Results for “markets in everything” 1878 found
How is the Russian war economy doing?
Here is a gloomy account from Vladimir Mirov:
Ruble depreciation will contribute to inflation even further, as Russia is continued to be heavily reliant on imports – this is a kind of self-sustaining spiral. I also strongly disagree with those who say that cheaper ruble is “good” for exporters and the budget. Exporters have yet to make good use of devaluing ruble – which they can’t do, because Russia is under all sorts of embargoes, and China and other Global South countries are not opening their markets to most Russian goods. As to the budget, the effect is much more complex than many consider: on one hand, budget gets more rubles from export revenues due to ruble depreciation, while minimizing ruble-nominated costs. On the other hand, though, higher inflation and costlier imports will, in my view, more than offset these budget-positive effects.
I think we have to look at the situation in a more complex way. Sharp ruble depreciation is a mere illustration of Russia’s deepening economic woes. Nearly three years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian economy is stranded. No new sustainable economic model has been found. Import substitution is not working. China is only buying our most basic commodities at heavy discounts, while keeping its market closed for other Russian goods. There’s no investment or technology coming into Russia from China and other Global South countries. Everything is dependent on state subsidies – but the government’s financial reserves are running thin. if you listen to industry and business speakers at the most recent economic fora, there’s an endless stream of begging – we won’t survive with state subsidies for this, state support for that, we haven’t got technology, haven’t got investment, haven’t got profitability, haven’t got workforce. etc. Makes one wonder – what have you got then?
There is much more at the link, bearish throughout.
A Bird Flu Pandemic Would Be One of the Most Foreseeable Catastrophes in History
Zeynep Tufekci writing in the NYTimes hits the nail on the head:
The H5N1 avian flu, having mutated its way across species, is raging out of control among the nation’s cattle, infecting roughly a third of the dairy herds in California alone. Farmworkers have so far avoided tragedy, as the virus has not yet acquired the genetic tools to spread among humans. But seasonal flu will vastly increase the chances of that outcome. As the colder weather drives us all indoors to our poorly ventilated houses and workplaces, we will be undertaking an extraordinary gamble that the nation is in no way prepared for.
All that would be more than bad enough, but we face these threats gravely hobbled by the Biden administration’s failure — one might even say refusal — to respond adequately to this disease or to prepare us for viral outbreaks that may follow.
…Devastating influenza pandemics arise throughout the ages because the virus is always looking for a way in, shape shifting to jump among species in ever novel forms. Flu viruses have a special trick: If two different types infect the same host — a farmworker with regular flu who also gets H5N1 from a cow — they can swap whole segments of their RNA, potentially creating an entirely new and deadly virus that has the ability to spread among humans. It’s likely that the 1918 influenza pandemic, for example, started as a flu virus of avian origin that passed through a pig in eastern Kansas. From there it likely infected its first human victim before circling the globe on a deadly journey that killed more people than World War I.
And that’s why it’s such a tragedy that the Biden administration didn’t — or couldn’t — do everything necessary to snuff out the U.S. dairy cattle infection when the outbreak was smaller and easier to address.
Will there be a large outbreak among humans? Probably not. But a 9% probabability of a bad event warrants more than a shrug. Bad doesn’t have to be on the scale of COVID-bad to warrant precaution. The 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, while relatively mild, infected about 61 million people in the U.S., leading to 274,000 hospitalizations, 12,400 deaths, and billions of dollars in economic costs.
H5N1 will likely pass us over—but only the weak rely on luck. Strong civilizations don’t pray for mercy from microbes; they crush them. Each new outbreak should leave us not relieved, but better armed, better trained and better prepared for nature’s next assault.
MR Podcast: Insurance!
In our new Marginal Revolution Podcast Tyler and I talk insurance, the history of insurance, the economics of insurance, the prospects for new types of insurance and more. Did you know that life insurance was once considered repugnant and was often illegal?
Tyler and I were both surprised how little good work there is on insurance. Here’s Tyler:
[Y]ou look at microeconomic theory. You feel all insurance should be a simple thing. There is risk aversion. You buy the contract. You look at the actual history. It’s very hard to make sense of it. The more I learned, I found the more questions I had. I didn’t fall into some, oh, now I understand what was happening kind of pattern. And the second is simply, I had been underrating Charles Ives. He was more than a great composer. Those are my takeaways.
Here’s one more bit:
COWEN: I want to get to the big, big question about insurance and see what you think. This is my worry. My worry is the agency problems behind insurance never have been solved.
….TABARROK: It is a peculiar market in the sense that all of your revenues come early.
COWEN: That’s right.
TABARROK: You’re selling all of this insurance, and everything is great because all of the money is coming in and your costs don’t come until much, much later. Your customers need to be convinced that you’re going to be around for a long time and are going to fulfill these implicit debts. Which is one reason insurance companies like to have big buildings with giant columns, like banks, to make them look solid. How do we guarantee that? I absolutely agree that’s a huge problem. I hate to say, but, there is a lot of insurance regulation which is precisely meant to deal with this problem.
COWEN: At the state level, you can choose the state. There’s reinsurance through Bermuda or other locales….[But] the problem is not just the company, it’s the person buying the insurance. You could have an insurance company. They advertise, we hold only T-bills and you know they’re safe. People don’t want that. It’s not what I would want. I want the riskier life insurance to get a higher return on the package.
The fact that it’s not for me, makes it really easy to spend for something that promises higher return. They don’t pay it all off, or oh, whatever, but I’ll be dead then, and you don’t think that explicitly. But your ability to monitor the true safety is maybe fairly weak. Maybe it’s efficient to have a bunch of these not pay off, and you get the higher yields on average. You don’t want full safety in most spheres of human existence. The real risk is that you die, right?
TABARROK: If anything, the insurance markets have becoming safer over time because as they get larger, law of large numbers does mean that the risk falls.
