Category: Education

Online Therapy as Good as Face to Face

A small study suggests that online therapy is as effective as face to face.

FreudOnline

Online psychotherapy is just as efficient as conventional therapy. Three months after the end of the therapy, patients given online treatment even displayed fewer symptoms.

Six therapists treated 62 patients, the majority of whom were suffering from moderate depression. The patients were divided into two equal groups and randomly assigned to one of the therapeutic forms. The treatment consisted of eight sessions with different established techniques that stem from cognitive behavior therapy and could be carried out both orally and in writing. Patients treated online had to perform one predetermined written task per therapy unit – such as querying their own negative self-image. They were known to the therapist by name.

“In both groups, the depression values fell significantly,” says Professor Andreas Maercker, summing up the results of the study. At the end of the treatment, no more depression could be diagnosed in 53 percent of the patients who underwent online therapy – compared to 50 percent for face-to-face therapy. Three months after completing the treatment, the depression in patients treated online even decreased whereas those treated conventionally only displayed a minimal decline: no more depression could be detected in 57 percent of patients from online therapy compared to 42 percent with conventional therapy.

If therapy works well online imagine what else might work online?

There is now a for-profit university entering NCAA Division I ranks

…Mueller’s company, Grand Canyon University, in Phoenix, is in the process of becoming the first-ever for-profit university to join the NCAA’s Division I ranks. The Antelopes (hence, the ticker symbol) accepted an invitation to the WAC last December when the oft-raided league was on life support. On July 1 they became official members, beginning a four-year transition period from Division II to Division I

The presidents of the Pac-12 — including one in particular — are none too pleased about it.

The conference’s 12 presidents signed and delivered a letter dated July 10 urging the NCAA’s Executive Committee to “engage in further, careful consideration” about allowing for-profit universities to become Division I members at the committee’s August meeting. In the meantime, Pac-12 presidents decided at a league meeting last month not to schedule future contests against Grand Canyon while the issue is under consideration.

“A university using intercollegiate athletics to drive up its stock value — that’s not what we’re about,” Arizona State president Michael Crow said in a phone interview over the weekend. “… If someone asked me, should we play the Pepsi-Cola Company in basketball? The answer is no. We shouldn’t be playing for-profit corporations.”

There is more information here, and the hat tip goes to Tim Johnson on Twitter.

Higher education in Greece

From a recent article:

“He says his name is George but declines to give his last name. He’s 29 years old, holds a master’s degree in economics, and has been unemployed for a year and a half, not counting the five months he worked as a street cleaner.

“It’s more difficult for the highly qualified,” he says. “The market thinks we will cost too much.” He’s applying for a position as a secretary, a job that requires a high school degree. For a couple of minutes, he and Stratigaki discuss whether his education will be an asset or a liability, and then their names are called.”

The article is here, sad throughout.  For the pointer I thank George Hawkey.

Does it matter if Muslim representatives are elected in India?

There is a new paper by Sonia R. Bhalotra, Guilhem Cassan, Irma Clots-Figueras,  and Lakshmi Iyer which says yes it does matter:

This paper investigates whether the religious identity of state legislators in India influences development outcomes, both for citizens of their religious group and for the population as a whole. To allow for politician identity to be correlated with constituency level voter preferences or characteristics that make religion salient, we use quasi-random variation in legislator identity generated by close elections between Muslim and non-Muslim candidates. We find that increasing the political representation of Muslims improves health and education outcomes in the district from which the legislator is elected. We find no evidence of religious favoritism: Muslim children do not benefit more from Muslim political representation than children from other religious groups.

The NBER version is here, there is an ungated pdf here.

For-profit education is better than we thought

From today’s Inside Higher Ed, there is now a revised version (pdf) of the Kevin Lang and Russell Weinstein paper which was very critical of the returns from for-profit education.  The new results are more like this:

The two economists, who were not available for comment, apparently tweaked their methodology and came to a different conclusion about the relative value of credentials earned at for-profits.

“We find no statistically significant differential return to certificates or associates degrees between for-profits and not-for-profits,” they wrote in the paper, which was released last month.

Certificate holders from for-profits tended to fare slightly worse in the job market, according to the study, while associate degrees from for-profits were worth slightly more than those from nonprofit institutions. Hence no clear winner emerged.

The revised paper still included some worrisome findings about for-profits. Those colleges are typically more expensive than their nonprofit counterparts, particularly community colleges. For-profits charged an average of $6,300 more in annual tuition for certificate programs, according to the study’s sample, and $6,900 more per year for associate degrees.

