The decline in reading for pleasure

We measure reading for pleasure and reading with children from 2003 to 2023, using a nationally representative sample from the American Time Use Survey (n = 236,270). We found marked declines in the proportion of individuals reading for pleasure daily in the US, with decreases of 3% per year (prevalence ratio = 0.97, 95% confidence interval = 0.97, 0.98, p < 0.001). There were disparities across population groups, with widening gaps for those of Black (vs. White) race, with lower education levels and less annual income.

That is from a new paper by Jessica K. Bone, Feifei Bu, Jill Sonke, and Daisy Fancourt.  I have not seen any plausible debunkings of this paper or result (which I believe), but if I do I will pass them along.  Note by the way that Denmark is abolishing the VAT on books, in an effort to boost reading.  It was formerly twenty-five percent, the highest in the world.

AI and the Detection of Gravity Waves

Researchers at the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, the giant two-observatory machine to detect gravitational waves, developed an AI to improve the sensitivity of the design:

Wired: Initially, the AI’s designs seemed outlandish. “The outputs that the thing was giving us were really not comprehensible by people,” Adhikari said. “They were too complicated, and they looked like alien things or AI things. Just nothing that a human being would make, because it had no sense of symmetry, beauty, anything. It was just a mess.”

The researchers figured out how to clean up the AI’s outputs to produce interpretable ideas. Even so, the researchers were befuddled by the AI’s design. “If my students had tried to give me this thing, I would have said, ‘No, no, that’s ridiculous,’” Adhikari said. But the design was clearly effective.

It took months of effort to understand what the AI was doing. It turned out that the machine had used a counterintuitive trick to achieve its goals. It added an additional three-kilometer-long ring between the main interferometer and the detector to circulate the light before it exited the interferometer’s arms. Adhikari’s team realized that the AI was probably using some esoteric theoretical principles that Russian physicists had identified decades ago to reduce quantum mechanical noise. No one had ever pursued those ideas experimentally. “It takes a lot to think this far outside of the accepted solution,” Adhikari said. “We really needed the AI.”

…If the AI’s insights had been available when LIGO was being built, “we would have had something like 10 or 15 percent better LIGO sensitivity all along,” he said. In a world of sub-proton precision, 10 to 15 percent is enormous.

As with AlphaGO and Move 37 the AI developed entirely novel approaches:

“LIGO is this huge thing that thousands of people have been thinking about deeply for 40 years,” said Aephraim Steinberg, an expert on quantum optics at the University of Toronto. “They’ve thought of everything they could have, and anything new [the AI] comes up with is a demonstration that it’s something thousands of people failed to do.”

Data on the effects of censorship in early modern England

We use a panel-data framework to study the effects of print censorship on early-modern England’s cultural production. Doing so requires distilling dispersed qualitative information into quantitative data. Integrating the historical record implicit in a large language model (LLM) with facts from secondary sources, we generate an annual index of print censorship. Applying a machine-learning (ML) algorithm to a major corpus, we construct document-level measures of the innovativeness (quality) and volume (quantity) of cultural production. We use pre-existing topic-model estimates to apportion each document among distinct cultural themes-three affected by censorship and five unaffected. We thereby assemble a yearly theme-level panel for 1525-1700. We use local projections to estimate censorship’s dynamic effects. Paradoxically, censorship raises the level of innovativeness in censorship-affected themes relative to non-affected themes. Censorship has a temporary chilling effect on the quantity of cultural production, with output recovering within a decade. Our findings are robust to the use of an instrumental-variable approach addressing the endogeneity of censorship. Our findings are unchanged when using three alternative LLMs to produce the censorship index. Using LLMs and ML to measure hard-to-quantify phenomena like censorship and cultural production, we provide new insights into the drivers of cultural evolution.

Here is the full paper by Peter Murrell and Peter Grajzl.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

My Conversation with David Brooks

Held live at the 92nd St. Y, here is the video, audio, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

David Brooks returns to the show with a stark diagnosis of American culture. Having evolved from a Democratic socialist to a neoconservative to what he now calls “the rightward edge of the leftward tendency,” Brooks argues that America’s core problems aren’t economic but sociological—rooted in the destruction of our “secure base” of family, community, and moral order that once gave people existential security.

Tyler and David cover why young people are simultaneously the most rejected and most productive generation, smartphones and sex, the persuasiveness of AI vs novels, the loss of audacity, what made William F. Buckley and Milton Friedman great mentors, why academics should embrace the epistemology of the interview, the evolving status of neoconservatism, what Trump gets right, whether only war or mass movements can revive the American psyche, what will end the fertility crisis, the subject of his book, listener questions, and much more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: Now, you mentioned the Tanenhaus book. It’s striking because you appear as a character in the book. I know you haven’t gotten to that part yet, but surely you remember the reality that William F. Buckley was considering making you editor of National Review. What would your life have been like if you had received that offer? Would you have even taken it? What does that alternate universe look like?