COWEN: Assets are more and more correlated over time, I would say.
TABARROK: Well, so we have reinsurance…
COWEN: It’s not that everyone’s going to die at once. The problem is the assets all go crazy at the same time. The world’s more globalized, the gains in the S&P 500 have been concentrated in seven or eight stocks lately. There’s a lot of worrying signs on the asset side, this higher correlation and the law of large numbers is working against you. Fewer publicly traded companies. A place like China is not really somewhere you’re going to be investing in. Maybe you would have thought that 15 years ago. It seems to me going in the wrong direction.
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My excellent Conversation with Nate Silver
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
In his second appearance, Nate Silver joins the show to cover the intersections of predictions, politics, and poker with Tyler. They tackle how coin flips solve status quo bias, gambling’s origins in divination, what kinds of betting Nate would ban, why he’s been limited on several of the New York sports betting sites, how game theory changed poker tournaments, whether poker players make for good employees, running and leaving FiveThirtyEight, why funky batting stances have disappeared, AI’s impact on sports analytics, the most underrated NBA statistic, Sam Bankman-Fried’s place in “the River,” the trait effective altruists need to develop, the stupidest risks Tyler and Nate would take, prediction markets, how many monumental political decisions have been done under the influence of drugs, and more.
Here is one excerpt:
COWEN: Why shouldn’t people gamble only in the positive sum game? Take the US stock market — that certainly seems to be one of them — and manufacture all the suspense you want. Learn about the companies, the CEO. Get your thrill that way and don’t do any other gambling. Why isn’t that just better for everyone?
SILVER: Look, I’m not necessarily a fan of gambling for gambling’s sake. Twice a year, I’ll be in casinos and in Las Vegas a lot. Twice a year, I’ll have a friend who is like, “Let’s just go play blackjack for an hour and have a couple of free drinks,” and things like that. But I like to make bets where I think, at least in principle, I have an edge, or at least can fool myself into thinking I have an edge.
Sometimes, with the sports stuff, you probably know deep down you’re roughly break-even or something like that. You’re doing some smart things, like looking at five different sites and finding a line that’s best, which wipes out some but not all of the house edge. But no, I’m not a huge fan of slot machines, certainly. I think they are very gnarly and addictive in various ways.
COWEN: They limit your sports betting, don’t they?
SILVER: Yes, I’ve been limited by six or seven of the nine New York retail sites.
COWEN: What’s the potential edge they think you might have?
SILVER: It’s just that. If you’re betting $2,000 on the Wizards-Hornets game the moment the line comes out on DraftKings, you’re clearly not a recreational bettor. Just the hallmarks of trying to be a winning player, meaning betting lines early because the line’s early and you don’t have price discovery yet. The early lines are often very beatable. Betting on obscure stuff like “Will this player get X number of rebounds?” or things like that. If you have a knack for — if DraftKings has a line at -3.5 and it’s -4 elsewhere, then it can be called steam chasing, where you bet before a line moves in other places. If you have injury information . . .
It’s a very weird game. One thing I hope people are more aware of is that a lot of the sites — and some are better than others — but they really don’t want winning players. Their advertising has actually changed. It used to be, they would say for Daily Fantasy Sports, which was the predecessor, “Hey, you’re a smart guy” — the ads are very cynical — “You’re a smart guy in a cubicle. Why don’t you go do all your spreadsheet stuff and actually draft this team and make a lot of money, and literally, you’ll be sleeping with supermodels in two months. You win the million-dollar prize from DraftKings.”
And:
COWEN: If we could enforce just an outright ban, what’s the cost-benefit analysis on banning all sports gambling?
SILVER: I’m more of a libertarian than a strict utilitarian, I think.
COWEN: Sure, but what’s the utilitarian price of being a libertarian?
Recommended, interesting and engaging throughout. And yes, we talk about Luka too. Here is my first 2016 CWT with Nate, full of predictions I might add, and here is Nate’s very good new book On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything.
Accelerating India’s Development
What will India look like in 2047? Combining projections of economic growth with estimates of the elasticity of outcomes with respect to growth, Karthik Muralidharan in Accelerating India’s Development reports:
Even with a strong GDP per capita growth rate of 6 per cent, projections for 2047 paint a sobering picture if we maintain our current course. While India’s infant mortality is projected to halve from 27 per 1000 births to 13 in 2047, it will still be well above China’s current rate of 8. Child stunting will only decrease from 35.5 to 25 per cent, which is only a 10.5 percentage point or 30 per cent reduction in nearly 25 years. In rural India, 16 per cent of children in Class 5 will still not be able to read at a Class 2 level, and 55 per cent of them will still not be able to do division at the Class 3 level.
Bear in mind that this is assuming an optimistic 6% growth rate in GDP per capita. Even more telling is that if growth increased to 8%, infant mortality would only fall to 10 per 1000 (instead of 13). Growth is great. It’s the single most important factor but it’s not everything. If India can double the elasticity of infant mortality with respect to growth, for example, then at the same 6% growth rate infant mortality would fall to just 6 per 1000 by 2047–that’s millions of lives saved. The big argument of Muralidharan’s Accelerating India’s Development is that India can get more development from the same level of growth by increasing the total factor productivity of the state.
There are many “big think” books on growth–Landes’ Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Acemoglu and Robinson’s The Narrow Corridor, Koyama and Rubin’s How the World Became Rich–but these books are primarily historical and descriptive. The big think books don’t tell you how to develop. Create institutions to strike “a delicate and precarious balance between state and society” isn’t much of a guide to development. Accelerating India’s Development is different.
“Accelerating” opens with two excellent chapters on the political economy of politicians and bureaucrats, outlining the constraints any reforms must navigate. It concludes with two chapters on the future, including ideas like ranked choice voting, representing its aspirations. It’s in-between the constraints and the aspirations, however, that Accelerating India’s Development is unique. I know of no other book that offers such a detailed, analytical, and comprehensive examination and evaluation of a country’s institutions and processes.
