Category: Philosophy

High and low decoupling, and other matters (from my email)

This is all from an anonymous reader, not by me, but I will not indent:

“Hi Tyler,

I enjoyed your post – I’m kind of tired of this – and wanted to respond to it as I think what you wrote gets at two important trends happening in politics today.

1 – High and Low Decoupling

First of all the examples of idiotic tribal behaviour you cited remind me of an idea I was first introduced to by Tom Chivers about the difference between high decouplers – individuals comfortable separating and isolating ideas from actions, and low decouplers – individuals who see ideas as inextricable from their wider contexts. – https://unherd.com/2020/02/eugenics-is-possible-is-not-the-same-as-eugenics-is-good/

I would argue that up until today low decoupling (along with the everpresent sin of motivated reasoning) has been the cultural norm in politics for over a century, if not longer, and so much of the bollocks we see in political rhetoric and in corporate news coverage across the western world can be explained by everyone having to conform to the norm if they want to succeed.

hat I would argue we are seeing now thanks to Twitter (and especially its inspired Community Notes feature) is the first proper challenge to the low decoupling cultural norm and the vacuum that is developing thanks to more and more people seeing (and criticising) politicians conforming to it. Indeed whilst the internet may not forget anything, up until Elon’s takeover of twitter the internet has been something of a toothless old dog.

How will this shift away from low decoupling change political discourse? I suspect it will make debate more elitist and less accessible for ordinary people because arguments will have to become more sophisticated and require a certain level of engagement to understand. This will probably make political discussions seem  duller to many people due to a more analytical and rigorous style as opposed to the quick trite phrases of the present moment. because political actors will know that they can be “owned” or discredited as “fake news” if they are shown to be using spin or overly simplistic arguments. Counter intuitively (for those not paying attention) I also then think the decline of low decoupling will see the death of “fact checkers” because of the growing cynicism towards this movement and the growing appreciation of the fact that there are inherent biases underlying those checking the facts and that they often present their responses in emotive and low decoupling ways.

It’s important to say I don’t think this change will necessarily change everyone’s behaviour but then it doesn’t need to. If it just changes the behaviour of the 10-20% of the population who take a moderate to high interest in politics (and are more important for changes within politics) then this will change the discussion even if the remaining 80% are still by and large low decouplers on political matters. But this change will itself play into the wider changes we are seeing in politics and which is the other point I want to highlight.

2 – The political realignment

Now going back to your post, what is arguably more interesting is the subtext of what you said, specifically your (low decoupling) defence of the new right. It could be argued that a Straussian reading of what you are saying is that despite where you thought you would be in the political new realignment you keep finding yourself in a different position and you find this fact unsettling. I think it shouldn’t be. It’s just that the present framing of the realignment is wrong and based on outdated understandings of the forces involved.

Now in the established narrative the new realigned politics should pit socially conservative economic nationalists against cosmopolitan socially liberal centrists (and leftists). And for libertarians/classical liberals the argument by many has been that the best position for the libertarian/classical liberal right is towards the cosmopolitan liberal end of the spectrum due to alleged shared norms for open societies. However, I actually disagree with this interpretation as whilst it’s a good theory it does not fit the reality of what has happened or indeed is happening in western politics.

The cosmopolitan liberal tribe could be about a commitment to open societies and broad liberal values but the reality has been and I would argue continue to be (because of the need to include radical leftists in this divide) a commitment to egalitarianism and the social democratic (left liberal) norms of political conduct which are poorly designed for our very online, wealthy multiracial Western nations.

These norms have led to the toleration of state corruption and inefficiency “how dare you criticise the teachers”, “how dare you criticise the NHS”, “how are you criticise the EU/Federal government” and the promotion of cancellation against those who go against the established narrative on issues such as the speed/scope/direction of Net Zero, stand up for women’s rights against the trans ideology or who critique the current model of immigration/integration.

The cosmopolitan liberals are on a hiding to nothing with all of these issues. And why? Because they as a political wing represent the status quo, and what we are seeing now is the beginning of the end for the dominant post 1945 social democratic settlement. 2020-21 I would argue, with the twin pillars of massive state control through the excuse of COVID and the cultural dominance of the BLM/Woke movement,  was Western social democracy at its apex and the longer that model to hold the more it will corrode and wither into either a Robespierre-esque focus on equity, or else a degeneration into deep green anti growth nihilism, either of which will kill it as a force anyway. This is why Emmanuel Macron now seems out of his depth, why Trudeau keeps failing, and why the European Union continues to stagnate – they are the status quo establishment and they’ve run out of ideas.

