Category: History
Rebuilding our world, with reference to strong AI
When 2012 passed into 2013, we did not have to rebuild our world, not in most countries at least. It sufficed to make adjustments at the margin.
After the Roman Empire fell, parts of Europe had to rebuild their worlds. It took a long time, but they ended up doing pretty well.
After the American Revolution, the newly independent colonies had to rebuild their own world. They did so brutally, but with considerable success.
After WWII, Western Europe had the chance to rebuild its own world, and did a great job.
We moderns are not used to having to rebuild our world.
It is now the case that strong AI is here/coming, and we will have to rebuild our own world. Many of us are terrified at this prospect, others are just extremely pessimistic. It seems so impossible. How are all the new pieces supposed to fit together? Who amongst us can explain that process in a reassuring way?
Yet we have done it many times before. Not always with success, however. After WWI ended, Europe was supposed to rebuild its own world, but they came up with something far worse than what they had before. Nonetheless, in the broader sweep of history world rebuilding projects have had positive expected value.
And so we will rebuilding our world yet again. Or maybe you think we are simply incapable of that.
As this happens, it can be useful to distinguish “criticisms of AI” from “people who cannot imagine that world rebuilding will go well.” A lot of what parades as the former is actually the latter.
In any case, it all will be quite something to witness.
Malthus had real influence
From a recent paper by Eric Robertson:
Public officials often fail to implement government policy as directed, yet the role of economic ideas in shaping these implementation choices is poorly understood. This paper provides causal evidence that exposure to economic ideas can durably influence bureaucrat behavior. I study British colonial bureaucrats in India, exploiting a natural experiment created by the abrupt death of Thomas Malthus in 1834, replacing his economics instruction at a bureaucrat training college for that of a contemporary critic, Richard Jones. Whereas Malthus regarded economic distress as a natural mechanism for restoring equilibrium by reducing population growth, Jones disagreed with this view. Linking rainfall shocks to district-level fiscal responses, I show that officials trained by Malthus delivered less relief during droughts, providing 0.10-0.25 SD less aid across all major measures compared with officials taught by Jones. The results reveal that exposure to abstract economic ideas can shape real-world policy implementation for decades.
This may be a case where using rainfall shocks in a paper actually makes sense. Via Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski.
At the Grand Egyptian Museum
Neal Spencer has a good review at the LRB, excerpt:
Over the past few decades, however, Egyptian museums have pivoted away from Europe and America. The National Museum of Egyptian Civilisation, which opened in 2021, rejected the traditional division of artefacts into pharaonic, Coptic, Greco-Roman and Islamic eras (a framework associated with European academic disciplines). The Grand Egyptian Museum, announced at the height of Hosni Mubarak’s rule and styled ‘the largest museum in the world dedicated to the people, history and culture of Ancient Egypt’, opened in November last year with a lavish ceremony broadcast round the world. It is estimated to have cost more than $1 billion ($300 million of which was a loan from Japan) and sprawls over an area the size of seventy football pitches. The financial crash of 2008, the Arab Spring and Covid meant that its construction took almost twenty years. Much has changed in that time. The last decade of construction took place under the military regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who installed one of his generals as its head – the first non-Egyptologist to direct a major Egyptian museum.
I saw the museum shortly after the opening and found it pretty spectacular, both the building/setting and the collection. It is worth making a trip to Cairo just to see this, and it now can be considered one of the world’s great museums and history sites (yes I had seen the earlier incarnation of the museum, years ago). The very wise Rasheed Griffith also gave the museum an A+.
Natural and Artificial Ice
Excellent Veritasium video on the 19th century ice industry. Shipping ice from America to India would hardly seem like a wise idea—it’s hard to imagine ever getting a committee to approve such a venture—but entrepreneurs are free to try wacky ideas all the time, and sometimes they pay off, resulting in great riches. That’s the story of the “Ice King,” Frederic Tudor, who lost money for years before figuring out the insulation and logistics needed to make the trade profitable.
What I hadn’t fully appreciated is how the ice trade reshaped shipping, diet, and city design before the invention of mechanical refrigeration. Ice created the cold chain, and the cold chain made it possible to move fresh meat, fish, and produce over long distances. That in turn enabled cities to grow far beyond what local agriculture could support and shifted the American diet from salted and smoked provisions toward fresh food.