Muralidharan’s recommendations are often based on his own twenty years of research, especially in education, health and welfare, and when not based on his own research Muralidharan has read everyone and everything. Yet, he offers not a laundry list but a well-thought out, analytic, set of recommendations that are grounded on political and economic realities.
To give just one example, India’s bureaucracy is far over-paid relative to India’s GDP per capita or wages in the private sector. With wages too high, the bureaucracy is too small–a reflection of the concentrated benefits (wages to government workers), diffuse costs (delivering services to citizens) problem. Lowering wages for government workers is a non-starter but Muralidharan argues persuasively that it is possible to hire new workers from local communities at prevailing wages on renewable contracts. The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), for example, is India’s main program for delivering early childhood education. There are 1.35 million anganwadi centers (AWCs) across India and typically a single anganwadi worker is responsible for both nutrition and pre-school education but they spend most of their time on paperwork!
A simple, scalable way to improve early childhood education is to add a second worker to AWCs to focus on preschool education….In a recent study, my co-authors and I found that adding an extra, locally hired, early-childhood care and education facilitators to anganwadis in Tamil Nadu doubled daily preschool instructional time…we found large gains in students’ maths, language and executive function skills. We also found a significant reduction in child stunting and malnutrition…We estimate the social return on this investment was around thirteen times the cost….the ECCE facilitators typically had only a Class 10 or Class 12 qualification and received only one week of training, and were still highly effective.
The example illustrates Muralidharan’s methods. First, the recommendation is based on a large, credible, multi-year study run in India with the cooperation of the government of Tamil Nadu. Second, the study is chosen for the book because it fits Muralidharan’s larger analysis of India’s problems, India has too few government workers which leads to high potential returns, yet the workers are paid too much so these returns are fiscally unachievable. But hiring more workers on the margin, at India’s-prevailing wages, is feasible. India has lots of modestly-educated workers so the program can scale–this is not a study about adding AI-driven computers to Delhi schools under the management of IIT trained educators, a program which would be subject to the heroes aren’t replicable problem. The program is also politically feasible because it leaves rents in place and by hiring lots of workers, even at low wages, it generates its own political support. Finally, note that India’s ICDS is the largest early childhood development program in the world so improving it has the potential to make millions of lives better. Which is why I have called Muralidharan the most important economist in the world.
One of the reasons state capacity in India is so low is premature load bearing. Imagine if the 19th-century U.S. government had attempted to handle everything today’s U.S. government does—this is the situation in India. When State Capacity/Tasks < 1, what should be done? In premature imitation, Rajagopalan and I advocate for reducing Tasks–an idea best represented by Ed Glaeser’s quip that “A country that cannot provide clean water for its citizens should not be in the business of regulating film dialogue.” Accelerating India’s Development focuses on increasing State Capacity but without being anti-market. In fact, Muralidharan proposes making the state more effective by leveraging markets more extensively.
Indian policy should place a very high priority on expanding the supply of high-quality service providers, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sector.
Hence, Muraldiharan wants to build on India’s remarkably vibrant private schools and private health care with ideas like vouchers and independent ratings. Free to choose but free to choose in an information-rich environment. My own inclinations would be to push markets and also infrastructure more–we still need to get to that 6% growth! But I have few quibbles with what is in the book.
Accelerating India’s Development is an exceptionally rich and insightful book. Its comprehensive analysis and innovative recommendations make it an invaluable resource. I will undoubtedly reference it in future discussions and writings. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding and improving life in the world’s largest democracy.
The Sea Change on Crypto-Regulation
In the last few weeks there has been a sea change in crypto regulation:
1. Bitcoin spot ETFs were approved–reluctantly, after a 3-judge Federal Appeals court ruled unanimously that the SEC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously–but nevertheless opening Bitcoin holdings to institutional investors. Case in point, The State of Wisconsin bought Bitcoin ETFs for its pension fund.
2. In a very unusual move, SAB 121, was overturned by the House and then, even more surprisingly, overturned by the Senate including the votes of many Democrats. < href=”https://www.sec.gov/oca/staff-accounting-bulletin-121″>SAB 121 is an SEC staff accounting bulletin (not law but guidance) that said to banks if you hold crypto for your customers, i.e. a custody service, you must account for it on your balance sheet. This guidance does not apply to custody of any other asset. Essentially, SAB 121 made it prohibitive for banks to offer custody services for crypto because that service would then impact all kinds of risk and asset regulations on the bank. Aside from singling out crypto, the SEC is not a regulator of banks so this seemed like a regulatory overreach.
President Biden said he will veto but that is no longer certain. It wasn’t just crypto lobbying against SAB 121 but traditional banks. The banks point to the approval of Bitcoin ETFs saying, quite logically, why can’t we custody these ETFs the way we do every other ETF? Senate Majority leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., sometimes called Wall Street’s man in Washington, voted in favor of nullifying SAB 121. Schumer can read the room.
3. The House voted to ban the Fed from establishing a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
4. The House approved a wide-ranging bill to (finally!) establish regulations for digital assets markets. The vote was 279-136 in favor with many Democrats crossing party lines to support it.
5. After saying nothing for months, usually a bad sign, the SEC approved Ethereum spot ETFs. On the surface, this might have seemed logically inevitable given the approval of Bitcoin spot ETFs but many people thought the SEC would do everything it could to find daylight between Bitcoin and ETH. Instead, it tacitly acknowledged that ETH is a commodity and not a security.
