Does the O-Ring model hold for AIs?
Let’s say you have a production process, and the AIs involved operate at IQ = 160, and the humans operate at IQ = 120. The O-Ring model, as you may know, predicts you end up with a productivity akin to IQ = 120. The model, in short, says a production process is no better than its weakest link.
More concretely, it could be the case that the superior insights of the smarter AIs are lost on the people they need to work with. Or overall reliability is lowered by the humans in the production chain. This latter problem is especially important when there is complementarity in the production function, namely that each part has to work well for the whole to work. Many safety problems have that structure.
The overall productivity may end up at a somewhat higher level than IQ = 120, if only because the AIs will work long hours very cheaply. Still, the quality of the final product may be closer to IQ = 120 than you might have wished.
This is another reason why I think AI productivity will spread in the world only slowly.
Sometimes when I read AI commentators I feel they are imagining production processes of AIs only. Eventually, but I do not see that state of affairs as coming anytime soon, if only for legal and regulatory reasons.
Furthermore, those AIs might have some other shortcomings, IQ aside. And an O-Ring logic could apply to those qualities as well, even within the circle of AIs themselves. So if say Claude and the o1 model “work together,” you might end up with the worst of both worlds rather than the best.
The anti-tourism movement continues into winter season
It’s well past the August holiday peak, but anger against over-tourism in Spain is spilling into the off-season, as holiday-makers continue to seek winter sun.
On Sunday locals in the Basque city of San Sebastian plan to take to the streets under the banner: “We are in danger; degrow tourism!”
And in November anti-tourism protesters will gather in Seville.
Thousands turned out last Sunday in the Canary Islands, so the problem is clearly not going away.
This year appears to have marked a watershed for attitudes to tourism in Spain and many other parts of Europe, as the post-Covid travel boom has seen the industry equal and often surpass records set before the pandemic.
Spain is expected to receive more than 90 million foreign visitors by the end of the year. The consultancy firm Braintrust estimates that the number of arrivals will rise to 115 million by 2040, well ahead of the current world leader, France.
Here is the full story.
Saturday assorted links
1. Samuel Siskind, Awake, he is a 17-year-old composer. And Les Aunties, female vocalists from Chad.
3. Emory University invests in Bitcoin.
4. We can terraform the American West. By Casey Handmer, I am a big fan of this approach and think it is far more promising than Mars exploration.
5. Alan Heston has passed away, RIP.
6. Treasure hunters compensated for unearthed coins, supply is elastic edition.
Ethiopia fact of the day
More than 6.1 million malaria cases, and 1,038 deaths, have been recorded in the country this year through the end of September, compared with 4.5 million cases, and 469 deaths, for all of 2023. Worse, cases are likely to soar far higher in the next couple of months because peak malaria season, driven by seasonal rains, begins in September and runs through the end of the year.
“We’re backsliding so fast — we’ve gone back a decade,” said Fitsum Tadesse, the lead scientist overseeing the malaria program at the Armauer Hansen Research Institute in Addis Ababa, the capital of the country.
Here is more from the NYT.
The uneven effects of AI on the American economy
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
To see how this is likely to play out, start with a distinction between sectors in which it is relatively easy to go out of business, and sectors in which it is not. Most firms selling computer programming services, for example, do not typically have guaranteed customers or revenue, at least for long. Employees have to deliver, or they and their company will be replaced. The same is true of most media companies: If they lose readers or customers, their revenue disappears. There is also relatively free entry into the sector in the US, due to the First Amendment.
Another set of institutions goes out of business only slowly, if at all. If a major state university does a poor job educating its students, for example, enrollment may decline. But the institution is still likely to be there for decades more. Or if a nonprofit group does a poor job pursuing its mission, donors may not learn of its failings for many years, while previous donors may pass away and include the charity in their wills. The point is, it can take a long time for all the money to dry up.
Which leads me to a prediction: Companies and institutions in the more fluid and competitive sectors of the economy will face heavy pressure to adopt AI. Those not in such sectors, will not.