The profits of the ice trade encouraged investment in artificial ice which initially was met with resistance—natural ice is created by God!—a classic example of incumbents wrapping their economic interests in moral language, a pattern we see repeated with every disruptive technology from margarine to ridesharing.
Lots of lessons in the video about option value, permissionless innovation, and creative destruction. New technologies destroy old industries and create new ones that no one could have foreseen. The moral panic over artificial ice replacing the natural kind is no doubt familiar.
Hat tip: Naveen Nvn
Optimal timing for superintelligence
There is a new paper by Nick Bostrom with that title:
Developing superintelligence is not like playing Russian roulette; it is more like undergoing risky surgery for a condition that will otherwise prove fatal. We examine optimal timing from a person-affecting stance (and set aside simulation hypotheses and other arcane considerations). Models incorporating safety progress, temporal discounting, quality-of-life differentials, and concave QALY utilities suggest that even high catastrophe probabilities are often worth accepting. Prioritarian weighting further shortens timelines. For many parameter settings, the optimal strategy would involve moving quickly to AGI capability, then pausing briefly before full deployment: swift to harbor, slow to berth. But poorly implemented pauses could do more harm than good.
Via Nabeel.
Past Automation and Future A.I.: How Weak Links Tame the Growth Explosion
From Charles I. Jones and Christopher Tonetti:
How muchof past economic growth is due to automation, and what does this imply about the effects of A.I. and automation in the coming decades? We perform growth accounting using a task-based model for key sectors in the U.S. economy. Historically, TFP growth is largely due to improvements in capital productivity. The annual growth rate of capital productivity is at least 5pp larger than the sum of labor and factor-neutral productivity growth. The main benefit of automation is that we use rapidly-improving machines instead of slowly-improving humans on anincreasing set of tasks. Looking to the future, we develop an endogenous growth model in which the production of both goods and ideas is endogenously automated. We calibrate this model based on our historical evidence. Two key findings emerge. First, automation leads economic growth to accelerate over the next 75 years. Second, the acceleration is remarkably slow. By 2040, output is only 4% higher than it would have been without the growth acceleration, and by 2060 the gain is still only 19%. A key reason for the slow acceleration is the prominence of “weak links” (an elasticity of substitution among tasks less than one). Even when most tasks are automated by rapidly improving capital, output is constrained by the tasks performed by slowly-improving labor.
And an important sentence from the paper itself:
…, the key gain from automation is that it allows production of a task to shift away from slowly-improving human labor to rapidly-improving machines.
The authors stress that those are preliminary results, and the numbers are likely to change. For the pointer I thank the excellent Kurtis Hingl, who is also my research assistant.
*The Almighty Dollar*
The author is Brendan Greeley, and the subtitle is 500 Years of the World’s Most Powerful Money. A very well-timed book, excellent on the history of the dollar as it spans the centuries, I was happy to write a blurb for it.
My New Jersey history podcast with “Exit Interviews”
Exit Interviews is a new podcast run by David Piegaro. I am honored to be one of the first few guests, along with Chris Christie. Think of this session as “Tyler Cowen as regional thinker.” Almost 100% fresh material, not to mention some trolling directed at Central and South Jersey, Philly too. Here is my episode.
Definitely recommended, and let us hope that David Remnick gets on soon to defend the honor of River Vale vs. Hillsdale in Bergen County…
Can government coerce women into having more babies?
To illustrate this challenge of measurement and inference, Figure 7 presents Romanian birth rates before, during, and after the imposition of an infamously coercive policy aimed at raising births. In 1966, a dictatorial government imposed Decree 770, which banned abortion and made modern contraception effectively inaccessible. The figure extends an idea from Sobotka, Matysiak, and Brzozowska (2019), which compares cohort and period fertility rates in Romania over a similar evaluation window. We add data from Bulgaria, Romania’s neighbor that was also communist during the time of the policy and that might plausibly serve as a control, shedding light on what course Romanian fertility might have followed after 1967 if not for the policy. Panel A plots period birth rates in the two countries and shows that Romania and Bulgaria had substantially similar trends and levels in period total fertility rates before and after the Romanian policy window. Focusing on panel A of Figure 7, it is clear that birth rates in Romania changed dramatically following the start of the policy, as families were taken by surprise. TFR nearly doubled in the year that followed. The sharp timing of this apparent impact following the policy change, together with the availability of data from neighboring Bulgaria to serve as a control, suggests the possibility of a difference-in-differences analysis comparing birth rates pre– and post–Decree 770 in Romania and Bulgaria.