So what then do I think will take its place. Well inevitably one wing of politics seeks to preserve the status quo and one wing seeks to overturn it and looking at the ideas floating around the populist/rightist/nationalist camp we can already see trends emerging. Now I will caveat that it will take a while for these to develop as intellectually there is no fertile “home” for this wing (being excluded from academia and more generally all sympathetic intellectual figures being shunned/condemned/cancelled but substack seems to be developing into a way “rightist” intellectuals can work and be paid to be intellectuals. And those intellectuals will not be drinking from a barren pool and when we look at the expected intellectual influencers it gets hard for classical liberals/libertarians to pretend they have no sympathy with this movement.

Now in a previous comment you’ve stated you think that religious intellectual figures will be at the core of intellectual developments going forward but what I see is that the core figures will actually be 5 irreligious figures namely; Roger Scruton, Elinor Ostrom, Ayn Rand, Thomas Sowell and Lee Kuan Yew. Together these five offer a philosophical basis, an economic analysis and a political roadmap from which western rightist parties can seek direction. I struggle to think of 5 other intellectuals who could have more relevant ideas for the current moment. If I could term the ideology brewed from this pool of thought I would not call it populism or even national conservatism but State Capacity Localism (wink), or as a slogan, Politics for improving the oikos.

And looking at the current trends and discussions already happening within politics you can clearly see the influence of the 5 in the way the discussions on the right are beginning to articulate possible policies;

  • Improving state capacity through slewing the deadwood of the bureaucratic state with a burn it down/drain the swamp mentality.

  • Nationalisation offset by deregulation – probably a better compromise than what we have today.

  • Local/community decision making on contentious topics with a focus on finding solutions over the current model of finding problems (forced by national government with the threat of national decision if a local solution is not found)

  • The binning of multiculturalism as an idea and assimilation as the core of all arguments on immigration and racial/cultural integration. Combine this with increasing discussions on what countries have achieved high trust multiracial societies (spoiler – Singapore) I expect we will see a reflowering of support for secularism, the absolute necessity of learning the national language for access to employment and state services, and a zero tolerance for ethnic or religious based politics.

  • Tough law and order policies focused on objective outcomes over cultural contexts. President Bukele (and Gavin Newsom when Xi came to visit) prove it can work.

  • The return of aesthetics as a mode of political analysis – beautiful houses and pleasant neighbourhoods and with that an attempt to improve everywhere in a country, most especially rust belts/flyover country.

  • The introduction of land value taxes – which as an idea is literally the opposite of a transnational globalist politics in how it encourages rootedness by design.

  • A focus on high standards, individual responsibility and the veneration and promotion of outstanding individuals regardless of wider factors. Alongside which there will be a focus on repealing “hate” speech laws and the enshrining of free speech, a la first amendment, into multiple countries statutes.

  • Finally I also expect as a response to overkill from the woke movement we will see (over time) the  return of shame as a cultural norm.

And finally coming specifically to the core of social democracy – the bureaucratic welfare state we know the current model is unsustainable and yet the cosmopolitan liberals at best tinker or at worst do nothing to it – because their leftist element don’t want change just higher salaries. And we know as a certainty it will need to change but what are the practical solutions I think each welfare state could go one of two ways; a) to one based on mutual aid (maybe seeing the return of friendly societies?) and community ownership, or b) a new great bargain of a Hayekian welfare state as originally thought up by Sam Bowman back in 2015. https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/philosophy/lets-have-a-hayekian-welfare-state/. Neither of this fits neatly into the cosmopolitan liberal box as they require are particularist, require thinking domestically not internationally and would necessarily require a conversation about who and what  is and isn’t included in welfare coverage – a conversation about the degree to which a society is closed off from others.

And just thinking about these bullet points isn’t it clear there are ample opportunities for classical liberals/libertarians to get involved with the rightist end and influence the discussion and direction of debate. What does the cosmopolitan liberal politics offer – net zero by 2045 or 2050?  DEI officers in every workplace?

A soft warm feeling because the New York Times tolerates your existence.