It is debatable how much of the US economy falls into each category, and of course it is a matter of degree. But significant parts of government, education, health care and the nonprofit sector can go out of business very slowly or not at all. That is a large part of the US economy — large enough to slow down AI adoption and economic growth.
As AI progresses, the parts of the economy with rapid exit and free entry will change quickly.
Recommended, read the whole thing.
What happened to football’s concussion crisis?
Here is a very good New York piece by Reeves Wiedeman, here is the excerpt from yours truly:
When I reached out to Tyler Cowen, he said that his prognostication of football’s death had been off in part because he misread people’s concern for their health and the health of others. “COVID changed my mind on this,” he told me in an email. “A lot of people simply will do foolish stuff, such as not vaccinating, even when their lives may be on the line.”
And:
Youth football participation steadily decreased for more than a decade after news about CTE started to break, but it is on the rise again. Roughly a million boys still play high-school football — twice the number that play either basketball or soccer — and it remains possible in much of the country to sign up your 5-year old to be a linebacker. Most surveys of parents find that they understand there are risks but that they also don’t want to keep their kids from playing.
And:
Fans, it seems, have chosen to believe the NFL has largely done what it can. “They addressed the majority of the ethical issues — the stuff that made them look bad — and now suddenly the story is ‘It’s just sad,’” Nowinski said. “What people are missing is that football has gotten more ethical, but it’s not necessarily safer.”
Worth a ponder.
Friday assorted links
1. Goldfish crackers are changing, but only for a limited period of time.
2. The rise and decline of the secretary.
3. Not every economist would agree. Even fewer would frame it as such, even if they had some sympathies in that direction.
4. Canadian backlash on immigration.
6. The America First Policy Institute (NYT).
7. Charlie Goetz has passed away.
8. Works in Progress looking for a full-time, U.S.-based editor.
Science and politics podcast
From the Institute for Progress, here is the link, the participants were Caleb Watney, Dylan Matthews, Alexander Berger, and myself. Excerpt:
Tyler Cowen: I would stress just how decentralized science funding is in the United States. The public universities are run at the state level. We have tax incentives for donations where you have to give to a nonprofit, but there’s otherwise very little control over what counts as a viable nonprofit.
One specific issue that I think has become quite large is how much we run our universities through an overhead system. On federal grants and many other kinds of grants, an overhead is charged. The overhead rates are very high, and well above what the actual marginal overhead costs.
You might think that’s a crazy system, and in some ways it is crazy. It means there’s intense pressure on professors to bring in contracts, regardless of the quality of the work. That’s clearly a major negative. Everyone complains about this.
But the hidden upside is that when universities fund themselves through overhead, there’s a kind of indirect free speech privilege because they can spend the overhead how they want. Now, I actually think they are violating the implicit social contract right now by spending the overhead poorly. But for a long while, this was why our system worked well. You had very indirect federal appropriations: some parts of which went to science, other parts of which went to education. It was done on a free speech basis.
But like many good systems, it doesn’t last forever. It gets abused. If we try to clean up the mess — which now in my view clearly is a mess — well, I’m afraid we’ll get a system where Congress or someone else is trying to dictate all the time how the funds actually should be allocated.
That’s a question I’ve thought through a good amount: how or whether we should fix the overhead system? I feel we’ve somehow painted ourselves into a corner where there is no good political way out in any direction. But I think you’ll find case by case that the specifics are really going to matter.
Dylan Matthews: Let’s get into some of the specifics. Do you have an example of the overhead system breaking down that is motivating for you here?
Tyler Cowen: Well, universities are spending more and more of their surplus on staff and facilities — on ends that even if you think they’re defensible in some deep sense like “Oh, we need this building,” it’s about the university. It’s about what leads to long run donations, but it’s seen as a violation of public trust.
The money is neither being spent on possibly useful research, nor educating students. The backlash against universities is huge, most of all in Florida, Texas, and North Carolina. It seems to me that where we are at isn’t stable. How we fund science through universities is, in some ways, collapsing in bad ways. The complaints are often justified, but odds are that we’ll end up with something worse.
Recommended, interesting throughout.
