Results for “age of em”
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*Timefulness: How Thinking Like a Geologer Can Save the World*

Still more incredible is the fact that one person almost single-handedly created the first maps of two-thirds of the planet yet is unknown to the average citizen of Earth (while Amerigo Vespucci, whose cartographic credentials are suspect, has two continents named for him).  The unsung mapmaker Marie Tharp, who earned a master’s degree in geology from the University of Michigan, worked briefly for an oil company, and then in 1948 became a drafter for a new oceanographic project led by Maurice Ewing at Columbia University.  For years, Ewing’s all-male team of graduate students collected sonar soundings of the ocean floor while Tharp laboriously transformed the linear strings of depth readings into three-dimensional topography.

Here is the Wikipedia page for Marie Tharp.  Here is a biography of Marie Tharp, which I just ordered.  Timefulness is by Marcia Bjornerud and you can order it here.

Saturday assorted links

1. Engineering Philosophy podcast with me, by Jeffrey Meyerson.

2. “Empörung über geplanten Umzug von Bratwurstmuseum auf früheres KZ-Gelände.”  Die Kultur that is Thüringen.

3. Are female presidents less popular?

4. French organ master Jean Guillou passes away (NYT).

5. Forbes covers Pioneer and Daniel Gross.

6. For Ayn Rand’s birthday, a redux of my old post on whether she is important.

7. Muslims in Bengal vs. in Punjab.

A MimbleWimble Explainer

TechnologyReview: In July 2016, someone using the name Tom Elvis Jedusor (the real name of Lord Voldemort, the main villain in the Harry Potter universe, in the French edition) posted a link to a text file in a chat room frequented by Bitcoin researchers. Voldemort’s document described MimbleWimble, a blockchain system that would hide the identifying information associated with Bitcoin transactions.

…The person who started Grin [one of the first new currencies built on a blockchain that implements MimbleWimble] is also pseudonymous, going by the name Ignotus Peverell (the original owner of Harry’s invisibility cloak), and has never been seen. Peverell recently used a text-to-speech program to address attendees at a Grin conference.

So to sum up, Grin is a new currency on the MimbleWimble blockchain imagined by Lord Voldemort and implemented by the invisible Ignotus Peverell.

…Eric Meltzer, an investor for crypto-focused Primitive Ventures, recently estimated that $100 million of “mostly VC money” has already been invested in Grin mining operations.

New Zealand facts of the day

All of New Zealand’s major cities were rated as “seriously” or “severely” unaffordable, with a house in the least expensive city, Palmerston North, priced at five times the median income.

Mr. Pavletich, one of the report’s authors, said smaller markets like Tauranga, a coastal city on the North Island with a population of 128,000, had seen an influx of people who had left Auckland in search of more affordable housing. Average property values in Tauranga had risen to $497,000 from $304,000 in the last five years, and Demographia now rated it among the 10 least affordable cities in the world — along with famously expensive locales such as Hong Kong, San Francisco, Sydney and Vancouver, British Columbia.

People, I have been to Palmerston North (though not Tauranga, which seemed too empty and remote, now the fifth largest urban cluster in a country of 4.8 million), way back in the 1990s, and I recall a feeling of dullness above all else.  If you had asked me whether this outcome was possible, I sooner would have thought Donald Trump would be elected president.

Here is the full NYT story by Charlotte Graham-McLay.  P.s. they haven’t built enough homes.

The politics of a wealth tax

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is the end sequence:

Besides which — a fact that is getting too little notice — the U.S. already has what is in essence a wealth tax: Tax rates on capital gains are not indexed for inflation. With this nominal-based tax system in effect, it is harder to accumulate wealth over time, and the nominal-based tax erodes the real value of the asset base.

Whether or not you think this capital-gains policy is a good idea (I do not), it is striking how few Americans understand that it serves as a wealth tax. It is not marketed or proclaimed as such. And I don’t expect Republicans or Democrats to counter Warren by saying, “Don’t worry, we already have a wealth tax.” Isn’t this a sign that voters simply are not yearning for a wealth tax?