Looking to the future I think we as western societies face a choice, but it is not between Heaven or Hell (as the corporate press on both sides would have it) or as some classical liberals/libertarians would see it as between a sort of hipster Reaganism and a reactionary Corbynism. I think the choice western societies face is between becoming new Argentinas or new Singapores (and as of last December Argentina have chosen Singapore) and this is why so many (such as yourself Tyler) find themselves on a different political side than they expected. The establishment has failed across the West; it’s just that we keep forgetting the establishment is the cosmopolitan left.”

Will technology improve animal welfare?

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

There is, however, some better news on the animal welfare front. The cause is on the verge of some major victories — and they have been earned through technology rather than rhetoric.

The first major development is Ozempic and the other weight-loss drugs in the GLP-1 category. By one estimate, 25,000 Americans start taking these weight-loss drugs every week, and 93 million Americans may meet the criteria for using them. The spread of such drugs to many other countries is likely, especially since they seem to produce health gains above and beyond weight loss.

The logic is simple: People lose weight on these drugs because they eat less, and eating less usually means eating less meat. And less meat consumption results in less factory farming.

This should count as a major victory for animal welfare advocates, even though it did not come about through their efforts. No one had to be converted to vegetarianism, and since these drugs offer other benefits, this change in the equilibrium is self-sustaining and likely to grow considerably. Yes, it is only a partial victory, but total victory was unlikely anyway.

And this:

There is yet a third reason for animal welfare advocates to be optimistic. It is more speculative, but now seems less crazy than it used to: Super-powered AI could help us observe and learn animal languages, thus enabling humans to converse with at least some of the smarter (or at least more articulate?) animals. There is already a project at UC-Berkeley to converse with sperm whales by decoding their language and translating it to English, using techniques drawn from large-language models.

If we could talk with animals — and hear their complaints and descriptions of their own suffering — would we be less likely to eat them and treat them badly? How would we respond to the pleas of dolphins to stop using our nets to catch tuna, a process which kills many dolphins?

This is some chance this strategy could backfire; dolphins, for instance, may not be as charming as people think. Nonetheless, it holds at least some chance of a revolution in how we humans think of our relations with the rest of the animal kingdom.

Do you think there are any animals we could talk into vegetarianism, if only for marginal changes?  If not, why be so optimistic that humans will change?  Or maybe underneath it all, you do think that humans are somewhat special?

One view, not to be entirely dismissed

EAs building God. NRxers conquering the state. No more wokes vs chuds, but Thiel vs Karnofsky; Land smiles bitterly. Debates not about bathrooms, but «fear Apocalypse less and Antichrist more» and «we must secure the future of the light cone». I’ve been there, when it all began.

https://x.com/teortaxesTex/status/1813052509012824188.  And a modest comment from David Brooks.

Time Preference, Parenthood and Policy Preferences

Using a small sample of couples before and after they have children, Alex Gazmararian finds that support for climate change policy increases after people have children. People also become more future-orientated when primed to think of children.

The short time horizons of citizens is a prominent explanation for why governments fail to tackle significant long-term public policy problems. Actual evidence of the influence of time horizons is mixed, complicated by the difficulty of determining how individuals’ attitudes would differ if they were more concerned about the future. I approach this challenge by leveraging a personal experience that leads people to place more value on the future: parenthood. Using a matched difference-in-differences design with panel data, I compare new parents with otherwise similar individuals and find that parenthood increases support for addressing climate change by 4.3 percentage points. Falsification tests and two survey experiments suggest that longer time horizons explain part of this shift in support. Not only are scholars right to emphasize the role of individual time horizons, but changing valuations of the future offer a new way to understand how policy preferences evolve.

It’s a little tricky to say that the driving force is time preference per se, maybe it’s just caring about (some) future people. Suppose a white man marries an African American woman. He subsequently may become more interested in civil rights, just as having children may make people more interested in the(ir) future. Or suppose that medical technology extends life expectancy, leading people to save more. Is this due to lower time preference or increased-self love?

We do see more parenthood driving future-oriented behavior on many margins. I am reminded, for example, of More Pregnancy, Less Crime which showed huge drops in criminal activity as people learn that they will be mothers and fathers. Criminals are very present-oriented so this effect is also consistent with parenthood driving lower time preference, although other stories are also possible. It’s difficult to distinguish these explanations and as far as policy and behavior is concerned perhaps the distinction between caring about the future and caring about future people doesn’t really matter.

