunately Mark Thoma interpreted Samwick to be saying that Krugman was hypocritical. That, however, was not the point at all.
The point is that Krugman is a very good example of someone in the top 1% of income – someone whose earnings have increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s thus generating much income inequality. Krugman wants to say that earnings in the top 1% have gone up because of a reduction in the minimum wage or fewer labor unions. Huh? Remember, it’s not just inequality that has increased it’s absolute earnings at the top – where are these earnings coming from?
The idea that reductions in the bottom generate big earnings at the top reminds me of the theory, once popular among theorists of development, that the way to get rich is to steal from poor people. At best what you can get from lower labor earnings at the bottom is a slightly higher return to capital in general – not a big return to a few people at the top.
Krugman says it’s Republican policies that are generating inequality Or does he? Let’s go to the tape. Here’s what Krugman had to say when it was revealed that Enron paid him $50,000 for a speaking engagement.
My critics seem to think that there was something odd about Enron’s
willingness to pay a mere college professor that much money. But such sums
are not unusual for academic economists whose expertise is relevant to
current events…Remember that this was 1999: Asia was in crisis, the world was a mess.
And justifiably or not, I was regarded as an authority on that mess. I
invented currency crises as an academic field, way back in 1979; anyone
who wants a sense of my academic credentials should look at the Handbook
of International Economics, vol. 3, and check the index….And I wasn’t an ivory-tower academic. In 1994 I had published an article… in August 1998 I had advocated temporary
capital controls …in 1998 I had taken on the Japanese
situation, with a series of papers…I mention all this not as a matter of self-puffery, but to point out
that I was not an unknown college professor. On the contrary, I was a hot
property, very much in demand as a speaker to business audiences: I was
routinely offered as much as $50,000 to speak to investment banks and consulting
firms. They thought I might tell them something useful. For what it’s worth,
Citibank officials said – you can check it out with a Nexis search – that
a heads-up I gave them in 1996 about the risks of an Asian currency crisis
saved them hundreds of millions of dollars.
Now all this is amusing but that’s not my point (really, it’s just a side-benefit.) My point is that Krugman’s earlier explanation for his high income was all about the rising return to education ("Look at all my papers!") I would supplement this basic story with a greater winner-take-all market, more economies of scope etc. (See also Tyler’s comments.)
I think Krugman’s earlier explanation for his own income is mostly correct. Where Krugman and I apparently disagree is that I think that the very same explanation Krugman gives for his income also explains why other people in the top 1% are earning more. Krugman, however, no longer wants to talk about education and skill he wants to talk about nasty Republicans.
So let me rephrase Samwick’s question. Paul, If you’re not so smart, why are you so rich?
What’s Good for the Goose?
Writing in Slate, Tim Harford explains why conservation laws can kill the animals they are supposed to protect – the expectation of the conservation law leads to preemptive development. Case in point? (One that Tim doesn’t mention). The prospective ban on foie-gras (click on the link for Anthony Bourdain’s definition) in Chicago has lead to an orgy of consumption:
With the city’s ban on foie gras…days away from going into effect, upscale restaurants in the
city are serving it up like never before. They’ve put together special
menus featuring it in course after course — searing it, chilling it,
throwing it into salads and turning it into sauce.
One restaurant is even relocating just outside the city boundary.
Here is more on why the future is meat-eating vegetarianism.
Thanks to Amanda "I won’t eat Jello" Agan for the pointer.
Unholy Water
The EclecticEconomist alerts us to a story in the Onion CBC News:
The United Church of Canada may ask its members to stop buying bottled water.
The
request is part of a resolution against the privatization of water
supplies that has been put before delegates at the church’s general
council this week in Thunder Bay…."We’re against the commodification, the privatization is another way to say it, of water anyway, anywhere," [said a church leader.]
If the United Church cares about children they should reconsider their opposition. Privatized water saves lives. From my post, Water of Life:
…In the 1990s Argentina embarked
on one of the largest privatization campaigns in the world, including
the privatization of local water
companies covering approximately 30 percent of the country’s
municipalities.
