What should I ask David Commins?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. David recently published Saudi Arabia: A Modern History, a very good and useful book. He has numerous other books on Wahhabism, the history of the Gulf region, and also Syria. Currently he teaches at Dickinson College.
So what should I ask him?
Tabarrok on Flight Delays
Tyler already linked to Max’s excellent post on flight delays but Fortune gives you the backstory:
On one sweltering summer afternoon in June, thunderstorms rolled over Boston Logan International Airport. It was the kind of brief, predictable summer squall that East Coasters have learned to ignore, but within hours, the airport completely shut down. Every departure was grounded, and flyers waited hours before they could get on their scheduled flights.
Among those stranded were Maxwell Tabarrok’s parents, in town to help move him into Harvard Business School, where he is completing an economics PhD. Tabarrok told Fortune he was fascinated by how an entire airport could grind to a halt, not because of some catastrophic event, but due to a predictable hiccup rippling through an overstretched system.
So, he did what any good statistician would: dive into the data. After analyzing over 30 years—and 100 gigabytes—of Bureau of Transportation Statistics data, he found out his parents’ situation wasn’t bad luck: Long delays of three hours or more are now four times more common than they were 30 years ago.
Not only that, but Tabarrok found airlines are trying to hide the delays by “padding” the flight times—adding, on average, 20 extra minutes to schedules so a flight that hasn’t gotten any faster still counts as “on time.” Thus, on paper, the on-time performance metrics have improved since 1987, even as actual travel times have gotten longer.
We had a can’t miss appointment the next morning and ended up renting a car and driving through the night from Boston to the Washington. Glad Max got a great post out of it!
Dylan Matthews interviews Anne Krueger
MATTHEWS: What was the debate about import substitution like at this point, in the late 1950s/early 1960s?
KRUEGER: The whole profession believed in import substitution. Almost without question. Even Gottfried Haberler, in his lectures in 1959, said that, of course, infant industry substitution by the developing countries was acceptable. Go back and look at the Cairo lectures. It’s in there.
MATTHEWS: Would you say that was how you were thinking about import substitution at the time?
KRUEGER: It didn’t quite ring true. More than that, just seeing how import substitution was working made me skeptical. Lawyers who do trade law are more pro free trade than economists, because they know how badly protection works. A distorted economy is terrible. Not just a little bad—import substitution probably cut growth rates in half of what they could have been.
Here is the entire dialogue.
Optimal Tariffs with Geopolitical Alignment
Here is a new NBER working paper:
As geopolitical tensions intensify, great powers often turn to trade policy to influence international alignment. We examine the optimal design of tariffs in a world where large countries care not only about economic welfare but also about the political allegiance of smaller states. We consider both a unipolar setting, where a single hegemon uses preferential trade agreements to attract partners, and a bipolar world, where two great powers compete for influence. In both scenarios, we derive optimal tariffs that balance terms-of-trade considerations with strategic incentives to encourage political alignment. We find that when geopolitical concerns are active, the optimal tariff exceeds the classic Mill-Bickerdike level. In a bipolar world, optimal tariffs reflect both economic and political rivalry, and may be strategic complements or substitutes. A calibration exercise using U.N. voting patterns, an estimate of the cost of buying votes in the U.N., and military spending suggests that geopolitical motives can significantly amplify protectionist pressures and that the emergence of a second great power can contribute to a retreat from globalization.
The authors are
“In the interests of realism, we also consider models where the government a) seeks to maximize returns from corrupt side-bargains, b) seeks to maximize public treasury revenue beyond an optimal level, for Leviathan-like reasons, and c) considers behavioral postulates for policymakers who have an ungrounded attachment to protectionist ideas. The results then change as follows…”
This is after all 2025, and economics is supposed to have a descriptive component. I will make two other points:
1. The paper’s insight about how and why the rise of China may have contributed to the shinking of the pace of globalization is quite valuable, and as far as I know original.
2. This shows once again how the economics profession produces research at least supposedly defending a degree of protectionism, and how its top (non-libertarian) contributors refuse to acknowledge that. At the same time, those people do not wish to consider public choice arguments of the sort that would overturn those conclusions, because such a public choice perspective would have unwelcome implications across a broader range of issues.
Let’s go the corruption and Leviathan and ideology postulate routes with the analysis, you’ll still end up with a good case against Trump. It’s just that it will force you to reexamine some of your other priors.
Data center facts of the day
JLL estimates $170bn of assets will require construction lending or permanent financing this year. Between now and 2029, however, global spending on data centres will hit almost $3tn, according to Morgan Stanley analysts. Of that, just $1.4tn is forecast to come from capital expenditure by Big Tech groups, leaving a mammoth $1.5tn of financing required from investors and developers.
About $60bn of loans are going into roughly $440bn of data centre development projects this year, twice as much debt as in 2024, according to a recent presentation by law firm Norton Rose Fulbright. More than $25bn of loans were underwritten in the first quarter of this year alone, according to a report by Newmark.