BROOKS: The American conservative movement is going from strength to strength. Donald Trump is a failed real estate developer somewhere.

COWEN: [laughs]

BROOKS: I was never an orthodox National Review person, that kind of conservative. I was a neoconservative, which was different. Basically, you can tell what kind of conservative a person is by what year they want to go back to.

I’ve learned, especially from this Tanenhaus biography, that a lot of the old right National Review people wanted to go back to the 19th century. They were pre-New Deal. I never had a problem with the New Deal. I had some problems with some of the policies of the 1960s, and I was an urban kid. I was a New Yorker, and I was a Jew, and the magazine was Catholic. I’ve been told that one of the reasons I didn’t get the job was that reason.

COWEN: Tanenhaus says this.

BROOKS: Oh, does he?

COWEN: Yes.

BROOKS: Buckley was my mentor. We can tell that story, how that happened. I worked at National Review, and then I worked at the Wall Street Journal editorial page. I went from being an old right to being a free market, Wall Street Journal sort of person. I never had the opportunity to think for myself until I left those places and went to a place called the Weekly Standard. Suddenly, I could think for myself. It was funny how long — because I was in my 30s — before I really thought, “What do I believe?” Not how do I argue for the Wall Street Journal position on this, or the National Review position.

When I did that, I found I had two heroes. One was Edmund Burke, whose main idea is epistemological modesty. Change is really complicated, and we should be really cautious about what we think we can know about reality. The second was Alexander Hamilton, who’s a Puerto Rican hip-hop star from Washington Heights. Hamilton’s belief was using government in limited but energetic ways to create a dynamic country where poor boys and girls like him could rise and succeed.

That involves a lot more state intervention than National Review would be comfortable with. So, I became sort of a John McCain Republican. Now, another one of my other heroes is this guy named Isaiah Berlin, and toward the end of his life, Berlin said, “I’m very happy to be on the rightward edge of the leftward tendency.” That’s where I found myself today, as a conservative Democrat. I would not have fit in at National Review because I didn’t really hew to the gospel.

And:

COWEN: If you think about Buckley, where you disagree with him, and I don’t mean on particular issues — I feel I know that — but his method of thought, what is there in his method of thought where you would say, “I, David Brooks, diverge from Buckley in a fundamental way”?

BROOKS: His gift and his curse was that he couldn’t slow down his thinking. I would see him write a column in 20 minutes, and if he wrote it for an hour, it would get no better. He just moved at that speed. It takes me two days to write a column. It takes me 14, 20 hours. That’s one thing.

Second, he grew out of such a different background. His dad, as we know from this book, was an old right America Firster. My parents were Lower East Side New York intellectual progressives. I always felt at home in a diverse America, in a regular working-class America that was light years away from the world he inhabited.

COWEN: Your difference with Milton Friedman, again, not on specific issues such as the New Deal, but conceptually, how is it that you think differently from how Milton did?

BROOKS: Friedman — his great gift — and I think this is a libertarian gift — is that once you get inside their logical system, within their assumptive models, there’s no arguing with them. It all fits together. I don’t believe in assumptive models. I’m much less rational. I think human beings are much less rational than needed. I think they obviously respond to incentives in some ways, but often respond to incentives in no rational way. I’m, again, being more neoconservative than conservative, or more whatever you want to call it, a Humean.

I really do believe that David Hume’s famous sentence that reason is and ought to follow the passions — I believe that’s true, that our passions are wiser than our reasonable mind, and that our emotions, when well trained, are much more supple and much more responsible for the way we think. Again, I may be caricaturing, but the rational school of economics thought, well, you see the world, that simple process of looking, and then weigh costs and benefits about the world, and then you make a decision about the world, I don’t believe that’s the way thinking works.

Self-recommending!

Bad news, Mises vindicated!

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is looking into the federal government taking equity stakes in computer chip manufacturers that receive CHIPS Act funding to build factories in the country, two sources said.

Expanding on a plan to receive an equity stake in Intel (INTC.O), in exchange for cash grants, a White House official and a person familiar with the situation said Lutnick is exploring how the U.S. can receive equity stakes in exchange for CHIPS Act funding for companies such as Micron (MU.O), Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (2330.TW), and Samsung (005930.KS). Much of the funding has not yet been dispersed.

Here is more from Reuters.  It was bad to do this with General Motors, and bad when many of you, way back when, suggested doing this with the bailed out banks.  It is still bad, and getting worse.