Using the variation in ownership of water provision across time and
space generated
by the privatization process, we find that child mortality fell 8
percent in
the areas that privatized their water services and that the effect was
largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas….
That is the abstract to a very important paper, Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality, by Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler and Ernesto Schargrodsky in the February 2005 issue of the JPE. (free working paper version).
Trust Me, I’m an Economist
The first episode of Tim Harford’s television show, based in part upon The Undercover Economist, shows on BBC-2 tomorow (7 pm, BST). If it’s a big hit we can hope for international sales. In the meantime you can check out how Tim helps people to get dates, jobs and more in this 5 minute clip.
Tullock Insults
Call me a masochist but one of the great pleasures of being at George Mason is that I am regularly insulted by Gordon Tullock. You have to understand, however, that in my profession not to have been insulted by Gordon is to be a nobody.
In anycase, here is one from yesterday.
"Gordon," I asked, "do you think we should ban child labor?" "No, keep working."
The other day Gordon asked me to read one of his papers and I pointed out a few typos. "Excellent," he said, "this will surely be your greatest contribution to economics."
Gordon is prone to pressing people with difficult questions. One of my colleagues responded, "Gordon, I’m not that good at thinking on my feet." Without missing a beat Gordon pulled up a chair and said "well sit down and we’ll see how you do then."
Comments are open if you would like to memorialize your own Gordon insults.
Market Leaders that Went Under
I’m looking for a list of big firms that went under, i.e. either they went bankrupt or out of business in some sense. I’m interested especially in firms that succumbed to ordinary market forces so Texaco which went bankrupt due to a lawsuit doesn’t count and neither does Enron. Famous names that once dominated their field are ideal. Examples so far include:
KMart
Pan Am
Atari
Penn Central
Polaroid
Comments are open for your suggestions. Thanks in advance.
Market Failure? Academic Departments
The Angry Professor describes a new budgeting system at LSU:
Several years ago LSU moved to a business model budget. Under this
model, each department has control over its own funds. We might choose,
for example, to give everyone a big raise. Or, we might choose to hire
new faculty. We might purchase equipment, or furniture.As
with all such schemes, the administration makes sure that they will get
money from somewhere to sustain their bloated salaries. Each department
pays a "tax" to the college, which is determined by enrollments and
indirects as earned in "Year Zero" (the year before the new budget took
effect). If the department fails to generate at least the enrollments
and indirects earned in this year, the college will take the shortfall
out of the departmental budget. We’re not talking about that funny fake
money that colleges usually shuffle around, but real dollars: my
raises.
Some good things have come out this arrangement:
My department and several others have taken
advantage of the new model by "firing" the custodial staff provided by
Physical Facilities and hiring a private contractor to keep the
bathrooms looking spiffy. I must say, the bathroom has never looked
cleaner, and my office carpet has been vacuumed for the first time in
several years.
But, of course, the Angry Professor is angry.
In the social sciences, every department is trying to offer
statistics courses in house, so we now have about 8 courses titled
"Introduction to Statistics in [insert department name here]."
But why doesn’t the Coase Theorem and comparative advantage apply? The problem here can’t be the budgeting. I suspect a lack of property rights.
Each department is now in direct competition with every other for undergraduate enrollments.
Sounds good to me but the Angry Professor has a rebuttal:
The marginal departments, the ones with the
lowest possible academic standards, are pulling in vast numbers of warm
bodies and the tuition dollars associated with them. The departments that formerly only provided degrees to the football players are now thriving.
But grade inflation and the incentive to take easy courses in easy departments is nothing new, the only difference is that now the easy departments have funding commensurate with enrollments. The bottom line, therefore, is that the angry professor is angry at the students for not choosing classes more wisely.
A better grading system that takes into account the fact that some departments and professors grade easier than others would help students to make better choices. It’s not obvious to me, however, that on the whole the students aren’t making rational choices.