Why is this happening? I see three main factors at play. First, crypto is becoming integrated with traditional finance. As the big banks get involved, the politics around crypto are shifting. Second, crypto is becoming normalized. Ironically, the prosecution of Sam Bankman-Fried, Changpeng Zhao and manipulators like Avraham Eisenberg may have convinced some U.S. regulators that crypto doesn’t have to be destroyed, it can be tamed. Nakamoto might not be pleased but realistically this was the only option to move forward. Eventually, everyone wants to pay their mortgage. Third, Trump’s strong endorsement of crypto has alarmed the Biden administration. Most political issues are firmly divided along party lines, but crypto remains an open issue. With millions of crypto owners in the United States, a significant number are highly motivated to vote their wallets. Biden doesn’t want to give the crypto issue to Trump.
None of this means we are entering crypto Nirvana but as far as regulation is concerned a lot has changed in just a matter of weeks.
Full Disclosure: I am an advisor to several firms in the crypto space including MultiversX, Bluechip and 0L.
Will Japan have a financial crisis anytime soon?
The odds are against this, and most market prices are well-behaved, noting that the yen was hitting 160 to the dollar. More importantly, Japanese stocks have bounced back over the last two years, over the same time period that the yen has been weakening. That is one marker that this is a needed adjustment, rather than a pending collapse. Noah has a good post on the whole topic. Here are a few related observations:
1. When it comes to a mature, functional economy, do not bet on a financial crisis. Such crises are the exceptions. Furthermore, financial crises, by their very nature, are nearly impossible to predict in economies with functioning financial markets. If the prediction were a good one, the crisis already would be here.
2. That said, crises do occur, and economies can have hidden sources of leverage. The 1990s Asian financial crisis was not obvious in advance, and throughout South Korea had a strong long-run fiscal position, due to growing export potential. So talking about this is not a waste of time.
3. The real question is what Japan will do with all of its government debt, combined with a shrinking population. Note that the debt to gdp ratio is sometimes estimated at 260%, though much of this (half?) is held by the Bank of Japan. That said, I am not sure the relevance of the BOJ-held debt should be dismissed entirely. It still means the Bank is less solvent, and whether debt monetization/money printing is an automatic way to overcome that dilemma I consider in #4. Institutional barriers still do matter somewhat.
4. Japanese short-term interest rates are again very close to zero. So it is hard to inflate the debt away by an asset swap, as the “new money” might simply be saved and prove irrelevant. It is true that the Japanese central bank could try to credibly promise to keep inflating the actual paper currency until price inflation went up. But that kind of inflation is hard to predict and control, so perhaps such a promise would be a) not credible, and b) unwise. “We’re going to goose up the printing presses (literally, not metaphorically) until price inflation breaks double digits!” does not do wonders for a country’s credibility, fiscal or otherwise.
4b. It is hard to raise real interest rates, because the long-term fiscal position of the government is so difficult.
5. Japan as a whole has a very strong external position and foreign asset portfolio. Nonetheless the extent to which any of that can help Japan address its long-term solvency problem is an open question. Is the Japanese treasury going to start confiscating the Toyota plant in Kentucky?
In this regard I am somewhat less sanguine than are many of the optimists. A falling yen redistributes wealth from the Japanese consumers who buy imported food (directly), and energy (indirectly), and to Japanese MNEs holding dollars. But how much do one-time boosts in “corporate stock solvency” protect against longer-run growth unsustainabilities? I would not bet the house on that one.
6. Similarly, I am not so impressed by the strong dollar holdings of the Bank of Japan. In times of currency crisis, such reserves can be burned through quickly, as evidenced by South Korea right before the 1990s Asian financial crisis. Let’s say your total government debt is about $9 trillion, and the BOJ holds a trillion in USD. That is a nice cushion, but it is not going to save the day, especially since Japanese government debt will accumulate further with unfavorable demographics.
7. If you think about the political economy of the status quo, it is a bit worse than is being recognized. Inducing “austerity” through the exchange rate movement means that the redistribution from citizens goes to Japanese corporations, rather than to the government coffers, to pay off or retire debt. That makes tax hikes all the harder later on. You might rather have had the direct government austerity now in lieu of the exchange rate adjustment. How good a political message is the following?: “We know you’ve been hammered by higher prices for imported energy and food, but don’t worry, we’re going to take care of everything with a big tax hike.”
8. When push comes to shove, do markets believe that the Japanese government could see through a big tax hike? With the tax take currently at about 34% of gdp, well below western European levels, I’m still going to say yes. And if markets believe such a tax hike is possible, perhaps it is not anytime soon required. That is a core reason why I would bet against a financial crisis here.
9. Perhaps the true wild card is China, and the risk of contagion, no matter in which direction the contagion might run. Who really knows what is going on in the Chinese economy right now? I certainly don’t. It would however be a nightmare scenario if the world’s #2 and #3 economies, at the same time, had major financial troubles, including those of capital outflow.
Redux, my CWT with SBF
I won’t indent:
COWEN: I have some crypto questions for you. Is there, in fact, any way to coherently regulate stablecoins? I see what the proposals say: It’s all about capital requirements, deposit insurance, treat it as a bank account, like a new kind of money market fund. Can that possibly work? Doesn’t it end up having to be applied to all of crypto, all payments companies, PayPal, whatever else? What’s really there that they can do?
BANKMAN-FRIED: That’s a really interesting question. First of all, I will say, I think there is something that does work compared to the current environment, but I’ll get to your point — it’s actually a good one. If you just said, “Look, all stablecoins have to be fully backed by the dollar and have to have audits to confirm that they are in a bank account,” that would get a pretty safe product that was well understood, well regulated, and frankly would be, from a product perspective, just as good as current stablecoins. That’s what all the stablecoins are doing today.
It’s a mess because there’s no clear regulatory framework for them to fit into and to have oversight of that. So, part of my answer there is, basically, yes, I think that framework would solve the current problems that people have in a pretty clean way. But you have a good point there, which is, how about PayPal? There are all these things that we don’t call stablecoins right now, that we call something else.
