Category: Data Source

The culture of Hollywood vs. the culture of Bollywood

by  Tyler Cowen in

And a comment: “In Bollywood movies throughout multiple eras, the most shameful thing has always been disrespect of parents/family. By a wide margin.”

Did Norwegian schools actually ban cell phones?

by  Tyler Cowen in

Some commentators are suggesting no real ban was in effect.  I went back to the Sara Abrahamsson paper to confirm the following:

Schools where students are required to hand in their phones in the morning, and therefore cannot access them during breaks, are considered to have a strict policy against smartphones. Schools where students are allowed to access their phones during breaks but are required to have them on for instance silent [mode] during lectures are classified as having a lenient policy toward smartphones. For mental health, the effect between schools with a more lenient and strict policy is relatively similar, as shown in Figure 10.17. Four years post-ban, girls experience 3.48 and 2.3 fewer visits for specialist care related to psychological symptoms and diseases at schools with a lenient and strict policy respectively (p-values 0.036 and 0.068).18 For bullying, there is not much difference dependent on the type of policy implemented when it comes to bullying, neither for girls as documented in Figure 11, or boys as shown in Appendix Figure A21.

However, girls attending a middle school introducing a strict policy against smartphones, experience an increase by 0.12 standard deviations in GPA. This estimate is significant four years post-ban at the 5% level (p-value 0.032). Additionally, girls attending a middle school with a strict policy have significantly higher teacher-awarded test scores by 0.08 and 0.14 standard deviations, three and four years post-ban (p-values 0.075 and 0.011). These results, shown in Panel A and B in Figure 12, show that both GPA and average grades set by teachers for girls improve after strict smartphone bans in schools are implemented.

…However, there are no detectable differences in the likelihood of attending an academic high school track between schools with strict compared to more lenient policies

In other words, there were strict bans and they had only modest effects, including relative to the less strict bans.  On p.34, Figure 2, you will see that 200 schools had strict bans, somewhat less than half the total (not every case is easy to classify).  Note also that if smart phone bans could help with mental health problems in a big way, we still should see a change in mental health diagnoses, following the bans, yet we do not.

Here is my original post on the topic.

The US has Low Electricity Prices

by  Alex Tabarrok in

The US has some of the lowest electricity prices in the world. Shown below are industrial retail electricity prices in EU27, USA, UK, China and Japan. Electricity is critical for AI compute, electric cars and more generally reducing carbon footprints. The US needs to build much more electricity infrastructure, by some estimates tripling or quadrupling production. That’s quite possible with deregulation and permitting reform. I am pleased to learn, moreover, that we are starting from a better base than I had imagined.

GPT-4 beats psychologists on a new test of social intelligence

by  Tyler Cowen in

There were significant differences in SI between psychologists and AI’s ChatGPT-4 and Bing. ChatGPT-4 exceeded 100% of all the psychologists, and Bing outperformed 50% of PhD holders and 90% of bachelor’s holders. The differences in SI between Google Bard and bachelor students were not significant, whereas the differences with PhDs were significant; Where 90% of PhD holders excel on Google Bird.

That is from a new paper by Nabil Saleh Sufyan, et.al.  In the “good ol’ days” we thought that was the task where AI would never have much of a fighting chance.  Now the bets models are just outright beating the humans.

Note that all the subjects were men.  Via Christopher Altman.

Mask Mandate Costs

by  Tyler Cowen in

There is now an NBER working paper on this topic:

This paper presents the results from a hypothetical set of questions related to mask-wearing behavior and opinions that were asked of a nationally representative sample of over 4,000 participants in early 2022. Mask mandates were hotly debated in public discourse, and though much research exists on benefits of masks, there has been no research thus far on the distribution of perceived costs of compliance. As is common in economic research that aims to assess the value to society of non-market activities, we use survey valuation methods and ask how much participants would be willing to pay to be exempted from rules of mandatory community masking. The survey asks specifically about a 3 month exemption. We find that the majority of respondents (56%) are not willing to pay to be exempted from mandatory masking. However, the average person was willing to pay $525, and a small segment of the population (0.9%) stated they were willing to pay over $5,000 to be exempted from the mandate. Younger respondents stated higher willingness to pay to avoid the mandate than older respondents. Combining our results with standard measures of the value of a statistical life, we estimate that a 3 month masking order was perceived as cost effective through willingness-to-pay questions only if at least 13,333 lives were saved by the policy.