The Garbage Cafe

Every day, hungry people arrive at this cafe in Ambikapur, a city in the state of Chhattisgarh in central India, in the hope of getting a hot meal. But they don’t pay for their food with money – instead, they hand over bundles of plastic such as old carrier bags, food wrappers and water bottles.

People can trade a kilogram (2.2lb) of plastic waste for a full meal that includes rice, two vegetable curries, dal, roti, salad and pickles, says Vinod Kumar Patel, who runs the cafe on behalf of the Ambikapur Municipal Corporation (AMC), the public body which manages the city’s infrastructure and services. “For half a kilogram of plastic, they get breakfast like samosas or vada pav.”

…”I’ve been doing this work for years,” Mondal says, looking at the small pile of plastic she has gathered. Previously, Mondal used to sell the plastic she collected to local scrap dealers for just 10 Indian rupees (£0.09/$0.12) per kilogram – barely enough to survive on. “But now, I can get food for my family in exchange for the plastic I collect. It makes all the difference in our lives.”

Here is the full story.  The Cafe is supported through public funds.

Why is choral music harder to appreciate?

It has struck me that most recommenders and lovers of choral music and themselves singers (or conductors) of choral music.  It helps a great deal to be right there.  So it occurred to me there are a few reasons why choral music is harder to appreciate than say either symphonies or chamber music:

1. Mixtures of voices do not translate onto recordings as well as do most symphony orchestra instrumental blends.  For one thing, the different voices are harder to sort out.  They are best understood when you are singing in the midst of the action.

2. A good deal of choral music is sung in a different language, and so most listeners do not understand the words.

3. A good deal of quality choral music has a background religious context.  Most listeners have only a modest knowledge of this background context.  For instance, how many people know that Elgar’s Dream of Gerontius is about purgatory, and that this was highly controversial in Elgar’s time, as it was viewed as a very Catholic concept?

3b. 6. Choral works may depend on church acoustics, or the surrounding church aura, but we go to church less often these days.

4. A lot of choral music sounds pious, and indeed may be pious.  At the very least they tend to be serious.  (How many comic choral pieces can you think of from the classical repertoire?  Or even comic moments?)  That seriousness of mood may appeal less to contemporary listeners.

5. Star vocalists drive a reasonable percentage of classical music sales.  But most choral works have a strong collective element, and they may not be set up to showcase soloists.  So the celebrity-driven appeal of choral forms can be relatively weak.

6. Many of the best-known choral works are quite long.  That may place them at a relative disadvantage.

7. Opera arguably has grown in relative popularity, and that may be serious competition for choral works because it can serve as a substitute.

What else?

The AI polity that is Albania?

While the rest of Europe bickers over the safety and scope of artificial intelligence, Albania is tapping it to accelerate its EU accession.

It’s even mulling an AI-run ministry.

Prime Minister Edi Rama mentioned AI last month as a tool to stamp out corruption and increase transparency, saying the technology could soon become the most efficient member of the Albanian government.

“One day, we might even have a ministry run entirely by AI,” Rama said at a July press conference while discussing digitalization. “That way, there would be no nepotism or conflicts of interest,” he argued.

Local developers could even work toward creating an AI model to elect as minister, which could lead the country to “be the first to have an entire government with AI ministers and a prime minister,” Rama added.

While no formal steps have been taken and Rama’s job is not yet officially up for grabs, the prime minister said the idea should be seriously considered…

AI is already being used in the administration to manage the thorny matter of public procurement, an area the EU has asked the government to shore up, as well as to analyze tax and customs transactions in real time, identifying irregularities.

Here is the whole Politico story, via Holger.

China Versus the US in the Competition for Global Talent

In my posts The Sputnik vs. DeepSeek Moment and The Answers, I contrasted America’s reaction to Sputnik—expanded funding for education in math, science, and foreign languages; creation of agencies like ARPA; higher federal R&D spending; recruitment of foreign talent; and reduced tariff barriers—with the more recent U.S. response to China’s rise as an economic and scientific power, which has been almost the reverse.

One can also compare America’s choices today with China’s own strategy, where the roles also seem reversed. A striking example is China’s new K visa for science and technology.

BEIJING, Aug. 14 …China will add a K visa to its ordinary visa categories, available to eligible young science and technology professionals.

Compared with the existing 12 ordinary visa types, K visas will offer more convenience to holders in terms of number of permitted entries, validity period and duration of stay, according to a press conference held by relevant authorities on Thursday.

After entering China, K visa holders can engage in exchanges in fields such as education, culture, and science and technology, as well as relevant entrepreneurial and business activities.