COWEN: PayPal promises me a dollar, and they give it to me. I’m happy, right?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Exactly. In fact, a lot of these look a lot like stablecoins when you drill into it. When you really dig into it, what is the difference between PayPal and USDC? I guess there’s some differences, but I think there are more similarities than there are differences, to be honest. What does that imply for PayPal? You can just say, whatever it implies, stablecoin is not PayPal — it’s how it is.
I think there would be a big improvement over the current world, where it’s the same thing but without regulatory oversight and with a lot of random drama because of this. But I do think that it gets to this question of, “Wait, but banks are allowed to rehypothecate dollars. Banks are allowed to do all manner of wacky things with their deposits.” Are stablecoin companies allowed to? If not, is it obvious they shouldn’t be allowed to? And how should that be governed and regulated?
Maybe the answer is, whatever: The banks will do that on their behalf, the banks where they hold their assets, and then pay them interest for the right to do that — although, of course, right now banks aren’t actually paying interest, really . . .
COWEN: Not to me. Also, how stable does a stablecoin have to be to be regulated as such? If there’s any regulatory definition, won’t a lot of people just camp their crypto assets to be just slightly more volatile than wherever the line is drawn, or you’d just end up regulating all of crypto? How does that work?
BANKMAN-FRIED: This could go in a few ways. Is your thought that people will attempt to get just barely into the regulatory system or just barely out of it?
COWEN: Maybe both, but a lot of people will go out of it. So I’ll issue something. I’ll call it a “not stablecoin,” but de facto, it will be very stable. But also, “Oh, it’s just sort of an accident. Oh, who knows what the markets going to do today?” It’s just stable for decades. How do you regulate that?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Oh, that’s a really good question. Of course, what it gets you is this question of, what if a stablecoin didn’t promise to be a stablecoin? Is it bad that it’s backed by the dollar? Does it somehow make it worse from a regulatory perspective? Why is it being held to a higher standard?
COWEN: Exactly.
BANKMAN-FRIED: I do think there’s a little bit of an answer here, although I also think that this is getting at another point, which is, you could reasonably say, “Look, are consumers doing what they’re doing with their eyes wide open?” If there’s sufficient disclosures and transparency, shouldn’t people be allowed to use stablecoins with some risk in them?
I think that’d be a reasonable thing to think, but if you put that aside for a second, you say, “No, absolutely not.” Here’s one difference between that and the stablecoin, which I think is relevant, is that a stablecoin is not just stable in one direction. It’s stable in both directions. In particular, if you’re an investor, and you buy a stablecoin, you have downside risk but not upside. If somehow the stablecoin company makes money, you’re probably not going to get any of that, but if it loses money, somehow, you’re probably on the hook for that.
So, there is something a little asymmetric going on here for the consumer. I think it wouldn’t be crazy from that perspective to think that there should be some protection here and that maybe there should be regulation if consumers are only given one side of exposure, but I don’t think that’s obviously true. I think you’re making a decent point.
COWEN: Now, if we look at DeFi, there are some forms of obvious, explicit leverage, like people borrow money to participate in the system. But those aside, I’ve learned over my life, if you look at any system, any institution, typically there are forms of hidden implicit leverage in those institutions. Might be good, might be bad, but it’s there, and in a sense, you don’t understand the institution until you understand where’s the implicit leverage in this game. In DeFi, where is the implicit leverage? Is it rehypothecation, or where is it? What is it?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Ignoring the explicit leverage of borrow-lending protocols —
COWEN: Yes, which is easy to see, right?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Which is easy to see, yes. So, what happened in 2008? What caused the collapse in a lot of things? That’s sort of a dumb question, but one of the things that led to this is that no one knew how much leverage there was, really, in the system. As you said, there’s always implicit leverage, and in this case, it was all of these bespoke OTC swaps between banks that basically didn’t get reported anywhere. In fact, those got rehypothecated again and again and again. No one was keeping track of the total notional fees. It was impossible to — they weren’t public.
One thing you could do is look for a similar thing in crypto. You could look for OTC transactions. You could look for OTC swaps that live on. You could look at OTC borrow-lending. Those are in crypto. Are they in DeFi? It’s sort of ambiguous — they touch all areas of the crypto ecosystem.
But that’s an area where I think there’s some dubiously accounted-for leverage. I think that’s one answer to that question. Where else is there leverage that sort of is implicit? Rehypothecation sometimes, although in DeFi, because it’s all on-chain, it has to be pretty explicit if it’s going to be rehypothecated, but you’re not . . .
COWEN: But it’s hard to see, right? If you traced everything, you could find it, but no one’s actually watching it. Or are they?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Well, they’re halfheartedly watching it maybe, is how I’d put it, which is not great. Maybe full-heartedly watching it. I could imagine arguing for people full-heartedly watching it, and that would be a reasonable thing for them to be arguing for. In particular, if someone releases a protocol, there’s a question of, well, is that protocol rehypothecating? You just look at the code and see if it can rehypothecate, right?
In general, people actually often do know whether each protocol individually can rehypothecate, which is a separate question from whether they, as a group, can or whether they are or something. But in fact, most of these aren’t. Most DeFi protocols are not doing things beyond what they literally say they’re doing, and so the amount of leverage they introduce into the system mostly is what they say they are.
But here are some hidden things. First of all, you take one leverage thing, you put in another leverage thing, so DAI. DAI is an algorithmic stablecoin. Like other algorithmic stablecoins, it is not perfectly stable. It’s not perfectly stable because it’s not backed by the US dollar. It’s backed by crypto assets that could have price movements. It’s very overcollateralized. DAI can then be used as collateral on some borrow-lending protocols in crypto. That’s one form of rehypothecation in DeFi markets that you can trace through. It is, in theory, public, but it’s not super easy, necessarily, to trace through.