Scott Alexander on the Progress Studies conference
Here is one excerpt:
Over-regulation was the enemy at many presentations, but this wasn’t a libertarian conference. Everyone agreed that safety, quality, the environment, etc, were important and should be regulated for. They just thought existing regulations were colossally stupid, so much so that they made everything worse including safety, the environment, etc. With enough political will, it would be easy to draft regulations that improved innovation, price, safety, the environment, and everything else.
For example, consider supersonic flight. Supersonic aircraft create “sonic booms”, minor explosions that rattle windows and disturb people underneath their path. Annoyed with these booms, Congress banned supersonic flight over land in 1973. Now we’ve invented better aircraft whose booms are barely noticeable, or not noticeable at all. But because Congress banned supersonic flight – rather than sonic booms themselves – we’re stuck with normal boring 6-hour coast-to-coast flights. If aircraft progress had continued at the same rate it was going before the supersonic ban, we’d be up to 2,500 mph now (coast-to-coast in ~2 hours). Can Congress change the regulation so it bans booms and not speed? Yes, but Congress is busy, and doing it through the FAA and other agencies would take 10-15 years of environmental impact reports.
Or consider solar power. The average large solar project is delayed 5-10 years by bureaucracy. Part of the problem is NEPA, the infamous environmental protection law saying that anyone can sue any project for any reason if they object on environmental grounds. If a fossil fuel company worries about a competition from solar, they can sue upcoming solar plants on the grounds that some ants might get crushed beneath the solar panels; even in the best-case where the solar company fights and wins, they’ve suffered years of delay and lost millions of dollars. Meanwhile, fossil fuel companies have it easier; they’ve had good lobbyists for decades, and accrued a nice collection of formal and informal NEPA exemptions.
Even if a solar project survives court challenges, it has to get connected to the grid. This poses its own layer of bureaucracy and potential pitfalls.
Do read the whole thing. And congratulations to Jason Crawford and Heike Larson for pulling off this event.
Risers and Fallers, mostly Fallers
Here is a fun post by Arnold Kling on which thinkers have kept name recognition and also influence. Excerpt:
Sociology (Erving Goffman, Talcott Parsons, Robert Nisbet, Charles Murray, Matt Granovetter, Robert Trivers, E.O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould)
Is there not a good case to be made that we are living in Erving Goffman’s world? I think he coined the term “impression management,” and certainly with the advent of social media that is now a big part of our lives. But he is a Faller. Probably if you would read him now, you would dismiss him as offering Blinding Glimpses of the Obvious. Parsons and Nisbet are also Fallers.
Murray is still polarizing, but much lesser known than he was in the 20th century. So he is a Faller, but too much of one.
Granovetter is a Riser, no? Social networks are a big deal now, and he is known for his work on those.
I put the sociobiology controversialists in the sociology category, since the public doesn’t care about insects or peacocks. I would say that Gould’s crusade against evolutionary biology failed, so he seems to be somewhat of a Faller. Dawkins and Trivers seem like Risers, but Wilson was much more well known, and controversial, in his prime.
Keynes, Tolkien, and Rand are among the risers (sometimes relatively speaking), so what does that tell us about the current world?
Thursday assorted links
1. First robot painting to auction at Sotheby’s.
2. A Large Language Model for Interpreting Longitudinal Medical Records. Twitter summary here.
3. Practical suggestions for federal action on housing affordability.
4. Pseudoerasmus.
5. Are drivers an especially right-wing group of people?
6. Might Argentina have to default? (FT)
Quantifying the Super-Villains
There is a new paper on this topic:
We investigate the effects of substantial Medicare price reductions in the medicaldevice industry, which amounted to a 61% decrease over 10 years for certain devicetypes. Analyzing over 20 years of administrative and proprietary data, we find theseprice cuts led to a 25% decline in new product introductions and a 75% decrease inpatent filings, indicating significant reductions in innovation activity. Manufacturersdecreased market entry and increased outsourcing to foreign producers, associatedwith higher rates of product defects. Our calculations suggest the value of lost inno-vation may fully offset the direct cost savings from the price cuts. We propose thatbetter-targeted pricing reforms could mitigate these negative effects. These findingsunderscore the need to balance cost containment with incentives for innovation andquality in policy design.