An overly simple model of positive and negative contagion

When people feel bad and act badly, if only in rhetoric, they make others around them worse as well.  That is a simple account of negative contagion of mood.

There is positive contagion too, but it is harder to pull off.  If nine people tell you nice things, and one person serves up a somewhat credible insult, it is the insult that sticks with you.

Most social times are a relatively stable mix of positive and negative feelings, but sometimes the dynamics of negative contagion take over, and negativism leads to yet more negativism.  Arguably this happened in Europe before WWI, and arguably it is happening in many countries today, including the United States.  Very bad events, such as financial crises, also can trigger cycles of negative contagion.

This negative contagion is self-validating.  If all the negative feelings, expressed collectively, in fact make outcomes worse, it will seem those negative feelings are justified.  In this equilibrium the negative feelings about “opposing others” will be true, but still it would be better to avoid that equilibrium altogether.

A country can get out of a negative cycle either by winning a major war, or when a political entrepreneur comes along with enough oomph and reforms to shift the equilibrium, as Ronald Reagan did in America.  Still, negative cycles are hard to break once you get into them.  That said, over time things do start to become worse, so options for the positivity entrepreneurs do arise, at least if they can overcome coordination problems and get enough people to feel better.

Many thinkers and writers contribute to this equilibrium of negative feelings, most of all by writing about each other.  Even if their substantive points are correct, their social marginal product usually is negative, though you can learn from them because they are competing to offer the most incisive critique.

If you can avoid being overwhelmed by the peer pressure of this negative dynamic, the private and social returns are high.  You can just keep on going and build things.  Yet few are able to resist the logic of Durkheim, no matter how ostensibly contrarian they may be.  In fact the contrarians are often at greatest risk of being caught up in this, because they are so skilled in rejecting and also criticizing the claims of the opposing forces.

Happy Fourth of July!

What should I ask Nate Silver?

Yes, I will be doing another Conversation with Nate, based in part on his new and forthcoming book On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything (I have just started it, but so far it is very good, dealing with issues of poker and also risk-taking more generally).

Here is my previous Conversation with Nate Silver.  And please note I am not looking to ask him about the election.  So what should I ask?

Migration policy, and should you favor your own country?

There is a longstanding debate — for centuries in fact — as to whether you should consider only your national (or regional) interest, or whether you should think in cosmopolitan terms when evaluating policies with cross-national ramifications.

Some commentators, for instance, suggest that American immigration policy should be set to serve the interests of current American citizens only.  Whether or not one agrees, I can understand where that argument is coming from.

But what if an American is evaluating a French decision to take in or exclude some potential Algerian migrants?  You might think the French should take a French point of view, and that the Algerians should take an Algerian point of view.  But is the American allowed to be cosmopolitan in his judgment?  Even if he or she is otherwise a self-regarding nationalist on questions concerning America?

It seems to me Americans should in fact take the cosmopolitan perspective.

Alternatively, you might argue that there are degrees of relation.  American culture, politics, and gdp are much closer to their French equivalents than to anything in Algeria.  So perhaps the American can side with France after all.

But then I wonder about two things.

First, this scheme might count Algerians for less, but it doesn’t seem it counts them for zero.  Maybe America and Algeria have “better rap music” is common, or some degree of religiosity in common, or other points of similarity.

Second, once you start playing this sliding scale game, why look only at the dimension of nation?  You also could classify people by their taste in music, how smart they are, and many other dimensions.  I first and foremost might decide to identify with people on the grounds of their openness and their desire to travel.  Or how about kindness and generosity as a standard?

As a result, the major moral lines will not cut across nations in any simple way, even if in the final analysis the French people count for more than do the Algerians.

While this is not exactly simple cosmopolitanism in the Benthamite sense, it is just as far from strict nationalism.  Once you let partialism in the door, it seems like a tough slog to argue nationality is the only relevant moral fact for partial sentiments.

It is interesting to look at how people choose their friends.  Most of us have many friends of the same nation, but that is largely for reasons for convenience.  Unless perhaps I were living abroad, it would seem strange to be friends with someone because they were an American.  But it is not strange to be friends with them because they are smart, have good taste in music, like to travel, and so on.  So when it comes to our actual choices, nationality is just one fact of many, and it is (beyond the dimension of practicality) not an especially important fact for how we choose our partial commitments for our own lives.

So why should it be such a dominant factor for how we make moral decisions when it concerns other countries?