That is by Patrick Carlin, Shyam Raman, Kosali I. Simon, Ryan Sullivan, and Coady Wing.  A few comments:

1. Willingness to be paid magnitudes are often much higher than willingness to pay numbers.  Especially when issues of justice and desert are involved.  I know some people who might say: “I have a right to refuse a mask.  I’m not going to pay anything not to wear one, but you would have to pay me a million dollars to put it on.”  There are less extreme versions of this view, noting that even in quite normal laboratory circumstances WTBP can be 5x higher than WTP.

2. For many people the value of masking — either positively or negatively — depends on what others do.  Some might feel “I guess I can wear a mask, but if you make everyone do that, that is a gross Orwellian dystopia.”  Others, perhaps leaning more to the political left, might say: “I am willing to do my share, but of course I expect the same from everyone else.  Let us sing this collective song and with our masks dance to the heavens!”

3. Why not just look at what private sector establishments chose when the force of law was not present?  Don’t they have the best sense of how to internalize all the different factors behind what their customers want?  Of course the answer here will vary, depending on what stage of the pandemic we are in.

The world of labor shortages, the culture that is alcohol

by  Tyler Cowen in

Drunken-driving deaths in the U.S. have risen to levels not seen in nearly two decades, federal data show, a major setback to long-running road-safety efforts.

At the same time, arrests for driving under the influence have plummeted, as police grapple with challenges like hiring woes and heightened concern around traffic stops.

Here is more from the WSJ.  “About 13,500 people died in alcohol-impairment crashes in 2022…”  Here is my earlier post on the culture of guns and the cultural of alcohol.

Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Migrants at Sea: Unintended Consequences of Search and Rescue Operations

by  Tyler Cowen in

Many countries are facing and resisting strong migratory pressure, fueling irregular migration. In response to mounting deaths in the Central Mediterranean, European nations intensified rescue operations in 2013. We develop a model of irregular migration to identify the effects of these operations. We find that smugglers responded by sending boats in adverse weather and utilizing flimsy rafts, thus inducing more crossings in dangerous conditions and ultimately offsetting intended safety benefits due to moral hazard. Despite the increased risk, these operations likely increased aggregate migrant welfare; nevertheless, a more successful policy should instead restrict supply of rafts and expand legal alternatives.

That is by Claudio Deiana, Vikram Maheshri and Giovanni Mastrobuoni, published in the latest issue of the AEA policy journal.

As a side point, the call for greater legality is under-argued to say the least.  This is a classic example of academic bias not being called out, as there is zero consideration of the costs of such migration.  Loyal MR readers will know I am hardly unsympathetic to immigration, but there are reasons why the arrival of so many migrants in Europe is unpopular.  Policy recommendations can be issued without considering those reasons?  And there is a call for the EU to help Africa grow — are there plausible policy instruments there with benefits above costs?  Enough to matter for the migration problem?  Doesn’t making poor societies richer often boost the flow of migrants because now migration can be planned and afforded?  Also not discussed.

Or maybe it is that no one thinks these are real policy discussions, rather it is not “mood affiliation permissible” to simply end a piece on the note that trying to help vulnerable individuals can backfire and lead to a lot of moral hazard?  And so a mood affiliation of “we care about them nonetheless” has to be slipped in at the end?

Either way come on, both authors and editors…

Nonetheless this is an interesting paper, worthy of attention!  Here are less gated versions of the paper.