By Yunan Ji and Parker Rogers. Here is a summary tweet storm. Via Sam Hammond.
Metascience podcast on science and safety
From the Institute for Progress. There are four of us, namely Dylan Matthews, Matt Clancy, and Jacob Trefethen as well. There is a transcript, and here is one very brief excerpt:
Tyler Cowen: I see the longer run risks of economic growth as primarily centered around warfare. There is lots of literature on the Industrial Revolution. People were displaced. Some parts of the country did worse. Those are a bit overstated.
But the more productive power you have, you can quite easily – and almost always do – have more destructive power. The next time there’s a major war, which could be many decades later, more people will be killed, there’ll be higher risks, more political disorder. That’s the other end of the balance sheet. Now, you always hope that the next time we go through this we’ll do a better job. We all hope that, but I don’t know.
And:
Tyler Cowen: But the puzzle is why we don’t have more terror attacks than we do, right? You could imagine people dumping basic poisons into the reservoir or showing up at suburban shopping malls with submachine guns, but it really doesn’t happen much. I’m not sure what the binding constraint is, but since I don’t think it’s science, that’s one factor that makes me more optimistic than many other people in this area.
Dylan Matthews: I’m curious what people’s theories are, since I often think of things that seem like they would have a lot of potential for terrorist attacks. I don’t Google them because after Edward Snowden, that doesn’t seem safe.
I live in DC, and I keep seeing large groups of very powerful people. I ask myself, “Why does everyone feel so safe? Why, given the current state of things, do we not see much more of this?” Tyler, you said you didn’t know what the binding constraint was. Jacob, do you have a theory about what the binding constraint is?
Jacob Trefethen: I don’t think I have a theory that explains the basis.
Tyler Cowen: Management would be mine. For instance, it’d be weird if the greatest risk of GPT models was that they helped terrorists have better management, just giving them basic management tips like those you would get out of a very cheap best-selling management book. That’s my best guess.
I would note that this was recorded some while ago, and on some of the AI safety issues I would put things differently now. Maybe some of that is having changed my mind, but most of all I simply would present the points in a very different context.
Gossip phrased with concern provides advantages in female intrasexual competition
Although many women report being victimized by gossip, fewer report spreading negative gossip. Female gossipers might be unaware they are gossiping if they disclose such statements out of concern for targets. Four studies (N = 1709) investigated whether women believe their gossip is motivated by concern and whether expressing concern for targets insulates female gossipers against social costs, while simultaneously impairing targets’ reputations. Study 1 examined sex differences in gossip motivations. Compared to men, women endorsed stronger concern than harm motivations, especially when gossiping about other women, suggesting these motivations characterize female intrasexual gossip. In Study 2, female gossipers who phrased their negative gossip with concern (versus maliciously or neutrally) were evaluated as more trustworthy and desirable as social and romantic partners. Study 3 replicated the favorable evaluations of concerned female gossipers. Female participants especially disliked malicious female gossipers, suggesting professions of concern might help to avoid women’s scorn. Male participants reported lower romantic interest in female gossip targets when they learned concern (versus malicious or no) gossip, suggesting concerned gossip can harm female targets’ romantic prospects. Study 4 revealed these patterns extend to face-to-face interactions. A female gossiper was preferred as a social partner when she phrased her gossip with concern versus maliciously. Moreover, concerned gossip harmed perceptions of the female target as effectively as malicious gossip. Altogether, findings suggest that negative gossip delivered with concern effectively harms female targets’ reputations, while also protecting gossipers’ reputations, indicating a viable strategy in female intrasexual competition.
That is from a recent paper by Reynolds, Vaner, and Baumeister. Via a loyal MR reader.
Wednesday assorted links
1. The latest @pmarca gambit. Crypto + AI. And a Brian Armstrong offer, take it!
2. Where did all that Millennial wealth come from so suddenly?
3. Anthropic’s new computer use capabilities. And further observations on that.
4. The perverse consequences of tuition-free medical school (Atlantic).
5. New James Boyle book on AI and the future of personhood, open access version.
6. OpenAI hires chief economist (NYT).