“The return on investment is undoubtedly lower at for-profits,” the paper said.

At least this time around, the real world falls in line (somewhat) with the theory.

Penn State uses the stick to enforce medical exams

By November, faculty and their spouses or domestic partners covered by university health care must complete an online wellness profile and physical exam. They’re also required to complete a more invasive biometric screening, including a “full lipid profile” and glucose, body mass index and waist circumference measurements. (Mobile units from the university’s insurance company, Highmark, will visit campuses to perform these screenings.)

Employees and their beneficiaries who don’t meet those requirements must pay the monthly insurance surcharge [$100] beginning in January.

And if you don’t trust the employer, they have reassured us:

“It is important to note that screening results are confidential and will not be used to remove or reduce health care benefits, nor raise an individual’s health care premium,” a university announcement reads. “The results only are for individual health awareness, illness prevention and wellness promotion.”

The full story is here.

Where is income mobility high and low?

Climbing the income ladder occurs less often in the Southeast and industrial Midwest, the data shows, with the odds notably low in Atlanta, Charlotte, Memphis, Raleigh, Indianapolis, Cincinnati and Columbus. By contrast, some of the highest rates occur in the Northeast, Great Plains and West, including in New York, Boston, Salt Lake City, Pittsburgh, Seattle and large swaths of California and Minnesota.

Check out the map at the NYT link.  Based on eyeballing, western North Dakota seems to do best and northwestern Mississippi seems to do worst.

This is based on work by Raj Chetty, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, and the other results are quite interesting:

The researchers concluded that larger tax credits for the poor and higher taxes on the affluent seemed to improve income mobility only slightly. The economists also found only modest or no correlation between mobility and the number of local colleges and their tuition rates or between mobility and the amount of extreme wealth in a region.

But the researchers identified four broad factors that appeared to affect income mobility, including the size and dispersion of the local middle class. All else being equal, upward mobility tended to be higher in metropolitan areas where poor families were more dispersed among mixed-income neighborhoods.

Income mobility was also higher in areas with more two-parent households, better elementary schools and high schools, and more civic engagement, including membership in religious and community groups.

Regions with larger black populations had lower upward-mobility rates. But the researchers’ analysis suggested that this was not primarily because of their race. Both white and black residents of Atlanta have low upward mobility, for instance.

Of course that is all correlation and not causation per se.  The Google link to the original research ought to be here, but right now the available links are down, perhaps soon they will come back up again.

Some dangers in estimating signaling and human capital premia

Let’s say you signal your way into a first job, then learn a lot from holding that perch, and enjoy a persistently higher income for the rest of your life.  Is that a return to signaling or a return to learning?  Or both?

Maybe it matters that “the signaling came first.”  Well, try this thought experiment.

Let’s say you have to learn to read and write to signal effectively.  Can we run a causal analysis on “learning how to read and write”?  Take away that learning and you take away the return to signaling.  Should we thus conclude that the return to signaling is zero, once we take learning into account?  After all, the learning came first.  No, not really.

The trick is this: when there are non-additive, value-enhancing relationships across inputs, single-cause causal experiments can serve up misleading results.  In fact, by cherry-picking your counterfactual you can get the return to signaling, or to human capital, to be much higher or lower.  Usually one is working in a model where the implicit marginal causal returns to learning, IQ, signaling, and so on sum up to much more than 100%, at least if you measure them in this “naive” fashion.  If you think of a career in narrative terms, IQ, learning, and signaling are boosting each others’ value with positive and often non-linear feedback.  And insofar as these labor market processes have “gatekeepers,” it is easy for the marginal product of any one of these to run very high, again if you set up the right thought experiment.

Along related lines, many people use hypothetical examples to back out the return to signaling, learning, IQ, or whatever.  “Let’s say they make you drop out of Harvard and finish at Podunk U.”  “Let’s say you forge a degree.”  “Let’s say you are suddenly a genius but living in the backwoods.”  And so on.  These are fun to talk and think about, but like the above constructions they will give you a wide range of answers for marginal returns, again depending which counterfactual you choose.  A separate point is that many of these are non-representative examples, or they involve out of equilibrium behavior.

I call the methods discussed in the above few paragraphs the single-cause causal measures, because we are trying to estimate the causal impact of but a single cause in a broader non-additive, multi-causal process.