…applications for K visas do not require a domestic employer or entity to issue an invitation, and the application process will also be more streamlined.

“China’s development requires the participation of talent from around the world, and China’s development also provides opportunities for them,” according to the press conference.

The decision aims to…facilitate the entry for foreign young sci-tech talent into China, and promote international cooperation and exchanges among young sci-tech professionals, said officials at the press conference.

Keep in mind that this is on top of China’s newly-eased rules for visa-free entry.

In December 2023, China announced visa-free entry for citizens of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Malaysia. Almost all of Europe has been added since then. Travelers from five Latin American countries and Uzbekistan became eligible last month, followed by four in the Middle East. The total will grow to 75 on July 16 with the addition of Azerbaijan.

About two-thirds of the countries have been granted visa-free entry on a one-year trial basis.

The United States faces a shortage of high-IQ workers, yet instead of treating international talent as resource, every immigrant is cast as a threat. Today, it can take months to years just to get an interview to visit the US. At the same time, we are deporting international students, making them feel unwelcome, cutting research funding, and, as a result, losing ground in the competition for academic talent.

Attracting global talent is not China’s strength—the world’s best would rather join the United States. But if America abandons the openness that has long underpinned its exceptionalism, it will squander one of its biggest advantages and decline into a second-rate power.

*Capitalism: A Global History*, by Sven Beckert

This 1103 pp. book reflects a great deal of learning, and it is often interesting to read.  It is well-written.  So virtually everyone can absorb interesting things from it.  In that sense I am happy to recommend it.

The book has two major problems however.

First, is “capitalism” the right way of centering a book topic across centuries and 1103 pages?  What exactly ties all the different discussions together?  And how many of them succeed in making original contributions to the areas they cover?  There is a kind of “replacement level” left-wing series of cliches running throughout the narrative, but what else is unifying this story?  I would rather read a book on any single one of the covered topics.  And in too many cases the coverage seems only OK.  For instance, the discussions of Pinochet’s Chile, and neoliberalism, in the book’s final chapter are not above the quality of basic media coverage, as you might find in the NYT.

Second, the author does not know what “capitalism” is.  I am not going to insist on my pet definition, but consider a simple example.

Birkerts (p.180) is keen to describe mid-17th century Barbados as capitalism, indeed as a kind of extreme or ideal capitalism.  Well, in some regards.  Yes there were markets.  But King Charles I gave all the land to the Earl of Carlisle to distribute, and of course land was a centrally important asset back then.  Might that be called…heaven forbid…statism?  There was slavery too, at various stages of development, depending which years one is looking at.  Is that really “an almost perfectly Smithian economy”?  Smith hated slavery, and also considered it economically inefficient.  The Navigation Act of 1651 limited trade with the Dutch, and could be considered a further deviation from Barbadian capitalism.  The whole system was mercantilism built on land theft and slavery, and none of that is synonymous with capitalism.  Nor are these distinctions clearly unpacked in the discussion.

Or look to the book’s epilogue.  Cambodia is held up as the embodiment of current capitalism.  Really?  Not Poland or Ireland or Singapore?  Or even the Dominican Republic?  Better yet, how about multiple contrasting examples to conclude the book?  Cambodia was ruled by vicious communists, suffered under a major murderous holocaust, still has an absolute dictator, ranks 98th in the Heritage index of economic freedom (“mostly unfree“), and lies in the thrall of Chinese domination, economic, political, and otherwise.  I do understand there is now more FDI there, but this is hardly the proper representation of contemporary capitalism or its future, as the title of the final chapter seems to indicate.

The main problem is that the author has very little sense of what he does not understand.  Above all else, it is an example of just how insular our institutions of elite higher education have become.

How is fertility behavior in Africa different?

Sub-Saharan Africa’s fertility decline has lagged behind that of other regions. Using large-scale, individual-level data, I provide new evidence on how fertility in sub-Saharan Africa compares with that in East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America by examining differences in fertility outcomes by grade level across regions. Unlike prior research that compared aggregate fertility and education outcomes, I estimate fertility outcomes separately for each combination of region, area of residence, age group, and grade level. I find that differences in fertility between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions increase with education up to the end of primary school and then rapidly decrease. There is little consistent evidence of differences among women with secondary education or higher. Moreover, for grade levels where fertility is significantly higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions, the differences are substantially smaller for surviving children than for children ever born. Using women’s literacy as a proxy for school quality, I show that the results for literacy rates follow a similar pattern to the fertility outcomes. Overall, the results suggest that higher offspring mortality and lower quality of primary schooling contribute to higher fertility in sub-Saharan Africa compared with other regions.

That is from a recently published article by Claus C. Pörtner.