Here is more from a very good FT article.
Chicago facts of the day
The University of Chicago has now borrowed $6.3 billion, more than 70 percent of the value of its endowment. The cost of servicing its debt is now 85 percent of the value of all undergraduate tuition. (This is not normal. No peer institution has a debt-to-asset ratio greater than 26 percent. Perhaps that is one reason why Chicago’s tuition is so high and yet it wants to spend so little on education?)
Here is the full story. Via Anecdotal.
Thursday assorted links
1. Everything Kevin Kelly knows about self-publishing.
2. Technically Economics, new podcasts by Harvard economics graduate students.
3. Notes on Aberdeen, by Gavin Leech. Notes on Glasgow. Notes on Bristol.
4. Jason Furman on BLS (NYT).
5. Are humans running out of fresh water?
6. Why did people dress better in the past? A good thread.
Trading with ChatGPT
In this paper, we use ChatGPT outages to provide early evidence on whether investors rely on generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to perform professional tasks and the associated impact on stock price informativeness. We document a significant decline in stock trading volume during ChatGPT outages. The effect is stronger for firms with corporate news released immediately before or during the outages and for firms with higher ownership held by transient institutional investors. We then document declines in short-run price impact and return variance during the outage periods, consistent with reduced informed trading. Lastly, we document a positive effect of GenAI-assisted trading on long-run stock price informativeness. Overall, our findings indicate that a significant number of investors use ChatGPT in ways that influence their trading decisions and market outcomes. Future research can investigate the mechanisms underlying these GenAI effects and the potential risks of using GenAI for trading.
That is from a new paper by Qiang Cheng, Pengkai Lin, and Yue Zhao. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
My excellent Conversation with Nate Silver
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Nate dive into expected utility theory and random Nash equilibria in poker, whether Silver’s tell-reading abilities transfer to real-world situations like NBA games, why academic writing has disappointed him, his move from atheism to agnosticism, the meta-rationality of risk-taking, electoral systems and their flaws, 2028 presidential candidates, why he thinks superforecasters will continue to outperform AI for the next decade, why more athletes haven’t come out as gay, redesigning the NBA, what mentors he needs now, the cultural and psychological peculiarities of Bay area intellectual communities, why Canada can’t win a Stanley Cup, the politics of immigration in Europe and America, what he’ll work on next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: If you think about the Manifold types in terms of the framework in your book, how they think about risk — is there a common feature that they’re more risk-averse, or that they worry more? Is there a common feature that they like the idea that they hold some kind of secret knowledge that other people do not have? How do you classify them? They’re just high in openness, or what is it?
SILVER: They’re high in openness to experience. I think they’re very high in conscientiousness.
COWEN: Are they? I don’t know.
SILVER: Some of them are. Some of them are, yes.
COWEN: I think of them as high variance in conscientiousness, rather than high in it.
[laughter]
SILVER: The EAs and the rationalists are more high variance, I think. There can be a certain type of gullibility is one problem. I think, obviously, EA took a lot of hits for Sam Bankman-Fried, but if anything, they probably should have taken more reputational damage. That was really bad, and there were a lot of signs of it, including his interviews with you and other people like that. It contrasts with poker players who have similar phenotypes but are much more suspicious and much more street smart.
Also, the Bay Area is weird. I feel like the West Coast is diverging more from the rest of the country.
COWEN: I agree.
SILVER: It’s like a long way away. Just the mannerisms are different. You go to a small thing. You go to a house party in the Bay Area. There may not be very much wine, for example. In New York, if the host isn’t drinking, then it’d be considered sacrilege not to have plenty of booze at a party. Little things like that, little cultural norms. You go to Seattle — it feels like Canada to me almost, and so these things are diverging more.
COWEN: Why is belief in doom correlated with practice of polyamory? And I think it is.
SILVER: If you ask Aella, I guess, she might say, if we’re all going to die or go to whatever singularity there is, we might as well have fun in the meantime. There’s some of that kind of hedonism. Although in general, it’s not a super hedonistic movement.
COWEN: It seems too economistic to me. Even I, the economist — I don’t feel people think that economistically. There’s more likely some psychological predisposition toward both views.
SILVER: I guess you could argue that society would be better organized in a more polyamorous relationship. People do it implicitly in a lot of ways anyway, including in the LGBTQ [laughs] community, which has different attitudes toward it potentially. and if there’s not as much childbearing, that can have an effect, potentially. I think it’s like they are not being constrained by their own society thing that is taken very seriously in that group. There’s enough disconnectedness and aloofness where they’re able to play it out in practice more.
That creeps a little bit into Silicon Valley too, which can be much more whimsical and fanciful than the Wall Street types I know, for example.
Recommended. Here is my 2024 episode with Nate, here is my 2016 episode with him.