There is another way to analyze the return to signaling, and that is to leave historical causal chains intact and ask what if a degree is removed.  Let’s say I’ve held a job for ten years and my team is very productive.  But the boss can’t figure out who is the real contributor.  I get an especially large share of the pay because, from my undergraduate basket weaving major, the boss figures I am smarter than those team members who did not finish college at all.  If I didn’t have the degree, I would receive $1000  less.  So that year the return to signaling is $1000.  I call this the modal measure.  It is modal rather than causal because we take my degree away in an imaginary sense, without taking away my job (which perhaps I would not have, earlier on, received without the degree).

There are also the measures (not easy to do) based in notions from bargaining theory.  Consider IQ, learning, and signaling as coming together to form “coalitions.”  One-by-one, remove different marginal elements of the coalition in thought experiments, estimate the various marginal products, and then average up those marginal products as suggested by various bargaining axioms.  You could call those the multi-cause causal measures.  They are more theoretically correct than the single-cause causal measures, but difficult to do and also less fun to talk about.

Yet another method is to pick out a single counterfactual on the basis of which policy change is being proposed.  I’ll call these the policy measures.  Let’s say the proposal is to subsidize student transfer from community colleges to four-year institutions.  You can then ask causal questions about the group likely to be affected by this.  (It is possible to estimate the private return to education for this kind of policy, but hard to break that down into signaling and learning components.)  In any case the answers to these questions will not resolve broader debates about the relative importance of signaling, learning, IQ, and so on and how we should understand education more generally.

Usually when people argue about the return to signaling, they are conflating the single-cause causal measures, the modal measures, the bargaining theory measures, and the policy measures.  The single-cause causal measures are actually the least justified of this lot, but they exercise the most powerful sway over most of our imaginations.

The single-cause causal measures are especially influential in the blogosphere, where they make for snappy posts with vivid narrative examples and counterexamples.  But they are misleading, so do not be led astray by them.

How big is your chance of dying in an ordinary day?

A Micromort can also be compared to a form of imaginary Russian roulette in which 20 coins are thrown in the air: if they all come down heads, the subject is executed.  That is about the same odds as the 1-in-a-million chance that we describe as the average everyday dose of acute fatal risk.

That is from Michael Blastland and David Spiegelhalter, The Norm Chronicles: Stories and Numbers About Danger, which is an interesting book about the proper framing and communication of risk.

Is there a Flynn effect for dementia?

It seems so:

A new study has found that dementia rates among people 65 and older in England and Wales have plummeted by 25 percent over the past two decades, to 6.2 percent from 8.3 percent, the strongest evidence yet of a trend some experts had hoped would materialize.

Another recent study, conducted in Denmark, found that people in their 90s who were given a standard test of mental ability in 2010 scored substantially better than people who reached their 90s a decade earlier. Nearly one-quarter of those assessed in 2010 scored at the highest level, a rate twice that of those tested in 1998. The percentage severely impaired fell to 17 percent from 22 percent.

From Gina Kolata, there is more here.

Bryan’s breakdown on my break down

Re: my post immediately below on signaling, Bryan thinks I haven’t answered his question about the importance of signalling.  But I have, he is just confused because I don’t use the exact same normalization as he does.   In any case, I postulate the wage return to signalling as going away within five years, in say a career of forty years, then with the measure adjusted for the presence of capital and resource income.  You can express that in terms of totals, variations, percentages, as you wish but the point remains that signaling is only a temporary factor, and overall only somewhat of a marginal factor (5-10%?) in explaining the overall evolution of wages.  That is why it has lost ground to human capital approaches, all the more so with increasing inequality.  (One can believe all of that and still think, as I do, that we could organize current education more efficiently and at lower cost.)  I also stand by my points that insisting on the break down is missing the more important points about indeterminacy and nestedness and those points too can be applied to any normalization of the units.  It would be more useful if Bryan would outline where he disagrees with my assessment, as the entire chain of reasoning is laid out pretty explicitly.

By the way, the easiest way to boost the contribution of signaling is to invoke the “you got your first job by signaling and then from that job quickly gained persistent extra human capital” argument, but even then that increment can, under traditional measures, be assigned to human capital.  (You don’t want to rule out all human capital influences, on the grounds that signaling helped create them, any more than you wish to classify gains from signaling as human capital, if the human capital helped you get into the position to signal.  But if that doesn’t convince you, revisit the earlier point about indeterminacy, as you can see that the marginal products for human capital and signaling will sum to well over one hundred percent.)

How much of education and earnings variation is signalling? (Bryan Caplan asks)

On Twitter Bryan asks me:

Would you state your human capital/ability bias/signaling point estimates using my typology?