COWEN: Now, for mathematical finance, as you know, we at least pretend we can rationally price equities and bonds. People started with CAPM. It’s much more complicated than that now. But based on similar kinds of ideas — ultimately arbitrage, right? — if you think of crypto assets, do we even have a pretense that we have a rational theory of how they’re priced?
BANKMAN-FRIED: With a few of them, not with most. In particular, let’s talk about Dogecoin for a second, which I think is the purest of a type of coin, of the meme coin. I think the whole thing with Dogecoin is that it does away with that pretense. There is no sense in which any reasonable person could look at Dogecoin and be like, “Yes, discounted cash flow.” I think that there’s something bizarre and wacky and dangerous, but also powerful about that, about getting rid of the pretense.
I think that’s one example of a place where there is no pretense anymore that there is any real sense of how do you price this thing other than supply and demand, like memes versus — I don’t know — anti-memes? I think that more generally, though, that’s happened to a lot of assets. It’s just less explicit in a lot of them.
What is Elon Musk’s greatest product ever, or what’s his most successful product ever? I don’t think it’s an electric car. I don’t think it’s a rocket ship. I think one product of his has outperformed all of his other products in demand, and that’s TSLA, the ticker. That is his masterpiece. How is that priced? I don’t know, it’s worth Tesla. It’s a product people want, Tesla stock.
COWEN: But the prevalence of memes, Dogecoin, your point about Musk — which I would all accept — does that then make you go back and revisit how everything else is priced? The stuff that was supposed to be more rational in the first place — is that actually now quite general, and you’ve seen it through crypto? Or not?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Absolutely. It absolutely forces you to go back and say, “Well, okay, that’s how cryptocurrencies are priced. Is it really just crypto that’s priced that way?” Or maybe, are there other asset classes that may claim to have some pricing, or purport to, or people may often assume it does, but which in practice is not exactly that? I think the answer to that is a pretty straightforward yes.
It’s a pretty straightforward answer that you look at Tesla, you look at a lot of stocks right now, you think about what determines their market cap — the discounted cash flow? Yeah, sort of, that plays a role in it. That’s 30 percent of the answer. It’s when we look at the meme stocks and the meme coins that we feel like we can see the answer for ourselves for the first time, but it was always there in the other stocks as well, and social media has been amplifying this all over the place.
COWEN: Is this a new account of how your background as a gamer with memes has made you the appropriate person for pricing and arbitrage in crypto?
BANKMAN-FRIED: Yeah, there’s probably some truth to that. [laughs]
Here is the full dialogue.
Why so much drug use in the United States?
That is a question from a loyal reader, and he does not mean pharmaceuticals rather illegal drugs. I can see a few hypotheses:
1. Americans consume more of almost everything. Including health care. We are simply a nation of consumption, for longstanding cultural reasons and supported by our higher wealth and our ability to save through human capital and rising asset prices, thus enabling more spending. So we are going to spend more on illegal drugs too. In fact illegal behavior with the prescription drugs themselves is one of the fastest-growing drug problems in the United States.
1b. Americans also take way more legal prescription drugs than their counterparts in other countries. Under one estimate, Americans consume 80 percent of the world’s painkillers.
2. Corporate interests, including Big Pharma, are in America relatively strong, including politically strong, and relatively prominent in advertising. Some of those companies have worked hard to accustom you to the idea that you ought to “take something.”
3. America has borders with Mexico and the Caribbean, which makes it harder to keep out illegal drugs.
4. Price! (Duh) Somewhere recently I saw price estimates for cocaine in various countries (might anyone recall the link?). It was cheaper in the United States than elsewhere. We are a large market, have economies of scale, and are great at retail and marketing. Many other things are cheaper here to, which in turn brings us back to #1.
5. Compared to say Germany or Denmark, there are fewer people “looking out for you.” Americans are more likely to move away from family and friends, and more likely to live “in the middle of nowhere.” We are lonelier, maybe not at the median but on the left hand side of the distribution. Our demand for therapists is pretty high too.
6. Student life can be more competitive in the United States than in Canada or Europe, and that may induce many Americans teens to use amphetamines, which are more popular in America.
7. America is in general a high-variance country, due to large market size, ethnic diversity, relatively open and competitive markets, and the looseness of many of its social norms. A higher-variance country will have many more people clustered in the unsatisfactory behavior patterns.
7b. Along related lines, American teens are more frequent users of illegal drugs than are European teens. But American teens also have amongst the lowest rates of smoking and drinking. So some of us are very disciplined, others much less so, again reflecting the high variance of both inputs and outcomes.
8. Americans are keener to try new products, relative to most of the rest of the world. Along these lines, we have relatively big problems with the newer opioids and synthetic drugs. Heroin historically has often been a bigger problem in Europe, and that is hardly a new drug. In era of new drugs, as we currently are living in, this will nudge the balance toward Americans doing drugs more.
9. American teens have more disposal income to spend, compared say to European teens. This may come from either jobs or from parental allowances. Furthermore, the European youth, especially in Italy, are more likely to live at home for many more years. That probably limits illegal drug use. Americans are more likely to go away for college to “a campus,” and “a dorm,” a horrible institution if you think about it for too long.
What else?
Saturday assorted links
1. An obvious but still underrated point: “we find parenting attitudes strongly predict paternalistic policy attitudes—more than ideology, party identity, or any other measured demographic variables…”
2. DSM-V now makes the bestseller list (London Times). “Ralph Lewis, a psychiatrist, wrote recently in Psychology Today of a “trend toward increased self-diagnoses” that was “particularly pronounced among young people” and predated the pandemic.”
3. Roubini in the FT: “Before this week’s ECB meeting, executive board member Isabel Schnabel stated that the bank’s willingness to deal with fragmentation risk had “no limits”. This echoed former ECB president Mario Draghi’s game-changing “whatever it takes” statement of 2012. But Schnabel also hinted at the need for policy conditionality when it comes to offering support. Given the current volatility of financial markets, one can expect they will further test the ECB’s ability to protect the currency union by backstopping fragile eurozone states.”