The other major form of wealth taxation in the U.S. is of course the property tax, which is paid by large numbers of Americans and used to finance local services, rather than being primarily directed against the wealthy. It is seen as a way of making local government accountable to those who vote and pay for it, not as an engine of wealth redistribution. If anything, by maintaining the quality of school districts in wealthy communities, its net distributive effects are anti-egalitarian. That system seems to be a permanent part of the American political landscape.

Finally, think about politics in the broadest possible terms. What Americans really want is for their lives, their jobs, and society in general to get better — an admittedly ill-defined but nonetheless instantly familiar concept. Americans also want their leaders to deliver such outcomes with the considerable resources already at their disposal. Is that so unreasonable?

Anyone promoting a wealth tax is in essence saying that there aren’t many ways of improving society within current resource constraints. That is a brand of pessimism which Americans voters have not often rewarded.

File under: the Twitter reactions are self-refuting.  But if you would like the opposing point of view, here is Eric Levitz.

Friday assorted links

1. “Grant abstracts that are longer than the average abstract, contain fewer common words, and are written with more verbal certainty receive more money from the NSF (approximately $372 per one-word increase).

2. Loss aversion in professional golf.

3. Women in economics, from Journal of Economic Perspectives, here, here, and here.

4. Economists in tech companies.

5. The university as sting operation.

6. “Today they’re priced at -$.05!

California Tortilla (@caltort) Tweeted:
BRR, IT’S COLD! This Thursday, warm up by paying the #windchill temperature for chips and #queso 🧀 For example, if it’s 8 degrees, the price will be 8 cents for the day. And if it’s -12 degrees, we will pay you 12 cents when ordering. Stay tuned for the price tomorrow morning! https://t.co/R1CM9aPYjHhttps://twitter.com/caltort/status/1090721328280285189?s=17

Biotech on the Blockchain?

Bloomberg: In a novel approach for the biotechnology industry, small-cap company Agenus Inc. is aiming to raise $50 million to $100 million by issuing digital securities backed by future sales of an experimental cancer drug.

The digital securities will allow investors to bet on future sales of single products and will have a limited impact on shareholders’ equity, the company said. Agenus plans to offer at least 25 million of what it calls biotech electronic security tokens, or BESTs, to certain high-net-worth individuals and institutional investors starting Feb. 15.

I find this puzzling. First, why break out one drug from the rest of the firm? Investors generally want diversification and this is the opposite. Agenus is basically saying the rest of the firm is a value suck. Second, one of the virtues of the blockchain is that it allows for easy trade but the SEC requires that to buy these securities you must be an accredited investor and as such there are typically encumbrances on transfer. Thus, putting the securities on the blockchain doesn’t lower transaction costs, the way it could for other assets.

A lot of assets will be tokenized (i.e. securitized on the blockchain) in the future so this is an area to watch but to succeed tokenization must increase diversification and reduce transaction costs and this tokenization does neither.

The Impact of the Affordable Care Act: Evidence from California’s Hospital Sector

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized the largest expansion of public health insurance in the U.S. since the mid-1960s. We exploit ACA-induced changes in the discontinuity in coverage at age 65 using a regression discontinuity based design to examine effects of the expansion on health insurance coverage, hospital use, and patient health. We then link these changes to effects on hospital finances. We show that a substantial share of the federally-funded Medicaid expansion substituted for existing locally-funded safety net programs. Despite this offset, the expansion produced a substantial increase in hospital revenue and profitability, with larger gains for government hospitals. On the benefits side, we do not detect significant improvements in patient health, although the expansion led to substantially greater hospital and emergency room use, and a reallocation of care from public to private and better-quality hospitals.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Mark Duggan, Atul Gupta, and Emilie Jackson.

Wednesday assorted links

1. Robert Wiblin podcast with Martin Gurri.  And Russ Roberts podcast with Patrick Collison.

2. Addis Ababa airport triples its size.  The article complains about amenities in the airport, but let me tell you the place has good spicy food.  And can a Dutchman patent teff?

3. The golden age of Hollywood tax avoidance.

4. Ross Douthat on the Trump doctrine (NYT).

5. Might young people be turning to classical music?

6. How color palettes affect painting prices.

My Conversation with Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama

Lots of economic history in this one, with the underlying themes of persecution and tolerance, here is the audio and video.