Wednesday assorted links
My talent podcast with Yonatan Ben Shimon
Free the Patient: A Competitive-Federalism Fix for Telemedicine
During the pandemic, many restrictions on telemedicine were lifted, making it far easier for physicians to treat patients across state lines. That window has largely closed. Today, unless a doctor is separately licensed in a patient’s state—or the states have a formal agreement—remote care is often illegal. So if you live in Virginia and want a second opinion from a Mayo Clinic physician in Florida, you may have to fly to Florida, unless that Florida physician happens to hold a Virginia license.
The standard framing says this is a problem of physician licensing. That leads directly to calls for interstate compacts or federalizing medical licensure. Mutual recognition is good. Driver’s licenses are issued by states but are valid in every state. No one complains that Florida’s regime endangers Virginians. But mutual recognition or federal licensing is not the only solution nor the only way to think about this issue.
The real issue isn’t who licenses doctors. It’s that patients are forbidden from choosing a licensed doctor in another state. We can keep state-level licensing, but free the patient. Let any American consult any physician licensed in any state. That’s competitive federalism—no compacts, no federal agency, just patient choice.
A close parallel comes from credit markets. After Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha (1978), host states could no longer block their residents from using credit cards issued by national banks chartered elsewhere. A Virginian can legally borrow on a South Dakota credit card at South Dakota’s rates. Nothing changed about South Dakota’s licensing; what changed was the prohibition on choice.
Consider Justice Brennan’s argument in this case:
“Minnesota residents were always free to visit Nebraska and receive loans in that state.” It hadn’t been suggested that Minnesota’s laws would apply in that instance, he added. Therefore, they shouldn’t be applied just because “the convenience of modern mail” allowed Minnesotans to get credit without having to visit Nebraska.
Exactly analogously, everyone agrees that Virginia residents are free to visit Florida and be treated by Florida physicians. No one suggests that Virginia’s laws should follow VA residents to Florida. Therefore, VA’s laws shouldn’t be applied just because the convenience of modern online tools allow Virginians to get medical advice and consultation without having to visit Florida.
In short, patients should be allowed to choose physicians as easily as borrowers choose banks.
David Beckworth on stablecoins and stability
A key reason for the global financial cycle, as outlined by Hélène Rey, is that many firms and financial institutions in developing countries borrow heavily in U.S. dollars while their revenues, assets, and cash flows are denominated in local currency. When the Fed tightens policy, the dollar appreciates, global financial conditions tighten, and these firms suddenly find themselves squeezed by rising dollar debt burdens and falling asset values. This balance sheet shock forces cutbacks and retrenchment. This is one of the key channels through which U.S. monetary policy spills over globally.
But what Rashad Ahmed noted in our dicussion is that if households and firms begin holding dollar assets via stablecoins—in addition to borrowing in dollars—they begin to build a natural hedge on their balance sheets. A stronger dollar no longer only increases liabilities; it also raises the value of their dollar assets, helping to offset the shock. In effect, stablecoins can act as a decentralized balance sheet stabilizer, muting one of the very mechanisms that drives global financial volatility.
Here is the full post, featuring also a podcast on the topic.
*Saving Can-Do*
The author is Philip K. Howard and the subtitle is How to Revive the Spirit of America. The book is short, to the point, in the “abundance + state capacity” genre. Excerpt, noting I will not double indent:
“Three major changes are needed to restore the authority to achieve results: a new legal framework, a new institution that can inspire trust in ongoing decisions, and a special commission to design the details of these changes.
New legal framework defining official authority.
Here’s a sketch of what a new infrastructure decision-making framework might look like:
- Separate agencies should be designated as decision-makers for each category of infrastructure. The head of that agency should have authority to approve permits. For federal approvals, all decisions should be subject to White House oversight. For projects with national or reigonal significance, federal decisions should preempty state and local approvals.
- Fifty years of accumulated mandates from multiple agencies should be restated as public goals that can be balanced against other public goals….a recodification commission is needed to reframe thousands of pages of detailed regulatory prescriptions into codes that are goal-oriented and honor public tradeoffs. But unti this canhappen, Congress should authoritze the executive brranch to approve permits “notwithstanding provisions of law to the contrary” — provided the executive branch identifies the relevanto provisions and provides a short statement of why the approvals are in the public interest.
- Processes should be mainly tools for transparency and should be understood by courts as general principles reviewed for abuse of discretion, not as rules requiring strict compliance. NEPA has been effectively rewritten by judicial fitat, so it should be amended to return to its original goals — to provide enviromental transparency, public comment, and a political judgment.
- The jurisdiction of courts must be sharply limited. Lawsuits should be allowed foro approvals that transgress boundaries of executive responsbility, not inadequate review of process, unless these are so deficient as to be arbitrary.
Changing law is always politicall difficult, but the second challenge is perhaps even harder: creating new institutions that can inspire trust.”
TC again: All worth a ponder.
Are consumers hostile to high-falutin’ claims?
We find that decreases in Michelin stars improve consumer review ratings…The analysis of review content further shows that a loss in Michelin stars leads consumers to become less focused on value and become less demanding regarding service.
Here is the paper. Has implications for online life, GPT-5 reviews, and much more. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.