4. ESPN: “The Warriors are 5-1 to win the 2023 NBA title at Caesars Sportsbook, followed closely by the Brooklyn Nets and Boston Celtics, who are each listed at 6-1. The Milwaukee Bucks (15-2), Phoenix Suns (8-1) and LA Clippers (8-1) round out the teams with single-digit odds entering the offseason.” Nets #2???
5. “So intense was the EU’s involvement in Northern Ireland – a part of a non-member state, remember – that it has imposed 4,000 new laws there over the past 18 months.” Link here, where are the fans of democracy on this issue? (NB: I don’t agree with everything in this piece, should go without saying but periodic reminders can be useful.)
6. Further evidence (from sex lives) on the current human capital deficit (FT).
Further jobs with your voice
I’m a re-recording mixer and sound mixer so I can confirm that the people who provide such specialized voice talents are amazing. There are also many more varieties: one of the films I mixed featured a dog as a lead character. There are two people who are known for their abilities to mimic dogs and make between 5 and 10 thousand dollars a day.
There are also the amazing people who work in “loop groups”. They provide the background chatter that you hear in any scene with more than a few people. Whether it’s a scene with a few people in an office, or a large group in a restaurant, they have to provide talking without actually saying any identifiable words. It’s particularly important as many countries, especially Germany, will block any films that have identifiable English in the sound files. These background vocals are known as “walla”.
That is from Michael Farnan in the comments.
What Operation Warp Speed Did, Didn’t and Can’t Do
Operation Warp Speed was a tremendous success and one that I was pleased to support from the beginning. Many people, however, are concluding from the success of OWS that big Federal funding can solve many other problems at the same speed and scale and that is incorrect.
First, it’s important to understand that OWS did not create any scientific innovations or discoveries. The innovative mRNA vaccines are rightly lauded but all of the key scientific ideas behind mRNA as a delivery mechanism long predate Operation Warp Speed. The scientific advances were the result of many decades of work, some of it supported by university and government funding and also a significant fraction by large private investments in firms such as Moderna and BioNTech. It was BioNTech recall that hired Katalin Karikó (and many other mRNA researchers) when she couldn’t get university or government funding. Since OWS created no new scientific breakthroughs there isn’t much to learn from OWS about the efficacy of large scale programs for that purpose.
Second, it’s important to understand that we got lucky. OWS made smart bets and the portfolio paid off but it could have failed. Indeed, some OWS bets did fail including the Sanofi and Glaxo-Smith-Klein vaccine and the at-best modest success of Novavax. Many other vaccines which we didn’t invest in but could have invested in also failed. To be clear, my work with Kremer et al. showed that these bets and more were worth taking but one should not underestimate the probability of failure even when lots of money is spent.
So what did Operation Warp Speed do? There were four key parts to the plan 1) an advance market commitment to buy lots of doses of approved vaccines–this was important because in past pandemics vaccines had entered development and then the disease had disappeared leaving the firms holding the bag with little to show for their investment 2) the lifting of FDA regulations to allow for accelerated clinical trials, for example, phase 3 trials could start before phase 2 trials were fully complete 3) government investment in large clinical trials–clinical trials are the most expensive part of the development process and by funding the trials generously, the trials could be made large which meant that they could be quick 4) government investment in capacity, building factories not just for the vaccines but also for the needles, vials and so forth, even before any of the vaccines were approved–thus capacity was ready to go. All of these steps shaved months, even years, off the deployment timeline.
The key factor about each of these parts of the plan was that we were mostly dealing with known quantities that the government scaled. It’s known how to run clinical trials, it’s known how to produce vials and needles. The mRNA factories were more difficult but scaling problems are more easily solved with investment than are invention problems. It’s also known how to lift government regulations and speed the bureaucracy. That is, no one doubts that lifting regulations and speeding bureaucracy is within our production possibilities frontier.
It also cannot be underestimated that OWS funded people who were already extremely motivated. The Pfizer and Moderna staff put in near super-human effort–many of them felt this was the key moment of their life and they stepped up to their moment. OWS threw gasoline on fire–don’t expect the same in a more normal situation.
Another factor that people forget is that with vaccines we had a very unusual situation where the entire economy was dependent on a single sector–a macroeconomic O-ring. As a result, the social returns to producing vaccines were easily a hundred times (or more) greater than any potential vaccine profits. Thus, by accelerating vaccine production, OWS could generate tremendous returns. Most of the time, markets internalize externalities imperfectly but reasonably well which means that even if you accelerate something good the total returns aren’t so astronomical that you can’t overspend or spend poorly. Governments can spend too much as well as too little so most of the time you have to factor in the waste of overspending even when the spending is valuable–that problem didn’t really apply to OWS.
So summarizing what do we need for another OWS? 1) Known science–scaling not discovering, 2) Lifting of regulations 3) Big externalities, 4) Pre-existing motivation. Putting aside an Armageddon like scenario in which we have to stop an asteroid, one possibility is insulating the electrical grid to protect North America from a Carrington event, a geomagnetic storm caused by solar eruptions. (Here is a good Kurzgesagt video.) Does protecting the grid meet our conditions? 1) Protecting the electrical grid is a known problem whose solution does not require new science 2) protecting the grid requires lifting and harmonizing regulations as the grid is national/inter-national but the regulations are often local, 3) The social returns to power far exceed the revenues from power so there are big externalities. Indeed, companies could have protected the grid already (and have done so to some extent) but they are under-incentivized. (The grid is aging so insulating the gird could also have many side benefits.) 4) Pre-existing motivation. Not much. Can’t have everything.
I think it’s also notable that big pandemics and solar storms seem to occur about once in every one hundred years–just often enough to be dangerous and yet not so often that we are well prepared.