We talk about the evolution of anti-Semitism, how the Black Death influenced Europe, the economics and politics of volcanic eruptions, how much prejudice will come back, amateur astronomy,  Jared Diamond, cousin marriage and the origins of the West, why England was a coherent nation-state so early, the origins of the Industrial Revolution, Schindler’s List, and more.  I split the time between the two, here is one excerpt:

JOHNSON: Mark and I have done a lot of work on building datasets of Jewish persecution and Jewish expulsions at the city level and the country level in Europe over a very long period of time. And a question that I, for one, don’t fully understand is, you don’t need to actually kill all the Jews or expel them in order to extract resources from them. In fact, in some way, this is off the equilibrium path. You’re no longer in some optimal equilibrium for both the ruler and for the Jewish community.

Oftentimes, these Jewish communities would be expelled from a city, they would be invited to come back, and they would come back — in 5, 10, 15 years, sometimes even shorter. But that’s a little bit easier to understand.

In the case I gave you in England in 1290s, I think I understand a little bit about why it might have happened that way. I think it was signaling credibility in some political compact between the king and the nobles, but I’m not sure. But that’s an example of top down.

Other times, clearly, people are . . . You have, say, guilds moving against these Jewish communities. An example of this would be in 1614, when the most well-known Jewish persecution was in Frankfurt am Main. It was called the Fettmilch Massacre. Fettmilch was a baker. He was in guild, and he was upset about the terms of the political deal between the city rulers — the city council — and what the guilds were getting. One of the things that the guilds wanted were the Jews to be expelled. This was competition in some sense.

There was this bit from me:

COWEN: If the Black Death raised wages, does that mean that immigration today lowers wages?

And:

COWEN: Large volcanic eruptions earlier in history. From an economic point of view, what’s the single most interesting thing we know about them?

JOHNSON: I think what’s very interesting about the volcanic eruptions is that we are discovering more and more that they may have played a large role in political change that occurred. Joe Manning at Yale, and I believe his graduate student (Bruce M.S. Campbell) have been doing work on . . . They looked at a series of volcanic eruptions that led to the end of the pharaonic empire. That ended around 30 or 60 BC, I forget. Right around that time.

That was an empire that lasted for 300 years, but they experienced all these crop failures. And then once you look at it, you see that in Indonesia, all these major volcanic eruptions were happening in perfect timing with these crop failures that were taking place. Actually, they can tell from looking at the Nile and how much it’s flooding and things.

COWEN: Politics becomes nastier when the volcano goes off?

And from Mark Koyama:

COWEN: Why was China, as a nation or territory, so large so early in world history?

KOYAMA: Yeah, that’s a great question. There are several potential explanations, one of which is geographic. Another one would be an argument from the writing system. But I think the geography story is quite important. Jared Diamond, building on people like Eric Jones, argued that China’s geography . . .

Essentially there are two core geographic regions in China around the Yellow and Yangtze river deltas, which produced a huge amount of grain or rice. If you control those core regions, you can raise large armies. You can have a large population and dominate the subsequent regions.

Whereas, the argument is for Europe that these core regions are, perhaps, arguably more separated by geographical boundaries. The limitation of that argument on its own is that geography is static, so it doesn’t really tell you anything about the timing.

The interesting thing about China, in my view, is not just that it was once unified, or unified early. But it’s persistently unified. It reunifies. Interestingly enough, the periods of de-unification get consistently smaller. So there are always periods where it’s fragmented, like the warlord period in the early 20th century, but over time may become smaller.

Europe doesn’t seem to have that centrifugal force, so a lot of Europe is unified by the Romans, but it’s not able to come back together along those lines later.

And the argument that I put forward in an article with Tuan-Hwee Sng and Chiu Yu Ko of National University of Singapore is that it’s not just the core geographical reason. That’s part of it. But actually, the periodic threat from a nomadic steppe is another key factor.

This is geographic because China has a very sharp slope from really productive agricultural land to land which is only fit for horses, for Eurasian steppe. China could be invaded very easily from the north by these steppe nomads, whereas Europe — it was much less vulnerable to this. And that helps to explain why the Chinese state is often a northern state.

So if I can add, if you think about China today, or even China in the past, the really productive land — a lot of it’s in the quite far south, in Shanghai, Yangtze delta. But the political center of China is near Beijing, or it’s in the north. And that’s due to this political economy threat from the steppe. And it’s these periodic steppe invasions which we argue are responsible for the centralization, an almost militarized character of the Chinese state through history.