He refers to this blog post of his, though he does not clearly define the denominator there: is it percentage of what you spend on education or explaining what percentage of the variation in lifetime earnings?  I’ll choose the latter and also I’ll focus on signaling rather than trying to separate out which parts of human capital are from birth and which are later learned.  My calculations are thus:

1. I don’t wish to count “credentialed” occupations, where you need a degree and/or license, but you are reaping rents due to monopoly privilege.  It’s neither human capital nor signaling (it’s not about intrinsic talent), though you could argue it is a kind of human capital in rent-seeking.  In any case, let’s focus on private labor markets without such barriers.

2. Most capital and resource income is due to factors better explained by human capital theories or due to inheritance.  That is more than a third of earnings right there.  Note that the higher is inequality, the less the signaling model will end up explaining.  That is one reason why the signaling model has become less relevant.

3. Depending on job and sector, what you’ve signaled, as opposed to what you know, explains a big chunk of wages in the first three to five years of employment.  Within five years (often less), most individuals are earning based on what they can do, setting aside credentialism as discussed under #1.  Here is my earlier post on speed of employer learning.

Keep in mind that everyone’s wages change quite a bit over their lifetime and that is mostly not due to retraining (i.e., changes in the educational signal) in the formal sense, as most people stop formal retraining after some point.  The changes are due to employer estimates of skill, modified by bargaining power.  In this sense all theories are predominantly human capital theories, whether they admit it or not.

To be generous, let’s give Bryan the full first five years of income based on signaling alone, out of a forty year career.  And let’s say that on average wages rise at the rate of time discount (not true as of late, but a simplifying assumption and I think Bryan believes in a claim like this anyway.)

How much of income is explained by signaling?  I’m coming up with “1/8 of 2/3,” the latter fraction referring generously to labor’s share in national income.  That will fall clearly under ten percent, but recall I’ve inserted some generous assumptions here.

Bryan wants to call me “a signaling denialist,” yet I see signaling as still very important for understanding some aspects of the labor market.  But it’s far from the main story for the labor market as a whole, especially as you move into the out years.

That all said, this “decomposition” approach may obscure more than it illuminates.  Let’s consider two parables.

First, imagine a setting where you need the signal to be in the game at all, but after that your ingenuity and your personal connections explain all of the subsequent variation in income.  Depending what margin you choose, the contribution of signaling to later income can be seen as either zero percent or one hundred percent.  Signaling won’t explain any of the variation of income across people with the same signal, yet people will compete intensely to get the signal in the first place.

Second, in a basic signaling model there are two groups and one dimension of signaling.  That’s too simple.  A signaling model implies that a worker is paid some kind of average product throughout many years, but of course the reference class for defining this average product is changing all the time and is not, over time, based on the original reference class of contemporaneous graduating peers.  For the purposes of calculating your wage based on a signal, is your relevant peer group a) all those people who got out of bed this morning, b) all those people in the Yale class of 2012, or c) all those who have been mid-level managers at IBM for twenty years?  This will change as your life passes.

So there’s usually a signaling model nested within a human capital model, with the human capital model determining the broader parameters of pay, especially changes in pay.  The employer’s (reasonably good but not perfect) estimate of your marginal product determines which peer group you get put into, if you choose to invest in additional signals (or not).  The epiphenomena are those of a signaling model, but the peer group reshufflings over time are ruled by something else.  Everything will look like signaling but again over time signaling won’t explain much about the variation or evolution in wages.

Seeing the relevance of those “indeterminacy” and “nested” perspectives is more important than whatever decomposition you might cite to answer Bryan’s query.

The faculty are unhappy

Here is one recent report of falling salaries in public institutions, and, on the bright side, universities are having trouble filling some of those slots:

Public university professors don’t enter the profession to get rich. But some faculty are having trouble paying bills, and have even qualified for foods stamps, Olson said. “For somebody to go five to seven years beyond college to obtain a Ph.D. degree and to realize that you are in need of federal assistance to make ends meet — and that’s for a tenure-track position –” is devastating.

Adding what some view as insult to injury, a recently published database of public employee salaries shows that some professors earn less than their colleagues at local high schools without doctorates.

Yet how would they feel about actual poor people?  The article focuses on University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, and serves up the following numbers:

Faculty salaries averaged $67,000 for full professors; $57,100 for associate professors; and $51,900 for assistant professors during the 2012-13 academic year.

The full article is here.  It remains the case that numerous public universities are falling pretty far behind the curve.