Thus, while I think that enthusiasm for an “OWS for X” is overblown, there are cases–protecting the grid is only one possibility–where smart investments could pay big returns but they must be chosen carefully in light of all the required conditions for success.
Explaining NFTs
Writing at the Harvard Business Review, Steve Kaczynski Scott Duke Kominers have en excellent explanation of how NFTs create value–the best I have read.
NFTs don’t just provide a kind of digital “deed.” Because blockchains are programmable, it’s possible to endow NFTs with features that enable them to expand their purpose over time, or even to provide direct utility to their holders. In other words, NFTs can do things — or let their owners do things — in both digital spaces and the physical world.
In this sense, NFTs can function like membership cards or tickets, providing access to events, exclusive merchandise, and special discounts — as well as serving as digital keys to online spaces where holders can engage with each other. Moreover, because the blockchain is public, it’s even possible to send additional products directly to anyone who owns a given token. All of this gives NFT holders value over and above simple ownership — and provides creators with a vector to build a highly engaged community around their brands.
It’s not uncommon to see creators organize in-person meetups for their NFT holders, as many did at the recent NFT NYC conference. In other cases, having a specific NFT in your online wallet might be necessary in order to gain access to an online game, chat room, or merchandise store. And creator teams sometimes grant additional tokens to their NFT holders in ways that expand the product ecosystem: owners of a particular goat NFT, for example, were recently able to claim a free baby goat NFT that gives benefits beyond the original token; holders of a particular bear NFT, meanwhile, just received honey.
Thus owning an NFT effectively makes you an investor, a member of a club, a brand shareholder, and a participant in a loyalty program all at once. At the same time, NFTs’ programmability supports new business and profit models — for example, NFTs have enabled a new type of royalty contract, whereby each time a work is resold, a share of the transaction goes back to the original creator.
This all means that NFT-based markets can emerge and gain traction quickly, especially relative to other crypto products. This is both because the NFTs themselves have standalone value — you might buy an art NFT simply because you like it — and because NFTs just need to establish value among a community of potential owners (which can be relatively small), whereas cryptocurrencies need wide acceptance in order to become useful as a store of value and/or medium of exchange.
Read the whole thing. Kaczynski Kominers also offer good advice to firms and organizations interested in creating NFTs. It remains true, of course, that there is a lot of foolish and wasted spending in the space–that’s typical of most new asset classes where the rush to get into the space throws up a lot of noise making the signal more difficult to detect.
Addendum: Don’t forget you can buy the Marginal Revolution NFT! You will be purchasing from the new owner (we sold it) but I believe we get a royalty which also illustrates an advantage of the NFT model.
Image: SupDucks6484.
Why the lab leak theory matters
Here is Ross Douthat at the NYT:
…there’s a pretty big difference between a world where the Chinese regime can say, We weren’t responsible for Covid but we crushed the virus and the West did not, because we’re strong and they’re decadent, and a world where this was basically their Chernobyl except their incompetence and cover-up sickened not just one of their own cities but also the entire globe.
The latter scenario would also open a debate about how the United States should try to enforce international scientific research safeguards, or how we should operate in a world where they can’t be reasonably enforced.
I agree, and would add one point about why this matters so much. “Our wet market was low quality and poorly governed” is a story consistent with the Chinese elites not being entirely at fault. Wet markets, after all, are a kind of atavism, and China knows the country is going to evolve away from them over time. They represent the old order. You can think of the CCP as both building infrastructure and moving the country’s food markets into modernity (that’s infrastructure too, isn’t it?), albeit with lags. “We waited too long to get rid of the wet markets” is bad, but if anything suggests the CCP should have done all the more to revolutionize and modernize China. In contrast, the story of “our government-run research labs are low quality and poorly governed”…that seems to place the blame entirely on the shoulders of the CCP and also on its technocratic, modernizing tendencies. Under that account, the CCP spread something that “the earlier China” did not, and that strikes strongly at the heart of CCP legitimacy. Keep in mind how much the Chinese apply a historical perspective to everything.
A number of you have asked me what I think of the lab leak hypothesis. A few months ago I placed the chance of it at 20-30%, as a number of private correspondents can attest. Currently I am up to 50-60%.
How would actual alien spacecraft influence asset prices?
Primarily as an exercise, I thought about that question for a while, and here is part of my answer in a Bloomberg column:
If you know you are being watched, what exactly do you wish to buy more of? I would bet on defense stocks to rise, whether or not there is much we can do to defend ourselves against this alien presence.
Of course investors could not be sure that these alien drone probes will merely observe us forever. They might be observing with the purpose of rendering judgment. If they are offended by our militaristic tendencies, the quality of our TV shows and our inability to adopt the cosmopolitan values of “Star Trek” over the next 30 years, maybe they will zap us into oblivion. But that kind of systematic risk is hard to insure against. After such an act of obliteration, neither gold nor Bitcoin will do you any good.
My main prediction is that alien UFOs will be bullish for the dollar. The U.S. government seems most closely connected to the UFO phenomenon, for whatever reason. (Maybe its pilots fly more sallies and record better data?) In any case, if alien UFOs become more likely, an informational advantage would accrue to the federal government. And the dollar already has a tradition as a safe haven currency…
Most of us would get used to the idea of alien presence without quite believing in it. As The New Yorker makes clear, many Americans believed in alien-origin UFOs after World War II, as did many American policymakers. It might have spurred greater interest in the space program and science fiction, but it didn’t affect most aspects of American life, nor did it seem to drive markets.
Never underestimate the capacity of markets, like humans, to adapt. Just as many of the strangest parts of our lives can come to seem normal, so Wall Street can find a way to do business with just about anybody — aliens included.
I do full, literally mean everything stated in the column. But the piece also has (at least) two esoteric meanings — can you guess what they are?