Economic valuation of becoming a superhero

Have you ever wished that you were a superhero? If so, how much would you be willing to pay to become one? In this study, we measured the economic value of becoming a superhero or obtaining a superpower using a discrete choice experiment. We focused on four superpowers: mind-control, flight, teleportation, and supernatural physical strength and measured values for each power. Our results indicate that of the four powers, our participants valued teleportation the most.

That is from a newly published paper by Julian J. Hwang and Dongso Lee.  Via John Whitehead.

“What We Got Wrong About Depression and its Treatment”

I am not endorsing these hypotheses, but they are interesting to ponder:

  • Depression is neither disease nor disorder rather an adaptation that evolved to serve a purpose

  • Depression is so much more prevalent than currently recognized that it is “species typical”

  • Antidepressants drive neurotransmitter levels so high that homeostatic regulation kicks in

  • Antidepressants may suppress symptoms in a manner that increases risk for subsequent relapse

  • Cognitive therapy works by making rumination more efficient and “unsticking” self-blame

  • Adding antidepressants may interfere with any enduring effect that cognitive therapy may have

Those are from a new paper by Steven D. Hollon.

Claims about Brits (and Americans), by Gillian Tett

But what generally goes unmentioned is a more important distinction: that single-table conversations rarely happen in Britain. I first realised this when I started attending friends’ dinners in London a few years ago, when I was visiting from New York: when I tried to start a single conversation, I was told to stop because it was “too serious”.

There are multiple reasons for this, here is one;

In Britain, however, hustle is not so readily admired and ambition is sometimes derided as being pushy or showing off. Thus if you are brilliantly clever, you are admired for concealing the fact or cracking jokes about it at your own expense. Few Brits stand up in public and shout that they want to be public intellectuals; or not without a self-deprecating laugh.

The entire FT column is interesting, do note that Tett’s background is in anthropology.

Does visiting South Africa make you more right-wing or more left-wing?

Perhaps “both” is the correct answer?

The right-wing tendencies are easiest to explain.  South Africa is obviously much wealthier than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, and of course Westerners play a larger role in its history and also in its present.  You can put different glosses on that, but a variety of those paths lead to right-wing conclusions.  The left-wing lessons are more novel to ponder, here are a few:

1. Following the removal of apartheid, a black middle class and upper class arose fairly quickly.  That testifies to the importance of environment, opportunity, and circumstance.  Of course most of the blacks in South Africa still lack adequate opportunity, most of all because of poor education and also sometimes because of poor location within the country, a legacy from segregated apartheid times.  Overall, visiting the country causes one to upgrade the importance of opportunity, and to recognize that bad circumstances for talented people can continue for a very long time.

2. Post-apartheid economic performance has been disappointing, and economic inequalities have risen not declined.  That suggests more capitalism can exacerbate economic inequality, even as political inequalities are eased.

3. Apartheid was enforced with a remarkably small number of police, per capita much less than most Western countries at the time.  That might suggest a kind of Marxian and Foucauldian view that oppressive systems take on a force of their own, through norms and expectations, and are harder to dismantle than an analysis of simple coercion might indicate.  The disappointments of post-apartheid South Africa hardly refute that suggestion, as those earlier norms and expectations are by no means entirely gone.

4. In the new, non-apartheid South Africa, sometimes class appears to be far more important than race per se.  A certain number of blacks have been slotted into the upper classes, through their business successes, but the all-important role of class continues very much as before.  Tthat point appears more Marxian than contemporary leftist, but Marx still is on the left.

5. You can see how much of South African history has been shaped by the roles of gold and diamonds in their economy.  That again points in Marxian directions, more than today’s left.  In South Africa, the means of production really mattered.

6. What is the ideal of color-blindedness supposed to mean there, after so many centuries of color mattering so much and in so many formal ways?  They even still call one group “Coloureds.”  Would it be so wrong to suspect SA color-blindedness advocates of somehow missing the point, and asking for something that is both illusory and unobtainable?

I am not sure how much I agree with all of these, only that they are ways I can imagine visiting South Africa and coming away more rather than less left-wing.

What else?