Updated estimates on immigration and wages

by  Tyler Cowen in

In this article we revive, extend and improve the approach used in a series of influential papers written in the 2000s to estimate how changes in the supply of immigrant workers affected natives’ wages in the US. We begin by extending the analysis to include the more recent years 2000-2022. Additionally, we introduce three important improvements. First, we introduce an IV that uses a new skill-based shift-share for immigrants and the demographic evolution for natives, which we show passes validity tests and has reasonably strong power. Second, we provide estimates of the impact of immigration on the employment-population ratio of natives to test for crowding out at the national level. Third, we analyze occupational upgrading of natives in response to immigrants. Using these estimates, we calculate that immigration, thanks to native-immigrant complementarity and college skill content of immigrants, had a positive and significant effect between +1.7 to +2.6\% on wages of less educated native workers, over the period 2000-2019 and no significant wage effect on college educated natives. We also calculate a positive employment rate effect for most native workers. Even simulations for the most recent 2019-2022 period suggest small positive effects on wages of non-college natives and no significant crowding out effects on employment.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Alessandro Caiumi and Giovanni Peri.  I wouldn’t say I have massive trust in this kind of estimate.  What I do notice, however, is the utter lack of countervailing real wage estimates that show immigration to be a major negative for U.S. native workers.

Trade reform and economic growth

by  Tyler Cowen in

From the excellent Doug Irwin:

Do trade reforms that significantly reduce import barriers lead to faster economic growth? In the twenty-five years since Rodríguez and Rodrik’s (2000) critical survey of empirical work on this question, new research has tried to overcome the various methodological problems that have plagued previous attempts to provide a convincing answer. I examine three strands of recent work on this issue: cross-country regressions focusing on within-country growth, synthetic control methods on specific reform episodes, and empirical country studies looking at the channels through which lower trade barriers may increase productivity. A consistent finding is that trade reforms have had a positive impact on economic growth, on average, although the effect is heterogeneous across countries. Overall, these research findings should temper some of the previous agnosticism about the empirical link between trade reform and economic performance.

Here is my much earlier CWT with Doug Irwin.

The Norwegian ban on smart phones in middle schools

by  Tyler Cowen in

Here is a new paper by Sara Abrahamsson.  Perhaps there is Norwegian exceptionalism at work, but the results reflect my expectations reasonably closely.  The basic setting is that smart phones were banned in middle school, but at varying (and exogenous) rates around the country.  Here are some of the core findings, noting that reading the paper gives some different impressions from some of the Twitter summaries:

1. Grades improve, for instance for the girls it goes up by 0.08 standard deviations.  Worth doing, but hardly saving a generation.  For girls, the biggest improvement comes in their math scores.

2. The girls consult less with mental health-related professionals, with visits falling by 0.22 on average to their GPs, falling by 2-3 visits to specialist care.

3. “I find no effect on students’ likelihood (extensive margin) of being diagnosed or treated by specialists or GPs for a psychological symptom and diseases.”  So more visits, but those visits don’t lead to much.

4. Bullying falls, by 0.42 of an SD for girls, 0.39 of an SD for boys.  That is a larger effect than I would have expected.

5. The grade gains are highest for students with lower SES backgrounds.

6. When you look into the details of the data (p.22), the improvement in grades does not seem correlated with the decline in the number of visits to mental health professionals.

So if you ban smart phones from schools, grades go up by a very modest amount, bullying falls by a less modest amount, and actual mental health diagnoses stay the same.  In the United States at least, parents seem to hate cellphone bans, because they cannot reach their kids at will.

And there you go.  Here is some commentary on the p values in the paper.

Hiring discrimination sentences to ponder

by  Tyler Cowen in

Several common measures — like employing a chief diversity officer, offering diversity training or having a diverse board — were not correlated with decreased discrimination in entry-level hiring, the researchers found.

But one thing strongly predicted less discrimination: a centralized H.R. operation.

The researchers recorded the voice mail messages that the fake applicants received. When a company’s calls came from fewer individual phone numbers, suggesting that they were originating from a central office, there tended to be less bias. When they came from individual hiring managers at local stores or warehouses, there was more. These messages often sounded frantic and informal, asking if an applicant could start the next day, for example.

“That’s when implicit biases kick in,” Professor Kline said. A more formalized hiring process helps overcome this, he said: “Just thinking about things, which steps to take, having to run something by someone for approval, can be quite important in mitigating bias.”

That is from Claire Cain Miller and Josh Katz in the NYT.