And:

COWEN: Max Weber. Overrated or underrated?

KOYAMA: Underrated.

COWEN: Why?

KOYAMA: Because most people just know the Protestant theory, and they misreport it. Whereas, actually, his most interesting stuff is on Chinese religion and ancient Judaism. And the role of —

COWEN: The history of music, right?

There is much more at the link.  I am very happy to recommend their forthcoming book Persecution and Tolerance: The Long Road to Religious Freedom.

The population explosion in the global South

Vegard Skirbekk shows that many of those who were part of Europe’s population explosion died before reaching childbearing age, which is not true in the developing world.  This means the European boom had a smaller impact on global population.  Take one of Skirbekk’s comparisons, Denmark and Guatemala.  In 1775, prior to the onset of its transition, Denmark had a population of 1 million and a population density of about twenty people per square kilometre.  In Guatemala in 1900, these numbers were about the same.  Because Denmark’s population boomed earlier, just two to three children per woman survived to adulthood during its transition.  By the time Denmark’s total fertility rate fell below 2.1 in the 1950s, its population had expanded to 5 million.  By contrast, Guatemala’s transition only began in 1900.  By the 1990s, the average Guatemalan woman was giving birth to five children who survived to childbearing age.  Today there are 15.5 million Guatemalans.  When Guatemala’s transition is complete, it is projected to have a population of about 24 million.  Its transition will have produced a population expansion five times that of Denmark.  Multiplied across many countries, this explains why the West’s share of world population dropped so rapidly after 1950.

That is all from Eric Kaufmann’s excellent Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities.

One shutdown lesson is that Americans need to save more

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

Indeed a higher savings rate is possible, and not just for the wealthy. Most Mormons in the U.S., for example, manage to tithe at least 10 percent of their incomes. This suggests it is possible to curtail one’s consumption without losing the best things in life. Mormons also tend to have especially large families, making tithing all the more difficult. If Mormons can tithe so much, is it so impossible for the rest of us, including government employees, to save more?

There is also a new “gospel of savings” in the U.S., being led by such renowned (but non-mainstream) figures as Dave Ramsey and Mr. Money Mustache. They reach millions of Americans, imploring them to strip down their consumption to essentials and to save a much higher percentage of their incomes, sometimes 20 percent or more. Ramsey wrote a column giving advice to unpaid federal workers, including “sell stuff” and to cancel Netflix.

Do read the whole thing.

The Buying Slow but Selling Fast Bias

In this clip professional money manager Ben Griffiths approvingly quotes fellow-trader Larry Williams, “If you get one thing right in your career it is to learn to be a slow buyer and a fast seller”. “If you can master that”, Griffiths continues “you will be well down the way to being a successful manager of money.” Using a huge database of 783 portfolios averaging $573 million in size and covering 4.4 million trades over 16 years, Akepanidtaworn, Di Mascio, Imas, and Schmidt show that professional money managers follow exactly this advice and it is exactly wrong.

Professional money managers do well on their “slow”, buy decisions–somewhat surprisingly, well enough to beat benchmark portfolios. It’s on their “fast”, sell decisions that money mangers significantly underperform the market. Remarkably, the authors show that on average professional money managers would have done better had the chosen what to sell randomly. Why? On their buy decisions money managers put in effort–you can tell they are putting in effort because their buy decisions cannot be explained by simple heuristics based on past returns (such as buy past winners or buy past losers). On their sell decisions, however, managers do appear to follow a heuristic of selling their big past winners or past losers. See the graph where the blue buy decisions are independent of past returns while the red sell decisions show a clear preference to sell positive or negative return outliers. The authors show that this bias reduces return (just as you would expect). When you sell fast you sell what comes to mind quickest, an availability bias, and that’s often a past winner or a past loser even if greater thought would convince you that these are not the best stocks to sell. The sell fast bias, however, is pretty easy to fix. I expect that institutional investors will induce money managers to take a second look at sell decisions, much as computer systems now ask physicians to check branded prescriptions when generics are available.