But while such an analysis could answer the narrow question of the causal effect of Decree 770 on the total fertility rate in 1967, it may nonetheless reveal little in terms of the impact of the policy on the number of children Romanian women had over their lifetimes. After the initial rise in TFR, birth rates soon began falling quickly in Romania, as behavior adapted to the new policy regime. If, for example, an unexpected pregnancy results in a birth at a young age in 1968, a woman may choose and succeed at reducing the probability of a pregnancy in subsequent years, and still achieve the same lifetime count of children.
For a discussion of the theoretically ambiguous impact of abortion restrictions on birth rates, see Lawson and Spears (2025). Of course, the extent of persistence from period fertility to completed fertility depends on the details: A shock that encourages earlier-than-desired births, as Romania’s might have, allows for adjustment later in life. But it may be harder, later in life, to adjust for a policy or event shock that leads to fewer births early in life.Panel B of Figure 7 plots completed cohort fertility. As in earlier figures, cohorts are plotted along the horizontal axis according to the year in which they turned 30. Although Romanian completed cohort fertility began at a higher level than in Bulgaria over the available data series, completed cohort fertility in Romania did not maintain a sizable upward trend relative Bulgaria during the period that Decree 770 was in force.
That is from the recent Geruso and Spears JEP survey piece on whether we can expect fertility rates to rebound in the future. By the way, after Hungary’s subsidy-driven baby boom, the country is now having a baby bust, it is possible that similar mechanisms are operating.
Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023
We compare trends in absolute poverty before (1939–1963) and after (1963–2023) the War on Poverty was declared. Our primary methodological contribution is to create a post-tax post-transfer income measure using the 1940, 1950 and 1960 Decennial Censuses through imputations of taxes and transfers as well as certain forms of market income including perquisites (Collins and Wanamaker 2022), consistent with the full income measures developed by Burkhauser et al. (2024) for subsequent years. From 1939–1963, poverty fell by 29 percentage points, with even larger declines for Black people and all children. While absolute poverty continued to fall following the War on Poverty’s declaration, the pace was no faster, even when evaluating the trends relative to a consistent initial poverty rate. Furthermore, the pre-1964 decline in poverty among working age adults and children was achieved almost completely through increases in market income, during which time only 2–3 percent of working age adults were dependent on the government for at least half of their income, compared to dependency rates of 7–15 percent from 1972–2023. In contrast to progress on absolute poverty, reductions in relative poverty were more modest from 1939–1963 and even less so since then.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Richard K. Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth.
My Conversation with Andrew Ross Sorkin
This was great fun for me, here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Andrew debate whether those 1929 stock prices were justified, what Fed and policy choices might have prevented the Depression, whether Glass-Steagall was built on a flawed premises, what surprised Andrew most about the 1920s beyond the crash itself, how business leaders then would compare to today’s CEOs, whether US banks should consolidate, how Andrew would reform US banking regulation, what to make of narrow banking proposals and stablecoins, whether retail investors should get access to private equity and venture capital, why sports gambling and new financial regulations won’t make us much safer, how Andrew broke into the New York Times at age 18, how he manages his information diet, what he learned co-creating Billions, what he plans on learning about next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: I have a few general questions about the 1920s. Obviously, you did an enormous amount of work for this book. Putting aside the great crash and the focus of your book, what is it you learned about the 1920s more generally that most surprised you? Because you learn all this collateral information when you write a book like this, right?
SORKIN: So many things. The book turned into a bit of a love letter to New York in terms of the architecture of New York. I don’t think I appreciated just how many buildings went up in New York and how they were constructed and what happened. That fascinated me. I think the story of John Raskob, actually, who was, to me, the Elon Musk of his time, somebody who ran General Motors, became a super influential investor. He was a philosopher king that everybody listened to at every given moment.