Thanks to Tom Slee for the pointer. I hope to say more about his interesting new book, No one Makes You Shop at Wal-Mart, in the future. Contrary to the title it’s about how markets fail, not a defense of Wal-Mart!
Markets in Everything: Police
Serbs seeking a bit of extra
protection or perhaps a helicopter for the weekend can now turn
to the police, which from this month will be renting out its
personnel, transport and even animals for private use.
More here. Of course, there is a history of private firms hiring police in Washington, DC.
Thanks to Carl Close for the pointer.
Adverse Selection among the Kiwis
The Unknown Professor points us to Pay Peanuts and Get Monkeys? Evidence from Academia a clever paper on adverse selection in academia. In New Zealand academic salaries are mostly independent of discipline so someone from a high-flying field like economics or finance is giving up a big American salary to teach in NZ compared to say a professor of literature. As a result, we ought to expect that the greater the salary in the U.S. the lower the quality in New Zealand.
…discipline research performance is indeed
negatively related to the value of outside opportunities: the greater a
discipline’s average salary in United States universities, the weaker
its research performance in New Zealand universities. The latter
apparently get what they pay for: disciplines in which the fixed
compensation is high relative to opportunity cost are best able to
recruit high-quality researchers and/or motivate their researchers to
be productive. Paying (relative) peanuts attracts mainly monkeys.
It’s a good paper, thus I expect the author will soon leave New Zealand.
Libertarians and Government Quality
Tyler is very wrong to say that libertarians assume that government quality is fixed. On the contrary, I always assume that government quality can go way down.
Seriously, however, a large part of the libertarian/classical liberal program has been about designing institutions to improve government quality just look at Hayek’s the Constitution of Liberty or Buchanan and Tullock’s the Calculus of Consent. The classicals, Montesquieu, Locke, Madison et al. were primarily focused on increasing government quality through constitutional design, things like democracy, division of powers, federalism, an independent judiciary and a bill of rights. The libertarian program of improving government quality has been remarkably successful, and far more successful than any other program.
Are there other methods of increasing government quality? Yes. In my post on Fiasco, I wrote, "Should we be surprised that delays, errors and incompetence are more prevalent at the INS than at bureaucracies which must deal with citizens or which face competition from the private sector?" which implicitly gives two methods for raising government quality – giving customers a vote and creating a competitive benchmark.
Contra Tyler, libertarians are on the forefront of offering
ideas to improve government quality. Term limits, flat tax (as a way
of reducing corruption not just an economic improvement), different voting methods, a balanced
budget amendment, openness and transparency, competition, increased
federalism, and unrestricted media are just a few ideas.
Tyler, in contrast, doesn’t give any hint of how to improve government quality and his examples are not very good. Tyler likes Finnish architecture. Well it’s no surprise that if a lot of governments promote architecture one of them will produce something that Tyler likes. I think this is very cool but I don’t advocate bringing back the funders. Same thing with the highway system or the Internet. Sure, these were good investments but does government investment pay as a rule?
The grand libertarian program has improved government quality tremendously – so much so that we are well into the realm of diminishing returns but we can do better and libertarians are among the leaders in suggesting how.
Addendum: Glen Whitman replies to Tyler also.
WashingtonWatch
WashingtonWatch.com is a new website that presents estimates of the costs or savings per family or person for a variety of bills. Here’s the latest DOD budget cost:
S. 2766 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for the
military functions of the Department of Defense (DoD), for activities
of the Department of Energy (DOE), and for other purposes, including
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.Cost Per Family: $5535.19
The website is a useful collection but be aware that there is no attempt to do any cost-benefit or incidence analysis. The numbers are just brute government estimates of the total program spending or tax reduction divided by the number of families or persons. I can guarantee you, for example, that the following calculation for the "average family" is way, way off the mark.
H.R. 5638 makes the estate and gift tax permanent; increases the
estate and gift tax credit to a $5 million effective exclusion amount,
making any unused effective exclusion amount portable between spouses;
and reduces rates, as well as making other changes in tax law.Savings per average family: $1896.79