Addendum: In related news, Deep Mind’s Alpha Star trounced human players of StarCraft II, a game of imperfect information that is much more complicated than chess. Amazingly, Alpha Star made fewer actions per minute than the human players. As with GO the AI developed new long-range strategies never before seen.

Eric Kaufmann’s *Whiteshift*

The subtitle is Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities, and might this be the must-read book of the year?  It is “to the right” of my views on immigration policy, but still I found it informative, fascinating, and relevant on just about every page.  Here is the author’s opening framing:

First, why are right-wing populists doing better than left-wing ones?  Second, why did the migration crisis boost populist-right numbers sharply while the economic crisis had no overall effect?  If we stick to data, the answer is crystal clear.  Demography and culture, not economic and political developments, hold the key to understanding the populist moment.

Kaufmann, by the way, is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck in London, but hails from Canada.  As for the basics, there is this in addition:

Much of this book is concerned with the clash between a rising white tribalism and an ideology I term ‘left-modernism.’

If you wish to understand “all the stuff that is going on today,” maybe Whiteshift is the best place to start?  Kaufmann, by the way, is not a mega-pessimist and he seems to think that “broadening the category of white” will lead to a “good enough” solution for many of the Western democracies.  Still, much of this book is disturbing, especially for readers who might consider themselves to be on the left.  Most of all, he sees “whiteness” as a legitimate cultural interest, and one which, if we deny, will lead to more overt racism rather than less.

Here is Kaufmann on Brexit, brutal but I think largely correct:

…many analysts bring a political lens to their analysis which inclines them to want to tell a story about wealth and power.  Over half the country voted Leave and we can’t condemn such a large group.  So we pretend populist voters are motivated by the same things we are: economic stagnation (for fiscal conservatives) or, for left-liberals, inequality and resentment of the establishment.

Kaufmann also has strong evidence for the “immigration backlash” hypothesis, for instance:

…a higher immigrant share is a consistent predictor of higher opposition to immigration over time…in Western Europe there is a .63 correlation between projected 2030 Muslim share and the highest poll or vote share a populist-right party has achieved.

On top of all of its other virtues, Whiteshift provides the best intellectual history of the immigration debates I have seen.  It also has the best discussion of why Canada seems to be different when it comes to immigration, and I may cover that in another blog post.

Kaufmann does very much argue that the left-wing values of diversity and solidarity stand very much in conflict.  How is this for an “ouch” sentence?:

Casual observation would suggest that being black in diverse San Francisco is not necessarily better than being black in white-majority Fargo [North Dakota].

By no means am I convinced by everything in this book.  I don’t think European politics can handle systematized refugee camps in Europe itself (rather than Turkey and Lebanon), and most of all I am not sure that recognizing whiteness as a legitimate cultural concern will diminish rather than boost racism.  I wish he had said much more about gender, and how immigration and gender issues interact.

Nonetheless this book has more points of interest yet, including an original and persuasive take on residential clustering, a good analysis of racial intermarriage, and a sustained argument that avoiding the “no dominant ethnic group” approach of Guyana and Mauritius is imperative.

Strongly recommended, it is out next week, you can pre-order here.

Dalrymple on Aleppo

The history of Aleppo is terrible stuff; a long succession of massacres and sieges disappearing into the mists of Syrian pre-history. First held by the Hittites, it was captured in turn by the Philistines, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Persians (again), Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols and Ottomans, each of whom vied to outdo the carnage of their predecessors. The Assyrians were the most imaginatively sadistic: they impaled the town’s menfolk on their spears and feasted for two days while their victims groaned to a slow death.

In between invasions Aleppo was ruled by a succession of aristocratic thugs who exacted outrageous taxes and perfected ingenious ways of bankrupting their burghers.

In all the town’s history there are only two cheering anecdotes. The first tells of the Arabs who captured Aleppo by dressing up as goats and nibbling their way into the city; the second concerns Abraham, who is supposed to have milked his cow on the citadel’s summit. It is not much in ten thousand years of history, especially when the one story ends in a massacre…and the other is a legend, and untrue. It is the result of a misunderstood derivation of the town’s (Arabic) name Haleb, which comes not from the Arabic for milk (halib) but a much older word, possibly Assyrian, connected with the mechanics of child abuse.

From William Dalrymple’s In Xanadu written in 1989…things have not since improved.