He ultimately constructs the Empire State Building, which was probably the equivalent of SpaceX at that time. He had written a paper about creating a five-day workweek back in 1929, November, as all of this is happening. Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing. There were so many little things.
Then, I would argue, actually, his role in taking his fortune — he got involved in politics. He was a Republican turned Democrat. He spent an extraordinary amount of money to secretly try to undermine the reputation of Hoover. I would say to you, today, I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover’s reputation is so dim, even today, is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual in America who spent two years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign to do such a thing. You go back and really read the press and try to understand why some of these views were espoused.
By the way, this was before the crash. He started this campaign effectively in May of 1929, just three months after Hoover took office.
COWEN: It’s striking to me how forgotten Raskob is today. There’s a lesson in there about people who think they’re doing something today that will be remembered in a hundred years’ time. It probably won’t be, even if you’re a big, big deal.
SORKIN: It’s remarkable. He was a very big deal. He famously used to tell everybody, “Everybody ought to be rich.” He was trying to develop, back then, what would have been something akin to one of the first mutual funds, levered mutual funds, in fact, because he also wanted to democratize finance.
COWEN: Let’s say you’re back in New York. It’s the 1920s; you’re you. Other than walking around and looking at buildings, what else would you do back then? I would go to jazz concerts. What would you do?
SORKIN: Oh my goodness. You know what I would do? But I’m a journalista, so you’ll appreciate this.
COWEN: Yes.
SORKIN: I would have been obsessed with magazines. This was really the first real era of magazines and newspapers and the transmission of media, the sort of mass media in this way. I would have been fascinated by radio. I think those things, for me, would have been super exciting.
The truth is, I imagine I would have gotten caught up in the pastime of stock trading. It is true that all these brokerage houses are just emerging everywhere, and people are going to play them as if it’s a pastime. I always wonder whether prohibition played a role in why so many people were speculating because instead of drinking, what did they do? They traded.
Some of the time he spent interviewing me…
What should I ask Paul Gillingham?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. He is a Professor of History at Northwestern, specializing in Mexico and to some extent the Caribbean. He has translated a Mexican book on Edgar Allan Poe. I am learning a good deal from his new 700 pp. book Mexico: A 500-Year History, and I very much like his earlier work on Mexico and violence. Here is an NYT review of the new book.
So what should I ask him?
What should I ask Joel Mokyr?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. He is of course one of this last year’s Nobel Laureates in economics, here is previous MR coverage of him. Here is Wikipedia.
He has a recent book Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000-2000, co-authored with Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini.
So what should I ask him?
*Paul Celan: A Life*, by Anna Arno
I do not think it is crazy to regard Celan as standing in the very top tier of poets, noting the poems must be read in the German language. Who has more important topics at a comparable level of quality? This is an excellent biography of him, from the origins in Romania to his affair with Ingeborg Bachmann to his eventual madness and suicide. Recommended, pre-order it here. Definitely slated for the best non-fiction books of the year list.
The United States as an Active Industrial Policy Nation
We document and characterize a new history of U.S. federal-level industrial policies by scanning all 12,167 Congressional Acts and 6,030 Presidential Orders from 1973 through 2022. We find several interesting patterns. First, contrary to a common perception, the United States has always been an active industrial policy nation throughout the period, regardless of which party is in power, with 5.4 laws and 3.4 Presidential Orders per year on average containing new industrial policies. Second, we identify roughly 300% more instances of industrial policies than those in the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database during 2008-2022, despite using essentially the same definition. Third, industrial policies in practice are as likely to be justified by national security as by economic competitiveness. Fourth, many U.S. industrial policies incorporate design features that help mitigate potential drawbacks, such as explicit expiration dates and pilot programs for emerging technologies. Finally, based on stock market reactions and firm performance, the identified policies are recognized as economically significant in shifting resource allocations.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
So if I were designing an “industrial policy” for America, my first priority would be to improve and “unstick” its procurement cycles. There may well be bureaucratic reasons that this is difficult to do. But if it can’t be done, then perhaps the U.S. shouldn’t be setting its sights on a more ambitious industrial policy.
A second form of American industrial policy is the biomedical grants and subsidies associated with the National Institutes of Health.
Published in 2019, but still relevant today.