*Cosmic Connections*

The author is Charles Taylor (yes, the Charles Taylor) and the subtitle is Poetry in the Age of Disenchantment.  This book is a very good introduction to romanticism, and also to the poetry of romanticism, noting that its degree of originality may depend on how much you already know.  I liked the chapters on Rilke and Mallarme best, here is one excerpt:

It follows that for Rilke, our full capacity to Praise can only be realized if we take account of the standpoint of the dead.  The medium of Preisen is Gesang [song].  thus the voice which most fully carries this song would have to be that of the gold Orpheus, who moves in both realms, that of the living and that of the dead.

And the sonnet is the medium.  As its name suggests, it is a poetic form which asks to be heard, and not only read on the page.  These two modes of reception are essential to all poetry, but in the sonnet the musical dimension becomes the most important avenue to the message.

So a praise-song from both sides, that of the dead, as well as the living.  They call on Orpheus, the singer-god who moves between the two realms.  Hence the Sonnets to Orpheus.

I am very glad to see that Taylor is still at it, and 640 pp. at that.  Furthermore, this book is (unintentionally?) a good means for thinking about just how much deculturation has taken place.

*Playing Possum: How Animals Understand Death*

That is a forthcoming book by Susana Monsó, and I found it both interesting and illuminating.  Here is one excerpt:

This fixation on the face suggests that Firuláis’s initial motivation was probably not to eat his human, but rather that this behavior started as an attempt to make him react.  Our face is the part of our bodies that our canine friends pay the most attention to, for it is key to understanding our emotions and communicating with us.  Consequently, it is to be expected that Firuláis, upon seeing his caretaker lying still after the gunshot, began to try to get a reaction from him by nudging his face with his snout.  In the absence of a response, and in order to calm himself down or out of sheer frustration, he might have started licking, the nibbling, and once blood was drawn the temptation to take a bit might have been overwhelming.  That is, it’s likely that Firuláis’s love for his keeper and his anguish upon his lack of response were at the root of his behavior.

Talk about “model this”!  Comparative thanatology edition, of course.  You can pre-order here.

My Conversation with the excellent Michael Nielsen

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

Michael Nielsen is scientist who helped pioneer quantum computing and the modern open science movement. He’s worked at Y Combinator, co-authored on scientific progress with Patrick Collison, and is a prolific writer, reader, commentator, and mentor. 

He joined Tyler to discuss why the universe is so beautiful to human eyes (but not ears), how to find good collaborators, the influence of Simone Weil, where Olaf Stapledon’s understand of the social word went wrong, potential applications of quantum computing, the (rising) status of linear algebra, what makes for physicists who age well, finding young mentors, why some scientific fields have pre-print platforms and others don’t, how so many crummy journals survive, the threat of cheap nukes, the many unknowns of Mars colonization, techniques for paying closer attention, what you learn when visiting the USS Midway, why he changed his mind about Emergent Ventures, why he didn’t join OpenAI in 2015, what he’ll learn next, and more. 

And here is one excerpt:

COWEN: Now, you’ve written that in the first half of your life, you typically were the youngest person in your circle and that in the second half of your life, which is probably now, you’re typically the eldest person in your circle. How would you model that as a claim about you?

NIELSEN: I hope I’m in the first 5 percent of my life, but it’s sadly unlikely.

COWEN: Let’s say you’re 50 now, and you live to 100, which is plausible —

NIELSEN: Which is plausible.

COWEN: — and you would now be in the second half of your life.

NIELSEN: Yes. I can give shallow reasons. I can’t give good reasons. The good reason in the first half was, so much of the work I was doing was kind of new fields of science, and those tend to be dominated essentially, for almost sunk-cost reasons — people who don’t have any sunk costs tend to be younger. They go into these fields. These early days of quantum computing, early days of open science — they were dominated by people in their 20s. Then they’d go off and become faculty members. They’d be the youngest person on the faculty.

Now, maybe it’s just because I found San Francisco, and it’s such an interesting cultural institution or achievement of civilization. We’ve got this amplifier for 25-year-olds that lets them make dreams in the world. That’s, for me, anyway, for a person with my personality, very attractive for many of the same reasons.

COWEN: Let’s say you had a theory of your collaborators, and other than, yes, they’re smart; they work hard; but trying to pin down in as few dimensions as possible, who’s likely to become a collaborator of yours after taking into account the obvious? What’s your theory of your own collaborators?

NIELSEN: They’re all extremely open to experience. They’re all extremely curious. They’re all extremely parasocial. They’re all extremely ambitious. They’re all extremely imaginative.

Self-recommending throughout.